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ABSTRACT
Like many developing countries, Thailand has adopted 
industrialisation policies to achieve growth objectives.
At the same time direct foreign investment has been 
encouraged to bring additions to the local stock of capital, 
management and technology. From the early 1970s, there has 
been growing disillusion about the benefits that a host 
country can gain from direct foreign investment. Direct 
foreign investment has been attacked as bringing 
inappropriate technology, inhibiting local learning and 
perpetuating technological dependence.
This thesis has taken Thai manufacturing industry as 
a case study. The study argues that modern large-scale 
manufacturing industries must be viewed as skills rather 
than employment generators. Employment objectives could not 
be achieved in any significant degree under the current 
strategy regardless of channels for technology transfer. Part 
I examines the role of direct foreign investment and other
channels for transferring technology to Thailand, the cost 
of importing technology through direct foreign investment 
and technology contracts, and the relative efficiency of 
these channels in exploiting imported technology. Evidence 
suggests that the weakness of local technical and industrial 
expertise often makes direct foreign investment, especially 
joint venture arrangements, the preferred form of 
transferring technology although its cost in terms of 
royalty payments is slightly higher. Local sectors turned 
out to be relatively efficient in bargaining for technology. 
Other invisible costs and factors which affect the pricing 
of technology are also discussed.
The positive spill-over effects of direct foreign 
investment, though they exist, are weak. This is partly 
attributable to the early stage of industrialisation of 
Thailand, the small size of Thai industries and the relative 
inefficiency of direct foreign investment in some sectors.
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Part II of the thesis examines in some detail the 
fostering of human capital and the choice of techniques in 
the textile industry. On the production side, evidence 
suggests that technology has largely been transferred. 
However, at the entrepreneurial level, the transfer has been 
inhibited by the desire (often of both local and foreign 
parties) to maximise efficiency.
It also reveals that both foreign and local textile 
firms are not significantly different in their choice of 
technology. Their choice has largely been affected by local 
factor prices which in turn are influenced by various local 
policy instruments. The relatively high productivity and 
profitability of foreign firms are attributable to their 
management rather than their machines.
While the evidence does not suggest that direct foreign 
investment per se has produced undesirable effects, more 
could be achieved by the promotion of market mechanisms and 
provision of information to local entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
After a period when, under the influence of Keynesian 
economics and especially the Domar-Harrod model, development 
economists stressed the role of capital formation in the 
development process, the past two decades have witnessed an 
increasing shift of emphasis towards the role of human 
capital and technology. The transfer of technology from 
advanced to developing economies has been considered as an 
important element in the process of development. It was not 
long before attention was drawn to direct foreign investment 
as an important mechanism for the transfer of technology. 
Apart from access to the parent companies' patented 
inventions and production techniques, subsidiaries in LDCs 
can rely upon the parent companies' pool of industrial and 
marketing experience as well as organisation skills. It is 
not surprising that direct foreign investment has been 
viewed as a speedy means of transferring technology. For 
instance, in 1967, Svennilson wrote:
... The most successful examples of the rapid 
transfer of technology are found in the activities 
of subsidiaries, which are established by the 
western firms in the underdeveloped countries. In 
such cases, often it has been possible, even in 
backward countries and within a few years, not only 
to establish a modern industry but to make it 
operate effectively, (p.179)
Until recently, this could be regarded as the 
conventional view in the literature on the transfer of 
technology. The success of the transfer was usually judged 
by how effectively the technology was utilised in the new 
environment. Since the late 1960s, the issues of technology 
transfer and of direct foreign investment as a channel for 
transferring technology have been put under closer scrutiny. 
The view that imported technology will accelerate growth has 
come under challenge. As the emphasis in thinking about
2economic development has shifted from "growth" to "equality" 
and to other social objectives, the capacity of industrial 
development to generate employment has come to be treated as 
an important criterion. This raises the question whether 
technology designed for the labour-scarce advanced countries 
is suited to labour-abundant LDCs. From this point of view, 
direct foreign investment has come into question as liable 
to transfer inappropriate technology to LDCs. There has, 
moreover, been increasing concern about the "packaged" 
nature of direct foreign investment. Direct foreign 
investment comes in a package of capital, management and 
production technology. This characteristic has allegedly 
facilitated transfer pricing and consequently "excessive" 
cost of technology. The self-contained characteristic of 
direct foreign investment is also claimed to "stunt local 
abilities" (Hirschman, 1969, pp.5-6) and perpetuate 
"technological dependence". These concerns about the 
"packaged" nature of direct foreign investment have led 
many developing countries to call for "a code of conduct on 
the transfer of technology" and "a code of conduct for 
multinational corporations", both of which have been under 
way within the United Nations framework. At the same time, 
the developing countries have been looking into the 
possibility of "unpackaging" - that is to obtain capital, 
technology and management from different sources. The 
question of how efficiently a technology is utilised has 
been superseded by the question of who utilises the imported 
technology.
This thesis studies the process of technology transfer 
in the modern large scale manufacturing industries in 
Thailand by contrasting direct foreign investment with other 
channels for transferring technology. Since 1960, 
successive governments in Thailand have actively pursued 
industrialisation by protecting the domestic market to 
encourage modern large scale manufacturing industries based 
on imported technology. As a consequence, there have been
3massive inflows of direct foreign investment, notably from 
Japan in the manufacturing industries. Between 1960 and 
1974, registered foreign capital in the "promoted" 
(government-assisted) sector amounted to 3596 million baht 
and accounted for 29 per cent of total registered new 
capital investment of all firms which were granted a 
"promoted" status. Japanese direct investment constituted 
42 per cent of total foreign investment.
Extensive foreign involvement often encounters 
nationalistic resistance. In the early 1970s, the extent 
of Japanese involvement in the Thai economy came under 
increasing criticisms from various sections of public 
opinion. As is often the case in less developing countries, 
nationalistic sentiment was most strongly expressed by 
student groups. The concern that was coming to be felt was 
illustrated in the Social Science Review, a magazine, 
radical by Thai standards. The magazine put out a special 
issue called "The Yellow Peril" which set off the anti- 
Japanese movement. In its best known feature article, the 
authors, student activists, summarised the position of 
Japanese influence on the Thai economy as follows:
... If all the Japanese cars in Thailand were taken 
away, then all the roads in the country would be 
empty. If all the Japanese radios, televisions and 
electronic and electric appliances suddenly 
disappeared from the Thai households, then all the 
households would be as silent as graves. If 
clothing with Japanese trademarks were taken away 
from the Thai people, then all the Thais would be 
naked. How completely are the Thais under Japanese 
influence! (Phatsa<j5ng and Chingchit, 1972 , p.13)
Anti-Japanese sentiment culminated in a ban on 
purchases of goods from a Japanese-owned department store. 
Demonstrations and books on the "economic monster" soon 
crowded the local market. One of the major criticisms of 
Japanese investment was the alleged failure on the part of 
the Japanese firms to foster skills in the local work force 
and to allow local staff to take part in managerial 
decisions. In the years that followed, attacks on American
4investment in extractive industries were also organised by 
the student movement. Despite such extensive public 
resentment and journalistic attacks, there have been few 
in-depth studies in this area.
The main arguments and objectives of this study can be 
summarised as follows. In the first place, I shall argue 
that the strategy of restricting trade and promoting modern 
large scale industries on the basis of imported technology 
which has been adopted to achieve growth in many developing 
countries is likely to lead to an inevitable influx of 
direct foreign investment particularly in these industries. 
This tendency will be reinforced by the dearth of human 
capital in the host countries. Consequently direct foreign 
investment becomes one of the most important means of 
importing technology. Indeed, the experience of Thailand 
is a case in point.
However, this strategy of promoting large scale 
manufacturing production based on imported technology may 
be inconsistent with the employment objective. Without any 
changes in the strategy, the discussion of "appropriate 
technology" is misplaced because, by its very nature, 
modern large scale manufacturing allows little room for 
modification into "appropriate" forms. The most useful role 
of modern large scale manufacturing industry is in 
generating skills rather than employment. Therefore, the 
contribution of direct foreign investment should be judged 
by its ability to generate or foster human capital in the 
host countries. This study is therefore concerned with the 
gain from, or the shortfalls of, foreign investment in the 
formation of domestic entrepreneurship through joint 
venture arrangement with foreign partners, and the training 
and participation of local staff in a foreign-controlled 
enterprise.
I shall further argue that promotion of modern large 
scale industry will prove an inadequate instrument for the
5employment objective regardless of the channels used for 
transferring technology. In other words, foreign and local 
firms will not behave very differently in their choice of 
techniques.
In the second place, the thesis examines purchase of 
technology through technology and know-how agreements. It 
investigates three aspects of total technology cost, viz. 
explicit (monetary) cost, the implicit or invisible costs 
(such as restrictions on export franchise, tied purchases 
etc.), and the durations of contracts. The study will 
postulate that, if strictly enforced, the implicit costs, 
through their potentially adverse effects on the economy, 
may be greater than the explicit costs. Some of these 
conditions could prevent the realisation of comparative 
advantage. Others are designed to restrict spill-over 
effects.
More specifically, this study will examine whether 
there are any differences in the price of technology to 
foreign and local firms. It is often assumed that a 
foreign subsidiary has free or cheap access to the 
technology of the parent company, while an arm's length 
deal between buyers and sellers may result in high costs 
owing to imperfect knowledge on the part of buyers. By 
contrast, it has also been alleged that since the allocation 
of cost among subsidiaries of a single foreign company is 
quite arbitrary, the cost of technology may in some cases 
be high. Moreover, if there is no time limit to payments, 
which is often the case for a subsidiary, the cost of 
technology can be very high. The thesis attempts to show 
that the pricing of technology depends also on a number of 
other factors, such as the market structure of products, the 
source of technology and so on.
Much of the information for this thesis was obtained 
by questionnaire survey and interviews with entrepreneurs, 
local employees, government officials and people involved in
6manufacturing industries in Thailand, especially the textile 
industry and their counterparts in the Japanese textile 
industry. Another substantial part was obtained from the 
Board of Investment of Thailand which gave me access to its 
1973 questionnaires and from the Bank of Thailand which 
released all information regarding technology contracts.
The study is organised as follows. The first part of 
the thesis provides an overall view of technology acquisition 
in some manufacturing industries in Thailand. The second 
part concentrates on the process of technology transfer in 
the textile industry.
The textile industry is one of the largest manufacturing 
industries in Thailand, with a great deal of foreign 
involvement. For these reasons, the industry seemed a 
logical choice for the detailed analysis of interaction 
between foreign and local entrepreneurs and of differences 
in choice of techniques between the foreign and local firms.
The study does not present an econometric model of 
technology transfer, nor is there a transfer index to 
summarise in a single figure the extent to which technology 
has been transferred, so that one could say, for example, 
that 80 per cent of the transmission of technology in the 
industry was attributable to foreign firms. The immediate 
problem with such a suggestion is that the transfer process 
involves interaction and repercussion effects both within 
and across industries. Even if one believed that the 
construction of such an index is worthwhile, one could not 
be sure how extensively the index captures the spill-over 
effects (externalities) and in face of the severe 
limitations of the available statistics, no attempt was 
made to quantify the overall intensity or effectiveness of 
transfer although some partial econometric estimations will 
be presented. The main emphasis will be on qualitative 
study of the behaviour of firms in the transfer of 
technology, in the hope that this will reveal a picture of 
successes or failures.
7The chapter outline is as follows. Chapter 2 
introduces the concepts and definitions to be used. It 
outlines the general approach of the study, reviews the 
literature and presents some empirical findings of others 
who have worked in this area.
Chapter 3 outlines the industrialisation experience and 
policies of Thailand since 1960. In particular, it describes 
government policies which affect the process of technology 
transfer. Chapter 4 discusses research methodology and 
field experience in Thailand and Japan. The definition of 
"foreign" firms used in this study is also explained.
Chapters 5 and 6, the first two chapters on empirical 
findings, provide an overall picture of the search for and 
purchases of technology in some manufacturing industries in 
Thailand. Chapter 5 examines the attempts of local 
entrepreneurs to acquire new technology and to improve 
their productivity, interaction between foreign and local 
sectors, between suppliers and customers and the relative 
efficiency of foreign and local firms in utilising imported 
technology. Chapter 6 looks into the terms and conditions 
of technology contracts and the monetary cost.
The remainder of the thesis discusses the process of 
technology transfer in the Thai textile industry. Chapter 7 
traces changes in the pattern of transfer of technology in 
the industry. Chapter 8 explains the parties involved in 
the formation of joint ventures and evaluates the extent to 
which local entrepreneurs, executives and local staff gain 
from participation in joint ventures.
Chapters 9 and 10 concentrate on the production aspects 
of technology transfer. Chapter 9 outlines recent 
technological progress in the textile industry and its 
implications for skill and employment creation in the LDCs. 
Chapter 10 investigates choice of techniques by local and 
foreign firms. The last chapter, Chapter 11, summarises the 
conclusions and presents some policy recommendations.
CHAPTER 2
Major Issues in the Study of Technology Transfer
In 1962, Denison's controversial findings on the 
sources of economic growth brought "advance in knowledge" 
into the foreground of economic debates. Since then, 
technical progress has become a key element in the analysis 
of growth of modern economies. Although the causal 
relationship between growth and technical progress is still 
in doubt (Nelson, 1974), many development economists as 
well as policy makers in developing countries themselves 
have started to consider the transfer of technology from 
developed countries as an important element for growth and 
prosperity.
The first part of this chapter presents the definitions 
and concepts to be used in the following discussion. In 
particular, it discusses the concept of technology transfer 
relevant for the LDCs. The second part explores the various 
ways in which technology can be imported, implanted in a 
local work force and diffused to other productive units in 
an economy. It also contrasts the role and the efficiency 
of direct foreign investment with other channels for 
transferring technology. The last part of the chapter 
examines the major issues in the study of technology 
transfer. It suggests that the major role of large scale 
manufacturing industries should be in skill generation 
rather than employment generation. It summarises the main 
arguments of this study and presents relevant empirical 
findings by other investigators in connection with these 
issues.
2.1 Definitions and Concepts
2.1.1 Technology. The term "technology" is often 
linked with scientific and engineering knowledge which has 
been adopted and adapted for commercial use. Recently, it
9has carried a much wider connotation and has been referred 
to as the application of science to the solving of well- 
defined problems, or as knowledge about physical 
relationships systematically applied to useful purposes 
(Quinn, 1969; Hawthorne, 1971). In his study of 
technological change and economic development, Strassmann 
(1968) defined technology as referring
... not only to tools, a stockpile of utensils,
but a kind of tool using behaviour, a set of
methods for making specific goods (p.2).
For the purpose of this study which emphasises 
technology as an element in the industrialisation process, 
technology is defined in its broadest sense to mean 
knowledge or methods that are necessary to carry on or to 
improve the existing production and distribution of goods 
and services. It includes entrepreneurial expertise and 
professional know-how. A word on each of these aspects is 
in order. First, entrepreneurial expertise consists of 
knowledge which helps an entrepreneur to make the right 
decision at the right moment on what, where and how to 
invest, expand or contract. In contrast to entrepreneurs 
in earlier times whose successes and failures rested largely 
on entrepreneurial instinct and imagination, a successful 
entrepreneur who wishes to be involved in large scale 
production today needs a good knowledge of the size of risks 
involved in his project, the cost of finance, the possible 
expected returns, the source and range of available 
techniques, market prospects, and so on. In modern 
economies, prices of final products alone are no longer a 
sufficiently good signal of profitability. An entrepreneur 
need not go about collecting such information himself, but 
a good entrepreneur must be aware of the importance of such 
information in the process of decision making. When an 
entrepreneur exploits such information skilfully, he is 
considered to have entrepreneurial expertise.
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In the context of the transfer of technology, a good 
entrepreneur constantly searches for new and better sources 
of "innovations". This ability could be developed through 
education or through working with or observing more 
experienced entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurial ability in perceiving new 
"innovations" was highlighted by Schumpeter (1911, 1939,
1949). However, for Schumpeter, entrepreneurship was 
exogenous to the economic system and was determined by social 
conditions. Unlike the theory of capital and growth which 
suggests saving as the important endogenous factor in 
economic growth, Schumpeter did not offer a solution for 
overcoming entrepreneurial bottlenecks in the LDCs.
It is argued here that entrepreneurial activities are 
not only socially conditioned but can also be stimulated and 
perhaps maximised by economic incentives. The promotion of 
industrialisation is one way of stimulating entrepreneurship. 
Industrialisation creates an awareness of additional 
opportunities for traditional agricultural and handicraft 
activities to achieve improvement in material well-being, 
by exploiting surplus earnings. So long as such promotion 
is not carried to extremes which result in inefficiency in 
local production, industrialisation will encourage the 
accumulation of entrepreneurial expertise.
Secondly, professional know-how consists of managerial 
knowledge which involves corporate planning and control, an 
understanding of accounting procedures which enable the 
right assessment of the financial positions of firms to be 
made, engineering knowledge and production know-how which 
is necessary for the production process, and familiarity 
with sales and marketing technology which involves skills 
for searching out and attracting more customers.
Modern managerial knowledge is an important bottleneck 
in the LDCs. The managerial task is to ensure the smooth 
functioning of an enterprise. The larger the size of an
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enterprise, the more complicated the organisation. Managers 
will have to assign the right amount of responsibility to 
the right persons. They must devise a check and evaluation 
system and design an internal hierarchy of decision making. 
Middle management staff have to carry out the supervision 
and follow-up tasks. Modern managerial science is a totally 
new technology for the less developed countries.
Engineering and production know-how includes a wide 
range of elements such as plant layout, input and output 
specifications, plant operation, repairs and maintenance, 
quality control, research and development, and so on.
It is evident that technology is embodied in many forms: 
in human capital, physical capital and in recorded 
information. The most important form in LDCs seems to be 
that technology which is embodied in human capital. It is 
this which makes the transfer of technology difficult. To 
the extent that technology can be totally embodied in 
physical capital, the process of transferring technology is 
a relatively easy task because it is reduced to the mere 
relocation of production facilities.
There is another kind of technology which has not been 
discussed so far. It is what Helleiner (1975) has called 
consumption technology. This term refers to the use of new 
products with a high income elasticity such as household 
electric appliances (colour television) and other luxuries 
(French perfume). These products are usually associated with 
prestigious brand names. Although it is debatable whether 
consumers in developing countries should actually be deprived 
of consumption technology and should be obliged to be content 
with basic products, it is clear that governments in many 
developing countries are reluctant to allow exorbitant 
payments for the purchases of such technology or to subsidise 
the production of such products. However, consumption 
technology sometimes accompanies production technology. In
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many cases, when products have reached a mature stage, 
producers need to rely on artificial barrier to entry in the 
form of trade marks to maintain their markets.
2.1.2 Concepts of the transfer of technology. Topical 
as it is, the concept of "transfer of technology" is rarely 
clearly defined. Under the general heading of technology 
transfer, different writers seem to employ different 
concepts leading to different and sometimes conflicting 
conclusions. I shall list the four concepts which are most 
often found in the literature.
The first considers technology to be transferred when 
it is used effectively in the new environment. No attention is 
paid to the origin of inputs of production. As long as new 
technology is employed efficiently, for example even the 
whole factory is run by foreigners, technology has been 
transferred.
Under the second concept, technology is transferred 
when the local work force is able to take charge of the 
imported technology and to do so efficiently. For example, 
technology transfer occurs when local workers have acquired 
the skill to operate machines correctly, to keep to a 
meticulous maintenance schedule, to fix and repair machines; 
and local managers are able to prepare input-output 
schedules, marketing plans and so on.
According to the third concept, technology transfer 
occurs when technology spreads to other local productive 
units in the recipient economy. This can take place in a 
number of ways, for example, through active dissemination 
efforts of the initial recipient enterprises, sub-licensing 
agreements, demonstration effects, and so on.
When imported technology is fully understood by local 
workers, and when these workers begin to adapt the imported 
technology to the specific needs of the local environment, 
or to modify it for various purposes, technology is
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transferred according to the fourth concept. In the most 
successful cases, local workers may discover and develop 
new techniques on the basis of imported technology.
Capable local technicians may be able to copy machinery by 
dismantling imported equipment - an act commonly known as 
"reverse engineering".
These four concepts are not mutually exclusive. Nor 
do they necessarily occur in any sequential order. For 
instance, technology need not be efficiently utilised before 
it is leaked to outsiders. Imported technology may be 
adapted to suit local conditions before it is transmitted 
to other enterprises.
Since this study is concerned with the role of human 
capital in the development process, the relevant concept 
must involve local participation. I shall define technology 
transfer as the fostering of technology which did not 
previously exist in the local environment in such a way that 
the local work force can independently exploit and improve 
the imported technology. Since local participation is a 
necessary condition, the first concept is not relevant for 
this study. It may be more appropriate for developed 
countries where their own high level manpower can assimilate 
new technology relatively easily. The concept used in this 
study will include the second, third and fourth as long as 
there is local participation.
To avoid confusion, I shall call the first concept, 
the geographical transfer of technology; the second concept, 
the transfer of technology into the local work force; the 
third, technology transmission or diffusion; and the fourth, 
technology adaptation and development. It is important to 
use precise terms because a channel used for transfer of 
technology may, for example, be extremely efficient under 
the geographical transfer concept but may be less efficient 
in the fostering of local skills. Direct foreign investment
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is often alleged to be a case in point. Moreover, a 
technology which is easily operated by local workers, for 
example a push-button type operation, may be less amenable 
to adaptations to suit local conditions.
2.2 Channels for Technology Transfer
Technology can be diffused internationally through 
various mechanisms. Broadly speaking, there are two major 
categories of channels for the transfer. The first category 
can be termed "packaged transfer" or direct foreign 
investment whereby technology is tied to other inputs of 
production, such as capital and management. In contrast, 
in the second category "unpackaged" channels include a wide 
range of activities which can be acquired independently of 
control and ownership of the sources of suppliers.
2.2.1 Unpackaged channels for transferring technology. 
For conventional technology and products, technology is 
fairly readily transferred through published information 
such as books, journals, trade exhibitions and international 
conferences. In many instances purchases of hardware are 
accompanied by technical services. Input suppliers and 
customers of finished products sometimes grant technical 
and laboratory testing services or offer marketing assistance. 
Government research institutes are potential transferors, 
adapters and innovators of new technology. The most common 
means, however, remains training and education conducted 
either locally or overseas.
Technology can also be obtained by concluding various 
kinds of technology contracts with experienced or consultant 
firms in the developed countries. Such assistance ranges 
from feasibility studies to the actual management of 
enterprises under contracts. Turnkey arrangements whereby 
technology suppliers are responsible for all technical 
decisions as well as installation are common in LDCs. If 
technology is sufficiently simple, and is not incorporated
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in specific firms, free-lance specialists can be hired.
When certain key elements are patented, licensing agreements 
can be concluded to obtain trade secrets or established 
market goodwill. These channels may be used by themselves 
or together with one another.
2.2.2 Direct foreign investment. The special feature 
of direct foreign investment is that it offers technology 
in one package along with money capital and control. Direct 
foreign investment can take several forms viz. wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries, foreign controlled and local 
controlled joint ventures and wholly locally-owned firms.
In this study, the former two will be treated as foreign firms 
and the latter two as local firms.
Direct foreign investment can transfer technology in 
two ways. An "internal transfer" occurs when there is a 
flow of knowledge from foreign investors and experts to the 
local work force within foreign subsidiaries or foreign 
controlled joint ventures. This is what has been termed 
technology transfer into the local work force. An "external 
transfer" takes place when technology spreads from foreign 
firms to local firms either in the same or in other sectors.
Internal transfer could occur at all levels within a 
firm - through observation, through on-the-job training or 
through formal training. For instance, machine tenders 
learn operative and other industrial skills on the job. From 
working with foreign employees, local technicians and 
engineers may acquire maintenance and repair know-how; local 
staff may develop research and development ability; 
managerial and organisational skills of foreign experts may 
be implanted in local counterparts.
Johnson (1970b, p.27) and Chang (1971, p.33) argued 
that since the costs of exporting skills from advanced 
countries were high, there was a profit motive for 
multinational corporations to train local staff. Brash 
(1966, pp.122, 138) reported the despatch of Australian
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staff to American parent companies for training of 
managerial techniques. Two-year training courses in the 
parent company's factory were provided to Australian 
technicians by an American car manufacturer. Philips N.V. 
of the Netherlands provided substantial training by 
installing a small scale plant for the training of employees 
and for the solving of special problems in LDCs (Reuber 
et at. , 1973, p.202). Multinational corporations in 
Singapore also provide substantial training to the local 
work force (Chia Siow Yue, 1977, p.17).
Joint venture arrangements could also enhance 
entrepreneurial activities. They offered local 
entrepreneurs the opportunity to gain industrial experience 
with reduced capital risks. In LDCs where most businesses 
are family businesses, co-operation with foreign partners 
could introduce a new system of organisation and 
recruitments. In addition, local executives may be brought 
into contact with more diversified sources of finances and 
technology. If the joint ventures export their output, local 
businessmen's trading horizons will be broadened. Needless 
to say, such internal transfers will be made possible only 
if local employees and partners take part in the running of 
the enterprises.
External transfers occur when trained local staff or 
skilled local entrepreneurs leave foreign subsidiaries or 
joint ventures and take with them those fostered skills 
which cannot be appropriated by transferors. They may go 
to other local firms in the same industry; local joint 
venture partners may be able to start new ventures on their 
own; or they need not even remain in the same industry but 
shift to other sectors and so create a spill-over effect in 
the economy. This is in fact the process of technology 
transmission.
Through its demonstration effects, direct foreign 
investment is a speedy transmission channel which often
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helps local entrepreneurs to be aware of new domestic 
production possibilities. The existence of foreign firms 
may force local entrepreneurs in the same industry to 
increase their x-efficiency, either by adopting new 
techniques or by searching for competitive innovations. In 
the long run, all such influences based on the observation 
of and the pressure from the operation of efficient firms 
will tend to upgrade the level of technology and technical 
efficiency in the recipient countries.'*'
Foreign firms may also provide training and know-how 
to suppliers and customers. Reuber (1973, pp.203- 5) 
reported that foreign firms often found it necessary to 
train local dealers and distributors. Innovations or 
introduction of new techniques or products by foreign firms 
may force supplier firms in local industries to adopt more 
efficient techniques or conduct more effective quality 
control procedures.
However, it is also equally often asserted that 
excessive foreign control of the national economy may be 
detrimental to the development of local entrepreneurship 
and skill formation. Gonick (1970) wrote:
... Canadian capitalism and capitalists, emergent 
through much of the 19th century are now deeply 
submerged in American capitalism (p.65).
For instance if foreign firms are much more efficient and 
the size of the foreign sector continues to expand in 
anticipation of market growth, there may be little 
opportunity for technology to be transferred in the short 
run. In fact an overdose of direct foreign investment may 
kill young and inexperienced local firms instantly. Being 
more efficient, foreign firms may wipe out all local firms 
by using aggressive pricing policies or introducing new
For the explanation of the difference between technical 
efficiency and x-efficiency, see Leibenstein (1977).
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low-cost technology not available to local firms. They may 
also compete with local firms for the most talented local 
staff by offering higher wages and therefore stretching 
scarce resources rather than accumulating more human capital. 
Foreign firms may be successful in keeping the labour 
turnover rate low and thus reduce the leakage in know-how. 
Cohen (1973, p.192) found that the spill-over effect of 
training by American firms to Korean firms was minimal.
Should they be international corporations, they might post 
talented staff overseas resulting in a brain drain and local 
firms will be starved of necessary human capital.
Foreign firms may also introduce luxurious consumption 
patterns through a demonstration effect and use goods with 
a high import content and thus retard the development of 
local input industries. They may also be subject to global 
strategies of their parent companies which may not at all 
coincide with the development goals of the host countries.
However, given a situation of workable competition, 
direct foreign investment will enhance local entrepreneurship 
and skill formation. The suppression of domestic 
entrepreneurs is not so much related to direct foreign 
investment per se but is more related to the oligopolistic 
market structures with which direct foreign investment is 
often associated. Moreover, industrialisation policies 
which favour large-scale production tend to give 
multinational corporations a competitive edge over local 
firms. The larger the market and the more intense the 
competition, the more likely the local firms will be 
pressured to observe, emulate and assimilate relatively more 
efficient technology.
As far as the transfer of technology is concerned, 
there is a special problem of the case when the host country 
gains from direct foreign investment. Some economists are 
willing to admit that internal transfer of technology is a 
major contribution of direct foreign investment in the whole
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process of technology transfer (Johnson, 1970; Kojima, 1973). 
However, strictly speaking, there is no gain to the host 
country if trained local employees never leave the foreign 
firms because those firms, acting rationally and with perfect 
knowledge, will provide just sufficient training for the 
expected increase in the marginal productivity of the 
trainees to equal to the marginal cost of their training so 
that the benefits from training will be internalised.
Indeed, direct foreign investment will bring extra 
benefits to the host country only if foreign firms over­
train, that is train more workers than they need. This is 
a very possible outcome of the run-in period or, that 
period when the trained work force leave foreign firms for 
local firms (Helleiner, 1975), or, when foreign firms 
provide training in related enterprises which cannot be 
fully appropriated through the price mechanism. In short, 
the host country gains when external effects have occured. 
Caves (1974) argues that:
... The host nation's private sector does not 
benefit directly because the foreign subsidiary is 
efficient, or brings to its shores skilled 
entrepreneurship or productive knowledge. Rather its 
gains depend on spill-overs of productivity that 
occur when the multinational corporation cannot capture 
all quasi-rents due to its productive activities 
(p.176).
In this study, the externality condition is not 
required for technology to have been transferred. Such 
external effects may often take time. Moreover, it is not 
known whether or when they will take place even assuming 
that they are obvious and quantifiable. Fieldwork, 
involving point-of-time observations, may yield different 
results at different times. This is a problem with the 
study of industries which are relatively new, and this is 
often the case in LDCs. To make this problem more clear, 
suppose some fieldwork is undertaken when the competition 
from foreign firms has just eliminated inefficient local 
firms (either because of superior technology or because of
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the small size of the market) and the new foreign firms are 
successful in keeping the turnover rate low and the import 
content high. At the time of the survey, there may be no 
sign that the local industry will revive. Following the 
logic of the externality condition strictly, it might be 
concluded that direct foreign investment is a bad channel 
for transferring technology. Yet another study, undertaken 
when local entrepreneurs, tempted by the high profits 
earned by foreign firms on the basis of new technology, have 
successfully entered the industry, will come to different 
conclusions.
In fact, this is to admit that industries in LDCs may 
not be good case studies of the externality effects of 
technology transfer owing to their relatively small size and 
their short industrial experience. Yet, some research must 
be done, at least to indicate the benefits, even if they are 
only internal. The less strict approach adopted in this 
study, which does not insist that externalities be present, 
is justified on the grounds that local employees are not 
perfectly immobile between the foreign and the local 
sector, that foreign firms do not have perfect knowledge as 
to how far they should train local employees, and finally 
that the host government is free and able, if it wishes, to 
require foreign firms to divest themselves of their 
investments (with appropriate compensations). Under these 
circumstances, technology implanted and so far profitably 
used only within foreign firms could then be spread 
throughout the country - that is, internal economies could 
be converted into external economies. If there is some 
indication that these foreign firms could survive without 
foreign control and management, then it is assumed in this 
study that technology can, in principle, be transferred.
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2.3 Direct Foreign Investment as a Channel for Geographical
Transfer of Technology
Direct foreign investment can be expected to be the 
most important single means of transferring technology to 
LDCs and will be the most efficient mechanism for the 
exploitation of imported technology. This is because, on 
the supply side, it has been argued that technology suppliers 
are usually not willing to sell technology if full 
appropriation of the benefits is possible only by having 
direct control. This is especially so in technologically 
intensive industries and is less applicable to the LDCs, 
unless such technologies are deliberately encouraged by host 
governments. However, even in relatively simple industries, 
industrialisation policies in favour of large scale 
production for protected local markets often encourage 
foreign firms to invest behind tariff walls to preserve 
their markets. The large capital outlays required by these 
projects often put local entrepreneurs at a disadvantage.
On the demand side, the relative shortage of human 
capital in LDCs often limits potential transfer through 
unpackaged channels. In view of all these supply and demand 
conditions, direct foreign investment in both its original 
and modified forms (as wholly owned subsidiaries or as joint 
ventures) is likely to become the preferred form of 
geographical transfer of technology. Insufficient education 
and relative distance from the place of origin increase the 
cost of searching for the most efficient channels of 
transfer and limit local entrepreneurs' access to relatively 
inexpensive channels such as published information and 
international conferences. This problem is compounded for 
countries where western languages, in which most 
technological information is recorded, are not widely used. 
As a consequence, the cost of investment in the search for 
such unpackaged channels is likely to be high for local 
entrepreneurs in such countries. They may eventually prefer 
joint investment with a foreign firm.
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Attempts may be made to acquire technology by hiring 
foreign experts. These experts consequently act as a link 
to aid in the transfer of technology, and hence the cost of 
searching for technology to individual entrepreneurs may be 
reduced somewhat. The success of this channel of 
acquisition depends on the type of technology wanted.
Certain types of technology will not be of a type in which 
individuals can be expert. In a study of the transfer of 
technology in the petrochemical industry, Stobaugh (1971) 
reported that in some instances where private consultants 
were hired, plants closed after few years and this led him 
to the conclusion that technological know-how resides 
within the organisation of people rather than with 
individual experts.
A better solution, then, may be in the concluding of 
various kinds of technology contracts, namely, licensing 
agreements, management contracts, turnkey arrangements, and 
so on. These channels, however, presume the existence of 
functioning enterprises and entrepreneurship and, in the 
case of licensing agreements, a certain degree of technical 
knowledge. If the local absorptive capacity is low, local 
firms may have to rely on technology contracts for a 
considerable period of time and perpetual dependence on 
unpackaged channels is often not very different from direct 
foreign investment in the eyes of the host country.
Host countries may use education as a means whereby 
technology can be transferred on a large scale. The main 
weakness of this educative process is that it often takes 
a long time to produce engineering, accounting and 
managerial graduates who will still, in any case, require 
intensive on-the-job training before they can embark on 
independent industrial projects. Again, on-the-job training 
requires that functioning enterprises be in existence, and 
be preferably more efficient ones. Unfortunately, the LDCs 
do not have a large pool of such enterprises so direct 
foreign investment has to be encouraged to speed up the 
process of on-the-job training.
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Furthermore, education systems have often been 
criticised because of outdated curricula, curricula unsuited 
to the needs of the private sector, the lack of equipment 
for practice, and so on. The misconception of most people 
that education is merely a means to achieve white collar 
jobs also does not really aid the industrialisation process.
More importantly, industrial education also requires 
economies of scale. In the LDCs where industrialisation is 
a recent phenomenon and the industrial work force is small, 
formal technical education is costly to arrange. For a 
textile engineering course in a university to be worthwhile, 
it is necessary to have a minimum work force of 50,000 
workers in the industry. Education and training abroad can 
also confer technical skills but since the costs are very 
high, this can only be provided for a small number of 
people.
Given this bottleneck in human capital in the LDCs, it 
is likely that direct foreign investment will become the 
dominant means of transferring technology, especially for 
modern large scale enterprises. Though the untying of the 
foreign investment package is desirable in certain 
circumstances, it may not be successful at an early stage 
of industrialisation. The failure of the public sector in 
Sri Lanka provides an example (UNCTAD, 1975c).
The efficiency of direct foreign investment as a 
channel for geographical transfer of technology rests on the 
belief that the various advantages of foreign firms have 
over local firms more than compensate for their disadvantages 
in operating away from their home base. Among these, 
references would most often be made to the foreign firms' 
unique assets such as patented inventions (Hymer, 1960), 
organisational skill (Servan-Schreiber, 1968) , marketing 
techniques, and so on. The well-trained and experienced 
staff of foreign transnational companies are likely to get 
the new industrial projects off the ground rapidly.
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The also rementioned shortcomings of other transfer 
mechanisms should not be taken to suggest that they are 
unimportant, costly and should therefore be dispensed with. 
These arguments only point out the relative importance of 
direct foreign investment as a channel for transferring 
technology at an early stage of industrialisation. The 
unpackaged channels can be expected in due course to become 
increasingly important and may eventually become a more 
suitable and cheaper means of transfer for certain 
activities.
2.4 Major Issues in the Study of Technology Transfer
The two major concerns of technology recipient 
countries are that imported technology may not be suited to 
local factor endowments, resulting in the idleness of 
abundant resources, and that the cost of imported technology 
may be excessive. These two issues will be looked at in 
some detail.
2.4.1 Technology transfer and factor proportions. In
recent years, employment generation for the burgeoning
labour force of the LDCs has occupied an enormous proportion
2of the literature on economic development. One of the few 
points on which economists have reached agreement in the 
course of discussion is that the modern manufacturing sector 
does not come up to expectations as an employment generator 
(M. Mehta, 1970). The experience of advanced countries 
where rapidly expanding manufacturing industries were capable 
of absorbing labour released from agriculture is not, it 
seems, being repeated in many developing countries today.
The reasons for this situation are manifold. The 
import of foreign technologies from advanced economies is
For the most recent comprehensive survey of this topic, 
see Morawetz (19 74) .
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alleged to be a major contributor to the problem. Since 
technology is the application of science for certain specific 
purposes, technology created for one environment may not be 
suitable for use in a different environment. Production 
techniques developed for labour-scarce, capital-abundant 
advanced nations are unlikely to be suited to factor 
endowments in developing countries. The application of such 
technologies in the LDCs will result in the concentration 
of scarce resources in one sector while others may be 
stripped of necessary capital and a great deal of abundant 
resources, especially labour will be left idle.
It has been argued and is now widely accepted that 
resort to excessive economic stimuli in the form of tax 
concessions, overvalued exchange rates, subsidisation of 
capital investment, and so on, to encourage the production 
of import substitutes in developing countries has promoted 
the use of capital-intensive technology in capital-scarce 
developing nations (Little et al. , 1970; Mason and Sakong, 
1971; Bruton, 1973). The problem may be compounded by a 
tendency for the distribution of income in developing 
nations to lead to a consumption pattern which aggravates3an inappropriate choice of techniques.
Moreover, the technological gap between rich and poor 
nations has been widening. The use of many modern 
techniques is likely to have large labour-displacement 
effects. At the same time, population in developing nations 
is growing at an alarming rate owing to better public health 
and medical service. Low income from agricultural production 
has caused a rural-urban drift and transformed part of rural 
underemployment into urban unemployment.
Some empirical studies have shown that the redistribution 
of income in favour of low income earners will increase 
employment slightly. See Morawetz (1974) for a summary of 
findings.
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These facts have led to a call for "appropriate 
technology". This concept was succinctly defined by 
Morawetz (1974, p.517) as
... a set of techniques which makes optimum use 
of available resources in a given environment. For 
each product or process, it is the technology which 
maximises social welfare if factors and products 
are shadowed priced.
In relation to labour-abundant LDCs, the concept has become 
loosely connected with labour-intensive techniques.
The problem arises when there is a conflict between 
maximum output and employment (Stewart and Streeten, 1971). 
Supporters of employment objectives believe that if 
potential rather than current production functions are 
considered, the range of production techniques will be 
substantially widened. If sufficient research and 
development effort is invested in adapting past innovations 
and developing new ones, the conflict between maximum 
output and maximum employment can be alleviated. Moreover, 
since the social cost of unemployment - including the 
affront to human dignity - is so great, the optimum strategy 
is to select a labour-intensive product mix and relative 
labour-intensive techniques.
On the other hand, other economists argue that the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in 
manufacturing industries is narrower than commonly assumed 
(Arrow et al. , 1961; O'Herlihy, 1972) especially when skill 
constraints in LDCs are taken into account. Labour- 
intensive products which do not require inputs of scarce 
skill are believed to be quite limited and confined to 
certain traditional cottage industries and differentiated 
products with a high income elasticity of demand such as 
high fashion goods, furniture and so on. Moreover, once 
products are chosen, there is little scope for variations 
in factor proportions unless the specifications of the 
products are altered. For instance, hand woven and machine
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woven textiles belong in the same product group but, 
strictly speaking, have different specifications and are 
produced for different markets. Even in the product lines 
where there may be a fairly wide spectrum of techniques to 
be chosen, modern techniques may be important to reach 
certain specifications in international markets.
The empirical evidence for both sides of the arguments 
is inconclusive. Without entering this debate, some 
questions relating to the earlier discussion may be raised.
In the first place, it has been pointed out that urban 
unemployment and rural underemployment are the result of 
numerous factors apart from wrong choice of techniques.
Since, characteristically, manufacturing industries in the 
LDCs account for a small proportion of economic activity in 
their economies, is it not over-optimistic to expect the 
modern large-scale manufacturing industries to make a 
decisive contribution to the solution of unemployment 
problems? Is it, in fact, necessary for every technique in 
Morawetz1s set of techniques to be optimally labour- 
intensive as long as the overall balance, taking into account 
all sectors including agriculture, trade and services, is 
optimal?
Moreover, should the concept of "appropriate technology" 
be applied indiscriminately? Should the problems of 
unemployment not be considered within a macro rather than 
a micro framework? Within such a framework, different 
sectors may be allowed to play different roles using 
different techniques with different factor proportions while 
making sure that the overall balance will not leave any 
abundant resources idle.
In the second place, a strategy of industrialisation 
based on modern large-scale manufacturing and imported 
technology which is designed for growth objectives is in 
itself an inappropriate strategy for the achievement of 
employment objectives. Even if relative factor prices are
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roughly correct, such a strategy is unlikely to provide 
appropriate technologies for recipient countries for several 
reasons. First, the bulk of R & D activities are 
centralised in the activities of multinational corporations 
whose competitive edge depends on their technological lead. 
New technology, from the private point of view, is worth 
searching for or marketing only if it will be difficult to 
duplicate. But it is a characteristic feature of labour- 
intensive techniques such as those’ in agricultural 
production or simple manufacturing tools that once 
innovation has been developed it is relatively easy to copy. 
Therefore, it is unlikely to be in the interest of private 
enterprises, either foreign or local (and especially of 
multinational corporations), to invest in such R & D. If 
there is a choice between creating labour-intensive or 
capital or skill-intensive techniques, the chances are that 
the development of labour-intensive techniques will be 
retarded (Magee, 1976b). Secondly, the demand for labour- 
intensive technology of the LDCs is not sufficiently strong 
to induce economic production of such technology (Pack and 
Todaro, 1969) . Lastly, the cost of searching for 
"appropriate technology" from an "international technology 
shelf" could prove to be a considerable strain on the meagre 
capital resources of entrepreneurs in LDCs.
Given the fact of life that many LDCs have adopted an 
industrialisation strategy based on modern large-scale 
manufacturing and imported technology and that there are 
other factors which hamper the introduction of more 
appropriate technology, the focus of the discussions about 
the transfer of appropriate technology seems to have been 
rather misplaced. In other words, is it not inappropriate 
to judge large-scale manufacturing industries by the 
employment criterion when all of the market and institutional 
incentives point in a different direction? The relevant 
criterion for the judgement of the appropriateness of an
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imported technology through the private sector cannot simply 
be employment. The large-scale manufacturing industries are 
more realistically viewed as a skill generating sector.
The criterion proposed here is that the concept of 
"appropriate technology" for the modern large-scale 
manufacturing should take into account the skill 
contribution as well as employment generation. An 
appropriate technology is one, which subject to a certain 
minimum employment effect, allows the creation of relevant 
skills both within an industry and in related industries for 
future industrialisation. A fact which should be 
established before an industry is selected is whether its 
future (or expected) technological path is skill-generating 
or skill-saving. Technological progress can decrease total 
skills absolutely or substitute one type for another. An 
acceptable industry under this criterion could be either 
skilled-cum-capital or skilled labour-cum-unskilled labour 
intensive industries. Using this criterion, unlike the 
simple employment criterion, a seemingly capital-intensive 
industry would not be rejected outright if there were good 
reasons to believe that it could generate valuable skills. 
This criterion, however, rules out sophisticated skills 
which are irrelevant to any foreseeable development of the 
economy. The weights to be assigned to employment and skill 
objectives will depend on the preference of the community.
The gains from skill formation are obvious. This 
strategy will allow a higher development of skill resources 
to occur which in turn will allow for more efficient 
selection and use of current and future production 
techniques.
The original concept of appropriate technology may be 
more usefully applied in industries where the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and unskilled labour is high 
while the complementarity between unskilled labour and 
supervisory skills as well as that between capital and
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technical skills is low. In other words, there are 
industries where substituting labour for capital will not 
substantially reduce the skills which will be potentially 
created.
As against all of this, the employment objective may 
have to be pursued by a totally different strategy to which 
the governments of LDCs may need to give serious attention 
if they consider that employment creation is the overriding 
objective. The chief scope for employment generation may 
lie in non-manufacturing industries or small-scale 
manufacturing industries. Fei and Ranis (1971a) emphasised 
that where a large section of the population is primarily 
engaged in agriculture, the prerequisite to the solution of 
unemployment might lie in agricultural policies.
My argument for the promotion of skill is an ex ante 
proposition and is somewhat different from the ex post 
contention that at an early stage of industrialisation, 
relatively capital-using techniques may be more feasible 
when the gap between socially and private appropriate 
technologies is very large (Fei and Ranis, 1972). Not until 
technical skills are generated and accumulated, until 
bottlenecks in supervisory resources are broadened, and 
until entrepreneurial resources approach maturity, can 
adoption of or adaptation to labour-using techniques be 
expected. This appears to have been the experience of the 
two success stories of Asia, namely, Taiwan and Korea.
My argument should also not be considered as whole­
hearted support for the import of all technology. The 
intention has merely been to point out that market 
mechanisms are unlikely to lead to the import of 
"appropriate technology" in the original sense under the 
present strategy. An appropriate transfer of foreign 
technology according to the employment criterion relies 
heavily on the adaptation of past innovation and this could 
be done only after the "inappropriate" foreign technology
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had been imported. Otherwise past innovations must be 
rediscovered and scanned at a considerable cost. Moreover, 
considering the cost of adaptation and the inappropriateness 
of such an exercise, substantial government assistance or 
subsidies to private enterprises may be needed to induce an 
appropriate transfer and adaptation. Otherwise, the bulk 
of the appropriate transfer of technology in the original 
sense may have to be undertaken by non-profit seeking or 
governmental institutions.
2.4.1.1 Direct foreign investment and the choice of 
techniques. It has become fashionable to blame 
industrialisation policies which include protection of 
domestic markets or subsidised capital for causing factor 
price distortion and consequently the use of techniques with 
inappropriate factor proportions. As mentioned earlier, 
lack of effective demand for labour-intensive technology in 
LDCs and the market disincentives for R & D on labour- 
intensive techniques severely limit the supply of 
"appropriate" technology in the original sense. In addition, 
the lack of technical expertise on the part of local 
entrepreneurs often makes it necessary for them to rely on 
the advice of sales agents whose main interest is to promote 
(high profit) modern technology. Consequently, employment 
objectives are unlikely to be achieved by manufacturing 
industries almost regardless of channels used for 
transferring technology.
Yet a common argument against direct foreign investment 
is that it accentuates the use of inappropriate techniques. 
Singer (1973) gave four possible reasons for this. First, 
foreign firms tend to use technology which they are most 
familiar with and which is most readily available to them. 
Inevitably, this results in relatively capital-intensive 
techniques. Secondly, foreign firms may wish to minimise 
industrial relations problems by using relatively labour- 
saving equipment. Thirdly, owing to nationalistic demands
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of host countries for higher wages, foreign firms are likely 
to face higher labour costs than local firms. Fourthly, 
insofar as one of the motives for direct foreign investment 
is to expand sales of machinery and raw materials, foreign 
firms are likely to be less concerned about prevailing factor 
proportions in the host countries. It has been argued also 
that the capital cost confronting foreign and local firms 
may be different. Foreign firms are more likely to obtain 
credit cheaply and easily from home or international sources 
(Kindleberger, 1969, p.24).
The last chapter of this thesis will examine the choice 
of techniques in foreign and local firms within the 
framework of relative factor price doctrine which has been 
modified to take the above factors into account. A quick 
glance at results of other empirical studies of others may 
be in order. Hughes and You Poh Seng (1969) observed that 
foreign firms in Singapore used the technology with which 
they were most familiar. The use of relatively capital- 
intensive techniques by foreign firms has been reported in 
Australia by Brash (1966) , in Ghana (Solomon and Forsyth, 
1977) and in India (Agarwal, 1976).
Experience in' Mexico and the Philippines (Mason, 1971, 
1973), on the other hand, suggests that foreign and local 
firms do not differ significantly in their choice of 
technique. Cohen (1973) was not able to find a clear-cut 
pattern as to whether American firms used more capital than 
Korean firms. In Indonesia, Wells (1973) reported that 
there was a tendency for foreign firms to use capital- 
intensive techniques but that this could be attributed to 
their monopolistic position. The drive to reduce the use 
of labour in Indonesia was equally strong for both foreign 
and local firms.
Other studies indicate that foreign subsidiaries are 
fairly responsive to local conditions (Baranson, 1967; 
Strassmann, 1968; Little et al. , 1970). In particular, Pack
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(1976) observed that owing to technical expertise, foreign 
firms in Kenya carried out labour-intensive adaptations and 
were more willing to use older equipment. Thus, there has 
not been a general concensus in this area.
2.4.2 The cost of importing technology from abroad.
The public good character of knowledge and technology has 
led some economists to assume that technology transfer is 
costless, in particular to suppliers. They tend to ignore 
the fact that the production of knowledge must be 
compensated for to encourage further private production.
In addition, there are actual transfer costs in the process 
of technical and managerial preparation for the transfer and 
the costs of R & D to adapt technology and products to suit 
local environments. There are also the costs, in terms of 
output forgone, that result from the reduction in manpower 
in the transferor's enterprises owing to these preparations 
and to the training of a new work force for a new project. 
Teece (1977) showed that the cost of transferring technology 
in 26 international projects ranged from 4-22 per cent of4total project cost. Finally, there is the opportunity cost 
of the loss in sales of final products as a result of sales 
of technology.
The cost to recipients of importing technology 
therefore depends on many factors, such as the actual cost 
involved in research and development of new products or 
processes, the cost of transferring technology which in turn 
depends on the level of technical sophistications, the 
economic life of the technology, the expected efficiency or 
goodwill of suppliers and the relationship between suppliers 
and recipients.
Teece also included excess manufacturing costs defined as 
the learning costs during the start-up until performance 
reached designed specifications in his total cost of transfer. 
Thus, his total cost is the cost to both suppliers and 
recipients but excludes implicit costs and the costs in terms 
of output forgone from the reduction in manpower which was 
devoted to transferring technology to a new project.
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In this study, the cost to recipient countries will be 
given special attention. The total cost to recipients is 
made up of two components: explicit monetary costs and
implicit or invisible costs. The explicit cost consists of 
payments for the use of trade marks, patented products or 
processes, technical data, trade secrets, and so on. In 
some cases, the explicit cost also includes provisions that 
require recipients to share with their suppliers advertising 
costs and at times a provision that holds recipients 
responsible for taxes on payments for technology levied by 
the government of recipient countries.
Implicit costs, on the other hand, include a wide range 
of restrictions and prohibitions on the activities of the 
recipients (for example, export restrictions), compulsory 
purchases of raw materials and equipment, and restrictions 
on the research and development capacity of recipients.
Some of these provisions may serve to strengthen the long- 
run advantage of the innovator or transferor or to increase 
barriers to entry by newcomers.
The implicit or hidden costs have become a major 
concern to developing countries in recent years. They not 
only pose potential balance of payment problems but may also 
have far-reaching adverse effects on the internal 
transmission of technology and the development of the 
technical infrastructure of recipient countries.
Another factor which affects total cost of technology 
is the duration of the contracts. The longer the period 
covered by the contract, the higher is the present value of 
the total cost. An additional complication arises when the 
explicit and implicit components are subject to different 
durations.
2.4.2.1 Implicit cost of technology. A technological 
advantage can be eroded over time through leakages and 
demonstration effects. To maximise the long-term gain, 
technology sellers may create barriers to the acquisition
35
of technology by recipient and other firms. These barriers 
enable technology sellers to appropriate more fully their 
total returns on technology. These barriers can be divided 
into a natural technological barrier, an artificial 
technological barrier and a goodwill barrier. The first 
depends on the difficulties inherent in innovation. The 
second, on the other hand, includes those activities or 
restrictions which obstruct the natural diffusion process, 
such as the prevention of demonstration effects, leakages, 
and so on. Artificial technological barriers prevent both 
recipients and other producers from offering potential 
competition in the sale of technology. The goodwill barrier 
is related to product differentiation - that is, accepted 
quality or experience which makes one supplier distinctly 
better than others, at least in the mind of a prospective 
recipient. This barrier is strengthened by the use of 
trade marks or brand names.
However, the gains to suppliers from the sale of 
technology may reduce their gains from the sale of final 
products if suppliers become competitive in international 
markets. To prevent such losses, suppliers will try to 
ensure that the sale territory for their final products will 
be maintained for as long as possible.
The following sections discuss the economic 
implications of hidden costs of technology contracts for 
recipient countries.
(a) Conditions affecting marketing, purchasing and pricing
policies of technology recipients
(i) Export restrictions. The four most general forms 
of restriction in the export market are the total 
prohibition of exports, allocated areas for a technology 
recipient's exports, a requirement of approval by the 
technology suppliers prior to export and a reciprocal market 
arrangement. Total prohibition confines recipients to the 
supply of their own domestic market. In the second case,
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the suppliers usually agree to allow recipients to export 
to certain areas. For instance, recipients may not be 
allowed to export to suppliers' domestic market. A 
reciprocal export arrangement is one where technology 
suppliers agree not to export into recipients' markets while 
recipients promise not to export outside the allocated 
areas.
It is often assumed that a total ban on export is the 
most restrictive among the four conditions and a reciprocal 
export arrangement is often thought to be advantageous for 
a recipient country especially if it is a latecomer in 
export markets. It will be argued here that there will be 
a different fee for each condition. When the cost of 
royalties is taken into account, one cannot conclude that 
one condition is preferable to another. In fact, there is 
a systematic relationship between royalties fees and export 
restrictions. Figure 2.1 is constructed to illustrate this 
point.
Consider a case where a technology owner has an 
alternative between exports of final products and sales of 
technology. OA is the total market of the technology owner 
before the sales of technology. AB is the local market for 
a prospective recipient firm. CC' is the cost curve of the 
technology owner in producing the agreed product. P is the 
fixed market price for the agreed product.
By selling his technology, the technology owner will, 
in the short run, lose a part of his market equal to AB and 
his cost of production will rise from OS to OT. If the 
technology owner agrees not to encroach upon the market of 
the recipient, the case of a reciprocal arrangement, he will 
charge technology fees equal to the heavily shaded area 
(STRQMN). If the technology purchaser is prohibited from 
export while the technology owner is not bound by a legal 
contract to stay away from the recipient's market, the case 
of a total ban on export, the total royalties charged could
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Output
Fig. 2.1 Export Market Arrangement
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be lowered depending on the market share which the technology 
seller expects to retain in face of competition from the 
recipient firm.
Suppose the technology recipient wishes to enlarge the 
area of export from the home market to a regional market - 
AC (a case of allocated areas for export), then an additional 
fee equivalent to the lightly shaded area (MNEFG) will be 
charged. The larger the allocated area, the higher the 
additional fees.
A requirement of approval from the technology owner 
before export provides an insurance against the recipient's 
encroachment of the technology seller's market. If the 
domestic market is AB, and the technology buyer wants to 
export into the area to the left of B, this condition will 
give the technology owner an opportunity to negotiate for 
an additional fee. However, if the technology buyer or 
recipient wants to export to the area to the right of A, 
and at the same time the technology seller has no intention 
to engage in export expansion in that direction, then the 
recipient or technology purchaser may be allowed to export 
without additional charges. Therefore, under this latter 
circumstance, the requirement to obtain the consent of the 
technology seller is more beneficial than a reciprocal export 
arrangement.
The implication of this systematic relationship between 
royalties and restrictions on export markets is that the 
recipient government must be prepared to pay higher fees for 
technology if export restrictions are to be removed.
The economic implications of these restrictions are 
obvious. If the recipients have potential comparative 
advantage in the production of the agreed commodity, these 
restrictions will prevent maximum achievement of real output. 
Potentially they also have an adverse effect on the balance 
of payments of recipient countries. The restrictive 
conditions are more likely to be imposed on enterprises and 
industries with highest export potential.
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The above arguments apply to arm's length bargaining.
It is often claimed that a foreign subsidiary may be able 
to obtain a liberal export franchise. The validity of this 
claim depends on a wide array of factors - the nature of 
cost, products, tax structures, and so on. It is possible 
that a foreign parent company may prohibit its subsidiary 
from export if the subsidiary's unit cost is higher than 
that of the parent company (even though the subsidiary can 
still make some profits at a relatively high cost). Profits 
for the whole organisation are maximised if the third market 
is served by the parent company which is the lowest cost 
producers. Thus, there will be a divergence of interests 
between the governments of the recipient countries and the 
foreign parent company.
If the agreed product is a differentiated product, a 
parent company which is a multinational corporation may use 
restricting an export as a market sharing arrangement among 
subsidiaries to avoid intra-corporation competition which 
may result in a loss of monopoly profits.
In the case where a foreign subsidiary is the lowest 
cost supplier and the market for the agreed product is 
competitive, there seems to be no economic reason why a 
parent company should prohibit a subsidiary from exporting 
unless the taxes levied on profits and remittances from the 
foreign subsidiary are much higher than those in other 
countries where the parent company has affiliated companies. 
Vernon (1972) argued that the most plausible motive for such 
a restriction is that it would be an insurance against loss 
of control over the management of the subsidiaries:
... if the "liberated" ex-subsidiary then undertook 
to export its products to third-country markets, 
the parent might have some legal basis for 
restraining its erstwhile offspring by invoking the 
formal contractual prohibition against exports 
(p. 17) .
In a case of a multi-product firm, the gain or loss to 
the host country must be considered in the general
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equilibrium framework. For instance, a subsidiary in 
country A may be prohibited from exporting product X while 
being allowed to export product Y. On the other hand, a 
subsidiary in country B may be restricted from exporting 
product Y but may be allowed to export product X. So, what 
country A loses in the potential export of X may be regained 
from exporting product Y. Short of information on 
comparative advantage of both countries and on the size of 
market of the two products, the net outcome cannot be 
determined.
Export restrictions are sometimes imposed if technology 
owners are anxious to preserve international quality 
standards. However, technology recipients should negotiate 
for a liberal export franchise in return for a commitment 
to strict quality control system.
Other forms of export restriction include restricted 
exportable quantity or value, prices of exports to be fixed 
by suppliers, exports to be handled through specific agents, 
and so on.
Empirical studies indicate that market restriction is
5fairly common (Arndt and Shirk, 1959; Hogan, 1967). More 
recently, a study in Chile (UNCTAD, 1974a) showed that 175 
out of 399 contracts (43.8 per cent) revealed some forms of 
export restriction. Moreover, two-thirds of these 175 
contracts stipulated a total ban on exports, and one-fourth 
that authorisation from suppliers was needed prior to export. 
A study of licensing agreements in India (1974) also 
suggested that 75.8 per cent, that is 956 out of 1261 
contracts of the surveyed agreements, had restrictive 
conditions on export markets. A study of technology 
contracts in Spain (UNCTAD, 1974c) also indicated that 60
However, Brash (1966) found that 50 per cent of 100 
American affiliates in his study provided liberal export 
franchise.
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per cent of 101 contracts involved some form of export 
restriction. Studies on other LDCs also reported similar 
findings (Vaitsos, 1974; UNCTAD, 1975b).
(ii) Tie-in clauses. Another common restrictive 
practice is provision for the compulsory purchase of 
machinery and equipment, raw materials and intermediates 
from technology suppliers. This provision is often linked 
to quality control. There are two potential economic 
consequences from such a provision. First, suppliers may 
take the opportunity to overprice machinery and raw 
materials unless it is stipulated in the agreement that 
suppliers must offer them at competitive prices. The true 
full cost of technology may be concealed in the price of 
tied purchases. As far as multinational corporations are 
concerned, tied purchases open the way for transfer pricing, 
that is by overpricing raw materials for production in high 
tax area, profits can be transferred to low tax regions. 
Secondly, tie-in clauses are detrimental to the local 
development of inputs and capital goods.
A study of tied purchases for raw materials in Bolivia, 
Equador and Peru indicated that 67 per cent of the contracts 
studied had a tie-in clause. In particular, 100 per cent 
of all contracts with foreign subsidiaries in the 
pharmaceutical industry had such a restriction (Vaitsos, 
1974, p.45). The overpricing of raw materials was also 
observed. The overpricing of three active ingredients in 
the Spanish pharmaceutical industry ranged from 120-880 per 
cent (UNCTAD, 1974c, p.50). In Chile, 12 out of 50 
products were found to be overpriced by more than 100 per 
cent (UNCTAD, 1974a, p.23). One study in Colombo suggested 
that overpricing in the pharmaceutical industry by foreign 
subsidiaries was as high as 199 per cent and the value of 
overpricing in this industry alone in 1968 amounted to 
US$3 million (Vaitsos, 1974, pp.47-49).
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(iii) Agreements on the price of the agreed products.
As an alternative to market arrangements, suppliers may 
wish to fix the price of agreed products so that recipients 
will not be competitive outside the home market. However, 
in other situations, where trade marks and brand names are 
closely associated with an imported technology, suppliers 
may wish to maintain a high price for the agreed products 
for prestige purposes such as in cosmetic and high fashion 
garment industries.
(iv) Appointment of sale agents by suppliers.
Suppliers may wish to specify outlets for the manufacture 
of the agreed products for three reasons. First, they may 
have made long-run commitments to other local agents. 
Secondly, by appointing their own sale agents, suppliers can 
indirectly control the market for and the price of the agreed 
products. Thirdly, they can also exercise a uniform and 
global marketing strategy.
(b) Conditions affecting technology transmission
As much as the governments of recipient countries hope 
to encourage spill-over effects from imported technology, 
suppliers of the technology are often keen to ensure that 
the gains from their know-how can be maximised by limiting 
new entry. This can be achieved through various means:
(i) Confidentiality. To maximise the economic life 
of innovation and trade secrets, suppliers may require that 
recipients keep all received know-how in strict confidence. 
More strictly, the secrecy clause may survive the 
termination or expiration of contracts for an agreed or an 
indefinite period.
Apart from confidentiality, clauses applied to 
corporate recipients must further ensure that there will be 
no leakages of information through employees. In the most 
strict case, recipients must indemnify suppliers for the 
disclosure of know-how by recipients' ex-employees. This is 
inhibiting to technology transmission and the spill-over 
effects from importing technology.
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The confidentiality clause has not received much 
attention in empirical studies. Only the Spanish study 
indicated that eight out of 101 contracts had this secrecy 
clause and five of them extend the enforcement to cover 
employees (UNCTAD, 1974c, p.35).
(ii) The right to transfer or to sub-licence 
technology. To ensure that suppliers will be the sole 
source of some technology and to prevent recipients from 
being potential rivals, it is to the advantage of suppliers 
to stipulate that all rights on received technology are non- 
transferable and non-sub-licenceable. This condition 
prohibits other local producers from acquiring technology 
which is available in the recipient country and to enable 
suppliers to make multiple contracts and thus gain larger 
returns from sales of know-how in the same market (UNCTAD, 
1974, pp.23-24).
(iii) Prohibition of the use of know-how after the 
expiration of the contracts. Another element in the hidden 
cost of technology is the prohibition on recipients to make 
use of the received know-how after the termination or 
expiration of the contracts unless they be renewed. More 
importantly, this clause prevents the costs of know-how from 
reducing to zero even when it has become public knowledge 
and it perpetuates financial commitments of recipients to 
suppliers even after the recipients have mastered the 
technology.
(iv) Prohibition of duplicating know-how and reverse 
engineering. Recipients may be required to return all 
technical data and other information to suppliers upon 
termination or expiration of the contracts. In the case 
where the disclosure of know-how involves the use of 
unpatented special machinery, suppliers may prohibit reverse 
engineering, that is, the dismantling of machinery for
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copying. If the disclosed know-how involves drawings or 
secret formulae, duplication of these materials is 
forbidden. This condition thus could mean unending renewals 
of technology contracts.
(v) Approval to enter into third party agreements.
When recipients enter into agreements with a third party, 
there is the possibility of know-how derived from suppliers 
being directly or indirectly disclosed to the third party. 
For example, by co-operating with recipients, a third party 
may observe better ways of organisation by the recipients 
who learned it from the suppliers. A third party may also 
have the opportunity to enter factories of the recipients 
where they may observe some new technology in use. This 
condition thus minimises the demonstration effect. In an 
extreme case, recipients may have to agree that no visitors 
will be allowed into their factories.
(vi) Provision on the use of improvements of agreed 
products or processes. During the term of an agreement, 
either suppliers or recipients may make some improvements 
to the agreed products or processes. Depending on the 
bargaining position of each party, the arrangement for the 
use of improvements may be unilateral or mutual.
However, the terms and conditions applicable to 
suppliers and recipients may well be different (UNCTAD,
1974a and 1974b). For instance, recipients are required to 
allow suppliers the use of all improvements free of charge 
while recipients must make additional payments for the use 
of improvements discovered by suppliers. Suppliers may also 
require the right to sub-license anywhere in the world the 
improvements discovered by recipients. More severely, 
recipients may be required to vest the property rights of 
their improvements in the suppliers.
The economic implication of the above conditions is 
that it creates a disincentive for local recipients to 
engage in R and D activities.
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(vii) Prohibition of local adaptation and development 
of new products. Another important provision is connected 
with the prohibition of local adaptation and the development 
of new products. This condition discourages developing 
countries in their search for appropriate products and 
production technology.
(c) The supply of technology and ownership of recipients
While recipient countries are concerned with the 
prospect of unpackaging direct foreign investment, that is, 
obtaining technology independent of capital and management, 
suppliers' interests may be quite the opposite. Economists 
who adopt the industrial organisation approach to the theory 
of direct foreign investment have pointed out that in 
certain industries, characterised by certain market 
imperfections, suppliers of technology will not release 
their control on their technology because the gain from 
their know-how will not be fully appropriated unless 
technology is tied to ownership and management. Thus, in 
many contracts, suppliers may stipulate conditions tying 
suppliers of technology to control and ownership by 
suppliers, for example,
- majority control and ownership by suppliers;
- minority but compulsory ownership by suppliers;
- the right to acquire voting shares at any time 
if they wish.
Such stipulations without doubt contradict the goal of 
untying direct foreign investment packages. The 
effectiveness of these conditions depend largely on the 
availability of alternative sources.
2.4.2.2 The relationship between implicit and explicit 
cost. Since the total return on technology consists of 
several interdependent components, this allows technology 
suppliers to vary the size of each component to achieve a 
desired level of total return without any change in the 
level of supply of technology. The previous section has
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suggested the relationship between the amount of royalty 
fees and the permissible areas for exports. Magee (1976b), 
on the basis of control theory, shows that subject to 
certain qualifications, lowering of the long-run advantage 
which is an implicit cost in this terminology results in 
higher optimal prices being charged (higher explicit cost). 
This raises a dilemma. Tampering with only one component 
may not reduce the cost of technology. However, strict 
regulation of all components may affect the supply of 
technology in the long run.
Insofar as the proportion of implicit and explicit 
components in the total cost is concerned, there may be a 
divergence between private and social interests in recipient 
countries. While private buyers will be concerned to 
minimise explicit costs, they may be less concerned to 
bargain for more liberal conditions. The corporate strategy 
of a private buyer is also an important determinant in the 
bargaining process; if he sees himself as a caterer for 
local market, it is unlikely that he will put an equal 
effort into minimising implicit costs as he does to explicit 
costs. Thus, while bargaining for explicit terms and low 
costs can be more or less looked after by the market 
mechanism, there is a case for government intervention in 
the bargaining over implicit costs.
For this implicit component, the combination of 
conditions may vary from one supplier to another and from 
one buyer to another, depending on the expected 
competitiveness of recipients. Being profit maximising 
monopolists, technology sellers will, as a rule, lay down 
conditions which will best serve their interests, but in the 
process of bargaining may be more prepared to forgo certain 
conditions for others. For instance, market restrictions 
may be of less concern to suppliers if recipients lack 
industrial and marketing experience. Instead, suppliers may 
be interested in restricting leakages of know-how. If
recipients are experienced industrialists and trading firms, 
suppliers may place more emphasis in market arrangement than 
technology transmission. In addition, since sellers' 
expectations are likely to differ with the stage of 
development it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish 
for each technology an international price which will 
incorporate implicit cost.
In conclusion, the authority of a reserve bank should 
not be concerned only with the financial cost of technology 
which, although it may have visible and immediate effects 
on the current balance of payments, may not have as much 
effect on the potential technical capabilities of the 
economy and its long run ability to earn foreign exchange, 
as the other costs noted here.
2.4.2.3 The cost of technology acquired through direct 
foreign investment. It has been suggested that direct 
foreign investment enables technology to be acquired more 
cheaply because foreign subsidiaries or foreign controlled 
joint ventures may have more and cheaper access to 
technology than local firms.^ Against this, it is 
contended that the interests of foreign firms especially 
multinational corporations do not necessarily coincide with 
that of the host countries, especially if the multinationals 
operate on a global strategy. It is argued that foreign 
control in such situations facilitates transfer pricing, 
tied purchases and other implicit costs (Vaitsos, 1974, 
p.86). Moreover, since technology comes in the same package 
as capital and management in the direct foreign investment 
bundle, the returns on one element may be concealed in
Dunning (1970, p.171) pointed out that the lower cost of 
technology will benefit the host countries insofar as it is 
reflected in lower product prices or the higher profits 
which will be taxed by the government of the host countries.
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another. When concealed payments and implicit costs are 
taken into account, the cost of technology acquired through 
direct foreign investment may be very high.
The view put forward here is that the return on or the 
cost of technology is not simply related to foreign 
ownership per se, although ownership will allow fuller 
appropriation. In the study of cost of technology, other 
factors such as alternative sources of technology, fiscal 
policies of the recipient countries, corporate strategy and 
motives for investment as well as the bargaining positions 
of the recipient countries, must be taken into account. The 
cost of technology acquired through direct foreign 
investment will tend to be high if investment is associated 
with market imperfections.
Again, empirical evidence on this subject is 
conflicting. That foreign subsidiaries often have cheaper 
access to know-how of parents or obtain technology free of 
charge is supported by the studies of Hogan (1967) and 
Reuber et at. (1973, p.193). Reuber et al. found that no 
know-how fees were levied in 44 out of 53 firms studied.
When fees were levied, the range was small, i.e. between 
1-3 per cent. Other studies (UNCTAD, 1972b; Balasubramanyam, 
1973) also indicated high costs of technical collaborations 
in the form of tied purchases and sales restrictions when 
compared with the costs under direct foreign investment. 
Balasubramanyam further argued that technical collaborations 
agreements were in fact a means of obtaining sufficient 
profit without capital risks and at the same time provided 
suppliers of technology with sufficient influence on many 
decisions of the recipients despite the lack of control and 
ownership.
By contrast, Vaitsos (1974, p.86) suggests that the 
ratio of royalties to declared profits was much higher in 
foreign than in Colombian firms. Moreover, the incidence 
of overpricing in foreign subsidiaries is very striking.
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Unfortunately, most of the evidence was based on the Latin 
American experience. In Chile, ten out of twelve 
pharmaceutical products which were overpriced by over 100 
per cent were produced by foreign subsidiaries (UNCTAD, 
1974a, pp.22-23).
In this chapter, the concept of technology transfer and 
various channels for transferring technology have been 
outlined. This study postulated that the strategy of 
industrialisation based on modern large-scale manufacturing 
is unlikely to generate substantial employment, regardless 
of the channels involved in the transfer. Under such a 
strategy and given the low absorptive capacity, direct 
foreign investment or packaged transfer is likely to become 
the most prominent means of transferring technology. It 
could also prove to be a valuable source of diffusion and 
training provided that over-protection is not granted.
The role of modern large-scale manufacturing should be 
realistically viewed as skill generation rather than 
employment generation. Considering the urgent problem of 
underemployment and unemployment in the LDCst other 
strategies, for example, promotion of agriculture and small- 
scale labour-intensive enterprises, need to be given more 
serious attention.
The latter part of the chapter argued that technology 
suppliers will adjust the three components of the price of 
technology, namely implicit costs, explicit costs and the 
duration of agreements, to maximise their total gains. It 
is evident that one cannot deal with one component of cost 
without properly dealing with others and at the same time 
bearing in mind the long run implications of supplies of 
technology. If an authority of the reserve bank tried to 
reduce the monetary cost of technology, foreign firms could 
compensate by erecting higher barriers to entry and thus 
elongate the earning horizon resulting in equivalent net 
present value. Although the explicit costs have a direct
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and visible impact on the balance of payments of the 
recipient countries, the implicit costs will have far- 
reaching effects on the potential technical ability and its 
long run ability to increase real output and in turn to earn 
foreign exchange.
The pricing of technology is further complicated by the 
expectation of the recipient's competitive potential, the 
relationship between sellers and buyers, and so on. In fact, 
it is nearly impossible to establish an international price 
for each technology.
It has also been suggested that there is a divergence 
between social and private interests in bargaining for an 
imported technology, especially in dealing with implicit 
cost. This provides a case for recipient government's 
intervention in the bargaining process. However, this point 
will be pursued in the last chapter.
CHAPTER 3
Industrialisation and Government Policies in Thailand
Industrialisation is a fairly recent phenomenon in 
Thailand. Before World War II, the country was committed 
to international trade and specialised in agricultural 
production. After the war, the government became 
increasingly attracted to industrialisation. The first 
National Economic Development Plan was promulgated in 1960.
By the mid-1960s, massive industrialisation was well under 
way and the role of the government in the economy had 
increased substantially.
In this chapter, industrialisation and structural 
change in the Thai economy will be briefly discussed.
Special attention will be given to government policies which 
directly and indirectly affect the transfer of technology 
in the industrialisation process.
3.1 The Thai Economy 1855-1959
Prior to 1855, Thailand, known as Siam, was virtually 
a subsistence economy. Only a small volume of trade was 
conducted with China and neighbouring countries. Most 
externally traded commodities were controlled by the 
monarchy.
In 1855, the conclusion of the Bowring Treaty with 
Britain removed royal monopolies and western merchants were 
allowed to trade directly with local merchants. From then 
on, Thailand became increasingly commercialised and 
specialised in agricultural and primary production, notably 
rice, teak, tin and rubber.
From 1855-1950, there was little change in the structure 
of the economy and production technology. According to 
Ingram (1971, p.209),
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The Thai population largely remained in agriculture, 
and from 1850-1950, it neither improved techniques 
nor increased the proportion of capital to labour. 
Moreover, in this period, most changes in the 
economy as a whole were in volume rather than in 
kind. New methods were not used, new products were 
not developed. No product of any importance 
(except rubber) was exported in 1950 which was not 
exported in 1850.
Ingram (1971, pp.210-12) attributed the relative lack 
of change to four factors. First, the increase in the price 
of rice after 1850 encouraged specialisation in rice farming. 
Secondly, between 1855-1926, the import duty ceiling was 
fixed at three per cent according to the Bowring Treaty. 
Consequently, it was difficult for local products to compete 
with cheap imports. Thirdly, Chinese migrants were allowed 
to enter the country freely. Since the Chinese had 
comparative skills in trades and services, they took over 
most trading activities. Fourthly, infrastructure was 
grossly inadequate.
Even when the Bowring Treaty was abolished in 1926, 
private investments outside agriculture did not take place 
in any significant magnitude. According to Muscat (1966, 
pp.189-95), the Coup in 1932 which led to constitutional 
democracy had aroused nationalistic sentiments among some 
high ranking officials and intellectuals against the Chinese 
business community. Thus, the 1930s and the 1940s saw the 
establishment of a great number of public enterprises in an 
attempt to foster indigenous control of the economy. 
Government manufacturing activities included oil refining, 
and the production of paper, gunny bags, textiles, plywood, 
cigarettes, sugar, etc. From 1948, tighter controls were 
placed on alien businesses.
The encouragement of the public manufacturing sector 
rendered private investment in the same product lines less 
attractive. Discrimination against local Chinese increased
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risks and uncertainty for these local capitalists and they 
tended to invest in enterprises that had high liquidity such 
as commerce rather than in long-term industrial projects 
(Muscat, 1966, pp.235-46).
Moreover, the financial records of these public 
enterprises reflected mismanagement and inefficiency. It 
was not until the late 1950s that the government came to 
grips with reality and decided not to intervene directly in 
the industrialisation process. Since then, the role of the 
government has concentrated on planning and promotion of the 
private sector. Discrimination against the Chinese 
community had eased and foreign investment was welcomed.
Thus, until 1960, the Thai manufacturing sector was 
characterised by a dual structure of a modern public sector 
and small-scale manufacturing in the private sector. There 
were a few foreign establishments in logging and trading. 
Local interests were concentrated on small-scale 
manufacturing of simple consumer products and basic food 
processing.
3.2 Planning for Industrialisation
The master plan for industrialisation was outlined in 
the National Economic and Social Development Plans.
Although the first development plan (1961-1966) outlined the 
need to promote industrialisation along with agricultural 
diversification, the main task during the first plan was to 
build a public infrastructure and to collect information for 
further planning. In the second plan (1967-1971) , more 
specific guidelines on industrialisation were provided, viz. 
the generation of employment, human capital formation and 
the encouragement of joint ventures between local and 
foreign investors. In the third plan (1972-1976), export 
promotion, decentralised industrialisation and full 
utilisation of existing capacity were added to the list, and 
for the first time the National Development Plan recognised 
the need to slow down population growth.
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To translate the aspiration for industrialisation into 
reality, the Board of Investment (BOI) was set up under the 
jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office in 1959 to 
promote economic activities which were seen to be vital to 
national development. The function of the Board is to
encourage domestic and foreign investors' 
investments in industry and public utilities and 
to negotiate conditions of investment agreements 
on the basis of mutual interest of both investors 
and the government (BOI, 19 59 , p.l) .
The 1960 Investment Promotion Act, which was amended in 
1962, provided the Board with considerable power to grant 
and administer special benefits to firms operating in the 
"promoted" industries.^ These benefits and the selection 
of the promoted firms will be discussed more fully in a 
later section.
3.3 Structural Change Since 1960
As in any other typical agricultural country, the bulk
of output and employment in Thailand is from the agricultural
sector (Table 3.1). In 1960, the manufacturing sector
accounted for ten per cent of total output contributing
5882 m. baht to GNP at constant price, but absorbed only 3.6
~  2per cent of the total work force. In 1973, the 
manufacturing sector accounted for 18.2 per cent of total 
output and its contribution to GNP reached 26,079 m. baht
The first promotion Act was passed in 1954 and promotional 
measures were to be carried out by the Ministry of 
Industries, but the effects of private investments were 
negligible. See IBRD (1963, p.98), Silcock (1967, pp.263-67) 
and Muscat (1966, pp.227-28).
2 For the argument that the contribution of the agricultural 
sector is underestimated and that of manufacturing sector 
is overestimated, see Silcock (1970, Ch. 2) and Ingram (1971, 
pp.235-36).
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at constant price. Its employment share was 7.1 per cent.
During the same period, the share of the agricultural sector
was steadily falling, indicating a remarkable structural 
3change. GNP per capita rose from 2248 baht in 1960 to 
3572 baht in 1973.
However, it is clear from Table 3.2 that output rose 
faster than employment in all sectors except in the 
construction industry reflecting an increase in productivity. 
The manufacturing sector turned out to be the most impressive 
sector in terms of growth in output, largely owing to a small 
base, while the construction industry was the fastest growing 
sector in terms of employment.
It should be noted that during the same period, 
population had been growing rapidly at an average rate of 
three per cent per annum. In 1960, the total population of 
Thailand was 26.25 million but in 1973 the figure reached 
41.34 million, bringing in additions to the work force of 
approximately 600,000 workers per year. It became evident 
that the performance of each sector in terms of employment 
would be increasingly important.
During 1960-1973, the share of the agricultural sector 
fell more sharply in terms of value added than in terms of 
employment. One implication is that it was absorbing more 
than its share in the increase in labour force. The social 
and economic characteristics of family farming render 
absorption relatively easy. The high absorption rate of the4construction industry is hard to explain. It may be the 
effect of economic fluctuations in the particular years.
Muscat argued that the falling share of agriculture was 
due to stagnation in this sector rather than a structural 
shift. See Muscat (1966, pp.56-64).
 ^ For a discussion of employment generation in the 
construction industry, see Stretton (1977).
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Table 3.1
Shares of Value Added and Employment of Major 
Sectors in the Thai Economy (selected years)
(percentage)
Value added Employment
1960 1967 1973 1960 1967 1973
Agriculture 38.9 32.5 28.0 81.6 73.8 72.0
Manufacturing 10.6 14.8 18.2 3.6 5.0 7.1
Construction 3.6 6.8 4.8 0.5 1.1 1.5
Commerce 17.3 17.5 18.5 5.9 8.7 8.2
Service 9.1 9.8 9.8 5.1 8.1 8.1
Others 20.5 18.6 20.7 3.3 3.3 3.1
All sectors 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bureau of National Statistics
Table 3.2
Indices of Value Added and Employment of Major 
Sectors in the Thai Economy (selected years)
Value added 
(constant 1962 price)
Employment
1960 1967 1973 1960 1967 1973
Agriculture 100.0 122.0 169.0 100.0 98.9 108.3
Manufacturing 100.0 214.3 368.7 100.0 159.7 256.9
Construction 100.0 281.4 286.9 100.0 249.6 371.5
Commerce 100.0 147.0 245.6 100.0 169.0 179.2
Service 100.0 180.7 265.5 100.0 187.8 - 210.6
All sectors 100.0 158.3 240.8 100.0 110.3 123.8
Source: Bureau of National Statistics
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There may be a change in output-mix over time from relatively 
capital-intensive constructions to relatively labour- 
intensive constructions. It may be because the elasticity 
of factor substitution in this sector is relatively large 
and thus enables the sector to bear the burden of taking in 
the swelling labour force. However, this issue is not to 
be pursued here.
From Table 3.2, it appears that the manufacturing 
sector had also been growing rapidly in terms of employment. 
The index of employment rose from 100 in 1960 to 256.9 in 
1973. However, in absolute terms, it was estimated that the 
sector had taken in only 700,000 workers in this period 
(Bank of Thailand, n.d.). Moreover, closer examination of 
data from the Board of Investment reveals that the bulk of 
these jobs were not created by the promoted sector. During 
the same period, only 161,000 jobs were generated by the 
promoted sector. The bulk of the work force absorbed in the 
manufacturing sector was presumably taken up by the small- 
scale non-promoted enterprises.
Within the manufacturing sector, there have been some 
remarkable changes. The 1960s saw rapid expansion of local 
manufacturing production. The impressive growth in this 
period was seen as a response to import substitution and 
demand expansion (Akrasanee, 1974a). Figures in Table 3.3 
indicate the change in the structure of the manufacturing 
sector. Originally, three industries dominated the 
industrial scene in Thailand. The food-processing 
industries, a large proportion of which is accounted for by 
rice-milling, gained a strong foothold in the 19th century 
when rice became the major export income earner. The 
tobacco industry, on the other hand, enjoyed a monopolistic 
advantage, while the beverage industry benefited from 
growing urban income. These industries showed a relative 
decline in their share of total manufacturing value added 
although the absolute figures increased. They gave way to
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new industries, notably textile manufacturing. There is 
some indication that the manufacturing sector is moving from 
relatively simple to less simple production techniques.
3.4 Expansion and Foreign investment in the Promoted Sector
After 1960, the promoted sector expanded rapidly. By 
1967, there were 184 firms in operation and by 1973, the 
number of promoted projects had reached 558. In 1973, 
employment in the promoted sector accounted for 21.5 per cent 
of total manufacturing work force and 51.1 per cent of the 
manufacturing work force in municipal areas and its total 
investment over the period 1960-1973 amounted to 31,586 m. 
baht, which is equivalent to 10.2 per cent of gross fixed 
capital formation over the same period. The promoted sector 
is believed to contain most of the large-scale manufacturing 
firms.
The 1960s also saw a massive inflow of foreign 
investment, following the government promotion of the 
private sector. By 1974, foreign investment constituted 30 
per cent of total registered capital in the promoted sector 
(Table 3.4). Japan turned out to be the leading investor 
and accounted for 12 per cent of total registered capital 
and approximately 42 per cent of total foreign registered 
capital. The investment of the second largest investor, the 
U.S.A., was less than half of Japan's. The majority of 
direct foreign investment is in the form of joint ventures 
between foreign and local equity.
3.5 Government Policies Since 1960
Since 1960, successive Thai governments have issued 
legislation and guidelines in pursuit of different 
objectives - local control and ownership, social welfare, 
employment generation, industrialisation, etc. - the policy
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Table 3.4
Shares of Foreign Registered Capital in the 
Promoted Sector (October 1960 - October 1974)
Total registered capital Foreign
registered
capital
%
Source of ownership
( '000 baht) %
Thailand 8,952,618 71.35 -
Japan 1,504,030 11.98 41.83
USA 518,236 4.13 14.41
Other developed 
countries3 371,559 2.97 10.34
Republic of China 459,128 3.66 12.77
Other developing 
countries*3 473,365 3.77 13.16
Others 269,134 2.14 7.49
Total 12,548,065 100.00 100.00
Notes: a. includes the United Kingdom, France, West
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia 
and Denmark.
b. includes Malaysia, Israel, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
India, Panama, Philippines and Portugal.
Source: BOI
instruments which indirectly influence the process of 
technology transfer. It may be worthwhile investigating at 
some length some of these policy instruments which will be 
relevant to further discussion.
3.5.1 Indirect subsidies. In this section, indirect 
subsidies in the form of tax incentives available only to 
promoted firms will be outlined. The two major tax 
incentives which have been used widely since 1960 are fiscal 
and trade tax incentives.
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According to the 1962 Investment Promotion Act, 
promoted firms were eligible for a five-year corporate 
income tax holiday. They were also exempted from business 
tax and import duties on machinery, equipment, accessories 
and materials used in the setting up of promoted industrial 
activities. Moreover, full or partial reduction in import 
duties on inputs was granted for five-year periods. Under 
this provision, promoted enterprises were grouped into three 
categories in accordance with their importance to economic 
development. Full exemption was granted for those under 
category A, which was considered to be most vital to the 
economy, a 50 per cent reduction to those under category B 
and a 33.33 per cent reduction to those under category C.
For exporting firms, full or partial reduction in export 
duties and business tax was granted.
In 1967, the three categories were abolished and all 
existing promoted firms were allowed only a 33.33 per cent 
reduction in the tariffs on inputs. New promoted firms were 
no longer eligible for tax exemption on imported materials.
In 1972, the government enacted a new decree (National 
Executive Council Decree 227) on investment promotion to 
conform more closely to the national development plan. The 
new law stressed both the role of exporting enterprises and 
the decentralisation of investment from Bangkok. The 
period of income tax holiday was amended from five years to 
a range of three to eight years at the discretion of the 
Board of Investment. The inclusion of ancillary income in 
computing profits for tax exemption purposes was permitted, 
and, for enterprises incorporated abroad, exemption was 
given only if the home country granted tax exemption to 
income earned in Thailand or to that part of income exempted 
from tax in Thailand.
Trade tax incentives were re-introduced for promoted 
exporting activities and very generous incentives were given 
to promoted enterprises in a promoted zone outside Bangkok.
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For exporting firms, full exemption was granted from import 
duties and/or business tax on raw materials, intermediate 
products and re-exported products. In addition, a tax 
deduction equal to two per cent of the annual increment in 
the f.o.b. value of exports was granted.
To offset the disadvantage encountered by promoted 
firms which located their plants away from Bangkok, exemption 
was granted from import duties and a business tax of no more 
than 50 per cent of the normal rates for raw materials for 
not more than five years. These firms were also eligible 
for an allowance of double deduction for the costs of 
transport, electricity and water supply for a period to be 
fixed by the Board of Investment. An allowance of up to 25 
per cent of the capital invested in plant installation could 
be deducted from taxable income in any year or years within 
ten years of the first operation. A reduction of 50 per 
cent in the corporate income tax following the initial 
income tax holidays was allowed for not more than five years; 
also a reduction in business tax of not more than 90 per cent 
of the normal rates for promoted products for five years.
Thus, in 1972 government objectives shifted from import 
substitution to regional balance and export promotion. 
Incentives were increased substantially for those activities 
and were removed from import substituting activities.
Since the early seventies, there has been an increasing 
emphasis on an equality-oriented attitude to development. 
Labour-intensive export industries have been considered as 
one possible means towards that end, with an added benefit 
of redressing the balance of payment problem. Catching up 
with the new trend (at least in policy framework), the newly 
elected government issued new policy guidelines in 1975. It 
was pointed out in the guidelines that special emphasis 
would be given to the generation of employment while export 
promotion, agro-based industries and the decentralisation 
of industry remained the important objectives. The new
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guidelines were also more definitive and selective.
Exporting enterprises were, for the first time, explicitly 
defined as firms with exports (f.o.b.) exceeding 20 per cent 
of their annual sales. More stringent conditions were laid 
down for non-exporting firms wishing to obtain "promoted" 
status; they had to be located outside Bangkok, their share 
of value added had to exceed 30 per cent of annual sales, 
they had to be operating at full capacity within three years 
of the commencement of production, and their industry had 
to receive less than 30 per cent protection. Moreover, they 
were to have minimum investments (excluding working capital 
and land) of not less than 10 m. baht. There was also a 
restriction on foreign ownership which will be discussed more 
fully in the following section.
No other stringent conditions were placed on exporting 
enterprises but the length of the income tax holiday was to 
be determined by either of the following:
(a) Value added criterion
Share of value added in annual sales (%) Period of
exemption (years)
Less than or equal to 30
31-40
41-50
Over 50
(b) Employment criterion 
Number of workers
Less than or equal to 200
201-400
401-600
More than 600
5
6
7
8
Period of exemption 
(years)
5
6
7
8
Two points need to be noted about government policies 
in this connection. First, indirect subsidies in the form 
of tax exemptions and deductions of capital costs from 
taxable income render the costs of capital artificially cheap 
and make the use of capital more attractive than the use of
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labour. Construction of infrastructure would yield direct 
benefits and would be neutral in the choice of factor 
proportions. It would also benefit the agricultural sector. 
Secondly, the tying of the income tax incentive to the 
employment criterion tended to inhibit employment objectives. 
Labour-intensive firms are characteristically small and 
medium sized. Although their capital per worker is 
low, their work force is not necessarily large and rarely 
reaches 200. Thus, the above employment criterion is likely 
to be in favour of large-scale production, which in turn is 
usually associated with capital-intensive technology. 
Therefore, these tax incentives tend to be in conflict with 
the employment objective set out in the guidelines. The 
transferred technologies may thus be biased against labour­
using techniques.
It should be noted that the BOI has been committed to 
large-scale manufacturing production. Since 1959, the BOI 
has set minimum capacity for firms wishing to obtain 
promoted status. There has been a tendency to increase the 
minimum size in some industries. For example, in 1959, 
promoted spinning firms were to have no less than 3,000 
spindles. By 1973, 20,000 spindles were required. In the 
electronic industry, minimum capital investment used to be 
1 m. baht in 1959. This was raised to 2 m. baht in 1973.
In 1975, minimum investment of non-exporting promoted 
enterprises was further raised to 10 m. baht. The increase 
in the level of minimum investment reflects partly the 
allowance for inflation and partly the desire to keep up 
with modern technology and to achieve economies of scale at 
the same time.
On the other hand, the Department of Industrial 
Promotion which is responsible for the promotion of small- 
scale enterprises requires that eligible candidates for 
assistance must not have investment exceeding 1 m. baht.
Thus there is a big gap between the minimum level of
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investment set up by the BOI and the maximum investment 
level set up by the Department of Industrial Promotion. 
Moreover, since benefits given by the BOI are more extensive, 
it is likely that local resources, especially capital, will 
be drawn towards large-scale and probably capital-intensive 
manufacturing. Neither of these two government bodies is 
likely to fulfil the employment objective.
3.5.2 Protection. The most powerful instrument that 
the government can utilise to protect and foster domestic 
production is tariff policy. Originally, tariffs were used 
as a revenue raising device. In 1964, however, there was 
an upward revision of the tariff rates to encourage domestic 
production (Akrasanee, 1974b). Balance of payment 
difficulties in 1969 necessitated another major upward 
revision followed by minor changes in 1972 and 1973 to reduce 
production costs for domestic producers.
Insofar as the promoted sector is concerned, promoted 
firms were given an assurance that, if necessary, the 
government would consider the imposition of tariffs to 
protect local producers. Although this was supposed to be 
temporary, in practice it lasted longer than expected 
(Draper, 1974). Alternatively, quantitative restriction 
of imports of competing products of promoted firms may be 
enforced. In 1972, the government introduced another 
alternative measure of protection. A special fee or 
surcharge of no more than 50 per cent of the c.i.f. value 
of competing imports could be imposed. This was expected 
to provide more immediate protection and was not intended 
to last more than one year.
Although the special privilege of "protection on 
request" is granted to promoted enterprises, once the 
protection is provided, non-promoted firms automatically 
receive the same benefits. Thus, in practice, "protection 
on request" has more far-reaching effects than originally 
intended.
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So far, there have been few comparative studies of the 
level of potential effective protection in the less developed 
countries. Ranking the level of protection by nominal tariff 
rate the level of protection in Thailand falls in the medium 
range. However, Akrasanee (1974b) showed that ranking by 
the two methods can be very different. Moreover, it is 
clear that the revision of tariff rates since 1964 has 
resulted in a widening gap between the level of tariff 
applied to inputs and final output. Consequently, potential 
protection has risen over time. Akrasanee also suggested 
that there was a bias in the protective structure against 
export commodities and against inputs. At the same time, 
the structure encouraged domestic production of consumer 
goods, e.g. beverages, transport equipment and other 
consumer durables. Moreover, the attempt to fight inflation 
in recent years has led the government to reduce business 
taxes on some of the domestically produced goods, thus 
compounding the protective structure.
In 1975, the government took a new turn in using tariff 
policy for industrial promotion. Non-exporting firms would 
be eligible for promotion only if "protection" in their 
industry did not exceed 30 per cent. However, the existing 
tariff structure still remains very protective.
Protection indirectly affects the process of technology 
transfer in two ways. In the first place, if factor 
proportions or input mixes in the economy are to a certain 
extent determined by the output mixes, a non-uniformed 
protection will encourage the use of input which is 
utilised more intensively in highly protected sectors. For 
example, if the tariff structure is biased towards capital- 
intensive products, then the transferred techniques will be 
relatively capital-intensive.
Secondly, protection reduces competition in the local 
markets. This may lead to reduced efforts by firms
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5operating in the protected sector. Local firms may make 
less effort to copy or learn from one another or from 
foreign firms than they otherwise would have done. Thus, 
the demonstration effects and the spill-over effects from 
direct foreign investment will be weakened or neutralised.
The effect of price distortion of protectionist policy 
on cost benefit calculus should also be noted (Little,
1972). Under the distorted price system, the extra value 
added generated by protected firms will differ from value 
added measured at world price which can be negative in the 
case of high protection and inefficiency. In this case, it 
becomes difficult to evaluate the gain from direct foreign 
investment brought about by high protection.
3.5.3 The minimum wage law. Prior to 1973, wages were 
fixed through market mechanisms. There has been no 
comprehensive study of wage structure and levels in Thailand. 
In 1971, a survey of 401 manufacturing establishments in the 
Greater Bangkok area suggested that average monthly earnings 
of unskilled workers were 670 baht for males, 446 baht for 
females and 224 baht for child labour (Sarkar, 1974).^ On 
the assumption of a 26-day month, the daily average wage can 
be estimated to be 25.8 baht for males, 17.2 baht for 
females and 8.6 baht for child labour. However, the 
director of the Department of Labour has suggested that the 
average wage for unskilled labour was lower than Sakar's 
estimates, i.e. between 10-15 baht per day, and had been 
steady at 8-10 baht per day over the last two decades 
(Chantharawitun, 1972). From these studies, it appears that 
there is a large wage differential between modern large- 
scale and small-scale family enterprises, between foreign 
and locally-owned businesses and among industries.
5 It is debatable whether protection reduces X-efficiency 
overall. See Corden (1974).
 ^ Greater Bangkok consists of Bangkok-Thonburi and three 
adjacent provinces, viz. Pathumthani, Nonthaburi and 
Samutprakarn. Child labour includes workers below 14 years 
of age.
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The wage differential, and especially the low wage paid 
to some groups of labour, was partly a result of the surplus 
labour force. The relatively stable wage trend up to 1970 
and the relatively low wages paid to some parts of the labour 
force were made possible by the fact that the price of rice, 
the main wage good, had been kept low by an export premium 
to subsidise the urban sector. Prior to the 1970s, the cost 
of living as measured by the consumer price index was also 
very stable, rising no more than four per cent p.a. in the 
1960s. However, in 1973, the situation changed abruptly.
The oil crisis sharply raised the cost of living (Table 3.5). 
In 1973, the consumer price index rose 11.7 per cent and in 
1974 the increase reached 23.29 per cent. During these two 
years the food price index increased over 40 per cent. In 
October 1973, the ruling military regime was ousted and 
replaced by an elected government one year later. Incipient 
democracy induced a sudden awareness among the labour force 
of the possibility of collective bargaining. The year 
1973-74 saw unprecedented increases in the number of labour 
disputes (Table 3.6). The number of disputes rose sharply 
in 1973 leading to 507,607 man days lost. The textile 
industry alone had 157 work stoppages resulting in 112,829 
man days lost (Table 3.7). Several labour disputes produced 
violent and bitter confrontation between employers and the 
police, on the one hand, and employees on the other.
Recognising the increasing cost of living, the first 
minimum wage law was enacted in April 1973 fixing the 
minimum wage at 12 baht per day in the Greater Bangkok area. 
Subsequent collective bargaining resulted in four wage 
adjustments which were as follows:
(a) January 1974 - the minimum wage was raised to 16 baht
per day.
(b) June 1974 - the minimum wage was further raised to 20 
baht per day and the minimum wage area was extended to 
include Samutsakorn and Nakorn Pathom.
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Table 3.5
Consumer Price Indices (1965-1974) for Bangkok-Thonburi
All items Food
1962 100.0 100.0
1965 103.8 104.8
1966 107.7 111.6
1967 112.0 119.6
1968 114.4 123.7
1969 116.6 128.6
1970 117.7 128.9
1971 120.1 129.7
1972 124.9 138.0
1973 139.5 157.9
1974 172.0 202.9
Source: Ministry of 
Economics
Commerce, Department of Business
Table 3.6
Labour Disputes (1969-1974)
Number of disputes
leading to work Number of workers Man days
stoppages involved lost
1969 18 5,345 23,594
1970 25 2,888 6,004
1971 27 553 12,646
1972 54 7,803 19,903
1973 501 177,877 296,887
1974 357 105,883 507,607
Source: Department of Labour
Labour Disputes in All
Table 3.7
Manufacturing and Textile Industry
All manufacturing Textile
Number of disputes 389 157
Total workers 123,614 64,346
Workers involved (%) 95.45 97.09
Man days lost 232,116 112,829
Source: Department of Labour
70
(c) October 1974 - the minimum wage of 16-18 baht per day
was to be enforced for the whole kingdom of Thailand.
(d) January 1975 - a minimum wage of 25 baht per day was
to be enforced for the Greater Bangkok area.
Therefore, in less than two years, the minimum wage 
increased by more than 100 per cent. The earlier increases 
affected mainly the small and medium sized firms because the 
large-scale firms were already paying more than 20 baht per 
day. The larger firms began to feel the impact of the law 
when the minimum wage was raised from 20 to 25 baht per day. 
It was estimated that the textile and electrical equipment 
industries, the two industries most affected, experienced a 
rise in production costs of 2.2-2.4 per cent while the 
average increase for all manufacturing industries was 1.9 
per cent (Prachathippatai, May 20, 1975).
3.5.4 Regulations on foreign ownership and control. 
During the 1950s, discrimination against foreign businesses 
had eased and the government made it clear in the first 
National Economic and Development Plan that foreign investors 
would be as welcome as local investors and would be eligible 
for promotional status as long as their operations belonged 
to one of the promoted categories. To reinforce this 
invitation, the government offered several guarantees to 
foreign investors in the 1962 Investment Promotion Act. The 
government promised not to expropriate promoted enterprises. 
Remittance of profits and dividends as well as repatriation 
of imported capital in foreign currency would be allowed.
If Thailand were to experience difficulties with her balance 
of payments, promoted enterprises which had been operating 
in Thailand for over two years would be permitted to remit 
at least 20 per cent of their profits, and to repatriate at 
least 20 per cent of the imported paid-up capital.
During the second development plan, it was made known 
that the government favoured joint ventures between local 
and foreign interests but there were no regulations on
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foreign ownership in the promoted sector. As far as the 
non-promoted sector was concerned, apart from encouraging 
foreign firms to register locally, there were no restrictions 
on foreign operations either.
Towards the end of the second plan, there was increasing 
public concern over foreign economic domination. This time, 
it was directed against Japanese investment, which had been 
extensive in the Thai economy for some time. This led the 
government to issue two decrees putting some restrictions on 
foreign businesses and on foreigners working in Thailand.
The Alien Occupation Law (National Executive Decree 322) 
denied work permits to aliens (apart from those working for 
promoted enterprises) wanting to work in the manufacturing 
of traditional handicrafts, construction, research, 
advertising and other services. The Alien Business Law 
(National Executive Decree 218) classified economic 
activities into three categories covering trading, modern
nas well as handicraft manufacturing and services. No new 
majority-foreign-owned firms were to be allowed in activities 
under group A. Existing foreign firms were either to be 
converted into local firms or to leave the industry by 
November 1974. New foreign entries under group B were 
allowed only for promoted firms but even these would have 
to agree to restrict their output to the capacity initially 
proposed to the BOI. Existing non-promoted foreign firms 
were not allowed to expand and were to limit their growth to 
30 per cent of their 1972 output or sales or profits.
Promoted foreign firms under group C were to be allowed to 
operate but they might be called upon to meet extra 
conditions on foreign financing, gearing ratios and 
employment of aliens as well as the phasing out period of 
between 10-15 years. This decree thus has direct bearing 
on the channels through which technology is transferred.
7 The list of activities under this decree is given in 
Appendix A. However under the new government in 1976,there 
were some suggestions that the restriction might be abolished 
or relaxed to improve the investment climate.
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Foreign businesses which were most severely affected 
were the non-promoted Japanese trading enterprises, the 
operations of which fell under classifications A and C of 
the Alien Business Law. The law was believed to have been 
promulgated with the underlying motive of regulating the 
extensive activities of Japanese trading houses although it 
is applicable to all foreign firms (Katano and Smutrakalin, 
1976).
The new investment promotion guidelines in 1975 also 
took a tougher stand on foreign ownership. The new 
guidelines were designed to protect "national interests and 
the environment" (BOI Announcement No. 2, 1975). For the 
first time, local ownership of no less than 60 per cent was 
required for non-exporting promoted firms. If local 
ownership was less than 60 per cent but greater than 40 per 
cent, then the applicant was to meet at least one of the 
following extra conditions: local contents were to exceed
50 per cent, the factory was to be located in a promoted 
zone, or the technology utilised was to enhance technological 
progress. However, negotiations for flexibility on this 
foreign ownership criterion could be arranged, depending on 
the characteristics of a particular project. Thus from 1975 
onwards, promoted enterprises with more than 60 per cent 
foreign ownership would be allowed only if they agreed to 
export more than 20 per cent of annual sales.
The Ministry of Industry can also exercise special 
control on foreign ownership, both in the promoted and non- 
promoted sector. So far, its control in this direction has 
been negligible. In 1973, only new entries in a few 
industries were under special control. For instance, new 
firms in the glass manufacturing industry were to have 75 
per cent local ownership.
Before finishing this section, it should be noted that 
apart from the very vague condition on technology in the 
1975 promotion guidelines, Thailand has had no specific
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policy on technology. Negotiations for the acquisition of 
foreign technology have also been left entirely to private 
bargaining. Apart from the need to gain government 
recognition for remittance of royalties, know-how and 
management fees in foreign currency, there has been no 
government intervention in the terms and conditions of the 
technology contracts.
The lack of government policy in this area is probably 
due to the fact that industrialisation is a recent 
development activity. The general impression is that 
transferred technologies have so far involved simple 
production techniques. Thus, technology contracts were not 
expected to be complicated. This point will be examined 
more fully in a later chapter.
In this chapter, it has been pointed out that, even 
without an explicit technology policy, the government can 
indirectly influence the choice of factor proportions, the 
channel of technology transmission, and the strength of 
demonstration and spill-over effects. The government's 
attempt to tackle one problem has often resulted in 
intervention or the creation of another problem. In 
particular, the employment objective is often in conflict 
with other objectives, notably decentralisation, social 
welfare and the protection of the local market. Although 
the generation of employment is likely to be the most 
important issue in the 1970s, the promoted large-scale 
manufacturing industries which have been given considerable 
incentives have demonstrated little capacity for absorbing 
the increase in the labour force.
It has also been suggested that although direct 
government participation in industrialisation has decreased 
substantially, the government has increasingly been using 
various policy instruments to intervene in the private 
sector. It is important to bear in mind that the firms in 
this study conduct their business within these policy 
frameworks.
CHAPTER 4
Methodology
The overall impression after field-work was that a 
more systematic, detailed and co-ordinated collection of 
statistical data was desperately needed before there could 
be any good economic analysis. It was found that a 
considerable amount of data was independently gathered and 
compiled by various government offices, many of which are 
not generally known to the public. Thus, in collecting 
material for this thesis, I was faced with the dilemma 
whether to exhaust all potential official sources or to 
approach firms directly. Since time was the most limiting 
factor, I was forced to distribute questionnaires only to 
find out that some of the questions had already been asked 
by a government office. Admittedly, I also spent one-third 
of my time searching for the right way to approach firms. 
Therefore, by revealing the methodology used and problems 
experienced in field-work, it is hoped that the time wasted 
and the errors committed in this study can be avoided by 
future researchers.
The last part of this chapter provides the definition 
of foreign control and the classification of industries to 
be used in later discussions.
4.1 The Scope of the Study
Several limitations led to the decision to concentrate 
on the process of technology transfer in modern large-scale 
enterprises. First, it was quickly appreciated during the 
trial interviews that most firms were reluctant to provide 
information on production, salaries and wages, sales, 
profits, etc. In other words, financial questions would 
have to be minimised. This meant that heavy reliance had 
to be placed on data from official sources. Official data 
were most readily available from the Board of Investment
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(BOI) which is mainly responsible for supervision of the 
"promoted" sector which in turn consists mostly of modern 
large-scale enterprises. In the trial period, an attempt 
was made to distribute pilot questionnaires to non-promoted 
firms but there was little response. A personal follow-up 
stimulated a better response but again financial and 
technical statistics were not revealed, by some because of 
absence of records and by others for taxation reasons. 
Moreover, many of these non-promoted firms are partnerships 
and need not submit their balance sheets and profit and 
loss statements to the Commercial Registration Office which 
was one of the important government sources used for this 
study.
Secondly, the study is concerned with the relationship 
between direct foreign investment and technology transfer.
It is well known that foreign investments are likely to be 
found in modern large-scale industry. Therefore, it should 
be remembered that any conclusions drawn from this study are 
relevant only to large-scale enterprises, i.e. firms with 
more than 50 employees or total investment over 1 m. baht. 
"Small firms" referred to in this study are relatively small 
enterprises in the large-scale group.
The next step was to decide which industry to study in 
more detail. Since the industrialisation effort commenced 
only in 1960 and was not well under way until after the mid- 
1960s, most industries are relatively new and the number of 
firms producing the same products are usually small. The 
textile industry emerged as the most suitable case study. 
First, it is the oldest industry. The older the industry, 
the more widespread and likely the spill-over effect. 
Secondly, it is the largest manufacturing industry in the
promoted sector. It comprises a reasonably large number of
localfirms (65 excluding non-integrated/finishing firms) although 
it can be considered a small industry by western standards. 
The larger the number of firms in the industry, the more
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competitive is the pressure for firms to improve and better 
their technology and the larger the number of potential 
sample firms. Thirdly, it is also an industry with a 
reasonable number of both local and foreign controlled 
enterprises. The only drawback is that the textile industry 
is well known for its highly embodied technology, i.e. most 
of the know-how is embodied in capital and thus the industry 
requires a large proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. However, it was hoped that some useful findings on 
entrepreneurship, employment, skill trade-off and 
accumulation of managerial and supervisory resources might 
still be found. Lastly, the textile industry has a well- 
established association with a well-informed research 
division. It is one of the very few industries that is 
constantly collecting information from members and it 
publishes annually reliable statistics.
4.1.1 The period covered in the study. My first field 
trip in Thailand lasted from October 1974 to August 1975 
during which a period of six weeks was spent in Japan. The 
most recent official data available at the time of the 
survey were the 1973 figures. Therefore, in general, the 
findings (except interviews) refer to the 1973 data base and 
are supplemented as far as possible by the most recent data. 
It should also be stated at the outset that 1973 was a boom 
year for Thai industry, especially the textile industry. 
Therefore, the findings in this study tend to indicate the 
best possible outcome of the performance of sample firms, 
other things being equal.
My second field trip in Bangkok during January 1977 
lasted one month and I was mainly concerned with collecting 
data from the Bank of Thailand.
4.1.2 Official data. The most useful data were 
provided by the BOI. Each year, the BOI distributes a 
questionnaire to all promoted firms to collect statistics 
for its annual report. Promoted firms are also requested
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to submit their profit and loss statements with the reply. 
Unfortunately, there is no statutory obligation for firms 
to reply to the questionnaire. Consequently, not all 
promoted firms respond to the questionnaire.
During my field-work, the 1974 replies to the 
questionnaire had not been submitted to the Board in large 
numbers. Therefore, the BOI made available the data of the 
1973 questionnaire covering 132 firms out of which 115 
replies were sufficiently complete for analysis in this 
study. Table 4.1 presents the number of firms which replied 
to the BOI questionnaire classified by industry according to 
the method adopted by the Bureau of National Statistics of 
Thailand. The BOI questionnaire includes information on 
planned and actual production, gross and net income, 
depreciation, foreign and local wages, source and cost of 
know-how assistance, value of local and imported inputs and 
machinery, fixed assets, total investments and liabilities, 
source of and interest on loans, number of local and 
foreign workers in three skill categories, viz. executives, 
technical and management staff and others, ownership by 
country of origin, etc.
An attempt was made to approach the Ministry of 
Commerce for the profit and loss statements and balance 
sheets of the textile firms which did not respond to the BOI 
1973 request. Altogether replies to the questionnaire and 
financial documents of 45 textile firms were obtained from 
both the BOI and Ministry of Commerce. Yet, some data were 
missing for several firms because they presented financial 
documents in only a few aggregate figures. It was decided 
however that the data set of 37 textile firms could be used 
for they provided information in sufficient detail for the 
econometric analysis.
In 1974, the Bank of Thailand supplied information on 
the aggregate payments for trademarks, royalties and 
management fees. In 1977, the Bank decided to let me have
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Table 4.1
Number of Firms in this Study Classified by Industry
Number of firms
replying to BOI Number of
questionnaire technology contracts
Food 13 14
Dairy products 4 6
Preserving of food 6 4
Sugar - 2
Animal feed 3 2
Beverages and breweries - 2
Textiles 37 24
Garments and accessories - 7
Garments - 3
Garment accessories - 4
Shoes - 3
Paper and paper products 7 2
Chemicals and petrochemicals 9 12
Chemicals and fertilisers 3 6
Filament yarn 3 3
Petrochemicals 3 3
Chemical products 10 36
Paints 8 13
Medicine and pharmaceuticals 2 8
Cosmetics - 12
Adhesives - 3
Petroleum products 1 1
Rubber and rubber products 10 4
Automobile tyres 3 4
Bicycle tyres 3 -
Other rubber accessories 4 -
Plastics - 3
Ceramics - 4
Glass and glass products - 2
Cement - 3
Metal equipment - 16
Electrical products 13 25
Industrial apparatus - 2
Household appliances 6 15
Batteries 3 8
Light bulbs 4 -
Vehicle assembly 15 22
Automobile 6 6
Auto parts 5 14
Motorcycles 3 2
Bicycles 1 -
115 184
Sources: BOI and Bank of Thailand
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full access to all technology contracts. In order to obtain 
permission to remit royalties and know-how fees in foreign 
currency, firms must submit applications together with the 
relevant technology or trademark contracts. By 1975,
256 contracts were submitted to the Bank of Thailand.
However, only 184 contracts are usable for the analysis.
These 184 contracts were classified, according to the method 
adopted, by the Bureau of National Statistics of Thailand 
into 17 industrial groups which were further divided into 
20 groups as shown in Table 4.1.
The Bureau of National Statistics published a 
comprehensive survey of industrial enterprises in 1973. It 
covered detailed information on types of legal organizations, 
value added, employment, energy consumption, etc. 
Unfortunately, it did not include all industrial enterprises 
and only a few large-scale enterprises in the textile 
industry were covered by the survey. Moreover, it did not 
distinguish foreign and local ownership. The 1974 
unpublished census did cover industrial establishments in 
the whole kingdom but information was collected only on 
types of operation and location of industrial enterprises.
It was found during visits to firms that some of the 
classifications of types of operation used in the census 
were inaccurate owing perhaps to lack of technical 
understanding. The Bureau's estimate should be considered 
as a conservative approximation.
The Labour Department compiles data on labour disputes 
and issues a bulletin called Labour and Industry which 
provides up-to-date information and studies of matters 
relating to industrial relations.
4.1.3 Non-official sources. There are three main 
types of non-official data: data collected by manufacturing
associations, data collected by other researchers that were 
made available to me in the original form, and other 
completed surveys and studies.
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The Thai Textile Manufacturing Association (TTMA) 
provided the most comprehensive background statistics on the 
textile industry. It is the biggest manufacturers' 
association in Thailand. In 1974, it had 41 members which 
controlled more than 90 per cent of national spinning 
capacity and included most of the large-scale weavers. The 
association has a research division which compiles statistics 
on output, imports, exports, capacity, efficiency of the 
industry. It also provides some technical information about 
the industry. Its counterpart in Japan, the Japan Spinners' 
Association in Osaka also assisted me with similar data on 
major Japanese investors in Thailand.
In 1968, Gregory Clark, who was then a graduate student 
in my department, made brief visits to several Japanese 
textile firms in Thailand. He permitted me to consult his 
interview notes which gave some information on motives of 
investment and Japanese participation in local ventures.
At the time of field-work, a group of postgraduate students 
at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok also 
distributed a questionnaire to 100 foreign firms in the 
promoted manufacturing industries. Six replies were 
returned and were made available to me in their original 
form. These six firms were among those submitting a reply 
to the BOI questionnaire.
There have by now been several surveys and studies 
which are related to this subject. These studies are useful 
for references, comparison and for checking up on my data.
The more important references are Thomrat Sivaranon's various 
papers on the textile industry, Narongchai Akrasanee's study 
of the protective structure of Thailand in the 1970s and 
Udom Kerdpibule's paper on Thailand's experience with 
multinational corporations. ECOCEN has published several 
studies on Japanese involvement in Thailand which are useful 
for background information. The study on Japanese-Thai 
economic interaction edited by Khien Theeravit sums up
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relations between Thailand and Japan and presents the 
popular attitudes of Thai intellectuals and students towards 
Japanese involvement in the Thai economy. In 1973, two 
theses on foreign investment and economies of scale in the 
Thai textile industry were presented by postgraduates of the 
Department of Economics of Thammasat University. In 1975,
Dr Yoshihara of Kyoto University, who had been writing a book 
on Japanese investments, made available his unpublished study 
of the Japanese textile industry and firms, some of which 
were investors in Thai joint ventures.
4.1.4 Field-work data. My own survey consisted of two 
parts, the questionnaire and the interview. The questionnaire 
was brief for the principal purpose was to elicit responses 
from firms. It was designed to set a starting point for 
interviews. The questionnaire was available in Thai,
English and Japanese. It contained questions about types 
of operation, size of firms, foreign ownership, innovations, 
sources of technology, and input, know-how agreements, skill 
composition at the commencement of operation and, at the 
time of survey, types of training provided for local labour 
forces, types of technical, marketing or financial 
assistance received from or provided to customers and 
suppliers. Although the textile industry was selected as 
the sample industry, the questionnaire was distributed to 
firms in various industries to capture an overall picture 
of the transfer mechanisms used in the manufacturing sector. 
The questionnaire was distributed by mail to 200 promoted 
enterprises in chemical, food processing, textile, transport 
machinery and accessories, rubber products, petrochemical, 
electric and electronic manufacturing firms. The response 
rate was 35 per cent, i.e. 70 returns out of the 200 sets 
distributed. Thirty-six returns were from the textile 
industry. During the follow-up, ten non-promoted firms 
(including two textile enterprises) and 44 promoted firms 
(including 35 textile manufacturers) as well as the Thai
1 See Appendix B.
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Weaving Organization which is a public enterprise granted 
interviews. Altogether, 55 enterprises were interviewed but 
factory visits were made only in textile enterprises.
Therefore, in this study, the size of the sample of 
firms varies according to the source of data. The BOI 
sample consists of 115 firms, the Bank of Thailand 184 firms, 
and my own questionnaire sample of 70 firms of which 55 
firms granted interviews.
For the textile firms, interviews were conducted at 
least twice for each firm, one with an executive (above 
manager level) and another with the mill manager and/or the 
chief engineer. In some cases the accountant and the chief 
foreman were also interviewed.
The interview with the chief executive usually lasted 
one to two hours. The purpose was to investigate the history 
and development of the firm. Discussions covered the motives 
for and benefits of getting into the business or joint 
venture, the contribution of each partner, their interaction 
in the management and control of the enterprises, inter­
industry and intra-industry interaction and competition, 
executive attitudes towards choice of factor proportions, 
sources and means of technology acquisition, costs and 
conditions of technology agreement, joint venture conflicts, 
participation of local work force, etc.
At the factory, the interview was designed to rate the 
level of technology used in each enterprise. This involved 
questions on characteristics of machinery. Other questions 
included history of changes in the method of production, 
innovation and adaptation of technology, skill composition 
of work force, labour problems, recruitment, promotion and 
training of work force, technical difficulties and plant 
organization. Data on the number of workers per machine and 
output per spindle per unit of time were obtained from 
cotton spinning mills.
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Generally, the partner who controlled the enterprise 
gave interviews. However, in foreign controlled enterprises, 
extra interviews with local executives and professionals 
were usually possible. Interviews were conducted in English, 
Thai, Chinese or Japanese whichever was convenient. In the 
single case where the interview was conducted in Japanese, a 
Japanese-educated Thai employee was present to make sure that 
there would not be misunderstanding and confusion.
In Japan, interviews were granted by three trading 
firms and five manufacturers. Together, they had 22 
affiliates in Thailand. Usually, the interview was with a 
panel of staff in charge of overseas investments and 
finance, and a member of staff who had been posted to the 
Thai joint venture. It was decided that interview questions 
for the Japanese headquarters should be general and concerned 
with policy problems rather than with trying to obtain 
specific data. The main purpose was to obtain letters of 
recommendation to the local joint ventures in Thailand. 
Therefore, the emphasis in the interview was on the motives 
for investment in Thailand, autonomy of joint ventures, 
policy on replacement of Japanese staff by local workers, 
headquarters' attitudes towards factor proportions to be 
used in the Thai factories, gains from forming joint 
ventures in Thailand, costs and conditions of know-how con t r a c t s ,
Four Japanese manufacturers permitted me to visit their 
factories. The problem was that most had a range of 
factories from conventional to super modern plants. Owing , 
to limitation of time, it was decided to visit the plant 
which was most similar to the joint venture in Thailand to 
allow appropriate comparison. The four factories were in 
Nagoya, Kurashiki, Ise and Osaka.
In Tokyo, interviews were conducted in English and 
firms usually had many members of staff who were competent 
in English. In smaller firms in Kansai, and factory visits, 
the Japanese language was essential.
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Attempts were also made to obtain more information from 
various producers on the value of modern textile machinery. 
Four out of 19 major textile machinery producers supplied 
information on prices and technical characteristics of their 
machinery. Two American second hand textile machinery 
dealers supplied similar information. In addition, two 
sales agents for Japanese textile machinery producers and 
an agent of a Swiss manufacturer also granted interviews 
and provided more information on the types of textile 
machinery used by enterprises in Thailand.
During the field-work, several government officials 
also provided some valuable information for this study.
4.1.5 Procedures and problems experienced during field­
work . I was attached to the Department of Economics at 
Chulalongkorn University during my field-work period in 
Thailand. The first month was spent testing a pilot 
questionnaire and an interview checklist. After trials, 
the questionnaire was substantially shortened and financial 
questions were deleted. Follow-up for the textile firms was 
done personally, but for other firms follow-up was done by 
telephone. It was quickly found that without personal 
introductions, firms refused to co-operate.
Meanwhile, the manager and the research officer of the 
Thai Textile Manufacturing Association were contacted.
After a briefing by the research officer on technical 
processes in the production of cotton yarn and fabrics, the 
manager contacted one local firm in which I was allowed to 
spend four days familiarising myself with aspects of 
production. The Board of Investment issued letters of 
recommendation to several promoted foreign textile firms.
This met with little success.
The reason for the coolness among Japanese firms was 
that, since 1972, the Japanese business community in Thailand 
has gone through successive blows of nationalistic resentment
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against Japanese economic domination. The anti-Japanese 
business campaign organised by university students in 1972 
which was followed by an angry demonstration during Prime 
Minister Tanaka's visit in January 1974 rendered the 
Japanese firms extremely sensitive to public criticism.
Thus they maintained a policy of "polite silence" to 
outsiders. In one extreme case, I was repeatedly told that 
the questionnaire was on its way to the city office. Only 
on the eighth call was I told that no information could be 
supplied at all. This was decided at the very beginning 
but it was thought that I would soon give up. After one and 
a half months of little success, I decided to go to Japan to 
seek co-operation from the firms' headquarters. Most head 
offices were extremely co-operative. They showed competence 
in handling interviews. Interestingly, the three trading 
firms which were interviewed gave exactly the same answers 
to almost all questions. Most important of all, all 
headquarters except one instructed their Thai joint ventures 
to supply more local information as far as possible. 
Consequently, the second contacts with Japanese controlled 
joint ventures in Thailand were very successful and were 
completed very swiftly. The sole firm to which the head 
office could not provide me with a letter of recommendation 
refused to grant interviews. Finally, I entered the factory 
with a party of government officials from the Ministry of 
Commerce. However, this method was used as the last resort 
since it set severe limitations as to the type of question 
that could be asked.
Attempts to contact the local firms met with mixed 
success. Firms were normally co-operative when a personal 
introduction could be obtained. This indicates the 
impossibility of conducting random sampling for research on the 
Thai industry. In one extremely difficult case, six months 
elapsed before an interview was allowed. First, the author 
approached the firms as a student. Next, personal
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connections were used but proved fruitless. By contacting 
one employee, it was learned that the firm had some water 
control problems. The Head of the Department of 
Environmental Control was approached and he rang the manager 
and an appointment for interview was granted promptly.
While my difficulties were real, the firms' problems 
should be appreciated. At the time of my survey, at least 
four other questionnaires had been sent to these firms.
These were from the Bureau of National Statistics, the Bank 
of Thailand, the Board of Investment and the Asian Institute 
of Technology, not counting other questionnaires distributed 
by private research firms, academic staff and postgraduate 
students from the three universities in Bangkok. It was a 
totally new and demanding experience for firms to cope with 
research students and to answer long questionnaires five 
times a year. One manager granted an interview after 
spending 30 minutes cross-examining me on my personal history. 
He said he had to make sure that I was not from a private 
research company that was compiling information for his rival.
As mentioned earlier, the years 1973-74 also saw numerous 
labour disputes. Some were supported by student activists. 
Just four months before I arrived in Bangkok, there was the 
biggest demonstration ever held in Thai history involving
25.000 workers from 54 textile mills. During field-work, 
five sample firms were troubled by labour disputes. One of 
them had three work stoppages in four months leading to
17.000 man-days lost. The administrative staff of another 
firm was locked up in the office for two days before the 
employer gave in to workers' demands. Strikes accompanied
by violence were also reported by some sample firms. As soon 
as strikes threatened, the neighbourhood firms went on the 
alert and closed all communications to outsiders especially 
students. In some cases, the appointment was cancelled 
altogether. In many cases, appointments were postponed by 
several firms owing to labour disputes.
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A special problem with local firms was that some did 
not reveal full information on technical aspects. The 
question on innovation was the one that met with total 
failure. Firms refused to give dates and types of new 
innovations for fear that the information might be leaked 
to rival firms. To grade the level of technology of each 
firm, it is essential to note certain characteristics of 
machinery such as speed of revolution per minute. Sometimes, 
this information was not given and I had to estimate it by 
using a stop watch. This fact suggests the need for 
government to diffuse more basic technical understanding 
among small locally-owned enterprises.
To minimise both official resources and company 
resources in dealing with questionnaires, perhaps a data 
bank or at least more co-ordination among government offices 
is needed, so that each year there would be only one 
official questionnaire. This would eliminate overlapping 
of questions and would improve the response from private 
enterprises. If possible, university and international 
research institutes should be allowed to suggest the types 
of important statistics that have not so far been collected. 
To protect firms, firms would then be classified by a 
multiple digit industrial code and individual number. This 
information would be revealed to non-government bodies 
according to merit and the credibility of the supporting 
institute. This arrangement would facilitate future 
research.
4.2 Ownership and Control: Definitions of a Foreign Firm
It is generally recognised that the important 
characteristic which distinguishes direct foreign investment 
from portfolio investment is that investors can assert 
direct control over subsidiaries in the case of direct 
investment. Thus, the key word of direct foreign investment 
is "control" and this is also the basic concern of some host
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nations. However, the conventional definition of a foreign
firm is one with more than 25 per cent of foreign voting 
2shares. This definition stems from the fact that, from the 
statistical collection viewpoint, ownership statistics are 
more easily collected. Moreover, the "joint venture" is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Some writers impose a more 
severe restriction and require that a foreign firm is one 
with majority foreign ownership.
The use of a majority ownership criterion implies that 
there is a close relationship between ownership and control. 
The host government of the LDCs thus assumes that the larger 
the local ownership, the larger the local control and 
participation. Hence a larger share of benefits from these 
enterprises will accrue to the nation. Besides, a proportion 
of local participation and control is expected to facilitate 
transfer of technology to local staff.
In practice, ownership and control can be radically 
different. In the cases of low indigenous absorptive 
capacity or hired dummy local partners, major local ownership 
does not necessarily imply considerable control in the 
enterprises. Control can also be asserted through several 
channels.
It is possible to imagine a wholly locally-owned firm 
to be effectively controlled by a foreign (contracted) 
enterprise if it is entirely dependent on the foreign firm's 
technology and all-round management. Although control of 
corporate strategy and management are conceptually and 
functionally different, they are not often separated in the 
Thai case. In addition, the position of the party with 
managerial control is strengthened by the fact that they have 
more information. In the situation where local and foreign 
partners have approximately equal ownership and perhaps policy
This is the definition adopted by Sarkar (1974). The Thai 
government defines a foreign firm as one with 50% foreign 
ownership (Alien Business Law).
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control, but the joint venture is dependent on the foreign 
partner's know-how and managerial expertise, overall control 
can be expected to be biased towards foreign investors.
Policies of firms can be influenced to a certain degree 
by the desires of creditors, although the effectiveness 
varies with the ups and downs of debtor firms. If a 
shareholder is also the creditor, his effective control may 
be larger than reflected by his equity participation.
The relationship between foreign ownership and control 
is complicated by the participation of several foreign and 
local investors. Although a joint venture has a local 
majority, each local owner may hold a very small amount of 
shares and they may not act as a group. As will be mentioned 
later, Japanese investors have very close relationships and 
can be safely regarded as a consortium. In such cases, the 
joint ventures are unlikely to be locally controlled.
Fortunately, control and ownership of sample firms in 
this study usually correspond fairly closely. The problem 
only arises when the industry has a high concentration of 
Japanese investment. In comparison with American or 
European investors, Japanese investors prefer joint venture 
investment (Allen, 1973). Seventy-three per cent of 
Japanese related firms are within the 25-75 range, while only 
36.4 per cent of U.S. joint ventures are within the same 
range (Table 4.2). Characteristically, Japanese investors 
hold equity interests within the range of 45-55 per cent 
with the mode value of 49 per cent. Executive control, on 
the other hand, belongs to the Japanese partners. This is 
a particular problem in the textile industry.
To give an example, the correlation between foreign 
ownership and foreign control defined as the share of 
foreign executives in the executive board is 0.83 in the 
textile industry. This indicates that foreign ownership 
explains 68 per cent of the variation in foreign control.
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Table 4.2
Number of Promoted Firms Classified by Country of Origin
Source of Percentage share of registered capital
ownership 100 99.9-75.0 74..9-50.0 49.9-25.0 24.9-0 Total
Thailand 207 73 123 38 31 472
Japan 1 11 25 32 9 78
Republic of 
China 1 1 7 36 48 93
USA 4 8 7 9 16 44
Other
developed
countries 5 3 10 24 22 64
Other
developing
countries - 1 6 19 37 63
Others - - 3 5 10 18
Source: BOI
It is not at all uncommon to discover firms with 49 per cent 
foreign ownership having a majority foreign participation 
in the full-time executive board. The evidence of silent 
or dummy partners was confirmed in some of the sample firms. 
This makes the judgement of foreign and local firms on the 
basis of ownership all the more difficult.
Moreover, in two foreign-minority owned firms, local 
ownership is very fragmented. When they were established, 
the Japanese equity share was over 80 per cent. In the early 
1970s, acting in accordance with the wishes of the local 
government, the firms turned public and reduced their 
holdings to 48 and 50 per cent respectively. An examination 
of the local shareholder list revealed that the largest 
local shareholders hold a very small proportion of equity, 
approximately five per cent. It is therefore difficult for 
local shareholders to organise effective voting powers.
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Further complexity arises from the fact that some of 
the local investing firms are themselves foreign joint 
ventures. A foreign joint venture with local majority is 
considered a local firm. When they invest in another joint 
venture, they are considered, at least in official statistics, 
as a Thai partner. Official statistics show that two 
Japanese-related firms have 39 and 50 per cent Japanese 
equity but their largest local shareholders are Japanese- 
related financial and trading firms. If these indirect 
controls are taken into account, foreign equity in both cases 
far exceeds 50 per cent.
Borrowing from foreign partners is also not uncommon.
The size of loans varies from enterprise to enterprise. One 
Japanese joint venture acquired a loan 1.7 times as large 
as the total equity from a trading company which holds ten 
per cent of the equity interest. A fibre manufacturing firm 
received a loan nearly as large as its total equity from the 
Japanese investing firm. Synthetic fabric producers 
obtained loans ranging from 69.3 to 7.6 per cent of total 
equity. Since most of the BOI questionnaire respondents did 
not supply information on the total sources of funds, total 
loans from Japanese partners cannot be estimated. Bank of 
Thailand data indicate that 363 million baht is from 
Japanese parent companies; this is 6.7 per cent of total 
net capital inflow to Thailand between 1965-73. In contrast, 
the BOI questionnaires indicate that there were no loans from 
local investors to Japanese-Thai joint ventures.
Since the prime concern of this thesis is accumulation 
of local skill and knowledge, it is important to know who 
runs the firm, because it is only through participation in 
an enterprise that knowledge can be transferred to the local 
labour force. Thus, the conventional criterion of majority 
ownership must be supplemented by measures of managerial 
control.
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The notion of "foreign" and "local" controlled 
enterprise is to be used in this study. Data collected 
during field-work make it possible to compute a ratio of 
foreign to total executives in foreign related firms. 
Executives are defined as those on full-time executive 
boards. A firm is considered foreign if it has a foreign 
managing director and if its ratio of foreign to total 
executives is greater than the median value of the sample 
industry.
To give an example of the textile industry, the median 
value for foreign equity is 0.45 and for foreign management 
is 0.40. Those with values above the median are considered 
to have high foreign control. Firms are then classified 
into five groups as shown in Table 4.3. Since control is 
the main concern, the first two groups are considered 
foreign-controlled joint ventures, in short, foreign firms. 
The last two groups are considered locally-controlled and 
from now on will be called "local" firms.
Table 4.3
Firms Classified by Foreign Equity 
and Management Participation
Number of firms
1. High foreign management 
and high foreign equity 25
2. High foreign management 
and low foreign equity 3
3. Low foreign management 
and high foreign equity 7
4. Low foreign management 
and low foreign equity 18
5. No foreign equity and no 
foreign management 14
Total 67
Sources: BOI, Japan Chamber of Commerce, 
and Interviews.
Questionnaires
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Fortunately, it was found that textile firms which have 
substantial loans from foreign partners fall neatly into 
group 1. Contacts with firms during field-work did not 
reveal any major difficulty in classifying groups 2 and 3 
as foreign and local enterprises as had been expected. 
However, the interviews necessitated reshuffling the 
positions of two firms, one in group 1 and the other in 
group 3. For the former firm, it was found that the 
managing director and deputy managing director were local 
staff. The foreign experts took mostly supervisory and 
purely technical positions. Thus this firm should in fact 
be considered as a local firm. The latter firm, on the 
other hand, was found to have local partners responsible 
only for local distribution as had always been the case 
before the forming of joint ventures, so this firm is 
considered a foreign firm. Therefore, in contrast to the 
ownership criterion which would suggest that there are 14 
foreign firms, i.e. firms with 50 per cent or more foreign 
equity share, there are 28 foreign firms and 37 local firms 
under the majority management criterion. This criterion of 
control is also applied to firms in other industries.
As for the textile industry, since there is a small 
number of companies to be discussed in this industry, it is 
thought useful for further discussion to assign a label for 
each textile firm as shown in Table 4.4. Although not all 
the firms were interviewed, some information about each 
firm could be obtained from other firms in the business. 
However, these firms will be discussed at some length in 
Part II.
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CHAPTER 5
The Role of Packaged and Unpackaged Mechanisms 
in the Transfer of Technology to Some 
Manufacturing Industries in Thailand
In Chapter 2, it was mentioned that the sizeable volume 
of direct foreign investment in many newly industrialising 
countries can be explained by two factors prevailing in the 
host countries. First, weak local technical and educational 
infrastructure renders transfer of technology through direct 
foreign investment less costly and thus more profitable. 
Secondly, industrialisation policies which encourage modern 
large-scale industries for the domestic production of 
consumer goods aimed mainly at the small urban population 
necessitates foreign participation. Large-scale projects 
require large capital outlay and industrial expertise. 
Consequently, direct foreign investment becomes a chief 
channel for the transfer of technology in the modern large- 
scale industries.
In this chapter, the first section examines the relative 
importance of packaged versus various unpackaged transfer 
channels in some manufacturing industries in Thailand. The 
second section discusses the influence of different motives 
for direct foreign investment on the types of technology to 
be transferred. It also examines the difference between the 
packaged and unpackaged channels with regard to certain 
qualities and characteristics such as efficiency, capital 
intensity and wage levels. The third section explores the 
effects of the foreign sector on domestic productivity and 
compares them with other factors which also influence 
productivity. The fourth section compares packaged and 
unpackaged mechanisms in fostering inter-industry diffusion 
of technology. In the last section, adaptation of foreign 
technology and local R & D will be considered.
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5.1 The Packaged and Unpackaged Mechanisms in Some
Manufacturing Industries in Thailand
A "packaged" mechanism is used in cases of firms 
acquiring all three elements, capital, management and 
technology from the same source but the term may be extended 
to the case where one or two elements come in part from 
other sources, provided the rest comes from a single foreign 
source which also exercises the dominant control.
Table 5.1 presents the overall picture of technology 
transfer channels used by the 70 sample firms. Firms are 
divided into foreign and local firms according to the 
criteria stated in the previous chapter. It is clear from 
the table that while foreign firms usually have direct access 
to the technology of their parent companies, local firms are 
usually compelled to use other channels more extensively. 
Among the foreign firms, the three elements, viz. capital, 
management and technology were, in 34 cases, acquired mainly 
from one foreign source or a consortium of foreign sources. 
There was only one case where capital and management were 
provided by a foreign parent company, but technology was 
acquired from a contracting firm (which was a machinery 
supplier). Together these firms make up the 35 foreign 
firms in the sample.
Among the unpackaged channels, the hiring of private 
consultants combined with the use of a capital goods market 
is the most popular channel, followed by the acquisition of 
technology embodied in capital goods. Turnkey arrangements 
were observed in three cases and were normally used in 
conjunction with other mechanisms.
There were six firms in the local sector where 
technology was acquired from foreign partners, but the 
control exercised by these partners was not significant. 
Twenty-nine other local firms obtained their technology 
purely through various unpackaged channels. Thus, the 
evidence from the sample suggests that direct foreign
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Table 5.1
Mechanisms of Technology Transfer in Some 
Manufacturing Industries in Thailand
No. respondents
Local sector
Firms acquiring technology solely through 
capital goods market, both new and second 
hand and reverse engineering (1 turnkey 
arrangement) 8
Firms relying on capital goods market and
private consultants (1 turnkey arrangement) 15
Firms relying on technology contracts:
(a) with IESC1 3
(b) with minor foreign partners (1
turnkey arrangement) 6
(c) with producers of the same products 3
35
Foreign sector
Firms concluding formal know-how contracts
with parent companies 21
Firms receiving technology from parent 
companies without concluding formal
agreements 13
Firms concluding technology contracts with
other technology suppliers 1
35
Source: Field survey, 1974-75
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investment is by far the most important single mechanism for 
transferring industrial technology to Thailand.^ The 
evidence supports the hypothesis that direct foreign 
investment is the dominant channel of transfer during early 
industrialisation.
5.1.1 Motives for local entrepreneurs to form joint 
venture enterprises. Among the 70 firms which replied to 
the questionnaire, eight were wholly foreign-owned, 41 were 
joint ventures and 21 were wholly locally owned firms. Among 
the 41 joint ventures, 14 were locally controlled.
The primary reason for forming joint ventures reported 
by these firms is the need for technological advice and, in 
a larger project, the need for capital. A good example is 
a petrochemical firm which began as a wholly locally owned 
firm. A German machinery producer installed a turnkey plant 
but the factory was run exclusively by local staff. The 
company, however, suffered unusually heavy losses on two 
accounts. First, there was buyer resistance to the products, 
partly because the German machinery produced products which 
were not perfectly suited to local customers accustomed to 
products of Japanese machinery. Second, there was 
considerable imbalance of capacity among the various 
processing stages with consequent disruption of production 
flows. To resolve these problems, the firm decided to 
accept Japanese minority participation for production 
management. Japanese technical experts corrected the 
imbalance and adapted the machinery to produce output 
appropriate for local customers. As a result, the joint 
venture has been making handsome profits.
Foreign equity participation was sometimes used in 
payment for know-how. For example, a Taiwanese manufacturer
A larger sample confirms these findings. Out of 166 firms 
in 21 promoted industries, there were 97 firms (58.4 per cent) 
which acquired technology mainly through various channels 
and 68 firms (41.0 per cent) which acquired technology mainly 
through foreign partners or foreign parent companies.
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of monosodium glutamate agreed to accept 2 m. baht as a 
once-and-for-all lump sum payment for technology on 
condition that this sum be allowed to be reinvested as equity 
participation in the local firm. Many local joint ventures 
were formed with foreign partners who were initially engaged 
as private technical consultants.
Similar findings were reported by Udom Kerdpibule who
conducted a survey in 1974. However, he did not distinguish
between foreign and locally controlled enterprises. The
results are summarised in Table 5.2. The most often cited
expected contribution of foreign partners was technical
advice, although despatch to Thailand of foreign staff was
2thought to be necessary by half of the respondents.
3Marketing and capital needs assumed secondary importance.
Both Dr Udom's results and those of the present study 
support the contention that the primary need for direct 
foreign investment arises from weak local technical 
infrastructure. Therefore, these findings stress the 
functional importance of direct foreign investment as a 
mechanism for transferring technology.
5.1.2 The use of other channels for transferring 
technology. It has been pointed out that technology can be 
transferred through combinations of several mechanisms. In 
fact, it is a common feature in the promoted industries for 
both local and foreign firms to acquire technology by 
various means. Four main channels are used in the Thai 
manufacturing sector.
Dr Udom's survey included only light manufacturing and 
assembling industries for which skill requirements are not 
substantial.
3 It will be shown in a detailed study of the textile 
industry in later chapters that marketing assistance from 
foreign partners becomes relatively more important as firms 
become more established.
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Table 5.2
Contribution Expected from Foreign Partners by 
Thai Entrepreneurs in their Joint Ventures (1974)
No. of respondents
1 Introducing new technology, technical 
advice on the use of machinery and
planning operation 28
2 Skilled technicians to help run the
business 15
3 Help find market abroad and the use
of parent company's trade names 12
4 Arrange for loans from abroad 11
5 Help acquire raw materials from abroad 10
6 Help arrange for the acquisition of 
capital equipment on credit terms from
abroad 7
7 Train local workers 6
8 Help control quality of the products 4
9 Help supply market information 3
Total 96
Source: Kerdpibule (1974, Table 12, p.25)
5.1.2.1 Technology agreements with manufacturers of the 
same products. Although the next chapter will discuss 
technology acquisition through technology contracts at some 
length, this section will provide a brief insight into the 
main features of technology contracts.
In my own questionnaire, firms were asked to describe 
the main provisions in their technology contracts. Table 
5.3 classifies the 34 firms which reported to conclude 
technology contracts by the main features of their contracts. 
Trade secrets refer to patented products and/or patented or 
non-patented secret production processes. Table 5.3 
indicates that both foreign and local firms are predominantly
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Table 5.3
Major Aspects of Technology Contracts 
of the Surveyed Firms
No. of respondents
Local Foreign All 
firms firms firms
Production, sales and general 
management
Trade secrets and production 
management
Trade secrets, trademarks and 
production management
Trademarks and trade secrets
Production management
Trade secrets
1 1
2 2 4
- 2 2
3 1 4
6 14 20
1 2  3
Total 12 22 34
Trademarks only 5 1 6
Source: Field survey, 1974-75
concerned with getting production technology. Since most 
industries studied are simple technology industries this 
reflects, not surprisingly, technical needs in the early 
stage of industrialisation.
During the interviews, it was revealed that most 
technology contracts except those relating to trademarks and 
brand names provided for foreign staff to assist recipients. 
There were four exceptions in the local sector. The first 
was a producer of vehicle components and parts who bought 
blueprints, production designs and methods from a Japanese 
firm which produces the same products. No Japanese staff 
was assigned to the local firm, but each year a team of 
Japanese experts visit the factory to discuss problems with
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the local recipient. Day-to-day routine work was supervised 
by a private Taiwanese consultant. The second concluded 
agreements with two American firms. The American suppliers 
provided microfilms of blueprints for over 100 product 
designs and models but no foreign staff was necessary. The 
third was a non-promoted electronic appliance assembler who 
concluded a licensing agreement with a European firm for 
necessary production methods. Instead of having foreign 
experts, the chief engineer was sent to the supplier's plant 
for six months training. The fourth was a producer of 
canned food who had the factory installed by an Australian 
machinery supplier but they hired two American consultants 
for plantation and factory management.
All except one firm replying to the BOI and my 
questionnaire concluded technology contracts with producers 
of the same products. For example, a local oil refinery 
contracted with the Royal Shell Dutch company for factory 
and general management. In contrast to the finding of 
Stobaugh (1971) that engineering firms took over the role 
of technology suppliers as products matured in the 
petrochemical industry, all petrochemical firms in Thailand 
are foreign controlled joint ventures or subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations producing the same product 
elsewhere. This fact probably reflects the lack of 
sufficient local funds to finance a big project independently 
of foreign capital; the prevalent family concern businesses 
are also reluctant to vest control in the hands of consultant 
firms.
5.1.2.2 Turnkey arrangements. Turnkey arrangements were 
found in the local sector, where technology is relatively 
complicated and where local investors lack industrial 
expertise. During the interviews, three enterprises claimed 
to use turnkey arrangements. For example, as mentioned 
before, a local petrochemical factory was totally designed 
and installed by a German machinery producer. A government
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spinning and weaving organisation contracted with a Japanese 
trading company to organise the design and installation of 
a textile plant in the north of Thailand.
5.1.2.3 Contracts with consulting firms and international 
organisations. Engineering and consultant firms have not yet 
been used extensively by the sample firms. However, three 
local firms reported the use of a private international 
organisation called the International Executive Service Corps 
(IESC) for short-term services (Table 5.1). IESC is a non­
profit organisation, the members of which are retired 
executives with substantial industrial and business 
experience. IESC members make their consultant services 
available to firms in developing countries free of charge, 
but accommodation and travel expenses have to be provided 
for. The service period does not usually last longer than 
six months. This mechanism was normally used when there were 
some specific technical or organisational problems. One 
local firm that utilised this service claimed that IESC had 
been asked for service four times, each time with highly 
satisfactory results. The other two firms also reported that 
the service was fruitful and inexpensive.
5.1.2.4 Hiring of foreign private individual consultants.
All foreign controlled firms, with or without technology 
contracts, have access to the foreign staff of the parent 
companies and need no private consultants from outside 
sources. However, one foreign firm hired a production 
manager from their machinery supplier because the parent 
company did not produce the same product.
Among the 35 local respondents to my questionnaire, 15 
relied on private consultants (Table 5.1). In cases where 
technology was less complicated, such as textiles and 
processing of food, local firms preferred hiring Taiwanese 
experts because of relatively lower salary costs. As will 
be shown later, they cost only half as much as Japanese 
consultants and less than one-third of European and American
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Consultants. Moreover, since many of the local entrepreneurs 
have Chinese origins, there are fewer language barriers and 
cultural adjustments to cope with.
5.1.3 Acquisition of technology through the capital 
goods market. Among 70 respondents, there were only eight 
local firms which relied solely on technology embodied in 
capital goods (Table 5.1). Other firms usually combined this 
with other mechanisms. The reason is obvious. Reliance on 
capital goods alone is possible only for firms with long 
industrial experience or with simple production techniques, 
mostly embodied in capital goods. They were vehicle part 
producers, textile (weaving only) manufacturers and a food 
processor. The last entrepreneur had more than 30 years 
experience in manufacturing of various kinds of foodstuffs. 
Table 5.4 indicates avenues through which capital goods 
have been acquired. Generally, each firm employed more than 
one avenue. Therefore, the total sum needs not correspond 
to the total number of respondent firms.
Table 5.4
Sources of Machinery and Equipment for 
Some Manufacturing Firms in Thailand
N o . of respondents
Local Foreign All
firms firms firms
Purchases of capital goods in 
international markets through
(a) local agents 22 6 28
(b) machinery producers 22 18 40
(c) foreign partners 4 23 27
Purchases of local capital goods 13 9 22
Purchases of second hand machinery 2 4 6
Reverse engineering 1 — 1
Source: Field survey, 1974-75.
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5.1.3.1 Acquisition of capital goods from international 
markets. Owing to the relative lack of an international 
information network, local firms appeared to rely more 
heavily on local agents for the purchase of machinery, 
especially in food processing, textiles and vehicle component 
parts production. Where local firms had more industrial 
expertise - that is, older industrial establishments - direct 
purchases from machinery producers were possible. Not 
surprisingly, foreign firms obtained their machinery from 
their parent or affiliated companies and to a smaller extent 
from machinery producers. Among the 23 foreign firms that 
ordered capital goods through their foreign affiliates, as 
high as 90 per cent of the total value of machinery in ten 
firms were from their foreign affiliates. Nine out of these 
ten firms were Japanese-controlled joint ventures, each 
having a Japanese trading company as a co-investor. As will 
be mentioned in a later chapter, it is customary for the 
trading house partner to organise purchases from various 
sources and collect sales commissions from machinery 
suppliers.
5.1.3.2 Purchases of second-hand machinery. Only a few 
firms in this sample used second-hand machinery. This is 
partly because all of them were promoted enterprises and 
they could get brand new machinery free of tax. Even when 
second-hand machinery was used, it did not usually 
constitute more than ten per cent of the total value of 
machinery. One exception was a local firm that purchased 
second-hand machinery worth approximately 15 per cent of the 
total value of its machinery (or half of the capacity). Its 
managing director bought the machinery cheaply when touring 
factories in the United States. Another exception was also 
a local firm, which bought second-hand machinery on the 
recommendation of an American plant manager. Four foreign 
firms that used second-hand machinery were take-overs of
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local enterprises. One of them, a non-promoted jute bag 
manufacturer, also transferred the production facilities of 
one of the factories in Japan to be reconstructed in 
Thailand.
5.1.3.3 Purchases of local machinery. Among the 22 firms 
that reported the use of local machinery, only five owned 
local machinery worth more than 60 per cent of the total 
value of their machinery. All of them were involved in 
simple production processes. Four of these five firms were 
Thai firms and one of these four firms was a non-promoted 
local tool-maker. The only foreign firm that used a 
substantial amount of local machinery (60 per cent) was a 
non-promoted Japanese manufacturer of insecticides and 
herbicides.
5.1.4 Reverse engineering. A Thai producer of edible 
starch reported that his firm acquired technology by reverse 
engineering. A local machinery producer was contracted to 
copy foreign machinery which had already been completely 
physically depreciated. This provided nearly half of all 
machinery, although the principal equipment was still 
imported from Japan and Germany. Copied machinery was 
valued at 30 per cent of the total equipment cost.
This particular example casts light on the types of 
industry that would generate skills indirectly. In this 
case, although the skill required by the industry itself is 
small, the skills generated from the production of tools 
will be valuable. The firm also reported that the producer 
of the copied machinery also produced the same kind of 
machinery for his competitors afterwards. Thus, from a 
social point of view, the skill generated for this specific 
purpose could be maintained and regenerated.
5.1.5 Acquisition of know-how through former employees 
of foreign firms. During the interview, one firm reported 
it had received technology through an ex-employee of a
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multinational subsidiary. This non-promoted manufacturer 
of household chemical products obtained a secret formula 
from a local scientist who had previously worked with a 
subsidiary of a multinational corporation. There was also 
scattered evidence of this type of technology transmission 
from the complaints of three large firms which were 
interviewed. They claimed that some of their skilled labour 
had left the firms to become chief production experts of 
small competitors (not in this sample).
5.1.6 Assistance from suppliers and customers. An 
indirect way of acquiring technology, especially for local 
enterprises, is assistance received from suppliers and 
customers. Twenty-six out of 70 respondents reported benefit 
from technical and marketing assistance from suppliers (Table 
5.5). Out of these 26 firms, 18 were local companies. This 
indicates the need of local enterprises to obtain technology 
from whatever sources are available. Typical technical 
assistance was to local workers in the use of imported 
machinery. For example, a local food producer asked an 
Australian supplier to stay back for four months after the 
factory was completed to train local operators. Top 
technicians were sent to an Australian mill for training.
A machinery supplier for a vehicle component parts producer 
despatched local technicians employed by the buyer to the 
U.S.A. and Japan for intensive training. Engineers of a 
local petrochemical firm were sent to Germany, South America 
and Japan for training as well. Some German suppliers of 
dyes gave a short-term training scholarship to the local 
staff of government owned mills. One German supplier of 
dyes also provided free laboratory service to a local 
private weaver of silk and cotton.
In addition to the above assistance reported by 
interviewed firms, the Thai Textile Manufacturing Association 
reported that technology was also transmitted through a 
conglomerate of suppliers. All members of the Association
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Table 5.5
Technical and Marketing Assistance 
Received from Suppliers and Customers
No. of respondents
Local Foreign All
firms firms firms
From suppliers
Technical and marketing assistance 2 3 5
Technical assistance 14 3 17
Marketing assistance 2 2 4
Sub-total 18 8 26
No assistance received 17 27 44
Total 35 35 70
From customers
Technical and marketing assistance 3 - 3
Technical assistance 1 - 1
Marketing assistance 4 7 11
Sub-total 8 7 15
No assistance received 27 28 55
Total 35 35 70
Source: Field survey, 1974-75
(44 firms in 1973) obtained special benefits from the U.S. 
Cotton Council. Each year, the Council despatches textile 
technologists to give seminars on the latest processing 
technology for cotton. Short-term (two months) touring 
scholarships have also been granted to representatives of 
members.
Assistance received from customers was less frequently 
cited. Only 15 firms, eight of which were locally owned, 
received technical assistance in the form of production 
designs and marketing service in the form of market surveys 
and joint advertising expenditure.
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5.1.7 International trade fairs. One Thai entrepreneur 
who had produced heavy cotton for curtain materials on hand 
looms discovered mechanised looms when he went to the 
international trade fair in Bangkok in 1968. He then 
contacted the machinery firms and obtained the displayed 
machines for trial use in his factory. Upon satisfactory 
results, he ordered more machines of the same type and, at 
the same time, considered more seriously the use of 
mechanised equipment in his other processes. He had also 
found some Korean jaggard looms appropriate to his purposes 
and hired a Korean technician to set up the new machine.
5.1.8 Formal education and training financed by 
proprietors of enterprises. Formal education is not a major 
priority of either local or foreign firms interested in 
promoting the transfer of technology. The educational 
process takes a long time to show any significant effects. 
When this method is used, it is usually limited to small 
local family businesses and also to a very small core of 
staff, usually members of the family concern. During the 
interviews, it was observed that in 13 cases education was 
used as a means of upgrading technology. However, this was 
normally financed privately by the proprietors. The common 
method was to encourage one of the children to go overseas 
and to undertake a course of study as close as possible to 
the family business, e.g. business administration, accounting 
and engineering. These people later on held key positions
in the company. While this monopolistic character of 
recruitments in family businesses may prove very successful 
owing to inherited or fostered talents since childhood, 
coupled with loyalty and devotion to kinship, its success 
cannot always be as assured as competitive recruitment on 
grounds of merit and talents. However, there were a few very 
successful cases in the textile industry. For instance a 
managing director who owned 50 looms went to Japan after he 
had a Bachelor's degree in commerce. He spent two years 
working in a Japanese weaving factory to gain himself some
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experience before setting up his own project. Through this 
experience, he also contracted two Japanese engineers to 
help installing the factory and the Japanese returned to 
Japan when the two-year contract expired.
5.1.9 Institutional mechanisms for accelerating 
technology transfer. Four local firms in my sample 
mentioned useful assistance received from institutional 
mechanisms such as the managerial course conducted by the 
Department of Industrial Promotions. They were smaller firms 
with less sophisticated techniques and without foreign 
affiliates. A few larger and older establishments, however, 
reported that they have used this mechanism but had not 
found it impressive. These firms were large textile 
companies which had good access to technology through foreign 
affiliates and training schemes offered by the Japanese 
government.
Industrial firms in this sample benefit from the general 
education system to a very limited extent. The main reason 
is that the industries were expanding at a much faster rate 
than the educational system. Local firms constantly 
complained about the lack of appropriate skills: vocational
school leavers lacked practical skills, their training was 
too general. This is not surprising and it explains why one 
of the underlying goals of encouraging domestic production 
is to strengthen these skills or to create an extra channel 
for fast accumulation of skills at the expense of the 
private sector outside formal educational systems.
The overall impression from the survey is that 
entrepreneurs in the local sector were dynamic and forward- 
looking but while most of them were undoubtedly very active 
in searching for means of improving their operations, there 
seems to be a considerable cost associated with technology 
acquisition, to upgrade their understanding of the production 
system and also to widen their access to free technology.
For example, during interviews, it was clear that a local
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entrepreneur was trying to keep secret some technical 
information which would have appeared in any standard 
textbook. For this entrepreneur, the information had been 
hard and costly to obtain owing to his relative lack of 
formal education. Another producer of simple food processing 
had problems with quality control and was contemplating the 
use of a private consultant firm, but was not able to afford 
the scheme on the off chance that it would not be worth it. 
Several local entrepreneurs enquired enthusiastically into 
other possible means of obtaining technology cheaply. Others 
were found to have unsuitable plant layout from the beginning, 
resulting in production inefficiency.
5.2 Influence of Motives for Direct Foreign Investment on
Types of the Transferred Technology
Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought 
concerning the motives of direct foreign investment. The 
first approach associates direct foreign investment with 
market imperfections. According to Hymer (1960),
Kindleberger (1969) and Caves (1971), imperfections in the 
technology market bring about direct foreign investment.
To a certain extent, intervention in the market such as 
through the introduction of tariffs or investment incentive 
systems attract direct foreign investment (Barlow and Wender, 
1955) . Such policies threaten shrinking export markets for 
foreign producers. In these cases, however, other factors 
such as the absorptive capacity of the host countries, the 
nature of the technology and property right markets play a 
significant role in determining the choice between direct 
foreign investment and licensing arrangements.
The second approach considers direct foreign investments 
as an adjustment of comparative advantage between home and 
host countries. This is an adaptation of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
and the product cycle theory. In contrast to the first 
approach, where investors tend to invest in the areas in 
which they have a comparative advantage, the second approach
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suggests that investors in fact invest in industries where 
they are losing comparative advantage. Several economists 
have developed various theses and have speculated that 
developing countries may gain from multinational corporations' 
global sourcing strategy (Adam, 1971; Helleiner, 1973). 
Observing the Japanese investment trend Kojima has argued 
that Japanese investment, in contrast to American 
multinational corporations' investments, was "pro-trade", 
i.e. Japan has invested more heavily overseas in industries 
where she has been losing comparative advantage.
If direct foreign investment is a consequence of an 
adjustment of comparative advantage between the host and 
home countries, then direct foreign investment will be 
concentrated in traditional industries such as food and 
textiles which are usually considered as relatively labour- 
intensive industries. On the other hand, if direct foreign 
investment has been encouraged by domestic policies, the 
types of technology which will be brought about with direct 
foreign investment will depend on the types of protected 
products and the measure used to encourage investments. If 
cheap credits and accelerated depreciation were granted, 
direct foreign investment would transfer technology that was 
more capital-intensive than it otherwise would have been.
In such cases, even though the traditional industries were 
the protected industries, if investment policies were biased 
towards capital cheapening, the types of technology 
transferred would be different from those being transferred 
purely because of an adjustment in comparative advantage.
Direct foreign investment associated with oligopolistic 
power of investors, on the other hand, will tend to introduce 
capital-intensive technology because foreign investors' 
oligopolistic advantage is more often found in labour-saving 
industries. However, skill-intensive technology may be 
one possible type of technology that may be transferred by 
investment undertaken with this motive. Yet, if direct
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foreign investment is mainly associated with trademarks and 
brand names, the transferred technology is liable to 
contribute little to the process of development of the 
recipient economy. Understanding of underlying investment 
motives will enable a local government to devise policy 
guidelines which will achieve a proper balance of skill and 
employment objectives.
It is argued here that direct foreign investment 
especially Japanese investment in Thailand is largely a 
consequence of the local industrialisation policy. Japan's 
overseas investment pattern in Thailand appears to be 
influenced by her trading patterns between the two countries 
prior to Thai industrialisation. Being a middle-of-the-road 
advanced industrial nation, Japan's investment is pervasive, 
covering industries with both low capital and high capital 
requirements.
To investigate the motives of foreign investment in 
Thai manufacturing industries, the share of packaged transfer 
or direct foreign investment in 21 promoted industries is 
presented in order of their total investment per worker in 
Table 5.6. Three measures are used to compute the share.
The first two are directly related to the concept of foreign 
control. The first is the percentage share of the foreign 
controlled firms in the promoted sector. The second is the 
percentage share of foreign controlled firms in total 
employment in each sector. The third is based on the 
conventional ownership criterion and is the simple average 
of foreign equity shares in each industry. The first two 
measures would be identical if all firms had the same factor 
proportions and were the same size. These three measures 
should be seen as complementary, especially in cases where 
the sample is small. For instance, consider an industry of 
three firms. If there is only one foreign subsidiary, the 
share of the number of foreign firms will be 33.3 per cent. 
However, if the foreign firm is the largest firm in the
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industry, employing over 50 per cent of the industry work 
force, the use of the share of the number of firms will 
underestimate the relative importance of the foreign sector.
In such a case, local firms may be marginal firms which 
struggle hard to compete. Consider another situation where 
the combined work force of the foreign sector is less than 
20 per cent of the total work force of the industry, because 
foreign firms use highly capital-intensive technology. The 
use of the share of employment will again underestimate the 
importance of foreign investment. When a sample is large, 
the first two measures are a good approximation to one 
another. In the present sample, the correlation between the 
first two measures is over 0.90. The correlation of the 
first two and the third measure exceeds 0.86 in both cases.
In Table 5.6 the value of average total investment per 
worker was weighted by the size of each firm relative to the 
size of industry measured in terms of employment. The 
correlation between the three measures of foreign shares and 
the total investment per worker for 19 industries were 0.74, 
0.73 and 0.73 respectively.
It is clear from Table 5.6 that in terms of employment 
and the number of firms, the shares of packaged transfer or 
foreign controlled sectors are higher in industries where 
technology is relatively sophisticated such as petrochemicals, 
automobile tyres and, with the exception of fertiliser 
production and petroleum refining, direct foreign investment 
is more often observed in the industries associated with 
relatively high total investment per worker. Foreign 
investments are also more frequently found in industries 
associated with international trademarks and brand names and 
international marketing networks such as paints, 
pharmaceutical products and batteries. On the basis of the 
first two measures of the share of direct foreign investment, 
the evidence suggests that foreign investment in Thailand is
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connected with oligopolistic market structure with the 
consequence that the transferred technology is not likely 
to be suited to Thailand's comparative advantage.
However when the third measure, viz. ownership 
criterion, is considered, direct foreign investments appear 
to be reasonably evenly distributed throughout almost all 
industries. To resolve this paradox, foreign investments 
were classified as investment from Japan, less developed 
countries and other more developed countries and presented 
in Table 5.7.
Industries were ranked from low to high average total 
investment per worker. Investments from non-Japanese 
advanced nations were clustered around industries with high 
total investment per worker. American investments were 
mostly observed in petrochemicals production, automobile 
assembly, manufacturing of paper and paper products, canned 
food and animal feed. British firms invested more heavily 
in trademark related industries, e.g. electrical appliances, 
batteries and paints. German firms concentrated on 
petrochemical and pharmaceutical production. Swiss and 
Belgian firms were observed in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Australian, Dutch and Swiss firms invested in condensed milk 
and canned food production. Therefore, western firms appear 
to invest according to their comparative advantage.
Investors from other developing countries were 
frequently observed in the textile industry and in those 
industries where investment per worker was relatively low.
The only exception was a Taiwanese firm in the petrochemical 
industry. However, its investment was relatively small. 
Investors from developing countries are therefore also 
largely involved in industries where they have a comparative 
advantage.
The most interesting case is that of Japanese investment, 
which was widely spread in all industries. It was pointed
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out earlier that Taiwanese and Japanese investment is mostly 
in the form of joint ventures, including some without 
majority ownership. Therefore, the even distribution of 
direct foreign investment according to the third measure 
is a combined result of Japanese investment and investment 
from other developing countries offsetting investment of 
other developed countries in high capital requirement 
industries.
It should be noted that this list includes only firms 
already in operation in 1973. There were several Japanese 
firms in the fertiliser, paper and paper products, 
petrochemicals, animal feed and electric bulbs industries 
which were not yet in operation in 1973 but had applied for 
or had obtained promotion certificates. In other words, 
Japanese investment would be increasingly widely spread in 
all industries.
Looking at the number of operating firms in Table 5.7 
it is tempting to conclude that Japanese investments are 
more concentrated in industries where Japan is losing 
comparative advantage, especially in the production of 
textiles. However, by value of registered capital, Japanese 
investments in relatively capital-intensive industries such 
as petrochemicals, automobile assembly, far outweigh 
investments from other developed countries.
To a large extent, Japanese investment was motivated 
by Japan's sensitivity to host government policies and her 
trading position prior to the encouragement of local 
production in Thailand. Japan has been the major supplier 
of most imported products, both consumer and industrial goods 
to Thailand. In 1962, Japan's share of Thailand's total 
imports was 29 per cent (Naya and Akrasanee, 1974, Appendix 
Table 2.2). Japan's share of Thailand's import by commodity 
in 1962 corresponded closely to her investment pattern. For 
instance, Japan supplied 100 per cent of Thailand's imports 
of synthetic fibre, 57 per cent of chemicals, 57 per cent
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of both electric appliances and motorcycle imports, 60 per 
cent of vehicle parts and 42 per cent of trucks and buses.
On the other hand, Japan did not export dairy products to 
Thailand and only exported 5 per cent of total Thailand's 
import requirements of pharmaceutical products.
The encouragement of local import replacing therefore 
had most impact on Japan. The strategy for Japan was then 
to invest behind in these industries to protect her market 
shares. The study on Japanese investment in Southeast Asia 
by the Export Import Bank of Japan in 1972 also concluded 
that,
... most of the overseas investors, taking advantage 
of the policy of developing countries of encouraging 
production of import substitution goods in their own 
countries, aimed at sales of their products in the 
expanding markets of the developing countries (The 
Export Import Bank of Japan, 1972, p.10).
The move also coincided with Japan's liberalisation of 
foreign exchange. Since Japanese investment up to 1970 was 
a direct response to Thai industrialisation policies,
Japanese entrepreneurs' choice of techniques might therefore 
be affected by the prevailing local policies.
5.2.2 Some characteristics of packaged and unpackaged 
transfer. An assumption underlying the argument for 
untying the packaged transfer is that certain characteristics 
and behaviour of local firms are more closely related to 
national objective. This section investigates some of these 
important characteristics. First, it is often suspected that 
foreign firms introduce technology which is more capital- 
intensive than that introduced by local firms. Second, 
foreign firms are alleged to pay unduly high wages, thus 
attracting local talent away from local enterprises and 
therefore rendering the local sector uncompetitive.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.8 present the average total 
investment per worker for the local and foreign sectors.
These figures have been weighted by the size of firms to the
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size of the respective groups. It will be seen that in four 
industries, viz. batteries, electric bulbs, paints and 
paper, the local sector showed a higher value of total 
investment per worker. However, this could have been the 
result of combinations of different vintages of capital 
equipment in different firms. To provide a check on the 
vintage problem, the share of non-wage costs in adjusted 
total manufacturing costs was computed. The adjusted total 
manufacturing cost was derived by subtracting the actual 
wage bill from the actual manufacturing costs, and then 
adding to the remainder the computed wage bill. The computed 
wage bill was derived by multiplying the size of work force 
of each firm by the industrial average wage. By so doing 
it is hoped that the effects of wage differential among 
firms on the denominator would be eliminated.
On the basis of the non-wage cost ratios, the foreign 
sectors, with the exception of the petrochemical industry 
were relatively capital-intensive. The exceptional situation 
of the petrochemical industry was due to the inclusion of a 
Taiwanese firm in the foreign sector. This Taiwanese firm 
was far smaller than any other firms and used a relatively 
high level of labour intensity. Omission of this firm 
increases the share of non-wage costs of the foreign sector 
of the petrochemical industry to 96.4 per cent which is 
higher than that of the local sector.
Therefore, on the basis of 115 BOI sample firms, it 
appears that the foreign sectors were generally more 
capital-intensive than the local sectors. More interestingly, 
looking at the non-wage cost ratios, the extent to which the 
foreign sectors were more capital-intensive was relatively 
small in most industries except in the production of electric 
bulbs and vehicle components and parts. These statements 
must, however, be made with some caution. The deficiencies 
of historical capital values included in the total investment
122
figures are well-known. The adjusted non-wage-cost ratio 
is a useful alternative but the prices of other factors 
including capital depreciation have not been standardised.
The second characteristic to be looked at is the wage 
level under the packaged and unpackaged mechanisms.
Generally, a host country will gain from higher wages paid 
to local staff by foreign enterprises so long as this 
represents the sharing of higher profits resulting from 
better foreign management and not from monopoly rents 
(Vaitsos, 1974, p.70). However, this gain may be offset by 
the fact that either local talent may be attracted away 
from the local sector, or that local staff trained by the 
local sector may be drained to the foreign sector. The 
local sector may be forced to join in wage competition and 
the general wage level in the industry might be bid up as a 
result. If this, in turn, leads to labour-displacement and 
unemployment, the host country will lose.
The average wage of each group in each industry was 
calculated by dividing annual salaries and wages (excluding 
fringe benefits and foreign salaries) by the number of local 
staff and workers. Fringe benefits were excluded because 
they were not presented as one single item in the accounts 
and were aggregated with other expenditure items, which makes 
it very difficult to trace. It is evident from the Table 
that as total investment per worker increases, the average 
wage also rises. One obvious explanation is that the 
marginal productivity of labour is higher in industries with 
larger stock of capital. Another explanation is that the 
average includes remunerations to both skilled and unskilled 
workers. If capital and skills are complementary, a high 
capital intensity will be associated with high average wages.
From Table 5.8, it is clear that in industries where 
there is no foreign sector, wages tended to be low, e.g. 
bicycles and bicycle tyres vis-a-vis batteries. In three 
industries, viz. electric bulbs, electrical appliances and
123
motorcycles the average wage in the foreign sector was 30 
per cent higher than that in the local sector. The high 
wage level of the foreign sector seems to put some pressure 
on the local sector to raise its wage level. For instance, 
local producers of electric bulbs and appliances had to pay 
high wages to their workers when compared with the local 
textile firms that had comparable figures on total 
investment per worker. In two relatively more sophisticated 
industries, e.g. paper and paper products and petrochemicals, 
local firms paid higher wages. This may serve as some 
indication of a bid for a well-qualified work force.
5.2.3 Sources of direct foreign investment and their 
effects on foreign-controlled firms. The differences in the 
stage of industrialisation among source countries of the 
packaged transfer may have some effects on capital intensity, 
wages and productivity etc., of a foreign firm. Table 5.9 
presents three sources (Japan, other developed countries and 
developing countries), five industries in terms of 
certain selected characteristics of the firms. It appears 
that Japanese controlled firms used more capital-intensive 
technology than firms controlled by developing countries 
except in textiles but were more labour-intensive than firms 
from other developed nations. The same pattern also holds 
for average wages of both foreign and local staff. The wide 
gap between Taiwanese and Japanese wages as well as that 
between Japanese and European and American wages is very 
striking. Executives and other experts from developing 
countries cost approximately one-third of their Japanese 
counterparts, but Japanese experts in turn cost about one- 
third of western experts. As a consequence, Japanese 
investors and investors from developing countries could 
afford more intensive use of their experts below executive 
levels. The allegation by student activists in Thailand 
that Japanese firms intentionally use more foreign staff to 
prevent leakage of know-how to local staff should be reviewed
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in the light of this evidence. The determining factor is 
more likely to be the low wage rate of Japanese firms 
relative to investing firms from other advanced nations, 
which enabled Japan to be cost-competitive while keeping a 
large number of foreign staff. The relatively small shares 
of foreign executives in Japanese, Taiwanese and Indian 
firms also reflected their patterns of joint venture 
investments.
Table 5.9 also indicates comparative performance of the 
three groups. Japanese firms excelled western firms both in 
automobile assembling and automobile tyres as far as factor 
productivity was concerned, but surprisingly their 
performance was slightly less than that of investors from 
other developing countries in textile production. It appears 
that Japanese firms still did not have a competitive edge 
over Taiwanese firms even when they operate in a low-cost 
country like Thailand. Detailed investigation during 
interviews suggested that Taiwanese firms operated at lower 
technical efficiency but with higher capacity utilisation. 
British battery manufacturers also performed better than 
their Japanese counterparts. Contrary to general 
expectation, Japanese firms were not superior in industries 
typified by simple technology.
Japanese textile firms seemed to reap substantial 
benefits from the 1973 textile boom. Exports from Japanese 
joint ventures were vigorously promoted by Japanese trading 
companies which were normally one of the co-investors of 
these enterprises. However, apart from textiles, exports 
from other industries from all the three groups were nil or 
negligible.
As regards local content, Japanese firms appeared to 
use more local inputs than other foreign investors except 
in battery production. However, the suppliers of Japanese 
firms were mostly Japanese joint ventures or Japanese 
affiliated firms. For example, a leading Japanese motor
127
vehicle assembly firm held ten per cent equity interests in 
one Japanese-related local firm which produced alternators. 
The assembler guaranteed outlets for total output. After 
1973, five more Japanese joint ventures in the component 
parts industry were expected to come into operation. This 
would increase the use of local contents substantially.
Local contents in American assembling firms were mainly 
batteries and tyres, which in turn were also supplied by 
American controlled joint ventures. Local machinery was not 
used in any substantial quantity by any of the three groups.
The data on cost of technology given in the previous 
chapter and on the performance of different sources of 
technology given above might give some guidance as to 
selection of potential joint ventures in future. If 
efficiency is similar between Taiwanese and Japanese firms, 
but the cost of technology is lower in Taiwanese firms and 
the opportunity for local participation is higher in 
Taiwanese firms, it is not unreasonable to give priority to 
Taiwanese projects.
5.2.4 Effectiveness of the exploitation of imported 
technology under packaged and unpackaged mechanisms. 
Abstracting from other non-economic considerations, direct 
foreign investment will seem preferable to the host country 
as a means of transferring technology if it exploits the 
transferred technology with higher efficiency, i.e. foreign 
firms are expected to produce more output per total 
resource committed. The reason is that owing to industrial 
experience, foreign firms should be able to operate closer 
to the production possibility frontier while inexperienced 
local firms suffer from the cost of learning by doing. In 
the case where the products are tradeable and no 
restrictions are imposed on export activities by parent 
companies, foreign firms should show higher potential in 
competing in international markets. This section 
investigates whether direct foreign investment in the 
sample industries appears to fulfil such expectations.
128
Table 5.10 presents several measures of performance of 
foreign and local sectors from the BOI sample. The first 
measures are the conventional factor productivity indices.
The general picture is that foreign sectors had higher 
labour productivity except in the production of electric 
bulbs and petrochemicals; this is largely a result of higher 
capital outlay. There were only four sectors in which the 
foreign sector performed better in both input factor 
productivity indices. These were the production of 
batteries, alkalis, acids and soda ash, motorcycles and 
paints. In the production of electric bulbs, the foreign 
sector performed worse under both indices.
Export performance may indicate the relative 
competitiveness and efficiency of enterprises. Firms which 
are able to export must survive international competition 
and are presumably more cost competitive. The percentage 
of weighted export shares in the total income of the 21 
industries was computed. Apart from canned food and 
pharmaceutical industries, exports generally constituted a 
rather small fraction of total income for both domestic and 
foreign sectors. Yet surprisingly, it is found that in four 
industries, viz. batteries, vehicle component parts, 
electrical appliances and animal feed, exports shares of the4domestic sector are more impressive. Export performance 
also hints at direct foreign investment motives. If the 
dynamic comparative advantage hypothesis is to be upheld, 
foreign sectors should be exporting more, for they are 
expected to be engaged in supplying the home country as well.
It is evident that until 1973, foreign controlled sectors 
seemed to be more preoccupied with catering for local markets.
When capacity utilisation (measured by the ratio of actual 
to planned output) is considered, it is not obvious that foreign
Detailed investigation of technology contracts of the 
foreign firms revealed that foreign firms in three out of 
these four industries were not permitted to export.
C
om
p
ar
at
iv
e 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
o
f 
D
om
es
ti
c 
an
d 
F
or
ei
gn
 
S
ec
to
r 
(1
97
3)
129
G
tn > to f t  CO tO O . t o  • • M1 CO ro  • co
•H ,—. o3 • • . . . . a a a a
03 o\° • l r - 1 1 i—i f t  uo tO Co • UO • oo f t  uo • cm i 1
P — G uo f t  00 CO f t n 6 n G oo t o  to  G co
P O
0 f t
P f t
•H P
O o3
rd in Ü
f t ■H •H
rH p • f t  OO O  f t Co U0 CO CO • • o o  . CO o  • o o o
u •H to 03 • • • . • . . • rd rd a a . .
P 03 0\° • OO f t O  to Co f t  CO CO • f t  i O  • f t  f t  .C M UO CM
P e '— C 00 p to  CO p uo CO uo G G 00 uo c  oo uo g  f t CM CO
0
a
c & CM O o O  CM O  O UO CO f t o )  h  o  o  f t  t r
f t •H .—. • 1 1 1 • • • < • • . • • • • • • • 1 1
03 03 o\° O0 o o O  f t  o  o UO O  uo o  rH r -  o  o
03 b P —- oo f t CO •—i
3-1 0 0
td u ft
P C
m •H
U
ft f t •H
p 03 P r- OO O0 UO UO f t O  O  p  o CO o O  • LO o  • o o O
0 P w ,—_ • • • • • • . . . . • • 1 a a . .
a 0 03 o\° CO i p  co tft  U0 uo O  CM CM O to o o  • CM o  « o o o
X P b '— i—i f t f t f t n n
w
8
1—1 C
rd On ft > CO to to UO f t  CM • to CO O  UO f t  tO UO CO
p f t -H f t OS • • • • . • rd . . . . . .
03 0 03 03 • 1 CTi 1 1 I—1 o  CO CO CO • p  CM O  to to CO O  t f 1 1
f t ft P f t c U0 P CM CO tO f t G U0 tO co Cl  to M1 CM
P 0 CO i—1 i—1 CM f t p  CM CM CM f t  CM
P f t G f t
03 0 03
n3 B
P p p
td f t w o
rd 03 •H —.
(1) f t > p P • CO UO O  CO CO CO f t  U0 CM • CO O  • CO • . f t OO t o
p G in P o3 • • • . • . . . . rd • a a a • .
1—1 o f t 03 o3 • tO CM CO f t CO to CO f t  CO • 00 1 f t  - C O  • . f t o UO
rd o e f t G f t  co UO CO to CO 00 t o  f t G O 5 n 7 n n 5 CM oo
> o Q 1—1 1—1 f t  CM f t f t  f t  1—I f t CM f t  f t
rH Q
c 00 f t f t  U0 f t  CO O0 CM UO CO U0 f t  to o
Cn • f t 00 M  CO CO O • CO 00 f t  t o  CO CO O  t o
•H f t o3 CM 1—1 f t  00 CM CO cd co f t t o  f t  co  t o  M1 O
f t 03 as • 1 1 1 -  -  -  - . -  - - - - - - - 1 1
<u f t P f t C CM UO CO f t  UO CO G p  uo Co O  co  d 1 f t  ro
f t 03 0 OO CO f t  M1 CO 00 CM CO to  uo t o  co co ft
f t ft ft I—1 ft 1—1
03 ft
0
QJ £ o p  cn CO CO to 00 UO CO o CO ft CO CO CM
P •H XT p< CM CM P< o i—1 i—1 i—1 o o CO r—1 f t r~ croi—1 P P • CM CM *3* CO CO GO U0 M1 O • CO U0 • P  • • uo r - CO
o3 03 w f t o3 -  - -  - - -  -  -  - rd -  1 -  rd -  rd rd - -
> f t 03 o3 • CO to CO UO f t f t  O  CO CO • uo P  • P  • • P CO p
B ft G CO ft CM 1—1 CM CO CM f t G P 4 n 5 n n 8 CM uo
8
ft 1 t o
P w
in w P
as p o
o p
aS P P
in P P O
in w CD o 0 p  i—i tP
03 P u  w p f t  p G
■H G c f t in B f t
p 0) aS - 03 P  03 f t G
f t 0 G to f t  m f t p  03 w f t  m ft
0 w in O P  f t  f t rd £>i f t  m ft i—i f t
O m 03 Qj i—1 Qj i—1 a P  rd rd B  rd 03ft 03 p B P  f t  as p  w f t ft Ü w P
o > O P  td ft 03 (13 P 03 0) P  ft pft u  w P u rH a» ft P ft P  ft 03 B 03 B
03 03 03 w u  m u  aS ft o  03 ft G ft P  03 W P> •H 03 03 03 ft 03 ft >i a P  rd P  rd P ft 03
P P P i—1 ft 1-1 P ft P i—1 U rd W O  O P  o t—1 rH
03 03 03 ü  Ü O P  ft P  CO rd P B P  B P  B O O •H 0
in P  P £0 ft Ü P  O P B O p G O 03 O ft P P p
03 f t  P Ü o P 03 X 03 f t f t  P  rd • H P  f t p  rd P P p
P P  03 ft ft 03 i—1 03 i—1 U G O P rd P  rd P  > 03 03 03
f t f t  CQ CQ CQ > W f t  w <c £  ft CU C  CU <  W ft f t f t
r—1 CM CO t r  uo to f t  00 CO o f t  CM CO t r  uo t o  co co O rH
f t f t  f t  f t i—1 rH  rH  rH  rH  rH CM CN N
ot
es
: 
1)
 
n
.a
. 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
th
a
t 
d
at
a 
w
er
e 
n
ot
 
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
.
2)
 
- 
in
d
ic
a
te
s 
th
a
t 
th
e 
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r 
se
ct
o
r 
is
 
n
ot
 
in
v
o
lv
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
p
ro
m
ot
ed
 
in
d
u
st
ry
.
130
firms were using resources more effectively. In several 
industries, local firms had higher capacity utilisation.
Yet even with the lower capital utilisation rate, foreign 
sectors managed to be superior in many industries such as 
textiles and motorcycles. Higher efficiency in these 
foreign sectors may be either the result of higher total 
investment per worker or of better work force and management. 
Investigation into the effects of foreign management and 
capital intensities of the textile industry will be conducted 
in the second part of this study.
5.3 Foreign Investment and Domestic Productivity
It has been suggested in Chapter 2 that transfer of 
technology from enterprise to enterprise can occur in a 
number of ways. Relatively efficient production or 
management technology of foreign firms may be observed, 
adopted and adapted by local firms. Local firms may benefit 
from a better quality labour force which has been previously 
trained in foreign enterprises. More indirectly the 
foreign sector serves as a competitive pressure that may 
force local firms to look for ways and means to compete with 
foreign enterprises, e.g. putting more resources into 
productivity study, providing more and better training for 
local workers or seeking assistance from consultant 
organisations. The competitive pressure exerted by the 
foreign sector may force local enterprises to devise new 
techniques or operating systems in order to improve their 
efficiency.
Against this positive effect, foreign firms may in the 
short run squeeze local firms out of the market and thus 
have adverse effects on production of the local sector. If 
local firms cannot reduce their work force proportionately 
to the reduction in output, their labour productivity is 
bound to fall.
This section examines the effects of the foreign sector 
on the productivity of local firms in the same industry. If
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foreign investment affects the domestic sector favourably, 
a positive relationship between the performance of domestic 
sectors and the share of foreign investment can be expected. 
In an industry where the spill-over effects of foreign 
investment are notable, productivity of foreign and local 
sectors will be less dissimilar, other things being equal.
One way of testing the external effect of technology 
transfer by foreign investment is to fit production 
functions for each sector for all industries, and then to 
investigate whether the difference in the shape of the 
production function is smaller in industries where direct 
foreign investment is relatively dominant, assuming for the 
moment that foreign firms use the desired technology. This 
method allows for a precise identification of contribution 
of each factor. Another weaker test is to investigate the 
relationship between the productivity differential of 
foreign and local sectors and the degree of foreign 
investment in the respective industries. Again a smaller 
differential should be related to a higher level of direct 
foreign investment. The third, and the weakest, test is to 
examine the relationship between the existance of the 
foreign sector and the productivity of the domestic sector. 
Caves (1974) employed this test for Australian data of 21 
industries. He hypothesised that
... productivity levels are higher ceteris paribus 
in the domestic sector of Australian manufacturing 
industries where multinational firms account for 
larger shares, where productivity advantage over 
the domestic rivals is relatively great or where 
their shares have been increasing (Caves, 1974, 
p. 185) .
He found a positive relationship between productivity 
(measured by value added per worker) and the employment 
share of the foreign sector.
The application to Thailand of the first two tests is 
severely limited by the small size of the BOI sample and the 
incompleteness of the data. Value added per worker of
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several industries was not available. In some industries, 
the size of the sample firm relative to the industry is so 
small that it cannot be expected to be a reasonable 
representative of the population. After weeding out 
industries with insufficient data, only 14 industries were 
left for an econometric study. However, four of these 14 
industries had no foreign sectors and therefore only ten 
industries were left to be used in the first or second test.
It was thought that a sample of ten industries was too small 
for either test to be worthwhile and therefore the third 
test had to be adopted for 14 industries.
Productivity of the domestic sector, measured by value 
added per worker, was used as the dependent variable. The 
explanatory variables included all three measures of foreign 
shares, average total investment per worker for each 
industry and capacity utilisation of the domestic sector. 
Capital utilisation was included to allow for demand 
variation for different products. The age variable measured 
by the number of years in operation allows explanation of 
relatively low productivity in relatively new industries.
Owing to limitations of the sample size, it was thought that 
not more than three variables should enter the regression 
at one time.
Total investment per worker is expected to explain a 
great deal of productivity variation, especially if the 
technology adopted is mostly in the form of embodied capital. 
The results of the regression confirm this expectation. It 
is evident from Table 5.11, equation 1, that total investment 
per worker alone explains roughly 90 per cent of productivity 
variation. Adding foreign share variables increases not 
more than five per cent (equations 2-4). Both variables have 
the expected positive effects but the first variable is 
extremely dominant. Capacity utilisation and the age variable 
fail to be statistically significant. All three measures of 
foreign shares are statistically significant with the share 
of foreign equity faring slightly better.
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It was thought that since the 14 industries sample 
includes fertiliser and oil refinery industries, both of 
which have either low foreign shares or none at all and both 
of which are extreme cases with regard to total investment per 
worker, this inclusion may have some effect on the estimated 
coefficient of the foreign share variables. Omission of 
these two industries still leaves the effect of foreign 
shares as positive, but they are no longer statistically 
significant (equations 5, 6 and 7, Table 5.11). The reason 
is that the omission increases the correlation between the 
two independent variables markedly and renders one variable 
insignificant.
2It can be concluded that despite the high R , the effect 
of foreign investments on the domestic sector, though 
positive, is extremely weak. Most of the variability of 
productivity is largely explained by the level of investment 
in each industry.
In addition, there are several qualifications to the 
above results. The small size of the sample does not permit 
hard and fast conclusions. Other weaknesses are that one 
has no way of controlling the effects of technology transfer 
to the domestic sectors through other channels apart from 
direct foreign investment. Relatively high productivity may 
partly be a result of the calibre of the local entrepreneurs 
who seek to obtain various mechanisms for improvement without 
feeling the competitive pressure from foreign rivals.
Moreover, the domestic sector may have high productivity 
because of the high proportion of foreign experts used, or 
as a result of some rigidity of the choice of technology 
which dictates a high level of investment and which is not 
related to external transfer and the pressure of foreign 
sectors. These qualifications must be considered 
concurrently with the interpretation of the results.
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Moreover, to be able to exert pressure on or to be a 
good example for the domestic sector, the foreign sector 
must be more efficient. It has been observed in the previous 
section that this does not always hold in all industries.
5.3.1 Foreign investment and other sources of pressure. 
The question of whether local firms felt threatened by the 
operations of foreign enterprises was pursued in the 
interviews. Local firms were asked with whom competition 
was most intense. The answer was unanimously "the foreign 
firms". One local textile entrepreneur said,
The Japanese are better than us all round. They 
have skills, experience, money and goodwill. We 
really have to fight hard.
The general impression gained during the interviews was that 
local firms were affected by the competitive pressure of 
foreign investment. Although statistically the positive 
relationship between foreign investment and domestic 
productivity is weak, it is at least not entirely a spurious 
correlation.
When local firms were further asked whether foreign 
firms had ever pursued any aggressive pricing policy to pre­
empt local firms from the local market, again the answer was 
a unanimous 'No, they are efficient enough'.
The next questions are how local firms go about 
improving their position vis-a-vis their foreign counterparts 
and to what extent such a response improves their 
productivity. Since, very correctly, most of them believed 
that the major disadvantage was in management, they sought 
assistance from consultant bodies as outlined before.
However, not all responses lead to positive improvement.
The study of the textile industry in the following chapters 
indicates that a few local firms have adopted high level 
technology in the hope of competing with foreign enterprises 
but have had little success.
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To make sure that the competitive pressure on local 
firms was not from different groups in the same local sector, 
smaller firms (less than 500 workers) were asked if very 
large local firms imposed an equivalent threat to foreign 
firms. The reply was generally negative. A typical answer 
was,
... The big firms have more problems. They cannot 
look after their big factories properly. Neither 
can they cope with their labour relation problems.
They do get easier credits from banks, but now in 
this recession they have suffered more than anyone 
else.
Interestingly, Japanese enterprises also reported that 
large local firms were not important rivals. One Japanese 
manager said
We are more concerned with competition with small 
firms and also small non-promoted firms. They are 
very cost competitive owing to lower fringe 
benefits. They are very quick to copy our new 
designs and they do not hesitate to cut prices and 
copy brand names.
The above statement suggests that a future study on bigness 
and smallness in manufacturing industries may be worthwhile.
To conclude, in modern large-scale manufacturing, it 
appears that local firms do feel competitive pressure from 
the operation of foreign firms. However, like any other 
spill-over effect, it is very difficult to identify.
5.4 Inter-industry Diffusion of Technology
The weak statistical results reported earlier should 
not lead one to reject the possibility of positive effects 
of foreign investments on domestic activities. The spill­
over effects of technology transfer need not be intra­
industry. Technology can be diffused indirectly and directly 
through local linkages and assistance given to customers and 
suppliers. This section investigates the extent of local 
linkages and assistance given to suppliers and customers by 
packaged and non-packaged mechanisms.
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5.4.1 Local linkages under packaged and unpackaged 
transfer. When a new industry is established, it may 
stimulate supplies of local materials, components and parts, 
and in time even machinery may be supplied locally. However, 
in the case of developing host countries, local linkages 
under both packaged and unpackaged transfer may be quite 
limited. Direct foreign investment is sometimes alleged to 
use higher quality input and therefore tends to use more 
imported materials. This section investigates the extent 
of local linkages.
Examination of the BOI questionnaire data of 115 firms 
reveals that the extent of local linkages depends on the 
types of technology rather than on the mechanisms through 
which technology is transferred. Table 5.12 suggests that 
it is not generally true that foreign firms use less 
domestically produced machinery than local firms. In canned 
food, animal feed, motorcycles, paint and petrochemical 
production, the foreign sectors employed relatively more 
locally produced machinery than Thai firms. This can be 
explained by the fact that local entrepreneurs relied heavily 
on machinery suppliers or their agents to purchase machinery 
for the whole plant, especially for more sophisticated 
projects, and therefore whole factories might be imported.
As mentioned earlier, a local petrochemical plant was 
constructed under a turnkey arrangement with a German 
machinery supplier. In contrast, foreign investors were 
more experienced with plant construction. They designed and 
installed the factories themselves and were therefore in a 
position to search for available local equipment to save some 
transport and material costs.
During interviews, some firms reported that local 
machinery makers had not yet been able to supply the types 
of high accuracy, high speed and sophisticated machinery 
demanded by large modern enterprises in the sample. For 
example, local producers were unable to produce spinning
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Table 5.12
Local Linkages in Some Promoted Manufacturing Industries (1973)
Percentage of 
locally produced 
machinery
Percentage of 
local contents
Domestic
firms
Foreign
firms
Domestic
firms
Foreign
firms
1 Preserved food 7.2 69.5 83.5 91.6
2 Rubber accessories 45.2 - 22.7 -
3 Batteries n.a. 7.4 100.0 45.6
4 Bicycles n.a. - n.a. -
5 Bicycle tyres 1.9 - 56.7 -
6 Vehicle components and 
parts 25.0 2.8 25.0 28.2
7 Electric bulbs 0.0 15.2 46.7 13.3
8 Textiles 2.7 1.5 37.9 43.5
9 Electric appliances 15.4 n.a. 31.7 20.0
10 Acids, alkalis, soda ash n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
11 Animal feed 2.1 27.1 93.6 100.0
12 Motorcycles .1 3.3 n.a. 26.6
13 Pharmaceutical products - 3.9 - 24.9
14 Paints 28.7 35.9 57.6 36.5
15 Automobile tyres n.a. 14.9 n.a. 28.8
16 Paper and paper products 7.9 5.1 36.7 37.1
17 Automobile assembly n.a. 7.7 34.1 11.1
18 Evaporated milk n.a. 3.8 32.4 45.7
19 Petrochemicals 0.0 8.2 0.0 6.5
20 Fertilisers 42.8 - 0.0 -
21 Petroleum refining 0.0 0.0 ""
Notes: 1) n.a. indicates that data were not available.
2) - indicates that the particular sector is not involved in
the promoted industry.
Source: BOI 1973 Questionnaire
139
machinery and can only produce a limited range of weaving 
and winding equipment. Local machinery and equipment often 
used by the firms in the sample included simple electrical 
and mechanical equipment, such as electric motors, 
accessories and simple delivering equipment.
Even when local supplies are available, it is often 
alleged that locally-made machinery has low efficiency, 
frequent breakdowns and short economic life if used on a 
three-shift basis. However, none of the entrepreneurs 
complaining of these problems had ever tried locally produced 
machinery.
It should be remembered that Table 5.12 lists data from 
the promoted sector. These firms were able to import foreign 
machinery free of duty. They were also large firms by local 
standards and presumably could better afford to use imported 
machinery. They therefore had little incentive to try local 
machinery.
It is not quite true that local engineering expertise 
is totally lacking. Two out of 70 firms in the sample gave 
some evidence of local expertise. Local machinery supplied 
70 per cent of the value of machinery in one flour mill. A 
local machinery maker in the sample also claimed that he 
supplied 80 per cent of the value of machinery to a non- 
promoted jute weaving firm. His machinery cost less than 
half the price of the famous Scottish machinery and, he 
claimed, was of comparable efficiency. He had been in the 
business for more than 20 years and had mostly supplied small 
factories (none of which were included in my sample).
These experiences suggest that if technical linkages 
are desired, perhaps the simple process industries that do 
not require high accuracy and precision machinery should be 
encouraged. Complex industrial projects such as 
petrochemical production generate a small core of highly 
qualified engineering and chemical expertise, but it is the 
simple industries that foster the accumulation of
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intermediate skills through local linkages. In other words, 
the sophisticated industries produce skilled technical 
elites, but the simple industries foster a broad skill base. 
Without a wide base, an industrial system cannot be 
properly maintained.
As far as local components and parts are concerned, 
statistical figures were not available but, in general, 
firms in the survey claimed that local components and parts 
constituted about 30-50 per cent of the total purchases of 
components and parts each year. In general, if local 
supplies were available, they tended to be used because this 
saved time and stocking problems. The largest textile 
factory even operated a tool and component workshop within 
the factory. The company claimed that it was the largest 
component producer and repairer for textile machinery in 
Thailand and over 30 skilled workers were employed in this 
department. The executive, however, admitted that while 
this method saved a lot of time and stocking of spare parts, 
the cost of components of these products was high owing to 
diseconomies of scale.
The use of raw materials was also comparable between 
foreign and Thai firms, and depends largely on the types of 
industries. For example, in agro-based industries, such as 
preserved food and animal feed, local contents tended to be 
high. Food processors utilised up to nearly 100 per cent 
local contents. In weaving, the use of local raw materials 
was slightly higher for foreign firms because they used more 
synthetic filament yarn which could be supplied locally. 
Local firms use higher cotton contents and a large 
proportion (especially long staple cottons) was imported 
from the United States and Africa. Local cottons are of 
middle length staple and are volatile, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. In a year of bumper harvests consumption 
of local cottons could be higher. It was observed that the
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larger the firm, the less likely it is to use local cottons 
in any amount exceeding ten per cent. The larger firms 
claimed that this would affect the quality of their final 
output.
5.4.2 Provision of technical and marketing assistance 
to suppliers and customers. Owing to higher technical and 
marketing skills, it is natural to expect foreign firms to 
provide more technical assistance to both suppliers and 
customers than local firms. Table 5.13 presents the number 
of firms in my questionnaire sample that reported giving 
assistance to local suppliers and customers. The evidence 
supports the contention that foreign firms provide more 
assistance than local firms, but only slightly more.
During interviews, various examples of types of 
assistance were given. A foreign producer of evaporated 
milk claimed to have assisted a local sugar cane factory in 
improving the quality of sugar. Two Japanese jute bag 
manufacturers contributed funds to the Thai Jute 
Manufacturing Association to undertake research to diffuse 
the technical improvements of jute cutting, soaking and 
bleaching to farmers, and to construct a demonstration pool. 
Two Japanese controlled automobile vehicle assemblers 
provided designs for local suppliers of component parts who 
in turn passed them on to local sub-contractors. A Japanese 
sugar factory also provided technical advice to farmers. A 
Japanese producer of nylon filament helped a local sock 
manufacturer to repair sophisticated equipment.
Two local firms that provided technical aid to suppliers 
were an electronic appliance producer and a flour processing 
mill. The former gave technical advice to sub-contractors, 
the latter who conceived the idea of copying foreign machinery 
(mentioned earlier) also assisted local machinery makers in 
trial and error processes.
Marketing assistance was mostly in the form of joint 
market surveys and in the sharing of advertising budgets.
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Table 5.13
Provision of Technical and Marketing Assistance 
by 70 Manufacturing Firms in Thailand
Number of respondents
Foreign Local Total
To suppliers
Technical 5 2 7
Marketing 2 1 3
Technical and marketing 2 1 3
No assistance provided 26 31 57
35 35 70
To customers
Technical 2 2 4
Marketing 5 4 9
Technical and marketing 4 5 9
No assistance provided 24 24 48
35 35 70
Source: Field survey, 1974-75
Technical assistance to customers was mainly technical 
advice on how to make the most of the products, e.g. 
treatment of fabrics to ensure fast and even colouring.
5.5 Local Adaptations and Research and Development under 
Packaged and Unpackaged Mechanisms
No study of technology transfer can be complete without 
considering local adaptations and R & D. They indicate the 
technical strength of the technology recipient.
5.5.1 Local adaptations. Information on adaptations 
is available only from firms which granted interviews. In 
the textile industry, where interviews were most intensively
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and extensively conducted, it was surprising to observe that 
there was little process adaptation. When adaptations were 
reported, they were discovered to be adjustments of 
machinery for various types of products. For example, 
spinning and weaving machines were adjusted to cope with 
different types or sizes of yarn ; they were not adaptations 
that would result in a reduction in unit cost. Adaptations 
in one local firm were necessitated by the need to avoid the 
cost of a low level of industrial discipline. A 
complicated, delicate and removable component of a machine 
was replaced by a fixed component designed by the firm's 
engineer because operators kept losing the removable parts.
Process adaptations were not reported by any other 
firms which were interviewed except from a local flour 
producer who financed a local scientist to develop a new 
method of heating by using low-grade coal as a substitute 
for oil heating, which has become increasingly expensive. 
Apart from this firm, there were no major process adaptations 
nor was there any significant difference in behaviour between 
packaged and unpackaged mechanisms.
Input adaptations were more common. Both foreign and 
local firms in the textile industry substituted tapioca 
starch for corn and potato starch for sizing materials. 
Tapioca starch was also used as a replacement for other 
industrial starches in the production of paper. Butter fat 
was replaced by coconut oil in the manufacturing of condensed 
milk. However, input adaptations were reported to be limited 
by international standardisation. A foreign electric bulb 
manufacturer stated that product and process adaptations were 
not permissible in his standardised process which aimed at 
keeping up with the international standard set by the parent 
company. The previous chapters have also indicated some 
prohibitions on adaptations of products and processes by 
technology suppliers.
There is little room for adaptation in auxiliary 
activities in the textile industry. Even in advanced
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countries, inter-departmental deliveries are mostly manual 
for the ring spinning system. In bale opening in Australia, 
a long conveyor belt is used so that one worker is sufficient 
for feeding the machinery. In Thailand, very short conveyor 
belts and several workers are used. In factories in advanced 
countries deliveries to and from warehouses are done by 
fork-lifts. In Thailand, all foreign and most local firms 
were observed to use manual deliveries during the survey 
period in 1974. Three local firms used fork-lifts but two 
of them were the largest mills, employing more than 3,000 
workers. In the last two cases, there was some indication 
of economic justification on the grounds of economies of 
scale for mechanised auxiliary activities.
All packaging was done by hand in all textile factories 
visited. Even in foreign controlled petrochemical plants, 
packing was done by hand and output was delivered to packers 
by a non-automatic conveyor.
It is possible to conclude that, in general, adaptations 
of foreign technology in main production processes were 
almost non-existent. This is partly explained by the 
standardised nature of imported technology and the 
restrictions imposed by technology suppliers. As far as 
input adaptation is concerned, both local and foreign sectors 
substituted local for foreign inputs as far as possible. The 
behaviour of both sectors was also similar in auxiliary 
activities.
5.5.2 Local R & D. R & D units of foreign firms were 
generally based abroad. Several reasons can be given. First, 
the absence of local patent laws discourages local research 
and development activities. Second, most of the imported 
technology is highly standardised. Third, even when the 
scope for R & D exists technically, the overhead cost of 
creating a new research centre is too high relative to the 
size of the local market which consists of mainly the small
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group of urban middle income earners. Lastly, the dearth 
of local technical expertise makes it difficult to establish 
a local R & D centre.
Most local firms also reported no R & D activities.
The only exception was the flour producer mentioned earlier 
who contracted a local machinery maker to copy foreign 
machinery and who substituted coal for oil heating. This 
particular firm also contracted the same machinery producer 
to produce an (unconventional) automatic scooper and a 
conveyor. This process was done manually in other firms.
The manager claimed that the factory handled a maximum of 
8,570 tons of raw cassava a day on a three-day shift basis.
On the assumption of full capacity, 20 baht minimum wage 
and 15 per cent interest on capital, this method would 
reduce production costs by 3,000 baht a day. He said,
Machinery never gets tired. At peak periods, the 
more workers, the slower the work pace. This 
machinery was produced locally and thus cost only 
half of the imported equivalent ... other firms 
cannot use the method because they do not handle 
large enough quantities.
However, the firm employed a manual packaging system. The 
reason was that
It takes four tons of raw cassava to produce one 
ton of flour and more raw materials are needed in 
the rainy season when the starch content is below 
25 per cent. So, it is worthwhile using a 
mechanised scooper in such a case.
However, final output weighs very much less and no mechanised 
process is necessary for packaging.
The main reason for the heightened activity of this 
particular firm was the severe competition the firm faced 
from local and foreign competitors. This incident supports 
the contention that an oligopolistic market is not a 
necessary condition for R & D. Local R & D can be initiated 
in a competitive environment.
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Both the above example and the use of mechanised 
auxiliary activities in some textile firms suggest that 
given the existing wage level, when economies of scale are 
allowed for there may be a trade-off point between machines 
and men, even in auxiliary activities. The incident 
suggests a need for an in-depth study of the role of 
economies of scale in ancillary activities at a distortion- 
free wage rate. There are two cases that need to be 
distinguished. The first is when there is a reduction in 
unit cost after mechanised ancillary activities have been 
introduced, i.e. the case of increasing returns to scale.
The second is when the use of mechanised ancillary 
activities as a substitute for labour-intensive ancillary 
activities prevents unit cost from rising. In other words, 
there is no reduction in unit cost as a direct result of 
introducing mechanised ancillary activities but the increased 
costs of diseconomies of administration and the reduction in 
labour productivity per unit of time owing to human fatigue 
can be avoided by the replacement of men by machines. If 
the latter is the case, government policies may have to be 
directed to discourage exceptionally large-scale production.
It has been pointed out in the previous chapter that 
restrictions on local R & D may retard development of the 
recipient countries. However, no firms reported that their 
desire for research and development had been made impossible 
by such restrictions. In fact, except for the flour producer 
no firms reported to have such desires at all. This probably 
reflects the symptom of underdevelopment where the priority 
of most industrial enterprises is the management of 
production until entrepreneurship and technical experience 
have matured.
The findings of this sample, therefore, suggest that 
R & D as well as local adaptations are not influenced by the 
mechanisms themselves, but depend more on the nature of 
technology, the environment in which these mechanisms operate 
and the absorptive capacity of the recipient economies.
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In this chapter, it has been shown that direct foreign 
investment is the most common mechanism for transferring 
technology to Thailand. On the local side, the perceived 
advantage of such a mechanism is the obtaining of technical 
advice. On the investor side, especially Japan, the 
transfer was a direct response to local industrialisation 
policies in the 1960s. Consequently, the types of technology 
transferred under such circumstances were probably not the 
same as the transfer which would have occurred in 
circumstances dictated by an adjustment to comparative 
advantage. This is probably the case though the investment 
flowed into traditional industries.
Several characteristics of foreign and local sectors 
have also been investigated. Characteristically foreign 
firms used more capital per worker and paid higher average 
wages than their local counterparts. There is also some 
evidence of the local sector paying high wages in competition 
with foreign firms. The efficiency of the two sectors in 
the exploitation of imported technology was discussed. The 
general picture was that foreign firms were slightly more 
efficient, but surprisingly not more efficient in all 
industries nor in all aspects.
The conclusion from the study of the external effects 
of direct foreign investment indicates a weak positive effect. 
This weakness can be explained by the nature of imported 
technology which is mostly embodied in capital. Productivity 
is thus largely determined by the level of investment. That 
not all foreign sectors were unconditionally more efficient 
also lessened the competitive pressure in a few industries.
There was some evidence indicating the involvement of 
foreign firms in inter-industry transfer, especially in the 
technical aspects. Local firms, on the other hand, were 
more concerned with marketing assistance.
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In both sectors, there was virtually no local 
adaptation or research and development. The lack of a strong 
technical infrastructure, the simple and standardised nature 
of the imported technology and the small size of the local 
urban market have made local R & D unattractive.
It is, however, not sufficient to show that direct 
foreign investment tends to have positive effects on the 
productivity of the domestic sector. The mechanisms behind 
these statistics must be investigated more fully. What 
makes foreign firms more efficient: machinery or men? What 
can be learned from foreign partners? Is there a substantial 
transfer to local staff within an enterprise? Do foreign 
and local firms use the same technology, and is there any 
way of overcoming the problems of different vintages when 
examining capital intensities? What is the trade-off between 
skill and employment under different types of technology?
Is there any case of a foreign controlled joint venture 
becoming locally controlled? These questions are best 
tackled by looking more closely into one industry. The 
chapters in Part 2 will look at these questions by 
concentrating on the textile industry.
CHAPTER 6
The Purchases of Foreign Technology 
through Technology Contracts
The previous chapter examined the overall pattern of 
technology acquisition of some manufacturing industries.
This chapter will concentrate on only one channel for 
acquiring technology, namely through technology contracts, 
but will cover all manufacturing firms which have concluded 
a know-how agreement. Technology contracts in most parts 
of this analysis include licensing agreements, technical 
assistance, and management and trademark agreements. 
Engineering construction and installation agreements will 
not be discussed in detail.
The first section of this chapter discusses the data 
and associated problems. The second part examines the 
pattern and the sources of technology contracts. This will 
be followed by the discussion of the nature of technology 
contracts in Thailand. The next section investigates 
explicit costs of technology and several factors which may 
influence the pricing of technology, namely, imperfections 
in technology markets, the relationship between sellers and 
buyers (effects of foreign control on recipient enterprises) 
and the position of technology sellers as early or latecomers 
into the technology markets. The last part of the chapter 
deals with the implicit costs of technology contracts.
6.1 The Data
Until 1975, 256 technology contracts were submitted to 
the Bank of Thailand. Out of these 256 contracts, 115 were 
technical assistance agreements, 57 licensing agreements,
27 trademark agreements, 23 engineering agreements, one 
management agreement and 33 contracts which were combinations 
of the above. This list covers all the fee-paying contracts 
ever concluded by the manufacturing sector in Thailand and 
ever released for research purposes.
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It should be noted that the above classification of 
types of technology contracts is based on the actual title 
of each contract. However, this classification is not always 
meaningful. First, there is no standard form for the 
adoption of the title of agreements. Trademark agreements 
sometimes involve technical assistance. Licensing agreements 
sometimes include patented products or processes, trade 
secrets and trademarks, as well as technical assistance.
Thus each category is not distinct. Secondly, in most of 
the licensing agreements, there is no indication or 
specification of the relevant patents. This is partly 
because Thailand has no patent laws. Therefore, it is 
impossible to separate patented from unpatented products 
and/or processes. Only a few firms indicated the 
registration numbers of the original patents in the 
suppliers' countries. However, the duration of the original 
patents was not indicated. It has therefore been decided 
that it is not useful to try to separate and analyse the 
contracts according to the types of agreement.
There are several problems associated with the number 
of contracts to be used in the analysis of restrictive 
practices. First, remitting firms are required to submit 
only an extract from the contracts as long as that contains 
the methods and terms of payment. Twenty-six firms were 
found to have submitted incomplete contracts. Notably, five 
out of eight contracts of foreign subsidiaries in the 
pharmaceutical industry were incomplete. Secondly, some 
firms made separate contracts with exactly the same 
conditions and terms for each product with the same 
technology supplier. For example, some condensed milk 
producers concluded a separate contract for condensed milk 
of a different brand name. One shoe manufacturer made a 
separate contract for women's and men's shoes under the same 
trademarks. In textile and fibre production, there were 
often additional contracts for each expansion of production 
capacity.
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Of the total of 256 contracts, there are 252 providing 
reasonably sufficient information on the duration of the 
contract and the financial cost of technology. However, for 
the analysis of conditions, it was decided that all 
incomplete contracts would be excluded to reduce bias. 
Multiple contracts with the same terms and conditions and 
with the same technology supplier and recipients were treated 
as a single contract. Moreover, it was observed that six 
out of 115 technical assistance contracts were concluded with 
individual foreign experts. Characteristically, both free­
lance engineering contracts and engineering service contracts 
concluded with foreign corporations stipulate no restrictive 
conditions. As a result, there are 184 contracts for the 
analysis of implicit cost.
Before turning to the analysis, it is important to note 
at the outset that since there are no complete official 
records of every firm with foreign equity outside the 
promoted sector in Thailand, it is impossible to establish 
the overall proportion of foreign firms which received 
technology free of charge from their parent companies. 
However, if a firm is a promoted enterprise, then its 
nationality of ownership and control can be readily 
identified from the BOI records. On the basis of BOI 
records, it was discovered that 93 out of 256 contracts were 
concluded by promoted enterprises. Attempts were also made 
during field-work to gather additional information on 
ownership and control of firms outside the promoted sector 
by interviewing government officials, entrepreneurs and 
people involved in manufacturing industries. Altogether,
95 contracts could be identified as contracts submitted by 
foreign subsidiaries or foreign-controlled joint ventures 
and 55 were contracts submitted by local firms. There were 
34 contracts of some non-promoted firms in the production of 
garment accessories, shoes, adhesives and chemical products, 
the control and ownership of which cannot be identified.
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In the following analysis of the effects of the 
relationship between sellers or buyers (effects of foreign 
ownership and control) on the pricing of technology, foreign 
subsidiaries which received technology from sources of 
supplies other than their parent companies were treated as 
local firms. However, there are only three cases which fall 
into this category.
6.2 Pattern and Sources of Industrial Technology in Thailand
In Table 6.1, technology contracts are classified by 
industry and by source of sellers. In terms of the number of 
contracts, it is evident that Japan is the most prominent 
seller of technology in Thailand. Up to 1975, 84 contracts 
were concluded with Japanese technology sellers. The United 
States and other developed countries supplied 92 out of 184 
contracts, while the less developed countries, notably 
Taiwan, have just entered the technology market in Thailand 
and concluded only eight contracts.
Although a major proportion of technology agreements 
with Japanese technology suppliers are in relatively simple 
industries, such as textiles, household electrical goods 
and vehicle assembly, Japan's presence can be seen in almost 
all industries. She is involved in traditional industries 
like textiles, food, relatively dynamic industries such as 
petrochemicals and chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and product- 
differentiated sectors such as cosmetics or vehicle assembly. 
On the other hand, the United States and other developed 
countries concluded a larger proportion of contracts in 
industries associated with imperfect markets and goodwill. 
Even the American technology sold to the textile and garment 
industries are all associated with trade names. The less 
developed countries' largest proportion of contracts is not, 
unexpectedly, in the processing of food and beverages.
Japan's position of the most important technology 
seller is partly attributable to her heavy investments in
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Table 6.1
Technology Contracts Submitted by 1975 Classified by 
Industry and by Source (184 contracts)
Number of contracts Percentage
Industry Japan USA ODCsa LDCs Total Japan USA 0DCsa LDCs Total
Food 4 3 5 2 14 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.2 7.7
Beverages and 
breweries . 1 1 2 0.5 0.5 1.0
Textiles 17 6 1 - 24 9.2 3.3 0.5 - 13.0
Garments and 
accessories 3 2 1 1 7 1.6 1.1 0.5 0.5 3-7
Shoes 1 - 2 - 3 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5
Paper products - 2 - - 2 - 1,1 - - 1.1
Chemicals and 
petrochemicals 8 3 __ 1 12 4.3 1.6 _ 0.5 6.4
Chemical products 9 14 12 1 36 5.0 7.6 6.5 0.5 19.6
Petroleum
products 1 1 2 1 5 0.5 0.5 1 .1. 0.5 2.6
Tyres 1 1 2 - 4 0.5 0.5 1.1 - 2. 1
Construction
materials 2 5 4 1 12 1.1 2.8 2.2 0.5 6.7
Metal products and 
equipment 7 5 4 _ 16 3.8 2.7 2.2 __ 8.7
Electrical
products 16 6 3 __ 25 9.0 3.3 1.6 __ 13.9
Vehicle assembly 15 1 6 - 22 8.0 0.5 3.3 - 11.8
Total 84 49 43 8 184 4 $.7 26.6 23.2 4.2 100.0
Note: a) ODC = other developed countries.
Source: Extracted from contracts held by the Bank of Thailand
Thailand. It was mentioned in an earlier chapter that Japan 
is the largest investor in the promoted manufacturing 
industries, especially in large industries. Moreover, since 
her mode of investment is usually joint venture arrangement, 
this necessitates formal technology arrangements to ensure 
income transfer to parent companies. It will also be shown 
in a later section that the cost of Japanese technology from 
a private enterprise's point of view is cheap relative to 
suppliers from other advanced nations.
154
The industrial group that holds the largest share of 
technology contracts is that which produces chemical goods, 
in which paints and cosmetic products have the largest 
share. A closer look at each contract in the paint and 
cosmetic industries indicates that the purchased technology 
is almost without exception tied to recognised brand names, 
e.g. I.C.I., Max Factor, and so on. Two other industries, 
namely, shoes and beverages were also found to be closely 
connected with well-known brand names such as Charles 
Jourdan, Greenspot, and so on. In these industries, the 
principal or active ingredients are not produced locally and 
production techniques involve only the blending of chemical 
ingredients according to a specified formula. In the case 
of shoe production, only trademarks and designs were 
provided. Two other industries, electrical goods and vehicle 
assembly, are also strongly associated with goodwill and they 
involve only basic assembling skills. Thus, it appears that 
approximately half of the purchased technology (48 per cent 
of all contracts) is related to monopolistic goodwill and 
does not contribute very significantly to the accumulation 
of industrial and technical skills.
The substantial import of foreign goodwill reflects the 
dominance of the consumption pattern of the urban sector.
The price of rice, the main agricultural product has been 
kept low to subsidise the urban sector (Manusphaibool, 1974, 
p.68). Much of the government’s fiscal expenditure has also 
been lavished upon the urban sector. Consequently, income 
and markets of the urban population have grown more rapidly 
than those of the rural population. Protectionist 
policy also encouraged the import substituting production 
of many consumer durables for the urban middle-income earners.
A fairly sizeable amount of contracts, i.e. 25 per cent, 
were concluded in industries with relatively simple 
technology, industries such as food, textiles and garments.
A large part of these technologies, especially textiles, is
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embodied in capital equipment, so there seems to be no 
obvious need for securing technology contracts. It was 
shown in the previous chapter that several local firms were 
found to be able to obtain sufficient technology to run an 
enterprise through the use of capital goods markets and the 
services of an international organisation. A detailed 
examination of the contracts revealed that 12 contracts 
(50 per cent) in the textile industry and three contracts 
(42 per cent) in the production of garments and garment 
accessories were also tied to trademarks and brand names.
The remaining agreements, which are mainly technical 
assistance contracts, were largely concluded by local 
partners who have had no industrial experience and those who 
perhaps act as dummy partners for foreign investors. For 
these inexperienced entrepreneurs, technology contracts 
offer complete technical expertise needed to run an 
industrial project. The purchases of technology for these 
industries reflect the basic industrial need of Thailand.
Technology contracts may also be used as a convenient 
facility for remitting income to foreign parent companies 
or for withholding parts of the income before it is split 
to local partners. This will be studied more fully in a 
later section.
6.3 Nature of Technology Contracts
Prior to the discussion of the cost of technology, two 
points need to be given special emphasis. First, there is 
some variation in the scope covered by each technology 
contract. A contract may include any or all of the following 
provisions:
- the right to use patented or secret production 
processes or to produce patented products,
- the right to use trademarks,
- selection of plant site, machinery and equipment,
- supervision of construction of factories and 
installation of machinery,
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- provision of technical information,
- arrangements for technical dissemination by 
despatching engineers from suppliers to train 
local staff,
- permission to recipient to send local staff to be 
trained in suppliers' plant at the expense of the 
recipient,
- managerial consultant service,
- laboratory and testing service,
- repair and maintenance service,
- marketing services such as market survey, 
provision of advertising materials,
- establishment of accounting system.
Technical information may incorporate any, or, in very 
few cases, all of the following items:
- site and plant layout,
- lists of machinery and equipment,
- drawings of machinery, products, wiring diagrams, 
blueprints and other engineering designs,
- trade secrets such as chemical formulae or secret 
manufacturing processes,
- flow charts, utility models, material balances,
- job specifications or assignments,
- engineering standards and instructions on methods 
of quality control and deciding quality standard,
- standard operation manuals,
- analysis or guidance on factory operations.
The wide differences in the content of each contract 
complicate cost comparisons. For example, one technology 
supplier might offer only trademarks and secret formulae 
without any start-up or continuous technical assistance but 
charge lower royalties than another supplier who may offer 
a complete package of technical assistance. It is difficult 
to decide how much each element in the package is worth.
More importantly, how can one evaluate the experience of 
different suppliers?
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The second point is concerned with the duration of the 
agreement. It has been observed above that the monetary 
cost, restrictive practices and duration of the contracts 
are not independent of one another and one cannot simply 
examine one component without examining the other two. In 
fact, the best way of comparing the cost of contracts is to 
compute the present value of the total expected cost. As 
will be shown below, the size of technology fees normally 
varies with the size of sales or output during the contract 
periods which in certain cases cover up to 80 years or more. 
Therefore, the present values of technology cost cannot be 
calculated. However, any remarks made on the basis of this 
result should take into account the relationship between 
duration of the contracts and other components of costs.
In Table 6.2, technology contracts are classified by 
duration. Work time is usually specified in construction, 
engineering and repair contracts where payments are made 
when jobs are accomplished or when it is difficult to 
specify the period of accomplishments. Normally, work time 
does not last more than one year. Most contracts have a life 
span of between five to ten years. Fifty contracts do not 
have any specific period. These contracts mostly refer to 
foreign subsidiaries. Some contracts for joint ventures 
stipulated that technology contracts would be invalid upon 
the termination of the joint venture. Very few local firms 
made contracts with indefinite periods. For these local 
firms, it was normally stipulated that the contracts would 
be valid as long as technology or trademarks were in use.
An indefinite duration is relatively common for the 
production of chemical goods. This is closely associated 
with the paint and cosmetic industry which is heavily 
foreign controlled and where product differentiation is 
common. On the other hand, more than half of the contracts 
in the textile industry are for a five-year period. In an 
industry where technology is relatively simple and suppliers
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Table 6.2
Duration of 252 Technology Contracts Submitted by 1975 
Classified by Industrial Group
(Number of contracts)
Duration
Industry
Work
time
Up to 
5
years
From
5-10
years
Over
10
years
Indefinite or as 
long as technology 
is used
Total3
contracts
Food 5 3 5 3 6 22
Beverages and 
breweries 2 2
Textiles 6 26 10 - 6 48
Garments and 
garment 
accessories 1 4 2 7
Shoes 1 2 1 2 1 7
Paper products - 1 - - 1 2
Chemical and 
petrochemicals 2 9 6 3 2 22
Chemical
products 3 8 14 2 16 43
Petroleum
products 2 _ 1 1 1 5
Tyres - 1 3 - - 4
Construction
materials _ 4 6 2 4 16
Metal products 
and equipment 1 9 4 2 7 23
Electrical,
industrial and
household
appliances
[
14 7 5 3 29
Vehicles and 
vehicle part 
assembly 1 15 5 - 1 22
Total 21 93 68 20 50 252
(%) (8) (37) (27) (8) (20) (100)
Note: a) excluding four incomplete contracts (three in motorcycle
assembly and one in automobile assembly).
Source: As for Table 6.1
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sell experience rather than trade secrets or goodwill, the 
barrier to entry is low, which improves the bargaining 
position of the recipients and results in less strict terms 
and conditions.
6.4 The Explicit Cost of Technology in the Thai
Manufacturing Industries
In 1969, remittance of royalties, know-how fees and 
management fees approved by the Bank of Thailand was 62.9 m. 
baht paid by 68 manufacturing enterprises. By 1975, the 
figure had reached 301 m. baht and 184 enterprises were 
involved. Of this, 14 per cent (42 m. baht) was paid by the 
cosmetic industry alone. The largest amount paid by any 
industry was by a US multinational corporation, a toothpaste 
producer, which paid, in 1975, 21.9 m. baht which was 7.3 
per cent of total remitted royalties and know-how fees.
Payments for know-how or trademarks in Thailand take 
several forms. The relatively common types of payments are:
- lump sum once-and-for-all payments,
- fixed annual payments,
- initial payments plus running royalties based on 
output, gross or net sales, and ex-factory value 
of sales (subject to fixed minimum royalties),
- annual payments based on output, gross or net 
sales and ex-factory value output (subject to 
fixed minimum royalties).
In addition, there are various other forms of payment. 
In one case, payments are based on net pre-tax profits, and 
in another case, it was stipulated in the contract that the 
local recipients may be called upon to make payments in kind 
bearing the trade name of the technology supplier. However, 
the two most general forms of payments are payments based on 
annual net or gross sales.
Thus, comparing the cost of technology was difficult. 
Fortunately, all firms also submitted to the Bank of
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Thailand their annual total technology costs. This total 
annual cost was then divided by 1973 sales figures obtained 
from the BOI. Since most firms in the same industry have 
fairly similar methods of payment, the method of costing 
adopted here will be to compare the annual technology costs 
to gross or net sales, depending on the most common practice 
in a particular industry. (This will enable the inclusion 
of a great number of non-promoted enterprises.) There is 
only one industry, namely motorcycle assembly, where unit 
technology cost is given. However, two industries, namely 
petrochemical products and beverages, have had to be omitted 
due to lack of information on annual sales and 
incomparability of payment methods.
It is thought that the range of know-how fees rather 
than their mean value should be given. First, it has been 
pointed out above that the content of each technology 
contract differs and it is not appropriate to compute one 
figure in order to represent different bundles of know-how. 
Secondly, the characteristics of technology may be different 
depending on the suppliers. One supplier may offer a more 
sophisticated technology than others. Thirdly, even in the 
same industry, products may not be of the same quality. For 
instance, all-purpose adhesive may well be different from 
adhesive made, say, specifically for wood. Without a good 
knowledge of the actual production system and the 
characteristics of particular products, it is impossible to 
present such conclusive figures as mean values.
To obtain a relatively accurate picture of technology 
cost, it is necessary that industries be disaggregated as 
far as possible. Table 6.3 indicates the ranges of technology 
fees and durations of technology contracts for 28 sub­
industrial groups. There seems to be no systematic 
correlation between the levels of technology and the size 
and duration of know-how fees. The ranges of technology fees 
in relatively sophisticated industries such as chemicals and
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Table 6.3
Range of Royalties, Technology Fees and
Duration of 245 Contracts Submitted by 1975
Royalties 
% of
net sales
and Technology Fees 
% of Baht
gross sales per unit
Duration
Minimum
(years)
Maximum
Food
Dairy products .5-6.5 4 30
Preserving of food - .4-14.0 - 21 Indf(a)
Sugar - 2.0-5.0 - - Indf
Animal feed .5-.4 - - 10 10
Spinning, weaving and 
finishing _ .01-7.5 _ 1 Indf
Garments and accessories 
Garments 2.0-5.0 7 Indf
Garment accessories - 2.2-2.5 - 5 8
Shoes
RC(b)-2.0
1.4-3.0 - 3 15
Paper products - - 1 Indf
Chemicals and 
petrochemicals 
Chemical and fertiliser 1.0-3.0 3 15
Filament yarn - .6-1.6 - 5 Indf
Petrochemical products - 2.0-2.9 - 5 15
Chemical products 
Paints 1.0-6.0 . _ 1 80
Medicine and 
pharmaceutical o0CM1Oi—l _ _ 2 Indf
Cosmetics - 1.5-22.5 - 1 Indf
Adhesives - 2.0-6.0 - 10 Indf
Tyres 2.5-5.0 - - 6 10
Plastics 2.0-3.0 - - 5 5
Glass and glass 
products 2.5-4.0 _ 5 10
Cement - 1.0-4.0 - 10 10
Metal products and 
equipment .38-12.5 _ _ 1 10
Electrical goods 
Electrical industrial 
apparatus f(°) -f+2. 0 5 10
Household appliances .5-5.0 - - 3 Indf
Wet batteries 2.0-7.0 - - 2 10
Vehicle assembly 
Automobile assembly _ 2.5-6.0 __ 2 7
Autopart assembly 1.0-4.5 - - 3 10
Motorcycle assembly - - 156-260 5 Indf
Notes: (a) Indf = indefinite duration
(b) RC = reimbursement of actual cost
(c) f = fixed sum
Source: As for Table 6.1
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petrochemicals are relatively narrow and the total ranges 
are lower than those prevailing in industries with relatively 
simple technology such as textiles, garments, cosmetics, 
paints, etc. Several factors may be responsible for this 
outcome. Some of these factors, monopolistic power of 
technology sellers, the relationship between sellers and 
buyers and the innovator-emulator position of the suppliers 
will now be looked at in some detail.
6.4.1 Market structure of the agreed products.
Generally it can be expected that the more perfect the 
market, the lower the price of the commodity, and in turn 
the lower the price of technology. Table 6.3 indicates that 
four industries, the preserving of food, medicine and 
pharmaceutical products, cosmetic products and metal 
equipment, exhibit an extraordinary range of know-how fees.
It is evident that, except for the production of metal 
equipment, industries with relatively large variations are 
closely associated with differentiated products. For 
instance, in the cosmetic industry, the recipient that was 
charged the highest fee (22.5 per cent of gross sales) is 
the producer of a well-known hair lotion. The second highest 
fee payer is also the producer of cosmetics with a widely 
recognised brand name. In the production of preserved food, 
the highest fee-paying firm (14 per cent of gross sales) 
produces a world famous brand of chicken stock essence. 
Another firm, which produces exactly the same product with 
a less recognised brand name, paid only 8,000 baht per annum 
which is less than one per cent of its 1973 sales. The 
relatively high fee paid by pharmaceutical firms is partly 
due to recognised brand names and partly to foreign control, 
a subject to be investigated in a later section.
Examinations of contracts relating to metal equipment 
further revealed that of the 15 contracts in this industry, 
all except one charged royalties between 0.38 to 5 per cent 
of gross sales. Only one British subsidiary paid 12.5 per 
cent of net sales for a trademark for metal tools.
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By contrast, the range of know-how fees in relatively 
technically sophisticated industries, such as the production 
of chemicals and petrochemicals, is relatively narrow. One 
explanation is that although these industries are complex 
by LDCs' standards, they are considered as standardised 
industries in developed countries. In other words, they are 
part of the phase 3 of the industry technology cycle which 
is parallel to the product cycle theory (Magee, 1976a). The 
data here also seem to suggest that the 'technological barrier 
to entry' is more easily eroded than the 'goodwill barrier'.
If there were relatively perfect markets, there would 
only be a narrow range of prices within which a technology 
seller could manoeuvre. He would have to offer either a low 
fee combined with a long duration or a high fee combined 
with a short duration. Competition would prevent him from 
reaping high fees for an indefinite period. A technology 
seller who is a monopolist, on the other hand, can charge 
whatever price that market will bear. Consequently, there 
will be a systematic relationship between durations and fees 
of technology contracts in a relatively competitive market, 
i.e. the higher the fees, the shorter the duration and vice 
versa. In a monopolistic situation, such a relationship may 
not prevail.
The data here tend to support the above hypothesis.
In a standardised and competitive industry like the 
petrochemical industries, two technology recipients were 
charged 2-2.9 per cent of gross sales for five years, while 
the third firm was charged 1.8 per cent of gross sales for 
eight years. In another competitive and standardised 
industry, the manufacturing of glass sheets, a firm paid 
2.5 per cent of gross sales for five years, while another 
firm paid 2 per cent of gross sales for eight years. In 
industries where markets are less competitive and technology 
is tied to trademarks and brand names, such a relationship 
is usually absent. For example, in the dairy industry, the
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contract with the longest duration (30 years) was specified 
with the highest fee (6.5 per cent of net sales). The 
lowest fee payer (.5 per cent of net sales) had to pay know­
how fees for only five years. In the manufacturing of 
differentiated products like paints, the highest fee payer 
(6 per cent of net sales) had to pay know-how fees for 80 
years, while the lowest fee payer paid only 1 per cent of 
net sales for ten years. In the production of cosmetics, 
one seller charged 16 per cent of gross sales for an 
indefinite period while another seller charged 10 per cent 
of gross sales for the production of similar products for 
a period of five years.
6.4.2 The effects of sources of technology on 
technology fees. The price of technology can also be 
affected by the sources, that is, early comers in the 
technology market will charge higher prices for technology 
than latecomers owing to accumulated (actual or imaginary) 
goodwill and experience. For this purpose, technology 
suppliers to Thailand were classified into four principal 
categories, U.S.A., Japan, other developed countries and 
developing countries. It is expected that latecomers into 
the technology market, namely Japan and developing countries, 
will offer more attractive terms and conditions to compete 
with early comers.
When the size of remuneration is classified by sources, 
the know-how fees charged by Japanese sellers lie mostly 
between 1.5 and 2.6 per cent. There are only two out of 84 
contracts where royalties reached 7 and 11 per cent. On the 
other hand, the fees charged by suppliers from other 
developed countries and the U.S.A. display a royalty range 
of 2-5 per cent. In the case of the United States, four out 
of 49 contracts charged royalties amounting to over 10 per 
cent of net sales. Five out of 43 contracts concluded with 
other advanced nations were specified with more than 10 per 
cent of sales for technology fees.
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Parts of these relatively high fees are attributable 
to the product differentiation mentioned earlier. Technology 
sellers from the United States and other developed countries 
seemed to enjoy considerable prestige in differentiated 
products. In the production of cosmetics, the royalties 
paid to Japanese sellers are 1.5 per cent of net sales for 
soap and 5 per cent of actual costs for shampoo, while the 
U.S. seller charged 3 per cent of net sales for soap and 10 
per cent for shampoo. In the garment industry, gross fees 
for trademarks and know-how collected by a Japanese supplier 
amounted to 2 per cent of gross sales, while an American 
technology supplier charged 5 per cent of gross sales for 
trademarks and know-how. There are few industries where 
Japanese firms charged higher royalties than American sellers 
such as in tyre and ceramic manufactures. However, the 
difference in these industries is small.
Even in standardised industries, the United States and 
other developed countries still enjoyed higher prestige than 
Japanese sellers. To illustrate, in the production of 
copper wire, a U.S. technology seller charged 2.5 per cent 
of net sales for know-how fees plus an initial fee of 
US$18,000. A Japanese producer of the same product only 
charged .38 per cent of net sales for bare copper wire and 
1 per cent of net sales for enamelled copper wire without 
any initial charge.
Comparing Japan with suppliers from developing 
countries, Japan generally charged higher fees than 
Taiwanese or Indian suppliers. For example, in the filament 
yarn industry where there were three producers in Thailand 
at the time of the field-work, the two Japanese joint 
ventures paid substantial know-how fees to the Japanese 
suppliers and partners. The third firm, which was a 
Taiwanese joint venture, received know-how free of charge.
In the textile industry, most Taiwanese suppliers charge 
relatively small fees and if the Taiwanese firms are joint 
venture partners, technology is supplied free of charge.
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Thus, to a certain extent, variations in the rates of 
know-how fees within an industry depend on goodwill which 
has been built up as a result of being an innovator in the 
industry or of being the earlier establishment. More 
lucrative offers must be provided by latecomers, in this 
case, Japan and other developing countries, to attract 
recipient firms.
6.4.3 The effects of foreign control on the explicit 
costs of technology. It has been mentioned earlier that 
there are several hypotheses about the effects of foreign 
control on the price of technology. The first is that 
subsidiaries of foreign firms tend to have free access to 
technology. Secondly, even if technology is not freely 
given, foreign subsidiaries may be able to obtain technology 
more cheaply than local firms which have to acquire 
technology through arm's length deals. On the other hand, 
it may be that sometimes know-how fees charged to foreign 
subsidiaries or foreign-controlled joint ventures are used 
for arbitrary allocation of costs among sister firms and 
therefore manipulated to fit the parent firms' strategic 
expediency. The price of technology in this situation will 
bear no direct relation to the actual cost and can in some 
instances be higher than the technology obtained through 
arm's length bargaining.
6.4.3.1 Foreign control and access to free technology. As 
was mentioned earlier, there are no official records of all 
firms in Thailand which have foreign equity. It is 
therefore impossible to determine the overall proportion of 
foreign subsidiaries which receive free technology. This 
can be investigated only for foreign firms in the promoted 
sector.
Combining the data of the Bank of Thailand and the 
Board of Investment, it appears that 40 out of 118 local 
firms (34 per cent) and 5 3 out of 81 foreign firms (65 per 
cent) from 21 sub-industrial groups concluded fee-paying 
know-how contracts. Table 6.4 classifies the shares of
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Table 6.4
Shares of 199 Promoted Firms with Technology Contracts (1973)
Total
Percentage of 
firms having
Number technology
of firms contracts
Local Foreign Local Foreign
firms firms sector sector
Food processing
Dairy products - 4 - 100
Preserving of pineapples 3 2 0 50
Animal feed 2 2 0 50
Othersa 2 1 100 0
Spinning, weaving and finishing 38 25 24 60
Paper and paper products 10 3 0 67
Petrochemicals and chemicals
Filament yarn - 3 - 100
Other petrochemicals 2 2 50 100
Chemicals 9 3 33 67
Chemical products
Paints 7 5 29 80
Medicine and pharmaceutical - 3 - 100
Fertilisers 2 - 50
Petroleum products 2 1 100 100
Tyres 1 3 0 67
Metal products and equipment 1 1 100 100
Electrical products
Electric bulbs 3 2 0 50
Household appliances 10 5 30 60
Batteries 5 2 100 50
Vehicle assembly
Automobile assembly 3 8 100 38
Autopart assembly 17 4 41 50
Motorcycle assembly 1 2 100 100
All sectors 118 81 34 65
Notes: 1) (a) includes seasoning powder and noodles.
2) - indicates that there are no firms in the particular sector.
Sources: 1) BOI listing of promoted firms; 2) BOI 1973 questionnaire;
3) Technology contracts held by the Bank of Thailand
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technology purchasing firms by industry and by sector (i.e. 
foreign or local). Among 20 industrial sub-groups where 
there are foreign firms, there is only one group, i.e. 
processing of other food, in which no fees were charged to 
foreign controlled firms. Vehicle assembly is the only 
group where the majority of foreign firms received technology 
free of charge (only 38 per cent paid know-how fees to parent 
companies).
Among the industrial sub-groups where there are both 
foreign and local firms, there are only three, namely 
processing of other food, batteries and automobile assembly, 
where the local sectors exhibit a higher proportion of fee­
paying firms than the foreign sectors. For example, only 
24 per cent of local textile firms in contrast to 60 per cent 
of foreign textile firms concluded technology contracts.
Local firms can run textile factories reasonably efficiently 
by hiring free-lance specialists who are less expensive to 
acquire than technology contracts (see Chapter 10).
That a large proportion of foreign firms in Table 6.4 
had to pay technology fees may be partly attributable to the 
dominance of joint venture arrangements in the foreign 
sector. Although the joint venture is foreign-controlled, 
the foreign partner may still wish to formalise technology 
agreements to extract a larger share of profits from the 
joint venture operation. However, evidence also suggests 
that wholly foreign owned subsidiaries paid substantial 
technology fees to their parent companies. For example,
Alcan Thai pays both trademark and management fees to its 
parent and sister firms. Without exception, non-promoted 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations in chemical and 
chemical products industries all recorded paying high fees 
(absolutely and relatively) to their parent companies. 
Therefore, technology fees may be a convenient avenue for 
transferring income to parent or associated companies. This 
point will be examined more fully in a later section.
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Another reason why foreign firms which presumably have 
higher technical expertise than local firms need to conclude 
technical assistance agreements, is that products produced 
by the foreign and local sectors may not be qualitatively 
identical.
6.4.3.2 Foreign control and the rate of technology fees.
To test whether technology fees charged to foreign 
subsidiaries and foreign controlled joint ventures reflect 
an arbitrary allocation of costs, the fees charged to the 
foreign and local sectors were compared. If the ranges of 
fees in the foreign sectors are much wider, this may provide 
some indication that technology fees for the foreign sectors 
are arbitrary allocation of costs.
Table 6.5 shows the rates of remuneration classified 
by nationality of ownership and control of recipient firms. 
Out of 14 industrial sub-groups where products are comparable 
and control can be identified, the foreign sectors 
consistently display a higher range of royalties except for 
the tyre manufacturing industry. The highest fee payers are 
normally foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures. However, 
the range of royalties of the foreign sectors is not 
substantially higher than in the local sectors. More 
significantly, many contracts concluded by foreign sectors 
have very long durations, with the result that the total 
private cost of technology to foreign firms will be higher 
than that incurred by local firms. This evidence also 
suggests that local firms have put considerable effort into 
bargaining for technology.
6.4.3.3 Technology fees as a means of income transfer. If 
foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures employ royalties and 
technology fees as an additional means of transferring income 
from direct investment to their home countries, technology 
fees will be sizeable in comparison with net income. This 
can be detected to a certain extent by computing the ratio
of technology fees to net income. If the ratio is very large
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and signilicantly different from that of the local sectors, 
then the foreign sectors may use the remittance of know-how 
fees as an alternative transfer channel to profit remittance.
One reason why remittance in the form of royalties and 
know-how fees is more attractive than the remittance of 
profits is that royalties and technology fees are treated 
as expenditure and are therefore tax deductible. Moreover, 
the Thai tax on remitted fees is 15 per cent while that on 
remitted income is 25 per cent. In addition, foreign firms 
in Thailand are not permitted to remit more than 20 per cent 
of their profits and dividends in one year. Thus, when the 
ratio is substantially higher than 20 per cent and much 
higher than in the local sector, this should be a cause of 
concern to the local authorities and an in-depth investigation 
may be needed.
The ratio, however, can be high owing to low profits 
resulting from either mismanagement or unfavourable demand 
or from the effort to transfer income in the form of 
technology fees. Unfortunately, these two causes are very 
difficult to determine from the present data. However, it 
is sufficient to note that a high ratio combined with low or 
negative profits should also be a cause of concern if the 
absolute size of know-how fees is unusually large.
Again, combining the data of the Bank of Thailand and 
the Board of Investment, Table 6.6 presents the average ratio 
of technology fees to net profits and the rate of return on 
total investment (ratio of net profits to total investment) 
for 15 industrial sub-groups in 1973. Two industries, the 
pharmaceutical and dairy industries, exhibit a ratio greater 
than unity. Although there is no promoted local sector in 
these industries, it is safe to consider these ratios 
exceedingly high.
The reason for a very high ratio in the milk industry 
is that the technology fees of some milk producers were very 
high in absolute terms. For example, the first producer
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Table 6.6
The Average Ratios of Technology Fees to Net 
Profits in 62 Thai Manufacturing Firms (1973)
Industry
Local
TNP
sectors
NRI
Foreign
TNP
sectors
NRI
A. Food
Preserving of fruit .16 -.08 .55 -.05
Dairy products - - 3.23 -.02
Animal feed - - .44 -.33
B. Textiles .23 .09 .26 .10
C. Paper products n.f. n.f. .28 .05
D. Chemicals and petrochemicals
Synthetic filament yarn - - .06 .15
Petrochemical products .10 .09 .11 .15
E. Chemical products
Paints .14 -.11 .32 .13
Pharmaceuticals - - 1.74 .14
F. Tyres n.a. n.a. .18 .17
G. Electrical products
Household appliances .53 .03 .43 .02
Batteries .22 .06 .14 .29
H. Vehicle assembly
Automobile assembly n.a. -.08 .19 -.06
Autopart assembly .13 -.08 .18 .04
Motorcycle assembly .29 .12 .27 .25
Notes: 1) TNP = ratio of technology fees to net profits.
2) NRI = ratio of net return on investment.
3) n.a. = data not available.
4) - = no promoted local sectors.
5) n.f. = no fees.
Sources: as for Table 6.4
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paid know-how fees equivalent to 9 million baht. Its net 
loss for the year (1973) was 3 million baht. The second 
producer paid 7 million baht for technology fees and reported 
only one million baht profits for 1973. The third firm, 
however, paid only .722 million baht and made 6 million baht 
profit for the year. These three firms are similar in size 
measured in terms of total assets and labour force. The data 
on the fee paying practice of the first and second firm 
suggest that further investigation is required.
In the pharmaceutical industry, the absolute cost of 
know-how fees was very high, reaching four to five million 
baht in three cases. At the same time their profits were 
highly impressive. Interestingly, Vaitsos (1974, p.86) 
observed that foreign subsidiaries in the pharmaceutical 
industry in Colombia reported their royalties to be, on the 
average, four times greater than declared profits.
Both the dairy product and pharmaceutical industries 
use simple production processes. Such a high level of 
royalties can hardly be justified in those relatively simple 
industries.
The other three industries where foreign sectors 
recorded relatively large know-how fees are the paint, 
animal feed and preserved food industries. The relatively 
high ratios in the latter two industries were largely owing 
to low profits. Since both industries were relatively new 
(no firms had been established for more than three years), 
some allowance must be made for the run-in period. The 
paint industry, on the other hand, is an old industry but 
its technology fees in absolute terms are not very high.
It should be noted that the above results are related 
to 1973 sales figures. If the rate of technology fees is 
not specified in a contract as a certain percentage of sales, 
the result will be affected by the size of 1973 sales. For 
example, if 1973 was an extraordinarily good year, the result 
would underestimate the cost of technology of a firm which
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agreed upon annual fixed lump sum payments. Fortunately, 
apart from the paper industry, all the payments of the firms 
in Table 6.6 were specified as a percentage of annual sales.
During an interview, there was a hint of a possible case 
of resource transfer through royalties. In sugar processing, 
a wholly foreign subsidiary paid substantial royalties to 
its parent. This particular company is a takeover from a 
joint venture, the local partner of which had to sell his 
share during the sugar market slump in the sixties. The ex­
local owner did not pay any royalties to his foreign partner 
who later took over the business and started charging the 
venture royalty fees.
6.5 Conditions in Technology Agreements
There is a large body of literature dealing with the 
restrictive practices of foreign technology suppliers in 
developing countries. However, it is to be expected that 
in the bargaining process, both suppliers and recipients will 
attempt to negotiate for provisions which will maximise their 
gains. So here an attempt will be made to examine both 
restrictive and non-restrictive conditions, the latter being 
potentially more beneficial to recipients. The study of non- 
restrictive practices is useful for two reasons. First, it 
will throw some light on the bargaining position of local 
recipients and, secondly, it may serve as a set of 
guidelines for further negotiations. Moreover, in many cases 
the dividing line between restrictive and non-restrictive 
practices is fairly thin. This will become more evident as 
the data are examined.
6.5.1 Conditions in technology contracts affecting 
marketing, purchasing and pricing strategies of recipients.
In Table 6.7, the conditions affecting marketing, purchasing 
and pricing policies are presented. The most common 
restrictive condition, which occurs in about 36 per cent of 
all contracts is the condition on export market franchise.
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Table 6.7
Clauses in 184 Technology Agreements (Submitted by 1975) 
Affecting Marketing, Purchasing and 
Pricing Policies of Recipients
Number of contracts
containing the As percentage
restriction indicated of 184 contracts
A. Market arrangement 87 47.0
- total prohibition of
exports by recipients 11 5.8
- restricted areas for 
exports by recipients
- recipients needing
23 12.5
approval by suppliers 
to export 32 17.4
- reciprocal arrangement 
on export areas
- prohibition of suppliers'
17 9.2
exports into Thailand 4 2.2
B . Local sales agents to be 
appointed by suppliers 14 7.6
C. Prices of agreed products 
to be fixed by suppliers 9 4.9
D. Recipients needing approval 
by suppliers to sell 
intermediate products 4 2.2
E. Prohibition of production 
of competitive products 14 7.6
F. Tie-in purchase of machinery 
and equipment 25 13.6
G. Tie-in purchase of raw 
materials 40 21.7
Source: Extracted from contracts available in the Bank of Thailand
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The most general form of market restriction is the 
stipulation that the recipient may not, without the previous 
written consent of the supplier, export the agreed products, 
nor knowingly sell or dispose of the agreed products to any 
firms or persons known to intend to export or to resell the 
products for exports. Of 87 contracts, with some market 
arrangement condition, the condition of written approval 
prior to export is in 32 contracts, restricted areas in 23 
contracts and a total ban on exports in 11 contracts. The 
areas to which Thai exports were allowed were generally Laos 
and Cambodia where exports by suppliers were marginal. Some 
relatively liberal contracts allowed exports to all 
Southeast Asian countries. A reciprocal market arrangement 
is one to which a technology seller agrees not to export into 
the recipient's markets or into a certain area set aside for 
recipient firms. The benefits of this condition depend on 
the size of the markets where recipients are allowed to 
trade and on the duration of the contracts. In 17 cases 
(9 per cent of all contracts) which included a reciprocal 
market arrangement, two contracts prohibited recipients 
entirely from export activities and three others allowed 
only small areas for Thai exports. In such cases, a 
reciprocal market arrangement is hardly advantageous to the 
recipient.
Only four contracts allowed unlimited export activities 
by recipients while suppliers agreed to restrain their 
exports into Thailand. The true non-restrictive market 
arrangement is indeed infrequent.
Two hypotheses offer explanations for export market 
restriction under an arm's length negotiation. First, 
technology sellers will try to maximise their gains by 
placing relatively restrictive conditions on exports in 
industries where recipients have potential comparative 
advantage. If this is the case, one would expect that 
industries like textiles and garments would face relatively
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stringent restrictions. Secondly, in industries where 
international quality standards are vital to the survival 
of technology sellers, sellers will stipulate export 
restriction conditions when they are uncertain of the 
ability of the recipient in achieving the international 
standard.
The present data suggest that export restriction is 
most common in the electrical appliance, chemical and 
petrochemical industries, accounting for 87 and 67 per cent 
of all contracts in the respective industries. Other 
industries, in which half of the contracts stipulate some 
form of export restrictions are paints, pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics, metal equipment and vehicle part assembly. It 
appears that only the evidence in the vehicle part industry 
supports the first hypothesis while the majority of the 
data indicates that quality of the agreed products produced 
by recipients appears to be the major cause for export 
restrictions. In one petrochemical contract, it was clearly 
stipulated that the recipient may not export without the 
prior consent of the technology seller. However, once the 
approval is given, the technology seller agrees to help the 
recipient to reach export specifications.
Tied purchases of raw materials and intermediates are 
the second most common practice. In most cases, however, 
suppliers promised competitive prices. Otherwise, 
compulsory purchases were mainly for principal raw materials 
such as flavouring ingredients, active chemicals for 
medicines, and so on. Similarly, the tied purchases of 
machinery and equipment usually specified that the machinery 
must be offered at competitive prices. In some of the 
contracts, suppliers would sell machinery to recipients only 
on special request.
In many instances of tied purchases of raw materials 
and intermediates where the final products are related to 
accepted trademarks and brand names, this condition serves
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to ensure for the recipients steady supplies of principal 
ingredients and parts. The dividing line between 
restrictive and non-restrictive practice in such cases again 
is fairly thin. Recipients in such cases are as anxious as, 
or in certain instances even more so, than technology sellers 
to include tied purchases in the agreements.
The tied purchases of raw materials and intermediates 
were observed in all contracts for synthetic filament, in 
about three-quarters of the contracts in the pharmaceutical 
and electrical appliance industries, and about 55 per cent 
in the vehicle part industry. Although no contracts in 
vehicle assembly had a tied purchase clause, the use of 
suppliers' intermediates is almost inevitable. Moreover, 
royalties in this industry were commonly fixed according to 
the degree of local content. The higher the local content, 
the higher the royalties.
It is not possible, given the available data to 
determine whether tied purchases of raw materials serve as 
a means of transfer pricing. The sheer existence of tied 
purchases gives no indication of the actual practice of 
transfer pricing although it does make transfer pricing, if 
it exists, easier. Very detailed information on input mixes, 
invoiced and world prices of inputs are needed.
However, for the production of synthetic filament and 
pharmaceutical industries, there are several indications 
that transfer pricing may not have been seriously used as 
a means of resource transfer. First, profits in these two 
industries were very impressive (Table 6.6). Secondly, all 
filament producers and some leading pharmaceutical firms are 
promoted enterprises and are exempted from corporate income 
tax which is already low by international standards.
Thirdly, the transfer of resources through royalties is 
administratively simpler than transfer pricing. In the case 
of electrical goods, the producers of which are mostly 
promoted firms, tied purchases of components are a result of
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quality control because most recipient firms are locally 
owned and use suppliers' brand name for marketing. The case 
of the vehicle assembly industry, however, needs further 
careful investigation.
The more visible impact of tied purchases is in their 
adverse effects on the development of local industries. In 
the production of electrical appliances and vehicle part 
assembly, tied purchases, although stipulated at world 
prices, discourage the recipients from the search for or 
the possibility of local sub-contracting. It would be more 
beneficial to recipients to let the price mechanism work out 
the cheapest source of supplies, be it local or foreign.
In the production of filament yarn, the effect of tied 
purchases on the development of an input industry is 
relatively unimportant, because Thailand lacks the necessary 
capital and more significantly the raw materials.
Tied purchases of equipment and machinery were observed 
in all contracts of filament yarn, cement, and about one- 
third of all contracts in the auto part and electrical 
appliance industries. Most of the technology sellers in 
these industries are Japanese. It will be suggested in a 
later section that the tied purchases of equipment and 
machinery are mainly a Japanese phenomenon.
There are other conditions which affect the market and 
pricing policies of recipients but their magnitudes are 
relatively small (Table 6.7) except for two conditions, i.e. 
there were 14 cases where recipients agreed to supply the 
agreed products to local agents appointed by technology 
sellers and agreed not to produce competitive products. The 
former is likely to be an attempt to honour the obligation 
of technology suppliers to local agents who have marketed 
these products prior to local production.
However, as far as export market arrangements are 
concerned, the evidence in the Thai manufacturing industries 
suggests that total ban on export is not as frequently found
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in Thailand as in other developing countries. Unfortunately, 
there is little empirical evidence nor are there comparable 
studies of other developing countries on conditions (other 
than those on export restriction) which affect the 
marketing, purchasing and pricing policies of recipients.
6.5.2 Conditions affecting the transmission of 
technology. Table 6.8 presents conditions affecting 
technology transmission but only the relatively important 
conditions will be discussed. The most common condition of 
all areas is confidentiality. A total of 134 contracts or 
approximately 73 per cent of all contracts had this 
condition. Moreover, in 60 contracts, confidentiality is 
expected to be observed even after expiration or termination 
of the contract. To give one example of a complete 
confidentiality clause:
The recipient agrees that all technical data made 
available to it by the supplier will be held in 
confidence and will not be divulged by recipient 
without the written consent of the supplier, to 
any person, firm, corporation, government establishment 
or governmental agency except responsible employees 
of the recipient for use in its business. The 
recipient will take all reasonable steps to insure 
compliances therewith by the recipient's employees.
The recipient's obligations of confidentiality under 
this article shall survive any termination of this 
agreement.
The fact that recipients must be responsible for any 
leak in information by employees necessitates its inclusion 
in employment contracts with employees. In an extreme case, 
recipients would be held liable to compensation for the leak 
in information by ex-employees. The last condition is very 
inhibiting to the internal diffusion of technology and 
neutralises any externality that may occur from importing 
technology.
During field-work, one employment contract between an 
American multinational corporation and its employee was made 
available. In this employment contract, the employee was
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Table 6.8
Clauses (in 184 contracts submitted by 1975) Affecting 
the Transmission of Technology
Number of contracts
containing the As percentage
restriction indicated of 184 contracts
A. Confidentiality (applied 
to recipient firms)
- during the term of the
agreements 74
- after expiration of the
134
40.2
72.8
agreements 60 32.6
B. Confidentiality (applied 
to recipient firms' 
employees) 22 12.0
C. The rights granted to 
recipients being
- non-transferable 59
127
32.1
69.1
- non-sublicensable 68 37.0
D. Prohibition of the use of 
know-how upon expiration 
of contracts 21 11.4
E. Prohibition of duplicating 
know-how or reverse 
engineering 15 8.2
F. Termination of production 
for a specified period upon 
expiration 2 1.1
G. Recipients needing approval 
by suppliers to enter into 
third party agreements 27 14.7
H. Suppliers needing approval 
by recipients to enter into 
third party agreements 17 9.2
I. Unilateral grants to suppliers 
for the right to make use of 
improvements on agreed products 
discovered by recipients 19 10.3
J. Unilateral grants to recipients 
for the right to make use of 
improvements on agreed products 
or processes of suppliers 22 12.0
K. Reciprocal grants for the right 
to make use of improvements on 
agreed products 38 20.7
L. Provision of training of 
recipients' staff in suppliers' 
plants 76 41.3
M. Specified period of takeover by 
local staff 3 1.6
N. Guarantee of certain achievements 
in quality or quantity by suppliers 12 6.5
0 . Adaptation of equipment and 
products by suppliers to suit local 
conditions 2 1.1
Source as for Table 6.7
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required to keep in confidence any information acquired 
during and after the term of the contract. The employer 
agreed to compensate the employee for any loss in income 
from future employment which was as a result of withholding 
the employer's secret information.
Other popular restrictions include the prohibition of 
recipients to transfer (32 per cent) or to sub-license (37 
per cent) received know-how to other individuals and 
enterprises. Interestingly, it was observed that among the 
184 analysed contracts four suppliers, all notably Japanese, 
were themselves sub-licensees from original innovators.
This would suggest that Thai licensees should negotiate for 
the right to sub-license, subject to a reasonable 
sub-licensing fee.
Generally, recipients agreed to return technical 
information to suppliers upon the expiration or termination 
of the contract. Moreover, in 21 cases (11 per cent), 
suppliers made sure that technical information was not to 
be used after expiration. In 15 cases, suppliers required 
that recipients be held liable for compensation if they were 
found using know-how on the basis of duplicated data or if 
they copied special machinery. In a few extreme cases, 
recipients agreed to cease production for a specified period 
of time should the contract be terminated without renewal.
It has been pointed out above that this clause perpetuates 
technological dependence in certain instances at a high cost 
and forces a long-term commitment to know-how which may 
become outdated.
In 19 cases (10 per cent), recipients agreed to 
unilaterally grant suppliers the right to the use of any 
improvement discovered by the recipients. Except in one 
case, suppliers had free access to recipients' technology 
and at the same time the right to sub-license. The 
following clause from a technology contract of an autopart 
assembly represents a typical provision:
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The supplier shall have the right to use such 
devices and invention as the recipient may make in 
respect of the products without any compensation.
The recipient shall also grant to the supplier the 
royalty-free and irrevocable licence thereunder the 
right to grant sublicence without consent of the 
recipient for the duration of the term of any such 
industrial property anywhere outside the recipient's 
territory.
A reciprocal arrangement for the diffusion of information 
on improvements is another example of the difficulty of 
classifying restrictive and non-restrictive practices. Of 
38 cases with such restriction, five contracts indicated 
reciprocal arrangements on unequal terms. For instance, in 
one case the industrial property right of any improvements 
discovered by either side must belong to the supplier. In 
another case, the recipient must pay fees for the use of any 
improvement made by the supplier while the supplier had free 
access to that made by the recipient. In a third case, the 
supplier agreed to inform the recipient of unpatented 
discoveries while the recipient agreed to provide all 
information on improvements to the supplier. In the other 
two cases, suppliers had the right to sub-license any 
improvements made by either party while recipients had no 
such right.
True non-restrictive grant back provisions on 
improvements were observed in 22 contracts. In these cases, 
recipients were not required to disclose their improvements 
while suppliers promised information on any useful information 
on improvements to agreed products.
Among the true non-restrictive clauses noted, the 
training of local staff in the suppliers' plant is most 
popular, constituting 41.3 per cent of all contracts.
However, expenses incurred during this training are always 
the responsibility of the recipient. There was one 
interesting contract which stipulated that while the 
recipient's employees would be allowed to be trained in the
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supplier's plant, they were not allowed to enter any 
laboratory. Other contracts stipulated the maximum training 
period and the maximum number of trainees at any one time.
There are many truly non-restrictive conditions which, 
unfortunately, are not usually included in most contracts. 
Only twelve recipients were given guarantees by their 
suppliers on the volume or the quality of the agreed 
products that would be achieved. Rarer still (three 
contracts of 1.6 per cent) is the clause stipulating the 
period after which suppliers guaranteed that local staff 
would be able to take over the operation of the acquired 
technology efficiently. Only two recipients required that 
suppliers assisted them in the adaptation of products and 
processes to meet local conditions. No suppliers, however, 
guaranteed that the use of their patents by their recipients 
would not infringe third-party agreements.
As far as conditions on the transmission of technology 
are concerned, the prohibition of sub-licensing is a 
standard practice in approximately half of the contracts in 
all industries. Reverse engineering and duplication of 
technical data were not allowed in 75 per cent of the 
contracts in tyre production and in 29 per cent of textile 
contracts.^  Both industries involved some special machinery 
and processes. Apart from these two conditions, other 
conditions were scattered across industries and no clear 
pattern has emerged.
6.5.3 Other conditions. One interesting condition 
which works against the untying of the direct foreign 
investment package is that on ownership and control of 
recipient enterprises. It was stipulated in 25 per cent of 
all contracts in the foreign sector that supplies of
While engaged in interviews in the textile industry, one 
local firm reported the use of this special process from 
another source of supply in Thailand. Thus, the process 
must have been sufficiently simple to be copied.
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technology would cease if suppliers lost majority ownership 
and in 7 per cent, if suppliers lost majority control. Less 
strictly, in 12 and 19 per cent of all foreign contracts, 
it was specified that suppliers would terminate the contract 
if there were unacceptable changes in local control and 
ownership respectively.
There are also other legal conditions which have not 
been discussed. Two contracts concluded with American 
suppliers forbid the trade and sale of the agreed technology 
or goods to the Soviet Bloc. Another concerns the settlement 
of disputes. The commonly accepted principle is that 
arbitration should take place in the defendant's country and 
should be conducted in accordance with the rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. However, in most 
contracts, disputes were to be settled in and according to 
the law of the supplier's country.
A crucial question that cannot be answered by the 
present set of data is to what extent and how effectively 
all these conditions have been enforced in practice. The 
above findings should not be taken as conclusive evidence 
of "restrictive practice" in Thailand but should be taken 
as a useful starting point from which the behaviour of 
these firms should be observed. However, whether these 
conditions have been or will be enforced in practice, the 
potential adverse effects are there and should be eliminated.
There seem to be other important factors influencing 
conditions in technology contracts. It may be useful to 
examine the effects of other factors such as foreign control 
and the source of technology on implicit cost.
6.5.4 Sources of technology and conditions in 
technology agreements. Parallel to the argument that 
Japanese investment is trade creating while investment from 
other developed countries, notably the United States, is 
trade diverting (Kojima, 1973), it can be hypothesised that 
if the above proposition is true, the sales of technology
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from these sources will exhibit certain patterns on 
marketing conditions. Japanese suppliers will be more 
liberal on export market arrangements while suppliers from 
other developed countries will demand relatively restrictive 
market arrangements.
In general, the present data suggest little difference 
in market arrangements between Japan and suppliers from 
other developed countries. It was discovered that 38 per 
cent of contracts concluded with Japan and 37 per cent of 
contracts concluded with other developed countries stipulated 
some form of export restrictions, i.e. total prohibition, 
restricted areas and the need for prior approval from 
technology suppliers. Moreover, while 7 per cent of 
Japanese contracts allowed reciprocal export arrangements,
13 per cent of contracts concluded with other developed 
countries specified such a provision. Nor was there a 
significant difference in the condition of tied purchases 
of raw materials, i.e. it was specified in 25 per cent of 
Japanese contracts in contrast to 18 per cent of contracts 
concluded with other developed countries.
The only significant difference in market arrangement 
is in the stipulation of tied purchases of machinery. 
Twenty-three per cent of Japanese contracts had such a 
condition compared with only 6 per cent of the contracts 
concluded with other developed countries. One explanation 
is that in most Japanese investments, one member of the 
investing consortium is normally a trading company. Thus, 
it is in the interest of trading company partners to specify 
tied purchases of machinery so that they can collect 
commission fees. It seems that insofar as the data suggest 
any difference, Japan's technology sales appear to be trade 
creating in only one direction, i.e. export creating for 
Japan but not for any other countries.
There were also negligible differences between Japan 
and other developed countries in most conditions affecting
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the transmission of technology, except for conditions on 
confidentiality, reciprocal grants for the right to make use 
of improvements on agreed products, overseas training 
provisions and quality or quantity guarantees. Japan tended 
to be concerned with placing stringent conditions on the 
first two but provided generous provisions for the latter 
two. While 81 per cent of Japanese contracts observed the 
confidentiality clause, 67 per cent of contracts concluded 
with other advanced nations stipulated such a condition.
This is probably because Japan's technology sales in 
Thailand have a relatively low natural technological barrier 
to entry, i.e. relatively simple technology. Thus, she 
needs to maximise her gains by erecting artificial barriers 
to entry.
As many as 32 per cent of contracts concluded with 
suppliers from other developed countries provided reciprocal 
rights to make use of any improvements made on agreed 
products, but only 11 per cent of Japanese contracts had 
that provision. One explanation is that Japanese suppliers 
are relatively concentrated in the sales of standardised 
technology. The scope for improvements is limited and 
therefore this condition is not regarded as relevant.
However, Japanese sellers are more generous in 
providing training for local staff than other developed 
countries, i.e. 51 per cent as opposed to 34 per cent.
Other developed countries also offered much shorter training 
periods than Japanese sellers. The training provision is 
often regarded as or thought to be useful among recipient 
firms. Moreover, 11 per cent of Japanese contracts gave 
guarantees that the quality or quantity of the agreed 
products would reach certain specifications or volume after 
a specified period in contrast to only 3 per cent of 
contracts of suppliers from other developed countries.
On the whole, Japanese suppliers tend to offer lower 
fees, more generous provisions on training and more stringent
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conditions on the remaining clauses. From a private point 
of view which disregards the external economies from intra­
industry diffusion, the cost of technology obtained from 
Japan will be less than that obtained from other suppliers 
except developing countries. The lower explicit cost is 
offset by a slightly higher implicit cost. Lower implicit 
cost may be necessary to compensate for her less 
prestigious position vis-a-vis other developed countries 
and this partly explains Japan's dominant position as a 
technology supplier to Thailand.
6.5.6 Foreign control and conditions in technology 
agreements. As far as conditions affecting market 
arrangements are concerned, there were three conditions 
which exhibited some noticeable difference in the degree of 
restrictive practices between foreign and local sectors.
The first was export prohibition, i.e. 35 per cent of 
contracts in the local sector as opposed to 24 per cent of 
contracts in the foreign sector stipulated total export ban 
or restricted export areas or the need for suppliers' 
consent prior to export. The second was the prohibition of 
the production of competitive products. This was observed 
in 4 per cent of the contracts in the foreign sector and in 
13 per cent in the local sector. The third was tied 
purchases of raw materials, i.e. 17 per cent of foreign 
contracts in contrast to 26 per cent of local contracts.
Thus, in general, the local sector faced slightly more 
restrictive market arrangements than the foreign sector.
This result is consistent with the findings of other LDCs 
discussed earlier.
Similarly, in the area of technology transmission, 67 
per cent of contracts in the local sector contained the 
confidentiality clause while 56 per cent of foreign contracts 
had the same condition. Moreover, 15 per cent of local 
contracts compared with 6 per cent of foreign contracts 
specified prohibition of reverse engineering and the
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duplication of know-how. In 20 per cent of all local 
contracts, recipients needed the suppliers' consent before 
entering third party agreements, but this condition was 
observed in only 7 per cent of foreign contracts. The local 
sector again seemed to have to live with more stringent 
conditions than the foreign sector.
However, the local sector was relatively successful in 
bargaining for non-restrictive conditions. For example, 49 
per cent of local contracts stipulated provision for 
overseas training compared with 31 per cent of foreign 
contracts. While 24 per cent of local firms had access to 
the reciprocal grant for the right to make use of 
improvements on the agreed products, only 15 per cent of 
foreign contracts recorded such a condition explicitly. 
Moreover, 4 per cent of local firms demanded that suppliers 
made certain adaptations of equipment or products to suit 
local conditions. This condition was not observed in any 
contracts in the foreign sector.
In general suppliers to both the local and foreign 
sectors were more concerned in restricting transmission than 
restricting export markets. The relative strictness of the 
condition on technology transmission indicates the suppliers' 
expectation that competition by the recipients would not be 
an immediate threat owing to the underdeveloped nature of 
industrialisation in Thailand. Moreover, since the domestic 
manufacturing sector had been artificially created to cater 
for domestic demand, it is possible that at the time the 
contracts were drawn up neither suppliers nor recipients saw 
Thailand as a contender in export markets and thus neither 
party put a great deal of emphasis on market arrangements.
The concern of the local sector is more directed towards 
technology diffusion within the enterprise as reflected by 
the training provision.
Since the local sector tended to obtain relatively 
generous provisions in training and the right to use
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improvements of the agreed products, this implies a fairly 
rigorous and effective bargaining. However, the fact that 
some of the foreign firms had not included such conditions 
is probably because their relationship with parent companies 
tacitly guarantees advantageous conditions.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that high 
royalties in the manufacturing industries in Thailand have 
been closely associated with monopolistic goodwill such as 
trademarks and brand names rather than production technology. 
Thus, most of the payments for technology are unlikely to 
create the technological infrastructure necessary for further 
technological progress.
As far as explicit costs in some promoted industries 
are concerned, foreign firms do not generally have free 
access to technology. Nor do they normally have cheaper 
access to technology than local firms. In certain 
industries, such as condensed milk and pharmaceutical 
industries, the ratios of royalties to net profits were 
extraordinarily high, which in turn may imply that returns 
on technology were used as a means of reducing the tax 
burden. An in-depth investigation of these industries 
should be undertaken in the future.
It has also been shown that potential increases in 
exportable output and the gain from diffusion of technology 
may be hampered by a number of conditions laid down in 
technology contracts. Generally the local sectors appeared 
to face relatively severe restrictions but overall, the 
experience of Thailand is encouraging compared with that of 
other developing countries. Interestingly, technology 
suppliers are more concerned with prohibiting further 
transmission of technology than restricting export markets. 
There are also some indications that local recipients have 
been successful in bargaining for the best deals.
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Although the types of industry have some effect on the 
explicit cost of technology, the effects on implicit cost 
are not so obvious. The source of technology appeared to 
influence the price of technology to a certain extent. For 
example, the explicit cost of technology obtained from Japan 
is relatively cheap for two reasons. First, Japan is a 
latecomer in many fields of technology and has to offer more 
attractive terms and conditions than other developed 
countries. Secondly, Japan is heavily involved in the 
production of standardised commodities which have low 
technological barriers. To compensate for low explicit cost, 
Japanese suppliers had to set up artificial barriers to entry 
by applying more stringent conditions on technology 
transmission than other developed countries. However, the 
examination of export arrangements of Japanese suppliers 
does not suggest that Japan's sales of technology are trade 
creating.
The rapid increases in technology costs in recent 
years suggest that the issue of technology transfer will 
increasingly become a major area for public concern. So far, 
there have been negligible government interventions in the 
import of technology. In the near future the government 
might need to pay more attention to this, in order to weed 
out redundant and expensive payments for trademarks and 
brand names, to minimise the cost of technology and to 
improve the local recipients' bargaining position.
CHAPTER 7
The Development of the Thai Textile Industry
This chapter explores the development of the textile 
industry and its relative contribution to the economy. It 
also examines the change in the pattern of technology 
transfer over time in the industry.
In general, the textile industry includes the 
manufacturing of fibre, yarn and finished fabrics. However, 
since the following discussion is mainly concerned with 
firms engaged in spinning and weaving, special attention 
will be given to these two activities.
7.1 The Textile Industry in the Thai Economy
Unfortunately, there were no statistics on total 
investment and fixed assets of the industry. However, from 
value added and employment figures, it is possible to 
conclude that the textile industry is one of the most 
important industries in Thailand.
In 1969, the textile industry ranked sixth in the 
percentage share of value added for all manufacturing 
industries. Its share has increased steadily and in 1973, 
the industry emerged as the second largest after food 
manufacturing, contributing 9.4 per cent to total value 
added for the industrial sector.
In terms of employment, the industry constituted .4 
and 6.3 per cent in the share of total workforce and total 
manufacturing workforce respectively (Table 7.1). Since 
the cottage textile industry was excluded from the Thai 
Textile Manufacturing Association's estimate, the figures 
in Table 7.1 should be considered a conservative estimate 
for the employment contribution by the industry. Its 
importance may be better understood by looking at its share 
of employment in urban areas. In 1973, the industry
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provided IG.9 per cent of manufacturing jobs in municipal 
areas and also accounted for 23.6 per cent of jobs created 
in the promoted sector. It is not surprising that the 
industry is often considered as labour-intensive and 
appropriate for countries like Thailand which have an 
abundance of labour. If the dynamic comparative advantage 
theory were accepted (Vernon, 1966; Kojima, 1970; Klein,
19 7 3) , the industry would remain the most important for a 
long time. It would also be expected to function as a 
stepping stone towards more advanced technology.
The textile industry exhibits a wide variation in its 
degree of market, concentration at each level of production. 
In the production of filament yarn, the market is shared by 
only three producers. In spinning, the four largest 
spinning firms accounted for 34 per cent of the total 
national capacity in 1973. On the other hand, weaving and 
finishing activities are characterised by a dual structure 
with large scale modern enterprises (mostly promoted firms) 
surrounded by an innumerable number of small scale firms. 
That the industry exhibits this structure results mainly 
from a combination of the government's promotion policy and 
the technical constraints of the industry.
Firms wishing to obtain promotion certificates must 
conform to the minimum conditions described below. For 
fibre production and spinning activities, the minimum size 
required by the Board of Investment coincided with the 
technically optimum scale of operation. All fibre and yarn 
producing plants, except one spinning mill, were eligible 
for promotion.'*' For weaving firms, the Board required that 
a promoted firm must have at least 500 looms or 50 knitting 
machines or 50 towel weaving machines. Since the technical
The size of this non-promoted spinning mill met the 
required conditions but when the application was submitted, 
the government temporarily suspended promotion to the 
spinning activity.
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economics of scale in weaving are not so much a function of 
size as in spinning, a weaving firm with six looms can be 
as profitable as that with 500 looms. Consequently the 
weaving industry consisted of a cluster of large-scale 
promoted firms surrounded by smaller and less modern 
unpromoted enterprises.
Unfortunately, the industrial census did not make a 
distinction between the promoted and non-promoted sector. 
Information about the size and number of establishments in 
each category was obtained from the Thai Textile 
Manufacturing Association. According to the 1972 survey of 
weaving capacity by the research division of the 
Association, which covered only the greater Bangkok area, 
there were 34 promoted weaving firms with a total of 
12,321 looms — an average of 362 looms each. There were 
322 non-promoted weaving enterprises, one of which belonged 
to the Ministry of Defence. Excluding the government-owned 
enterprise, the range of the number of looms in the non- 
promoted sector was from 5-460 looms. Together they owned 
20,129 looms, an average of 63 looms each.
7.2 The History and Development of the Thai Textile
Industry
The development of the industry will be considered in 
three periods: the traditional textile industry (until
1933), the modernised textile industry (1933-1959) and the 
promoted textile industry (since 1959). Considerable 
emphasis will be given to the second and third periods, when 
Western technology began to penetrate the local industry.
The analysis in the third period is largely confined to the 
promoted sector which is more susceptible to technological 
change.
7.2.1 The traditional textile industry. Prior to 
1850, domestic textile production was characterised by 
handicraft activities for household consumption. Cotton was 
locally grown, silk worms were domestically raised, and the
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fibre was spun and woven in a traditional manner. The 
wooden jerk-hand looms were common throughout the region. 
Apart from changes in the designs and patterns of the 
fabrics, there had been negligible change in the basic 
technology. Textile production was, however, the most 
important manufacturing industry outside food production in 
the subsistence economy.
From the mid-19th century, the rapid growth in rice 
exports led to a considerable increase in cash income of 
the people in the central region, which stimulated the 
purchase of imported goods. Improved ocean transport 
rendered imports more easily and cheaply accessible. Grey 
cloth was imported from India and dyed black for peasant 
clothing. Imports of inexpensive cotton prints gradually 
attracted the new purchasing power. Although dyeing 
workshops were set up around Bangkok by Chinese businessmen, 
domestic production slowly gave way to cheap imports and 
this resulted in the decline of the industry towards the end 
of the century, especially in central Thailand.
7.2.2 The mechanised textile industry: pre-promotion
2period 1933-1959. Mechanised production of textile goods 
was not introduced into Thailand until 1933 when the 
Ministry of Defence decided that local spinning and weaving 
facilities would be set up for military use (Thai Weaving 
Organisation, n.d.). in 1936, the Ministry purchased
German machinery, including 3,232 spindles and 72 weaving 
looms. During the first years of operation, unit costs were 
higher than the equivalent imported products but total 
output was consumed by the public sector.
It was thought that productivity would improve if more 
modern machinery was introduced. In 1937, air-conditioners
Unless otherwise stated, the materials for this and the 
following section were obtained from interviews, 
entrepreneurs, government officials and persons involved in 
the industry.
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and 70 automatic looms were added. Thus, since the very 
beginning of domestic production, modern technology has been 
selected.
During the Second World War, the first Japanese-Thai 
joint venture was formed. The site and building were 
provided by the Thai government and the machinery was 
supplied by the Japanese.
The year 1946, a decade after the first government mill 
was set up, saw the first modern cotton spinning mill in the 
private sector (T31). A local entrepreneur bought second 
hand machinery from Shanghai and experts were recruited from 
there to manage the production. The first private mill had 
a capacity of 3,600 spindles. In 1950, another local 
businessman opened the first mechanised weaving factory in 
the private sector (T23). The machinery was imported from 
Japan and the technicians were again Shanghai engineers.
Fifteen years, then, separate the introduction of 
modern textile production in the public sector and the 
interest of a few local industrialists. The two original 
private businesses were family ventures but operated as 
factories. Although some other weaving enterprises had been 
set up during this period, they did not used modern 
machinery and did not employ more than 20-30 workers 
(Ingram, 1971, p.122). The diffusion of technology from 
the public to the private sector appears to have been 
negligible. This is partly because the Thai government was 
not then aware of the importance of such diffusion, nor was 
the public sector used as a diffusion centre as it had been 
in Japan (Saito, n.d.). Ingram (1971,pp.121, 134)
attributes the slow growth of the industry to low tariffs 
on imported textiles, the relatively small domestic market, 
deficiency of local raw materials and the lack of local 
capital, entrepreneurship and trained labour.
In 1951, the government's second mill in Bangkok was 
leased to a Shanghai industrialist on the condition that he
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installed an additional 10,000 spindles. The lease was for 
25 years. The new installation raised the capacity to318,767 spindles. In the following year, a local 
distributor of imported textiles (Tl) established a second 
mechanised weaving factory in the private sector.
No sooner had the local industry started to grow than 
it was hit hard by cheap imports of cotton yarn from 
Pakistan, which was sold at 25 per cent below Thai unit 
production costs (Sivaranon, 1975). At that time, the 
Pakistani textile industry received a 25-30 per cent export 
subsidy from its government. As a result, the Shanghai 
entrepreneur went out of business. The locally-owned firm 
staggered but survived the dumping period. During this 
period, the government mills which sold some output to the 
private sector had to draw on heavy support from government 
subsidies.
It is interesting to note in this textile crisis of 
1952-53, the marginal firm was the one owned and managed 
by a foreign investor. The local firms, which presumably 
had inferior production know-how and experience, managed to 
cope with the crisis. The explanation may be that the 
capacity of the foreign firm was six times greater than 
that of the local mill and it therefore suffered greater 
absolute losses. In addition, it was in the process of 
expansion which made heavy demands on its financial 
resources. The local firm, on the other hand, may already 
have gained a greater foothold in the market as it had 
begun production earlier. Its small scale was, however, a 
technical disadvantage. The owners of the firm (Tl) 
confessed that they had incurred losses all through those 
early years. Yet, they displayed an admirable tenacity and 
determination to survive.
Ongkan Th^pha (n.d.) but Ingram (1971, p.121) reported 
that it was a group of Shanghai and Hong Kong businessmen 
who brought their machinery from China who leased the mill. 
Their capacity totalled 2,300 spindles in 1952 and could 
produce 3,600 metric tons of yarn per year.
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In 1954, the government's second mill in Bangkok which 
had stopped operation after the Shanghai businessman's 
bankruptcy, was leased to another local businessman (T38).
In 1959, the first private spinning mill (T31) began to 
expand its production capacity from 3,600 to 12,400 
spindles. In the same year, a Thai soldier who had become 
an industrialist commenced another textile venture (T32).
By 1959, there were five pioneering local entrepreneurs.
All of them later became the most prominent figures in the 
development of the textile industry.
An important external factor which affected the 
transfer of technology in Thailand during the period 1950- 
59 was the migration of Chinese entrepreneurs and 
technicians that followed the relocation of the Nationalist 
Chinese government in Taiwan. This released some capital 
to the Thai textile industry, and, more importantly, it 
introduced some of the modern textile technology and 
expertise which was previously unknown to the private 
sector. This capital and know-how were combined with the 
commercial talent and capital of local entrepreneurs.
An interesting feature of the pattern of technology 
transfer in this period is that capital, management, know­
how and machinery were drawn from fairly diverse sources. 
Foreign control was not significant.
7.2.3 The textile industry under promotion (since 
1959). The promotion period has been characterised by three 
big waves of investment in new ventures for yarn and fabric 
production, followed by only scattered investment. By 1961, 
there were already eight promoted spinning mills with a 
total of 92,516 spindles in operation (Sivaranon, 1975, 
p.3). These firms were managed and owned mainly by local 
entrepreneurs. Five of those had already been in the 
industry before promotion became effective and three of 
these were owned by local businessmen who had been quick to 
grasp this attractive opportunity offered by the government.
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In 1962, the first Japanese-Thai joint venture started 
blanket production in Thailand. The following year saw the 
establishment of a local weaving mill and another Japanese- 
Thai joint venture in spinning. The second wave began in 
1964 with a string of new Japanese-Thai joint ventures. 
Between 1964 and 1966, eight joint ventures were established 
in the industry. In 1964, a leading Japanese synthetic 
fibre manufacturer set up a weaving mill (F14) in Thailand. 
Two years later, its Japanese rival also formed a joint 
venture in Thailand. The first modern dyeing and finishing 
mill in the private sector (F28), the first synthetic 
textile factory (F14) and a cord and fishing net 
manufacturing firm (F2) were set up during this period.
There was no new entry of local firms, however, though there 
was some expansion in existing ones. The third wave started 
in 1970 and lasted until 1973 during which fifteen local 
firms and fifteen foreign-Thai joint ventures entered the 
industry.
A closer look at the Japanese joint venture partners 
reveals one interesting point. The Japanese firms that 
entered the industry in 1964 were the largest and strongest 
textile producers in Japan. Since 1969 new ventures have 
been by smaller Japanese and local manufacturers as well as 
offshoots from the earlier ventures. The reason for this 
is that large firms possess such plentiful resources that 
capital and know-how can be readily transferred. The threat 
of losing the export market in Thailand has forced them to 
operate beyond their national boundaries. The success of 
the first moves led to massive defensive investment by 
rivals and smaller enterprises. At the same time, local 
businessmen, observing the production and market potential, 
quickly followed suit. The success of the first moves also 
persuaded large firms to diversify.
That the investment has come in waves can also be 
partly explained by the existence of a promotion policy 
itself. The industry has been under promotion since 1960.
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The Board of Investment, anticipating a saturation of local 
demand by about the end of the sixties, lifted promotion in 
1967. This probably caused a temporary halt in growth.
The sharp increase in demand in 1968 brought back promotion 
and the industry was again crowded with new investment.
Backward linkage from synthetic yarn to fibre 
production started in 1967 when a Japanese company 
established a joint venture and commenced a nylon filament 
manufacturing plant (F24). This move was followed by that 
of a Japanese rival (F25) who, in 1970, began to supply both 
polyester and nylon filament. In 1972, a Taiwanese-Thai 
joint venture was started but it specialises only in nylon 
filament (F26) .
7.3 Changes in the Pattern of Transfer, 1933-1975
Since 1933, the transfer of technology has become 
relatively more 'packaged'. Until 1959, all the firms in 
the industry were locally-owned; machinery was purchased in 
the open market and technicians were recruited separately, 
the only exception being the initial firm (T31) where both 
human and physical capital came from China but they were 
not from the same source. After 1959, two important changes 
took place; there was a substantial increase in foreign 
investment and many local ventures were engaged jointly 
with foreign investors.
7.3.1 Foreign investment in the Thai textile industry. 
Since 1960, direct foreign investment in the form of joint 
ventures has become the most important means of technology 
transfer. By 1975, only 12 out of 63 promoted textile4firms were wholly owned locally. The rest have foreign 
eguity participation ranging from 1-90 per cent with the 
mode value of 49 per cent equity shares (Table 7.2).
Among foreign investors, Japan is the most predominant. 
Table 7.3 shows that there are 25 Japanese related firms,
4 Excluding non-integrated finishing firms.
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Table 7.2
Foreign Ownership in the 
Promoted Spinning and Weaving Industry(197 4 )
Foreign equity shares (%) Number of firms
0 12
1 - 24 12
25 - 49 25
50 7
51 - 74 5
75 - 100 2
63
Source: BOI
Table 7.3
Promoted Textile Firms Classified
by Nationality of Ownership (1974)
Nationalities Number of firms
Wholly local ownership 12
Predominantly Chinese related firms 22
Predominantly Japanese related firms 24
Indian related firms 4
Chinese and Japanese related firmsa 1
Total 63
This firm has 20 per cent Chinese and 20 per cent 
Japanese equity shares.
Source: BOI
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i.e. firms with Japanese equity investment. The word 
predominant is used because some Japanese related firms also 
have a small amount of Chinese investment, but except for 
one case, this is less than five per cent. Japanese 
involvement in the textile industry will be more fully 
discussed in the next chapter.
Table 7. 4 presents a number of promoted firms 
classified by operation and nationality of control.
Japanese controlled enterprises are mostly found in the 
production of relatively more sophisticated products such 
as production of nylon and polyester filament and cotton 
blended goods.
7.3.2 Conversion to joint ventures. During the 1960s, 
three locally-owned enterprises were converted to Japanese- 
Thai joint ownership. This was mainly motivated by the need 
for technical assistance, more capital for expansion, and 
the need to spread business risks. One of the local owners 
(T32) confessed that his firm had been faced with insoluble 
production problems which had resulted in extremely low 
efficiency. After a Japanese manufacturer had become a 
joint partner, providing technical assistance, efficiency 
improved markedly. At present, production is managed by the 
Japanese partner but general management remains with the 
local entrepreneur. The second local businessman (F8) 
listed his capital need, technical assistance and increased 
profitability as important motives.
The third local entrepreneur already had a textile 
plant (FI) operating before contemplating joining with a 
Japanese wire manufacturer in setting up a modern electrical 
wire manufacturing plant. He asked the Japanese partner to 
invest in his textile plant to increase capital investment 
and reduce risks. The control of the textile venture 
remained with him until his death after which the control 
was passed on to his foreign partner as his heir did not 
have keen interests in managing the enterprise. The wire
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manufacturer had to enter a technical assistance agreement 
with a textile machinery supplier to manage the plant in 
which he had had no previous production experience. The 
enterprise was hence fully controlled by the Japanese firm 
whose equity interests had risen to approximately 90 
per cent.
In 1973, a local firm (T31) sought the cooperation of 
a Japanese trading company and an international investment 
firm because it needed a worldwide marketing network and an 
international source of finance. It also entered into a 
joint venture agreement with the largest producer of its 
products in Japan for potential technical advice. Control 
remains with the local entrepreneur. This merger indicates 
the firm's determination to enter the export market.
The pattern of technology transfer in the Thai textile 
industry, therefore, seems to contradict the expected 
increase in the independence of the recipient country, that 
the possibility of untying the transfer bundle will increase 
as the industry matures. Several explanations can be 
offered. First, change in the technology of textile 
manufacture has been relatively rapid in recent years. The 
range in input and output mixes has been widened. Keeping 
up with technological progress demands higher absorptive 
capacity, which presumably requires a greater time lag. If 
the industry is to be encouraged to use modern technology, 
short cuts, such as foreign expertise, need to be imported.
Secondly, the enterprises have grown tremendously in 
size during this period. Towards the end of the sixties, 
some firms were employing more than 1,000 workers. In 1973, 
the average number of employees in promoted textile firms 
was 1,111. The larger the size of the firm, the better its 
organisation needs to be both in overall and production 
management. To maximise efficiency, a family business must 
give way to a more systematised corporation. Local firms
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may regard joint ventures as a compromise - something that 
will bring systematic organisation while allowing the family 
to retain a certain control.
Thirdly, as was noted above, the promotion policy which 
included the imposition of tariffs on imported textile goods 
posed a threat to Japanese manufacturers: the Thai market
could no longer be profitably supplied by exports. Local 
production became a necessity. At the same time, the 
government's desire for local participation (vaguely 
measured by equity participation) could not be ignored by 
the foreign investors. Joint ventures therefore became the 
preferred norm.
The timing and the motives for local firms entering 
joint ventures are also very interesting. In the sixties, 
the motives for cooperating with Japanese firms were mainly 
related to capital and technology; the Japanese partners 
usually controlled production. In 1973, a new motive 
emerged: the need for an export marketing network. Their
case seems to support the contention that at the early 
stage of local production, manufacturing technology is the 
most important element in the technology package (Hawthorne, 
1971). Once the project has begun satisfactorily and once 
production technology is more or less understood, managerial 
and organisational skills become more prominent. When the 
firms begin to expand marketing skill will gradually become 
a relative decisive factor. This implies a shift over time 
in the relative bargaining position of suppliers of 
different technologies. Since the less developed countries 
are latecomers in the export of manufactured products, 
technological independence will take some time to be 
achieved even if all the technical aspects are mastered by 
the local staff. The building up of the marketing skills 
and networks will probably prove to be a more taxing task 
than the mastering of production technology.
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7.4 The Growth of the Textile Industry
The previous sections have outlined the development of 
the promoted sector of the industry. In this section, the 
growth of the whole industry expressed in terms of capacity, 
output, imports and exports will be briefly outlined.
No official records prior to 1960 are available. 
Interviews with pioneering industrialists revealed capacity 
measured by the number of spindles for those early years. 
Table 7.5 presents capacity and its utilisation of the 
cotton spinning and weaving industry in selected years. 
Between 1934 and 1950, capacity increased almost ninefold 
but from a very small base. The period 1950-61 registered 
a growth rate of 21.28 per cent per annum in productive 
capacity. Between 1961 and 1974 productive capacity 
increased nine times. The capacity expansion, especially 
during the late sixties, is the consequence partly of the 
backward integration of weaving firms and also of new 
entries, but mainly it reflects the expansion of existing 
enterprises. At the time of the survey, total spinning 
capacity stood at 952,456 spindles of which 31,836 spindles 
(3.2 per cent) were government-owned and 43,568 spindles 
(4.6 per cent) belonged to the unpromoted firm.
Statistics on the total capacity of weaving enterprises 
measured in terms of the number of looms are harder to 
obtain. Since spinning requires large capital outlays and 
factory-type management, most of them are promoted 
enterprises which lend themselves to close government 
supervision and good statistical records. The weaving 
sector, on the other hand, consists of anything from a 
family business with three or four looms to factories with 
thousands of highly automated looms. It is, therefore, 
necessary to rely on statistics provided by the Thai Textile 
Manufacturing Association and the Weaving Organisation.
These associations consist of businesses that operate more 
or less like factories. Members of the two associations 
probably constitute most of the modern sector.
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Table 7.5
Capacity and Capacity Utilisation of 
Cotton Textile Production 
(selected years)
Year
Number of 
spindles
Capacity 
utilisation 
(per cent)
Number of 
looms
Capacity ^ 
utilisation 
(per cent)
1934 3,232 - - -
1950 27,687 - - -
1961 92,516 - 8,420 56.11
1971 538,958 79.11 30,619 78.34
1972 637,720 78.37 32,665 78.94
1973 773,404 - 37,542 -
1974 838,060 - 43,957 -
Capacity utilisation = percentage of actual to theoretical 
capacity.
Sources: 1. The Thai Textile Manufacturing Association
2. The Thai Weaving Organization
Table 7.5 shows that there was approximately a five­
fold increase in capacity over the period 1961-74. Between 
1961-71, there was a remarkable increase in capacity 
utilisation in the weaving industry from 56 per cent to 
approximately 78 per cent.
Since 1961, demand for synthetic textiles has been 
growing at 20 per cent per annum (Sivaranon, 1974). In 
response to local demand, there has been a rapid increase 
in production in the early 70s (Table 7.6) .
Looking at the trade statistics (Table 7.6), one is 
tempted to draw the conclusion that the cotton textile 
industry has changed from an import substituting industry 
to an export oriented industry and that 1973 marked the
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Table 7.6
Production, Consumption and Foreign Trade 
in the Thai Textile Industry 
(selected years)
Production Consumption Imports Exports
Cotton yarn (m 
1961
. tons)
10.39
1971 50.43 52.39 2.10 .14
1973 70.23 69.39 1.22 1.23
1974 58.76 59.61 .25 .17
Cotton fabrics 
1961
(m. yds. )
86.59 262.07
1971 471.79 498.84 48.62 15.88
1973 612.62 538.86 44.27 69.04
1974 524.71 526.44 38.01 32.35
Man-made fibre 
1970
(m. tons)
3.09 6.76 .27 10.67
1971 11.69 10.89 1.06 22.58
1972 15.59 18.88 3.40 33.97
1973 28.17 24.23 3.52 40.24
1974 28.55 15.59 2.55 44.14
Man-made yarn 
1970
(m. tons)
6.82 8.11 . 27 14.66
1971 20.17 6.29 1.06 25.40
1972 29.68 10.98 3.90 36.76
1973 35.42 12.93 3.52 43.37
1974 29.78 9.97 2.55 45.21
Man-made fabrics ('000 
1970
yds.) 
110,444 74,176 175 192,194
1971 194,201 43,103 415 241,751
1972 286,364 44,735 23,518 301,423
1973 410,058 49,770 75,309 360,209
1974 416,691 51,102 51,153 400,247
Source: The Thai Textile Manufacturing Association
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first year of this new orientation. International commodity 
speculation in 1973 led to an extraordinary boom for the 
industry. It was the best year for the textile industry in 
the last decade both locally and internationally. Almost 
all promoted firms exported during that year. Interviews 
indicated that several small firms which aimed at supplying 
the domestic market started exporting that year. Large 
firms upgraded the quality of their products for export 
markets. The textile boom in 1973 led to a trade surplus 
which amounted to 1.71 m. baht for cotton yarn, 162 m. baht 
for cotton fabrics and 165 m. baht for synthetic fabrics 
(Department of Customs). However, the recession that came 
the following year reduced exports in cotton textile trade 
substantially.
The 1973 textile boom had several implications for the 
industry. First, it indicated a local surplus capacity.
From 1973 onwards, the growth of the industry could only be 
maintained if firms engaged vigorously in export activities. 
Secondly, export activities in 1973 suggested to the firms 
the international marketing feasibility, which may have made 
them more outward-looking. Whether 1973 will prove to be 
the first year of export orientation or not, it certainly 
indicated the necessity for and the feasibility of the 
industry entering the international market.
The tremendous growth of the textile industry since 
1960 has now made it the most important manufacturing 
industry in Thailand. Whether this growth would have been 
less dramatic without the capital, know-how, management and 
marketing network contributed by foreign partners and whether 
the present pattern of transfer is the optimal way of 
ensuring that growth is maximised, enhanced, and the benefits 
justly shared between the partners, will be examined in the 
following chapter.
CHAPTER 8
Direct Foreign Investment in the 
Thai Textile Industry and Domestic Participation
This chapter explores the parties involved in the 
transfer process of the Thai textile industry. It is 
expected to highlight the characters of the transferors and 
the transferees, their interactions and contributions. 
First, the background of the major technology suppliers 
will be introduced. This will be followed by the study of 
local participation and training. It is hoped that the 
chapter will give some suggestions as to the direction and, 
to a certain extent, the degree of the generation of local 
skills and entrepreneurship through the direct foreign 
investment mechanisms.
It should be noted at the outset that this chapter 
deals only with 63 promoted firms plus two Japanese related 
firms which are engaged only in dyeing and finishing.^" 
Information in this chapter was obtained mainly from 
interviews in Thailand and Japan.
8.1 Japanese Involvement in the Process of Technology
Transfer in the Thai Textile Industry
Once one decides to take the Thai textile industry as 
a case study of the transfer of technology, Japan is 
invariably singled out as the most prominent transferor. 
Here are the main contributions in three respects. First, 
as has been mentioned earlier, she is the largest foreign 
investor in the industry. Over the period 1960-1973, 
Japanese investments in all promoted textile manufacturing
Initially those finishers and dyers who do not have 
backward integration processes have had to be ignored owing 
to limited time and resources. However, two Japanese 
related dyers and finishers voluntarily supplied information 
for they belong in the same group as some spinners and 
weavers. Although each firm is independently set up, its 
operations are very close to multiplant operations.
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activities exceeded half of the total registered capital of 
the promoted industry and constituted 52.2 per cent of her 
total investments in all promoted activities. It is 
apparent that Japanese affiliated companies are well 
represented in all kinds of textile manufacturing activities 
(Table 8.1).
Table 8.1
Japanese Investments in the Promoted Thai Textile Industry
Registered capital (Bl,000) Total
Japanese assets
ISIC classification Japanese Total shares % (Bl,000)
3211 Thread and yarn 216,950 376,500 57.6 1,599,105
Fabrics 282,975 262,125 51.9 1,535,478
3212 Finished textile 
products other 
than garments 10,000 14,300 69.9 48,500
3213 Knitting outwears 4,700 11,000 42.7 22,617
3215 Cordage, rope and 
twine 40,905 46,250 88.4 85,000
3220 Wearing apparel 6,860 14,000 49.0 14,000
TOTAL 562,390 1,007,150 55.8 3,304,700
Source: Naya and Akrasanee (1974, Table 4.3)
Secondly, Japan is the major supplier of textile 
machinery. From 1959 to 1974, net imports of textile 
machinery totalled 6,432 million baht and well over half of 
this amount was paid to Japan. Table 8.2 indicates that as 
early as 1959, before the entry of Japanese joint ventures, 
Japan had captured approximately half of the Thai textile 
machinery market. Other foreign investors were often found 
to use Japanese machinery rather than machinery produced in 
their own countries. Although imports from Taiwan, Korea 
and India have been increasing since the mid-sixties, their
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Table 8.2
Major Suppliers of Textile Machinery 
for the Thai Textile Industry
(Percentage)
Japan
Major European 
Suppliers3 LDCsb Others Total
1959 65.02 20.01 - 14.97 100.00
1960 27.78 69.81 - 2.41 100.00
1961 62.76 6.06 .01 31.17 100.00
1962 41.14 55.68 1.10 2.08 100.00
1963 69.41 17.65 8.80 4.14 100.00
1964 67.97 25.97 5.79 .27 100.00
1965 71.44 25.00 2.02 1.54 100.00
1966 55.43 37.47 4.94 2.16 100.00
1967 50.94 38.33 4.62 6.11 100.00
1968 51.73 25.23 2.44 20.60 100.00
1969 77.13 18.33 . 07 4.47 100.00
1970 73.11 22.31 . 01 3.94 100.00
1971 71.75 38.95 1.89 2.57 100.00
1972 50.68 42.75 .85 5.72 100.00
1973 45.86 42.00 5.22 6.92 100.00
a Includes United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Germany, France, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, 
Czechoslovakia.
Includes India, South Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Custom Department
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share is still relatively insignificant. As a minor 
customer, Thailand is unlikely to affect the types and 
developments of machinery supplies. On the contrary, the 
technology used in Thailand is likely to be influenced by 
the technology used in Japan.
Thirdly, Japan is the major recipient of royalties and 
know-how fees of the Thai textile industry. This is partly 
a consequence of the high level of Japanese investments.
Out of 63 textile firms from which information can be 
obtained from BOI and the Bank of Thailand on know-how 
arrangements, 24 were reported to be paying some kind of 
royalties and know-how fees. Seventeen of these firms made 
payments to their Japanese investing companies and two 
other firms were receiving technical assistance on a fee­
charging, non-equity participation basis. In 1973, the 
total know-how payments were 65.18 m. baht. Out of this 
amount, 3.9 m. baht was paid to Taiwanese and Indian know­
how suppliers. The rest presumably accrued to the Japanese
2technology suppliers.
8.1.1 Pattern of Japanese investment. Similar to the 
pattern of Japanese direct investment in Indonesia, Japanese 
investment in the Thai textile industry shows a consistent 
pattern of joint investment of several Japanese investors 
(Tsurumi, 1973). Typically, the group investments consist 
of a Japanese manufacturer(s) and a trading firm. Table 8.3 
presents statistics on projects classified by the number of 
Japanese corporate investors. From Table 8.3 only four 
firms have single Japanese investors (Fl, Fll, T31, T35).
A closer examination of the data reveals that one of these 
single Japanese investors in fact invested with its 
subsidiary, which has a Hong Kong base. Two of these single 
investors are leading fibre makers who have very strong
In 1973, the Bank of Thailand recorded only 27 million 
baht worth of approved remittance of royalties and know-how 
fees in the textile industry.
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Table 8.3
Japanese Related Firms Classified by 
Number of Japanese Corporate Investors
Number of investors Number of firms Percentage
Single investors 4 14.81
2 investors 15 55.55
3 investors 5 18.51
4 investors 1 3.70
No information 2 7.50
27 • 100.00 I
Note: Only spinners, weavers, fibre makers and finishing
and knitting firms are included.
Source: Field Survey, 1974-75.
financial positions. Both have their own international 
marketing network and thus rely less on the financial and 
marketing assistance of trading companies. The third firm 
(FI) is owned by a Japanese wire manufacturer who had to 
make cross-hauling investment in his local partner's textile 
joint venture. The fourth firm (T35) is a locally- 
controlled firm which gave equity shares to a Japanese 
spinner as payment for know-how.
Apart from these four firms, trading companies are 
involved in all joint enterprises. Traditionally, Japanese 
textile manufacturers leave most of their commercial 
dealings to trading companies and they concentrate on the 
production aspects. Trading companies supply raw materials 
and distribute manufactured products both domestically and 
internationally for the textile producers. Unlike other 
manufacturers, such as motor vehicle manufacturers and some 
fibre producers who gradually build up their international 
marketing network, the textile manufacturers, especially 
the cotton spinners, continue to rely on trading companies
216
in commercial dealings. The threat of market loss 
resulting from the Thai government's industrialisation 
policy was brought to their attention by the trading 
companies which acted as their export agents. They were 
then persuaded to make investments in Thailand to maintain 
their market shares. Inexperienced in international 
investments, the manufacturing firms insisted that the 
trading companies go abroad with them. A manager of the 
international investment decision of a cotton spinning firm 
said that
It is better to co-operate with our long-time 
trading house friend who is more experienced in 
international transactions, who is well equipped 
with staff competent in foreign languages.
The trading firms, on the other hand, are keen to maintain 
their commercial links with their export markets.
Yoshihara (1975) also pointed out that since the post­
war period, the cotton spinning industry had become a 
declining industry and its financial position had 
substantially weakened. Firms were, by themselves, unable 
to finance fast growing projects in the LDCs. Sharing 
investments with trading companies both facilitates 
financing and, at the same time, spreads risks. Thus, 
joint investment is a preferred solution for both parties.
Those cases with more than two investors are normally 
firms with integrated finishing processes. The third 
partners usually specialise in dyeing and finishing 
activities. If the joint ventures are engaged only in 
spinning and/or weaving, the third party investors are 
normally synthetic fibre producers who hope to have captive 
outlets for their products.
Although Japanese investments are joint investments, 
this does not necessarily mean that their bargaining 
strength will be weakened. Joint investors are normally 
long-time associates and have had stable and cordial
217
relationships (Yoshino, 1976, p.71). When they have to 
deal with local partners, they act as a group, not as 
individuals. Operating overseas further strengthens the 
sense of a need to co-operate.
8.1.2 The Japanese partners - trading companies. 
Japanese trading companies are unique commercial enterprises 
which have no exact counterparts in the western world 
(Emori, 1971). In their own words
The [trading] company's major functions are as 
follows: trading, distribution, financing,
marketing, export and import of new technology, 
participation in domestic and overseas undertaking, 
production, consulting, development and import of 
overseas resources, community development, organisers 
of new industries of future importance such as 
information services and so forth (Mitsui, 1974, p.3).
The trading houses which started several centuries ago as 
local distributors of products and services are becoming 
'more and more diversified, multinationalised and 
multifunctional'.
Although trading companies are not themselves directly 
involved in manufacturing, they have interests in all kinds 
of manufacturing activities, in fact in all economic 
activities, with the exception of retailing. Unlike western 
multinational enterprises, which started initially as 
manufacturers and later extended their operation to sales 
and customer services, the development of Japanese 
multinational trading companies is somewhat the reverse. 
Although they are not themselves manufacturers, they hold 
considerable interests in all kinds of economic activities 
all over the globe. For instance, Mitsui, one of the 
largest trading companies, as of April 1974, had 197 
subsidiaries and joint ventures in over 70 countries; 32 
ventures were in textiles, 30 in machinery and 27 in food 
processing, etc. Its total sales in 1973 were 5.4 per cent 
of Japan's GNP. In the same year, the company handled 12.2 
per cent of Japan's imports and 10.2 per cent of its 
exports (Mitsui, 1974, p.5).
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It is not an exaggeration to say that trading houses 
are the prime movers of the Japanese economy, which is 
highly dependent on trade. Together, the top ten leading 
trading companies handled 64.2 per cent of Japan's total 
imports and 52.7 per cent of total exports in 1973. Eight 
of the top ten trading companies are among the major sixty 
overseas investors. In 1973, they had 655 foreign 
associated joint ventures.
In the Thai textile industry in 1974, 11 trading firms 
were involved in 27 joint ventures in the production of 
yarns, fabrics and fishing nets. Six of them were among 
the top ten trading companies. All of them had made more 
than one joint venture in Thailand. For example, Mitsui had 
22 joint ventures in Thailand, out of which three were in 
the textile industry. As of April 1973, Mitsubishi had 19 
Thai joint ventures, with three in the textile industry.
The company's overseas related ventures totalled 121. 
Marubeni-Ida had nine ventures in Thailand out of 114 
worldwide ventures. Three of the Thai affiliated companies 
were in the production of yarn and grey fabrics, towels and 
finished textiles.
Through their trading activities, the Japanese trading 
companies in Thailand are familiar with local business 
communities and with government regulations. Once it is 
decided that investments are to be made in Thailand, the 
trading houses take the responsibility of seeking local 
partners, and in some cases of conducting feasibility studies 
and research. They provide the manufacturing partners with 
information on local investment and taxation laws. They make 
the preparations necessary for the establishment of new 
ventures and, in some cases, negotiate with the local 
government. In fact, they are the main co-ordinators of 
joint ventures. Once the joint ventures are established, 
the trading companies assume the role of suppliers of
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machinery and raw materials and the role of distributors of 
the final products. Their main income is derived from the 
brokerage fees from these transactions.
Since their major motive is to maintain their
commercial activities, trading firms rarely take part in
3the management of the joint ventures. Representatives 
from trading firms normally take the position of sales or 
finance manager while the Japanese manufacturing investors 
are responsible for general and production management. In 
the sample of this study there are only two exceptions, which 
had top executives from trading companies. In one of these 
cases (T34), Japanese executives were totally withdrawn 
after a few years. In another case (F7), the manufacturing 
partners had committed themselves to the management of 
several other joint ventures and did not have sufficient 
manpower to manage F7. In both of these cases, no management 
fees were charged.
Generally, there is no binding contract for the joint 
ventures to purchase supplies and to sell output or to use 
the brokerage service of the trading company which is the 
co-investor. There is, however, a tacit agreement among the 
partners that so long as the trading house partner offers 
competitive international prices, the trading house partner 
will be given first priority. Should the prices offered by 
the trading house partner not be as attractive as other open 
offers, the joint venture is free to conduct transactions 
with unrelated trading houses. In practice most joint 
ventures conduct all commercial transactions with their
For detailed investigation of the behaviour of trading 
companies, see Yoshino (1976, Ch. 4). He argued that 
investments by trading companies were made as a short-run 
response to the market threat imposed by local protection 
policies and they were not very concerned with management 
and control of their joint ventures as long as they provided 
supplies of raw materials to the joint ventures.
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trading house investor. However, insofar as exports are 
concerned, some joint ventures rely on more than one 
trading company for trading companies have different 
strengths in different markets.
It should also be mentioned that not all trading firms 
perform the dual role of suppliers of machinery and raw 
material and at the same time that of exporters of final 
products. One relatively small trading firm disclosed that 
it had no network in the United States, which was the main 
source of cotton supplies, so the Thai partner, who was 
originally a textile industrialist and had contacts with 
American suppliers, performed the duty of importing raw 
materials. However, the larger the size of the trading 
firms, the more likely they are to have a complete worldwide 
network.
Considering the areas of specialisation of the trading 
companies, it can be expected that the role and importance 
of the trading firms will vary with the growth and 
development of the joint ventures (Tsurumi, 1973; Yoshino, 
1976). At the time of establishment, trading firms assume 
the most important role as co-ordinators of the new projects. 
When production commences, the manufacturing investors 
become more important. Later on when the ventures engage 
in export activities, the role of the trading firms may be 
expected to be strengthened.
However, in Thailand, the role of trading companies in 
the private sector has been affected by two major policies. 
Since the government started to promote local production of 
textile fibres in the mid-sixties, the role of trading firms 
as importers of raw materials has been eroded. Since 
November 1974, according to the Alien Business Law, firms 
with majority foreign ownership have been prohibited from 
conducting commission businesses. Since most of the trading 
companies have majority foreign ownership their brokerage 
activities have been severely affected (Katano and 
Smutrakalin, 1976).
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8.1.3 The Japanese investors - manufacturing firms.
There are 20 manufacturing investors involved in 27 joint 
venture operations. Interviews were conducted with 
headquarters of six manufacturers in cotton and synthetic 
textile production. However, the six firms are the major 
participants in 23 out of 27 Japanese related enterprises.
Two of the six firms will be called non-cotton spinners so 
as to be distinguished from the rest, which are engaged in 
both cotton and synthetic spinning and weaving.
The four cotton manufacturing investors are the largest 
firms in the cotton spinning and weaving industry in Japan. 
They are also the pioneering firms of cotton textile 
manufacturing in Japan. The history of each firm dates 
back to the 1880s when they imported mechanised weaving and 
spinning technology from England. Engineers from the 
machinery suppliers, Platt Bros. Limited, went to Japan to 
set up factories and to train Japanese workers. By the mid­
thirties, Japan had displaced England as world exporters of 
textile products in international markets.
Over the years, the cotton spinners have diversified 
their production lines out of pure cotton products to cotton 
polyester goods, processed food, cosmetics, housing and 
pollution control equipment. Yet textiles remain their most 
important business in terms of output and sales.
The non-cotton spinners were established in 1918 and 
1926, after which they diversified widely into the chemical 
fields. Their main business line is production of synthetic 
fibres although their first investment overseas was in the 
production of synthetic fabrics.
The six manufacturing investors who were interviewed 
are, in their own right, international firms. Their overseas 
investment history dates back to the 1930s when they invested 
in China and Korea (Yoshihara, 1975). After the Second World 
War, the overseas plants were confiscated. Post-war overseas
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investment was resumed only in the late 50s and got into 
full swing in the 60s. The non-cotton spinners have 21 
subsidiaries and 48 joint ventures all over the world. The 
largest cotton spinners have 26 subsidiaries and joint 
ventures, the other three cotton spinners have 22, four and 
five foreign affiliates. Most of their joint ventures are 
in Southeast and East Asia and in Latin America.
In 1974, the largest cotton spinner had over 1,000,000
spindles and approximately 6,500 looms. The other three
firms each had half a million operable spindles. Other
spinners which were not interviewed were not much smaller
in size; the smallest firm had 59,200 spindles. Needless
to say, all leading manufacturer investors are multiplant
firms. Owing to the firms' long history, their factories
are multi-vintage, ranging from conventional models to super
modern models which are fully electronically controlled.
All of them have research and development departments or
institutes. In particular, the two non-cotton spinners have
manpower
24 research institutes staffed with h i g h - l e v e l /  , all Japanese- 
based .
The cotton spinners are highly specialised firms and, 
with the exception of one firm in the sample, are 
specialised in grey (unbleached, undyed) goods. Therefore, 
when they want to establish a fully integrated branch 
overseas, it is necessary to ask their long time customers 
who specialise in finishing and bleaching to go abroad as 
well. As a result, the Japanese investments in Thailand 
consist of a group of trading houses, spinners and weavers, 
and finishing firms. This explains the complicated 
investment pattern of Japanese firms. It is not one firm 
controlling one joint venture but it is a group of firms 
controlling a group of joint ventures.
It is also interesting to note that parent cotton 
spinners have transferred to Thailand mainly the production 
of low count yarn. Although they themselves are capable
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of producing very fine yarn - above count 100s - in 1974 
their joint ventures in Thailand rarely produced yarn above 
count 50s. There are several explanations for this. First, 
the Thai tariff protection covers only lower count yarn. 
Therefore, there is as yet no threat on market losses for 
higher count yarn. Secondly, production of higher count 
yarn requires more expertise and is less easily transferred. 
Thirdly, fine yarn is relatively income elastic.
Therefore, it may not yet be worthwhile starting production 
in a small low-income market of the LDCs.
The Japanese investing consortium tends to be large 
relative to the local partners who are mostly commercial 
entrepreneurs or owners of small family businesses. This 
suggests that they have the greater bargaining leverage and 
consequently the majority control in the joint ventures. 
Japanese investors, in contrast to Chinese investors, are 
corporate enterprises; their joint ventures are therefore 
more likely to be foreign controlled.
8.2 Other Investors
Other important investors in the Thai textile industry 
are Chinese and Indians, for they have very close ties with 
the Chinese and Indian migrants who handle the textile 
trade in the country. The Chinese investors include Chinese 
migrants, Taiwanese and Hong Kong investors. During the 
fifties, both Hong Kong and Taiwan emerged as important 
rivals of Japanese textile producers in the international 
market. Taiwanese firms are able to produce textiles, from 
synthetic fibres to finished garments, without foreign 
involvement. The insecurity of Taiwan in the international 
political scene also drove the Taiwanese capitalists to 
transfer capital and manpower overseas.
In contrast to Japanese investment, investments by 
Chinese migrants are characteristically individual rather 
than corporate investments. The Taiwanese and Hong Kong
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investments are rarely corporate investments: e.g. one
leading Taiwanese fibre manufacturer formed a joint venture 
with local Chinese to operate a group of fibre, fabric and 
garment manufacturing firms; a large Hong Kong-based textile 
firm also joined a Thai capital owner to form a joint 
venture.
When foreign investors are individuals, the local 
partner's position is considerably strengthened. First, 
individual investors lack the backing of an industrial 
organisation from which industrial resources (technology and 
management) can be drawn. The joint ventures still have to 
employ private individual experts from Taiwan for production 
management. Sometimes local managers who have had some 
experience in industrial management are employed. Secondly, 
unlike the Japanese investors who are in international firms, 
the individual Chinese have to rely entirely on local 
partners for local information and negotiations with local 
government. As a result, the bargaining position of the 
local partners is substantially strengthened and 
consequently they have major control of the enterprise.
There were only five Chinese-controlled joint ventures 
among 23 Chinese-related firms. These were mainly those 
engaged in relatively complicated technology. For instance, 
FI7 and F26, which belong in the same group, have a 
Taiwanese nylon producer as a partner and supplier of the 
complex nylon filament production process. F17 involves 
rayon synthetic spinning.
The next group is the Indian investor. The major 
Indian investor in F23 is the international firm, the Birla
This Hong Kong-based firm was hard hit by recession in 
1974-75 and was bought out by a Japanese firm, but during 
the fieldwork period the Hong Kong partner was the major 
participant in the joint venture.
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group which has an industrial empire in India and 
investments outside India. F23 has been branching towards 
production of synthetic textile fibres and therefore relies 
heavily on the foreign partner. Fll is a joint venture of 
the local Indian textile wholesaler and a leading Japanese 
synthetic producer. T30, another Indian joint venture was 
established as a solely locally-owned firm in 1959. To 
improve productivity and to backward integrate into spinning, 
technical advice was sought from the Indian firm, the 
Thappar group.
8.3 Local Partners
This section highlights the participation at an 
entrepreneurial level. It also outlines the interactions 
between partners. It is considered best to review the 
performance of local partners, their contributions and the 
development of entrepreneurship.
There are three types of local partners: those who
were established industrialists prior to the forming of 
joint ventures, those partners who were solely importers of 
Japanese textiles, and first acted as dummy partners but 
later became industrialists in their own right, and those 
who were importers and acted as and remain dummy partners 
for the joint ventures. This section will examine 
interesting cases from the three groups.
The most striking local partner in the first group is 
a local industrialist who leased a cotton spinning mill from 
the Thai government. At the same time, he also handled 
imported Japanese textile wholesale trade. It was not until 
the early sixties that he joined his Japanese trading 
partners in the establishment of a local weaving and spinning 
enterprise (F8). The Japanese loaned him the necessary 
capital for equity participation and debts were paid out of 
dividends each year. The first joint venture was followed 
by another spinning and weaving of synthetic fabrics (F9)
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and later on a dyeing and finishing firm (F27). High 
profitability, before long, enabled the local partner to 
become the genuine equity participant in the project.
Since establishment, the local entrepreneur has had 
general management authority, although not at policy level. 
The Japanese partner was able to put constraints on his 
movements because the Japanese partner was also his 
creditor. At the same time he continued to be the local 
distributor. Since the trading company partner has no 
network in the USA, the major supplier of raw materials, 
the local entrepreneur grasped the opportunity to become 
the importer of raw materials, and thus increased his 
participation. The production aspect, however, was 
completely under the supervision of the Japanese 
manufacturer partner.
Having established himself in the textile field, the 
local partner went on to launch a new project (T35) and this 
time became the independent investor, but relied on the 
Japanese partner as technology supplier. The partner 
charged a small fee ($100,000 per annum, excluding salaries 
for foreign staff) and perhaps a certain amount of equity 
shares in return. The technological supplier provided all 
plant layout, designs, machinery specifications, control 
production, and assisted in training the local staff. The 
local entrepreneur loaned foremen from the Japanese- 
controlled ventures for a short while to get T35 off the 
ground.
His next projects are joint ventures of synthetic 
textile fibres and product plants with one French and other 
Japanese enterprises. The projects are currently under 
construction. At the same time he has also made investments 
in other wholly locally-owned enterprises so that in future 
the local enterprises would be captive outlets of his fibre
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products and at the same time customers of his dyeing and 
finishing firms. The local entrepreneur has emerged 
eventually as an able entrepreneur in his own right.
The second case is the owners of a relatively small 
canvas factory (T31) which was set up in 1950, the first 
mechanised weaving mill in the country. In 1952, the owner 
sent his son to Britain to study textile engineering. He 
was followed later on by other members of the family. It 
was not until the late sixties that control of the 
enterprise was transferred to the hands of the highly 
educated generation. The firm henceforth went through a 
revitalising process. Local graduates were recruited to 
replace and assist the ageing self-made engineers. IESC, 
the international organisation which provided technical and 
management assistance to LDCs, was invited four times to 
help with production management. A French engineer was 
hired to improve weaving techniques. Systematic study was 
carried out to investigate and reallocate workloads and to 
reposition production floor workers. The company then 
emerged as the largest canvas producer in Thailand.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 7, the company became 
a joint venture in 1973, which enabled it to expand and 
compete with Korean firms, other low-cost producers. Senior 
female foremen were sent to a partner's factory in Japan for 
further training. The trading firm which is another partner 
despatched an export director to work with the company. The 
overall management, including production, remains with the 
local entrepreneurs. In 1974, the depression year, the 
company netted a profit of 26 million baht.
The third entrepreneur in this group is a military 
man-turned-industrialist. He is one of the pioneering 
textile entrepreneurs. To improve the efficiency of his 
factory (T32), he approached a Japanese spinning firm for 
technical assistance. The company became a joint venture
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in 1972. The Japanese partner helped to improve the cotton 
testing and management system. Some productive units were 
replaced and adjusted to achieve better balances.
Recruitment policies were based on individual merits and 
talents, rather than personal connections. This in turn 
promoted morale and enhanced efficiency of the local staff.
The success of the first joint venture led to a forming 
of the second joint venture, which dealt with the production 
of synthetic fabrics. While production was managed by the 
Japanese partners, the local entrepreneur insisted upon 
majority ownership and had a high degree of control in the 
enterprise.
The next case is a joint venture (T33) between a local 
banker-industrialist and a Hong Kong-based textile firm. 
Catching up on the industrial promotion benefits provided 
by the Thai government, one of the biggest textile joint 
ventures was formed between a local and a Hong Kong-based 
firm. The foreign partner despatched a plant manager and 
ten technicians for technical assistance. The local partner 
manages the enterprises and the Hong Kong-based firm 
participates only on request. The factory manager later on 
became a naturalised Thai and no longer belongs to the Hong 
Kong-based enterprise. It has a large number of local 
staff in key positions.
The local entrepreneurs in the second and the third 
group were previously the importers of Japanese textile 
products through Japanese trading companies. The imposition 
of tariffs and the promotion of local production made local 
production profitable, while import supplies became more 
expensive. To make sure of uninterrupted supplies, some of 
these importers approached their trading partners for a 
joint venture agreement. Others were approached by the 
trading partners to become decorative or dummy local 
partners. These partners continue to assume the local 
distributor role. Some of them have emerged as strikingly
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able partners; some of them have remained dormant and are 
content with a local distribution role.
An extremely successful case (T34) is that of a small 
sock manufacturer whose local partners were for a long time 
importers of Japanese products. During the first few years 
of operations, the general affairs of the firms were jointly 
presided over by both parties. After five years, the 
Japanese partner only retained a part-time director to look 
after their interests. The local partner has now gained 
total control of the enterprises and has become a 
manufacturer himself. Each year, the local entrepreneur 
takes his staff for a tour to Japan to discuss problems 
with the Japanese partners, and the trip is used as an 
incentive to boost morale of the local staff.
Another successful case is an importer of Japanese 
garment accessories. When the government promoted local 
industries, the local importer approached his Japanese 
supplier in setting up the local production facilities.
The Thai side supplied the site and helped to establish 
the plant with local connections. Consequently, an empire 
of firms producing thread and other garment accessory 
products was created with different Japanese firms in the 
same compound. The total general management of the group 
was vested in the local partner, while the Japanese looked 
after the production aspects. One Thai representative 
presided over general management of the cotton spinning 
plant. The local partner is highly satisfied with the joint 
venture arrangement.
It is rather unattractive in the sense that we cannot 
have total control on decision making and all the 
profits but then we did not have to provide all the 
capital. Besides we have been marketing this 
brandname for years for the Japanese partner. We 
cannot afford risking the invested capital and energy 
by trying to produce the goods on our own. We have
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done that for other products and found that we 
cannot produce the same quality as those of imported 
goods in the first few years. We quickly lost our 
market shares. Joining the Japanese manufacturer 
minimised risks of market loss.
Two other importers of Japanese products (T37, T38) 
approached the Japanese supplier for setting up a joint 
venture with the Japanese side providing technical 
assistance. The general management is conducted by one 
local partner but major decisions must be approved by both 
parties. The Japanese partner despatches staff for 
technical assistance on a three-year contract which is free 
of charge. In both firms, the local partners have general 
control of the enterprise.
To digress, experience of local entrepreneurs in the 
first two groups, especially the latter, suggests an 
incidental benefit of the local industrialisation policy.
It provides local Schumpeterian merchants with new and more 
varied opportunities, using foreign joint ventures as 
stepping stones to accomplish a totally new role of 
industrial entrepreneurs.
Not all local partners eventually become active in the 
running of joint ventures. A number of importer-turned- 
investors remained local distributors for the joint ventures 
in Sampeng (a Chinatown district where the textile wholesale 
market is situated).
For instance, in F5, F10, F13 and F24 the local 
partners performed no other function than that of acting as 
a source of outlets for the finished products. One of the 
local shareholders of F10 and F24 each had one relative in 
charge of personnel, but this was mainly because of a 
language problem on the part of the Japanese partner.
General management was exercised by the trading partner and 
production was controlled by two Japanese manufacturing 
investors. F6 and F14 are public companies. One Thai 
director on the F14 executive board admitted that he had
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little influence on overall decisions. This is because Thai 
shareholders are fragmented in the voting activities and 
each of the partners are preoccupied with other professions. 
Apart from silent local executives, the highest local 
participation is at the assistant manager level. In F13, 
the local distributor-partner spent all day in his own 
Chinatown office, leaving all the task of running the modern 
plants and the joint venture office to his Japanese 
partners. Some local partners' contribution is government 
connections. The local vice-president of F24's major 
responsibility is to negotiate with the Thai government.
Interestingly, the foreign controlled joint ventures, 
where local partners performed only a local distribution 
role and were generally passive in the enterprises, usually 
turned out to be the most efficient firms in terms of 
productivity, return to investments and total resources 
committed (see Table 8.6 in later section). The system of 
functional specialisation in which each partner assumed 
duties in accordance with their comparative advantage, i.e. 
Japanese manufacturers in production and management,
Japanese trading firms in import and exports trade and the 
local partners in local distribution, appears to yield a 
higher return. The system allows the fullest exploitation 
of the best qualities of each partner, i.e. economies of 
scale in international marketing of the trading house 
partners, the industrial expertise of the manufacturers and 
the familiarity with the local environment of local 
partners. Yet, this very character that makes the firms 
more efficient is the major obstacle to technology transfer 
at the entrepreneurial level. From the private firm's point 
of view, this system is clearly the best way to run the 
enterprise. As long as their expected profits are 
maximised, there is no incentive for local partners who have 
no industrial background to try to interfere with the 
production and management of the joint ventures.
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The functional specialisation of each partner further 
acts to weaken the bargaining position of local partners.
It is clear that the motives for local entrepreneurs to join 
foreign partners are the need for technology and capital 
assistance. Thus it can be expected that the bargaining 
position of the foreign partners is strongest at the time 
of establishment and then weakens as the years go by.
However, once the local joint ventures enter the 
international market, the bargaining position of the trading 
house partners is again on the up-swing, although this has 
been somewhat checked by the Alien Business Lav;.
It is evident that the bargaining position of the 
local partners of foreign enterprises - Indian, Chinese or 
Japanese - depends to a certain extent on their contribution 
to the enterprise, and on the types of technology. The more 
complicated the technology, the more influence the foreign 
partner can exert. In addition, if the local partners have 
previous background in industrial enterprises, it is 
relatively easy for the local partners to gradually assert 
more influence on the joint ventures. It is also observed 
that, invariably, the locally controlled enterprises are 
those whose local partners personally proposed the idea of 
joint ventures to the Japanese partners. The silent 
partners, on the other hand, are those businessmen who have 
been persuaded by the foreign firms to become decorative 
partners.
8.4 Direct Foreign Investment and Wholly Locally-owned
Enterprises
There is one case among the interviewed firms in which 
the local entrepreneur benefited from working in a Japanese- 
related company. The local entrepreneur of T9 used to work 
as an engineer in a Japanese-controlled factory for 12 years 
and was able to plan layouts and select machinery on his own.
233
8.5 Local Participation in Foreign Related Enterprises
The progress of local participation can be best traced 
from time series data on the replacement of foreign by local 
staff. This is in fact one of the most difficult items to 
obtain mainly because some firms were unwilling to search 
for their old files. Some had no systematic records. They 
knew vaguely how many foreign technicians came in the 
beginning but were unable to pinpoint the positions.
However, data on replacements by occupation could be 
obtained for 16 out of 35 firms which use technical and 
managerial services from foreign partners or foreign firms.
Apart from the 16 firms which provided rather detailed 
evidence, fragmentary evidence on the other ten firms on the 
replacement of foreign enterprises was collected from two 
other sources: the unpublished findings of a survey of
Japanese enterprises by G. Clark in 1968 and a report of 
factory inspections by the Board of Investment in 1969.
Table 8.4 presents the results obtained from interviews 
and the questionnaire. Executive jobs are defined as those 
involving policy and managerial decisions, which include 
positions of assistant managers and higher. Production 
specialists include all engineers and technicians: those
who have received tertiary education in universities or 
technical colleges or those who have equivalent 
remunerations to or salaries greater than university 
graduates. Foremen usually include those engaged in middle 
management. For small firms foremen are normally 
supervisors of different shifts. In larger firms, there are 
many classes of foremen and it was necessary to define them 
as those with salaries of over 1,500 baht a month. Chart 
8.1 suggests the popular arrangement of plant management and 
gives a rough idea of the skill classification. Participation 
is defined as the number of full-time local to total 
participants in the same group.
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 
(%
)_
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
__
 
A
b
so
lu
te
 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 
n
u
m
b
er
234
•p
c
cu
6
a>
o
id
I—I
cu
a)fa
c
a Cr
0 •H
•H CO a)
P  P p
O P 0
P  QJ fa
'b  (fa
o  x •H
p  (1) cdfa b
Eh
C
CP
CO •H
CL) a)
> p
*H 0
p fa
p
u •H
aj rd
X rC
w Eh
a) c 
cr> -p  
<
o
o
I—I
CM
vO
o
LO
o
LD
O
LD
CM
I
r-
pH
I—I
I
in
oo
ro
I—I
cn
I
r-
f—I
in
I—I
in
rH
I
CN
r-H
co
m
cn
I—I
I
CO
I—I
o
CN
r-'
I— i
o
rH
I
o
I—I
o CO
I— )
o
CN
m
I—i I—i
O O ' d ' r H O c o ^ O O O O O O v O O O
I I  I I
O O r H O O r H O O O O O O C N ' v f ' C O O
o o o o
o o o o
i~H I—I I—I rH
O O
r- o
I—I
m
co
CO
vD
o
CN
in
vo
o
o
r—I
O
O
I—I
nr
o
o
I—I
VO
VO
in
CN
O
CN
CO
CO
CO
CO
CN
CN
o
o
I—I
o
o
rH
CTi
VO
CN
00
rH
nT
O
O
rH
O
o
I—I
VO
00
CT>
nr
co
CO
co
CO
o
o
rH
o
O
rH
r-
vO
r-
vo
r-
vo
r-
vo
o
o
rH
O
o
o
l"'
O
O
I—I
nr
r-
o
o
I—I
o
m
oo
m
o o 
o cn
rH
O
o
rH
o
in
co
cr>
I—I
CN
O'
VO
r-
vO
O
o
I—I
m
e'­
en
CO
o
m
vo
co
m
CN
nr
nr
CO
CO
o
I—I
rH
r H
i n P - co vO VO o r - r - m CO nT
rH t—1 r- rH i n CN 1—1 rH CO CN CO CN CN CNfa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Eh fa Eh fa fa fa
I—I 
I—I
I—Ifa
r-
'vf
r-
nr
nr
rH
COfa
in
m
I
co
CN
CN
r-
i
in 
co 
■—I
CN 
i—I
. I
rH
rH
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
1
9
7
4
-
235
Chart 8.1
Factory Organisation
Managerial positions Mill manager 
(assistants)
Production specialists Departmental chiefs
(spinning, weaving, knitting, 
maintenance, power and 
personnel)
Middle management staff Heads of teams
Senior foremen 
Section foremen
Semi-skilled employees Production floor workers
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In the original questionnaire, firms were asked to 
provide information on the number of non-production 
specialists, e.g. accountants, economists, scientists, etc.
It turned out that the non-production specialists are almost 
without exception local staff from the establishment period, 
and as there is very little change in the number employed 
over the years they can be omitted.
The first column in Table 8.4 indicates the age of the 
firm. The next six columns show the local participation 
rate in year t , the year of first operation, and in tn, the 
interviewed date, which varied between November 1974-May 
1975. Firms were arranged in order of the number of years 
in operation. It is to be expected that the older the 
firm, the more extensive the replacement policy had been in 
effect. The last six columns indicate the absolute change 
in the number of local and foreign staff during the two 
periods. It is important because the increase in the local 
participation rate may not necessarily mean that more local 
staff have been trained. The local participation rate can 
increase while the number of local staff remains constant 
but the number of foreign staff decreases. The decrease in 
the local participation rate does not indicate that fewer 
local employees are running the enterprises. It may be 
because the firms have installed new techniques and therefore 
require a larger number of foreign staff temporarily. When 
the numbers of both local and foreign staff increase, the 
latter may be needed more, resulting in a decrease in 
participation while the absolute number increases. The 
absolute number of change indicates roughly the size of the 
accumulated local skills.
The experience of F13 he'lps to illustrate the importance 
of the inclusion of the absolute number of workers in Table 
8.4. The increase in the rate of local participation at the 
executive level is the result of the return to Japan of one
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member of Lhe foreign staff. Moreover, although the 
participation of local middle management was complete from 
the beginning, the expansion of the firms has necessitated 
the increase in the number of local foremen from 50 to 135, 
an increase of 85 persons.
In general, the local participation rate increases over 
time and the increase is more extensive on the production 
side, especially in lower levels of skills. The replacement 
of Japanese by local staff at executive levels has been 
relatively stagnant except in Fl, F28 and F35. The most 
static firm is F8, a Japanese-controlled venture. After 
fourteen and a half years in operation it has not produced 
any local staff production experts. The reason the firm 
gave was that:
When we first started, we employed local graduates 
for engineers and wanted to train them for key 
positions. Our experience was a bad one. These 
local engineers thought they knew everything 
because they had a university certificate. In 
addition, they did not want to dirty their hands 
with machinery. They think that all they have to 
do is to order. They spent insufficient time 
patrolling the factory and preferred to sit in the 
air-conditioned office. We finally had to dispense 
with these paper engineers and hired graduates from 
vocational schools and they proved to be better 
workers. The only drawback is that they could not 
be trained to achieve higher positions quickly due 
to insufficient background in formal education.
The firm may indeed be unfortunate to have been confronted 
with difficult cases, yet it seems that 14 years are long 
enough to train a local technician. In fact when its executives 
were asked whether they considered the present number of 
despatched Japanese staff a minimum, they agreed and 
indicated that they had no intention of decreasing foreign 
participation for that might affect the joint venture's 
productivity. F8 also provided technical assistance on a 
fee-charging basis to T35, a Thai firm. In this case, the
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Japanese technology supplier was not anxious to retain its 
staff in the recipient firm. The executive of T35 had some 
difficulty negotiating the renewal of the three-year 
technology contract.
The only case in which the transfer was complete at all 
levels after only five years in operation is T34 which is 
not included in Table 8.4 because breakdown data are not 
available. It should be noted, however, that T34 
manufactures socks, the technology of which is relatively 
simple. Neither are there any patented production processes.
The behaviour of Japanese firms tended to be slightly 
different from Taiwanese investors. For example, consider 
F15 and F17 which have comparable age. F15, a Japanese- 
controlled joint venture, exhibited no changes in local 
participation from its establishment. F17 which is 
Taiwanese-controlled experienced an increase in 
participation of local production experts from 50 to 62 per 
cent. After two years, local foremen had taken over the 
responsibility of middle management from the Taiwanese 
production experts who could then concentrate on technical 
aspects.
F24 and F26 should also be considered as a pair. Both 
are manufacturers of nylon filament, a technology which is 
still guarded as a top secret in Thailand. F26 is 
Taiwanese-controlled and F24 is Japanese-controlled. The 
local participation rate is relatively much higher in the 
former case, considering that it had been in the business 
for only four years. The local Chinese have full control 
of the enterprise and the participation rate in the 
production side has also increased markedly for both foremen 
and engineers.
Since F24, the Japanese firm, has a much better 
qualified local workforce than F26 it was not necessary to 
despatch foremen from Japan. The Taiwanese firm had to send 
for four foremen from Taiwan but they had returned and 
local staff was trained to take their positions.
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Considering the above two cases, it may be tempting to 
conclude that within the limited sample, internal transfer 
seems to be more extensive in Taiwanese-controlled than in 
Japanese-controlled enterprises. There are several points 
that should be noted in this connection. In the first place, 
the Japanese firms argued that since there were usually more 
than one Japanese partner in the joint ventures and since 
all of the partners usually despatched their representatives, 
it would be natural to discover a higher foreign 
participation rate in the Japanese-controlled joint ventures 
(see also Yoshino, 1976, p.73). Secondly, the Taiwanese- 
controlled mills tended to hire local technicians who could 
speak Chinese. This greatly facilitates the transfer 
process. The fact that most of the local entrepreneurs are 
ethnically Chinese and that there is a closer cultural link 
between Thailand and Taiwan may also help to promote better 
understanding between foreign and local partners. Thirdly, 
the decline in the cotton textile industry in Japan coupled 
with the commitment to lifetime employment have created 
surplus labour in the Japanese parent companies. They had 
less pressure to recall their personnel back to Japan from 
the overseas venture.
Yoshino (1976, Ch. 6) also offered a very revealing 
explanation based on Japanese traditions that made it 
difficult for the Japanese managerial system to accommodate 
in key positions those brought up outside the mainstream of 
the corporation. It can be further argued that the Japanese 
managerial system demands total commitment from its 
employees and provides a motivation for their employees to 
maximise X-efficiency. Since such motivation and commitment 
cannot be expected from local employees, they are therefore 
not given high responsibility.
The relatively slow replacement at higher levels may 
have also created a vicious circle attitude which could be 
detrimental to the future staff recruitment of the joint
ventures. If local workers cannot be expected to be 
promoted to executive positions in Japanese firms, local 
talent would not be found in the joint ventures. The 
replies to the questionnaire of the Asian Institute of 
Technology suggested that Japanese firms are the least 
preferred foreign enterprises to work in. Thus, in the long 
run, there may be a shortage of well-qualified local 
personnel for Japanese enterprises, and Japanese joint 
ventures would have to use more Japanese experts. The more 
they used foreign workers, the more local talent would be 
discouraged from entering Japanese joint ventures.
That transfer has been relatively extensive on the 
production side is also supported by some fragmentary 
evidence on four other firms, in 1969, a BOI factory 
inspection team reported that F4 had eight Japanese 
technicians. Yet, the 1974 reports of the Japanese Chamber 
of Commerce indicated that the number of Japanese experts 
in this firm had been significantly reduced to only one 
person. When F3 was established in 1963, then the first 
Japanese joint venture in Thailand, the Japanese partner 
sent a team of 40 technicians to start off the project.
When Gregory Clark visited the firm in 1968, the number of 
Japanese technicians was reduced to 19. In 1974, the 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce reported only eight technicians 
in F3. F14, another Japanese-controlled enterprise also had
40 Japanese to get the project off the ground in 1964. 
Gregory Clark recorded 22 technicians in 1968. However, 
when I visited the factory in mid-1975, it had only ten 
technicians and two of them were due to leave in December 
1975. This is a considerable reduction considering that the 
size of the firms has expanded several times since 
establishment. According to Gregory Clark, F12 had ten 
foreign technicians in 1968. In 1974 it had 17 foreign 
technicians, yet the size of the workforce of the firm had 
grown from 400 employees to 1672 and the percentage of 
foreign to total employees fell from 2.5% to 1.01%.
241
The ability of local technicians to cope with technical 
aspects was assured by all Japanese parent companies, 
including that of F8. As far as running and fixing the 
machinery are concerned, there would be no problems for the 
local staff. At present, Japanese experts are needed only 
when there is an unusual incident, or when firms start 
manufacturing new types of yarn and fabrics. There were 
some doubts on production management planning and control, 
for the local staff has not been given heavy responsibility 
in this area. However, since the general rules have been 
well laid down and routinised, if the system is properly 
administered the problem is reduced to rescheduling input 
and output to match market orders and demand. Productivity 
may be affected in the sense that smooth production flows 
may not be obtained at the initial stage of complete 
transfer. Such experience can be obtained only if some 
responsibility has been given.
However, parent companies except that of F8 had been 
more inclined to reduce the number of foreign production 
workers to a minimum of one or two advisers. This was 
especially so for fibre makers whose business was rapidly 
expanding. One Japanese manager of the fibre making firm 
disclosed that his firm wanted all the technicians back as 
soon as productivity in the subsidiary could be maintained 
without their technicians.
As far as managerial positions are concerned, the 
general consensus is somewhat different. All the Japanese 
parent companies feel that they need to hold certain 
managerial positions. One Japanese firm argued that their 
finance manager must invariably be a Japanese. Since local 
banks had a low credit base and the joint venture had to 
deal with Japanese banks, a Japanese manager would help to 
facilitate negotiations. Besides, Thailand lacks competent 
managerial resources that can cope with international 
monetary transactions.
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The future trend is that local participation will 
increase for several reasons. The Board of Investment 
persistently negotiates for the replacement of foreign by 
local staff as soon as possible. The Board expects three 
foreign positions to be the maximum number for foreign 
staff. Japanese firms themselves were facing higher and 
higher increases in the wages of Japanese expatriates, 
rendering their joint ventures uncompetitive in low-wage 
markets.
Some evidence suggests that the government's insistence 
is more influential in increasing local participation at 
higher levels, while the increasing costs in maintaining 
Japanese employees abroad operates only to reduce the number 
of foreign expatriates in the lower strata. Local executives 
of two Japanese-controlled firms (Fl, F13) claimed that they 
were the first to be employed in managerial positions only 
upon the government's insistence. Otherwise the change 
might have taken a longer time.
Interestingly, it was also observed that wholly locally 
owned firms were not always keen to dispense with foreign 
experts. The reasons were, firstly, that foreign experts 
were in some cases the only technological link with the 
outside world. This was especially important when the local 
capitalist was not well-informed. Secondly, the wages of 
Taiwanese and Korean experts were only marginally higher 
than those of talented and experienced local experts. In 
addition, there are other non-economic factors. For 
instance, the owner of the mill that hired the Korean expert 
said that, 'Technically, we don't need him any more but he 
has been with us for so long that we just can't tell him to 
leave'.
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8.6 Training of Local Labour Forces
Depending on the types of jobs, the length of training 
periods varied from two weeks to several months in a textile 
firm. However, for the production floor workers, training 
was without exception on the job, and new workers could be 
trained within a few weeks. On-the-job training was the 
most popular means of training for all firms at all levels 
of skills.
Table 8.5
Training in the Thai Textile Industry
Types; of training Local firms Foreign firms
(a) On-the-job training only 11 4
(b) On-the-job training and formal courses 
conducted within the firm 1 1
(c) On-the-job training and subsidised 
education (in cash, kind or time) - 1
(d) On-the-job training and overseas 
training - 8
(e) On-the-job training, formal courses 
conducted within the firm and 
overseas training 2 1
(f) On-the-job training, subsidised local 
education and overseas training 2 1
(g) All four types of training 3 2
Total 19 18
Sources: Interviews and questionnaire survey » 1974-5
In Table 8.5, other types of training are presented. 
Training provided by foreign firms, especially Japanese 
related joint ventures, appeared to be most extensive owing 
to direct and cheaper access to training facilities. The 
Japanese related joint ventures placed a great deal of 
emphasis on training abroad. In most of the Japanese 
related firms, senior foremen, technicians and engineers
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were trained in Japan for one to seven months while 
managerial staff spent six to twelve months in affiliated 
Japanese factories. All but one local firm that could offer 
overseas training are Japanese related locally-controlled 
joint ventures.
Two Japanese controlled firms strongly objected to 
the idea of sending local workers for overseas training:
'It is not worth sending workers for training abroad. A 
period of six months is too short to learn anything except 
to learn how to strike'. These two firms belong to the same 
parent company. They hired no local staff who had tertiary 
education. They were also the two firms where replacement 
of foreign experts had been most stagnant.
Formal technical courses within the factory were not 
regular. At the establishment period, foreign experts 
assembled local staff for a short orientation on the 
working of the factory. Once the factory was in operation, 
training was mostly done on the job.
Subsidised local training outside the firms was not 
very common. Local staff were sometimes required to take 
short courses on management organised by the Department of 
Industrial Promotion. Some firms also allowed partial 
absence from work with full payment for those workers who 
wished to continue their higher education.
Other types of training (not listed in Table 8.5) 
include technical seminars provided by the Japan Thai 
Association, available only to the staff of Japanese related 
enterprises. A very highly foreign controlled enterprise, 
F13, sought to improve the quality of the work force by 
providing voluntary continuing education. Local workers 
could attend the school within the factory compound after 
they had finished their shift. Each year, workers take 
examinations for official certificates and will be promoted 
accordingly. In 1976, the firm planned to widen the 
curriculum to include other vocational training such as
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dressmaking. This would be purely beneficial to workers 
and would be unrelated to improvement in the productivity 
of the firm.
As mentioned earlier, the Thai textile industry is 
sometimes viewed as a cluster of several prominent groups. 
Inter-enterprise training was sometimes available for 
members of the same group. For instance, foremen of a 
Japanese controlled firm, F8, were loaned to Til and T35 to 
train new workers. All three firms had the same local 
partner. Once T35 was established, it was used as a 
training ground for 30 foremen to man another new venture 
which was being constructed. This new firm was a joint 
venture of the local entrepreneur and other Japanese firms 
which were not related to F8.
So far, training in joint ventures has been concentrated 
on technical aspects. Very few local staff who were not 
involved in production have been given extensive training. 
Unlike the joint ventures, local firms had less direct 
access to training abroad. Only the larger firms could 
afford to send their technicians to machinery suppliers' 
plants for training, but this training was a once and for 
all event. In the case where foreign experts were hired, 
training was supervised locally by these experts.
8.7 The Intra-Firm Effects of Foreign Control
It has been shown in the previous chapter that, in the 
Thai textile industry, the foreign sector's efficiency 
indices are superior to those of local firms. Table 8.6 
presents some additional data on their performance. Returns 
on capital were derived by dividing net profit after tax by 
the book value of net fixed assets and total assets. Returns 
on primary factors were calculated by dividing net profit 
after tax by the total amount of labour and capital 
committed. The amount of labour and capital used were 
weighted by their cost on the assumption that all workers
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Table 8.6
Performance of Foreign and Local Textile Firms (1973)
Local firms Foreign firms
20 cases 17 cases 17 cases
1. Value added (m. baht) 28.0 22.5 45.4
2. Value added per worker 
( '000 baht) 30.5 32.7 47.8
3. Value added per 1,000 baht of 
total assets (baht) 183.1 202.1 293.5
4. Net returns on fixed assets 
(%) 12.7 13.3 19.1
5. Net returns on total 
investment (%) 8.7 9.3 10.3
6. Returns on primary factors 
(%) 26.9 28.1 48.3
7. Percentage of exports out 
of sales (weighted) 29.3 7.0 17.8
Sources: 1. BOI 1973 questionnaire
2. Ministry of Commerce
3. Fieldwork questionnaire and interviews
were paid the sample average wage; all firms depreciated at 
the rate of ten per cent per annum and the rate of interest 
was 12.5 per cent. In other words, it would have been the 
amount of factor cost to each firm had it paid the same 
prices for capital and labour input.
It should be noted that the average performance of the 
local group changed significantly when the three largest 
firms were excluded. Exclusion of these three largest firms 
improved the performance of local groups in nearly every 
aspect except exporting.
However, the factors that contribute to the better 
performance of foreign firms cannot be readily identified 
in this table. It is possible that the efficiency of the 
foreign group is not related to foreign management per se
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but may be due to higher capital intensity, economies of 
scale, etc. It may be useful to employ regression analysis 
to separate the effects of different factors on production 
and efficiency of the firms.
Particular emphasis will also be given to the effect 
of learning which brings local firms to the production 
possibility frontier. Learning by doing occurs in a number 
of ways (Hirsch, 1952, pp.136-43); production workers may 
have discovered ways of saving time, managerial personnel 
may have become more familiar with scheduling of input and 
output flows, particularly important in textile production 
which responds continuously to changes in the market. The 
engineering department may also have overcome its teething 
problems, etc. Several econometric studies have reported 
significant and positive effects of learning by doing 
(Hirsch, 1952; Cohen, 1973, pp.190-97).
8.7.1 The data. The data for this section were 
obtained from three sources: balance sheets and profit and
loss statements from the Ministry of Commerce, BOI's 
questionnaire and my own field work questionnaires and 
interviews, all of which refer to 1973 figures.
To overcome the problem of historical value of fixed 
assets, an alternative was computed by inflating the book 
value of capital by price index series and then the capital 
service flow was obtained by adding adjusted depreciation 
(on the basis of inflated capital value and of ten year 
depreciation) to the interest paid on loans and the computed 
returns on internal funds.
Adequate information could be obtained from only 37 out 
of 65 firms. Moreover, these firms were integrated in 
different degrees. Exclusion of firms with finishing and 
dyeing processes further reduced the sample size. Therefore 
it was necessary to include firms with an integrated 
finishing operation bearing in mind that there might be some 
upward biases for those partially or fully integrated firms.
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It should be noted again that this study is involved 
with modern large scale enterprises. A small firm referred 
to in this study is defined as a firm with less than 500 
workers, which is a very large firm by national standards. 
Different conclusions might be obtained if a study were 
conducted so as to include the non-promoted sector in which 
most firms employ less than 50 workers.
8.7.2 The variables. The two efficiency indices used 
were adjusted value added per worker and net return on 
primary factors. The adjusted value added is the sum of 
net profit, changes in inventory, adjusted wage bill and 
depreciation. The adjusted wage bill was the amount that a 
firm would pay if it paid the sample average wage to its 
employees. Adjusted depreciation was obtained by the 
method mentioned earlier. This was done to minimise price 
variations among firms resulting from the use of value added.
The first explanatory variable represented foreign 
management and control which was proxied by the ratio of 
foreign to total executives. The second variable represented 
the size of the firms. Although economies of scale are 
important in many industries, it will be shown in the next 
chapter that they are not particularly important in the 
textile industry. Thus, the larger the firms, the higher 
the probability that there will be diseconomies associated 
with administration. If this is the case, the co-efficient 
of the size variable will be negative. Two variables, i.e. 
the value of total sales and total employment, were used as 
an alternative proxy for the size of the firms.
Another variable was the ratio of the computed capital 
service to the number of workers, a proxy for production 
technology. The last variable is the age of the firm, a 
proxy for experience from learning by doing.
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8.7.3 The results. Only the best regression results 
are given in Table 8.7. The first brackets under the 
regression coefficients indicate the values of standard 
errors of regression coefficients and the second brackets 
give the t values.
Table 8.7
Determinants of Efficiency of the Textile Firms in Thailand
21. Y = .74 + .67 F + 1.78 A ; adjusted R = .34, F^ ^  = 9.53 
(.16) (.85)
(4.03)** (2.09)*
2. Y2 = -3422 + 1.44 K + 256.43 F + 1111.72 A ; adjusted R
(.22) (57.8) (332.74)
(6.56)** (2.70)** (3.34)**
.59,
3,32 17.19
where = net returns on primary factors
Y2 = value added per worker
F = the ratio of foreign to local executives 
A = age of the firms 
K = capital service flow per worker 
** = at 1% significance level 
* = at 5% significance level
In general, the regression results are consistent and 
show the expected signs. Foreign management, higher level 
of technology (high capital-labour ratio) and experience of 
the firms have positive effects on labour productivity and
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net return on primary factors. Together, they explained 
about one-third to two-thirds of the variation in the 
efficiency indices. The variables for size were negative 
in all equations but failed to be statistically significant.
As expected, the K variable is highly significant in 
the productivity equation. The more capital to work with, 
the higher labour productivity. More importantly, the K 
variable failed to be significant in the profitability 
equation. This seems to indicate that higher capital 
intensity has little influence on profitability. Firms which 
use capital less intensively can operate profitably, a fact 
to be cheered by supporters of relatively labour-intensive 
technology. In addition, the results also seem to suggest 
that foreign firms tend to be superior in cost minimising 
than in output maximising.
That foreign human capital, represented by shares of 
foreign executives, has a positive effect on both 
productivity and profitability indicates an area of clear 
advantage of foreign firms over local firms. This advantage 
is noticeable in executive control. It is therefore 
important for local firms to realise that the technological 
race is not the only way and perhaps not the most efficient 
way to achieve higher productivity and profitability. More 
effort should be put into promoting high calibre managerial 
resources.
If higher productivity in foreign firms is solely
related to high capital intensity, there will be a high
5correlation between the F and the K variables. However, 
the F and the K variables are both statistically significant, 
implying that multicollinearity is not a problem here, i.e.
5 Figures in Table 8.6 only indicate that foreign firms are 
more capital-intensive on the average. The following 
chapter will show that there are several local firms which 
use highly capital-intensive technology.
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the two variables are not highly correlated. Therefore, 
foreign management seems to have a positive effect on firms' 
productivity on its own right.
However, the results should be looked at with some 
degree of caution. It has been mentioned earlier 
that, first, the sample size is small and, second, firms 
were integrated in varying degrees. The latter can affect 
the performance of the firms. Thirdly, net profit, a 
component in value added, was not adjusted for price 
variation.
8.7.4 Possible improvements. If a larger and better 
set of data had been available, it would have been possible 
to improve the regressions in a number of ways. For 
instance, it could be hypothesised that the relationship 
between productivity and learning is non-linear and two 
dummy variables could be used to approximate a non-linear 
curve.
It may be interesting to see how open mechanisms for 
transferring of technology such as know-how agreements 
(represented by some ratios of know-how fees to sales), 
hiring of foreign technicians, etc., affect productivity of 
the firms. In fact, the test as to whether the foreign 
investment package can be untied can be conducted by 
regressing all foreign components, i.e. foreign capital, 
management and technology together in the regression. If 
the t value of each component is small but the F value for 
the group is large, then it indicates that these components 
must be used in a combination. If any of them has high t 
value individually, the package could be untied.
If the data on physical output and output mix had been 
available, it would have been possible to convert all 
products, e.g. yarn of different counts into one single 
product, say yarn count 20s. Then production functions 
could be estimated for all firms or for each group, if 
foreign and local firms have different production functions.
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Alternatively, a real value added function could beg
estimated. The effects of foreign control can then be 
incorporated in the production functions in a number of 
ways; as an explicit factor of production, as a factor 
affecting the efficiency parameter, etc. One difficulty 
with estimating production functions is that there is always 
multicollinearity between the two input variables (Doll,
1974). This can be overcome by dividing both sides of the 
equation with one variable.
In fact, some of the above improvements were attempted. 
However, owing to the small size of the data and other 
problems mentioned earlier, the attempts met with little 
success and therefore the results are not reported.
In contrast to what is generally believed in Thailand, 
it is clear that as far as production technology is 
concerned and with the exception of fibre production, the 
Thai labour force has benefited fairly substantially from 
training and participation in foreign enterprises.
Technology in this area has been extensively transferred. 
This transfer is relatively easy because a large part of 
production technology in textiles is embodied in capital 
equipment.
The transfer at management level, however, has not been 
equally impressive. On the government's insistence,
Japanese joint ventures have just begun to confer more 
responsibility on local staff. Complete transfer may take 
time. As one Japanese executive put it:
The arguments for the use of value added instead of gross 
output and for dropping raw materials from the production 
was given by Grilliche and Ringstad (1971, pp.108-12). 
Recently, Arrow (1974, pp.3-19) has shown that there exists 
a real value added function which consists of two primary 
inputs, capital and labour and which has all the necessary 
properties of the neoclassical production function. For more 
recent discussion of real value added function, see Lloyd 
(forthcoming).
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There is not always a short cut for everything. It 
takes some years to train a man to be a good 
engineer but it may take a decade to turn a good 
engineer into a good plant manager. At least it 
took me twenty years after I finished university. 
Experience cannot be substituted by education. They 
are supplementary.
Some of the obstacles to transfer at the entrepreneurial 
level are the carryover of the Japanese functional 
specialisation and the characters of the local partners.
Local partners with a commercial background have often been 
reluctant to take over the industrial decisions. For others, 
their bargaining positions had been weakened by the fact that 
their capital was loaned to them by their foreign partners. 
This has created the "sleeping partner" or "dummy partner" 
phenomenon. However, it has been shown that with sufficient 
will and determination, the local partners could excel 
themselves as an indispensable partner.
The study of intra-firm effects of foreign control 
reveal that foreign management seemed to be an important 
factor affecting efficiency of firms. High capital 
intensity was not the only way to achieve higher 
productivity. Moreover, its effects on profitability were 
statistically insignificant. The results suggest that local 
firms could improve performance by investing more in 
executive and managerial resources.
CHAPTER 9
Technological Progress in the Textile Industry 
and Its Implications for the LDCs
The textile industry is often thought of as a 
traditional, static and labour-intensive industry. 
Historically, it was one of the first industries to be 
transferred to the LDCs. Since the mid-fifties there has 
been very rapid technological progress and the increase in 
capital requirements for new models of some textile machinery 
has transformed certain sections of the industry into 
capital-intensive activities.
This chapter examines the contention that the textile 
industry is labour-intensive. It also investigates 
technological progress in the industry and explores the 
relative merits of different levels of technology. The 
implications of technological progress for the LDCs in terms 
of employment and skill formation will be examined. It also 
serves as a foundation for discussion of the next chapter.
Generally, manufacturing activities in the textile 
industry include production of fibre staple and filament, 
cotton ginning, production of natural and synthetic yarn and 
fabrics, gunny bags, knitted goods, apparel, mats, ropes, 
twines, cords, etc. For simplicity, technical discussions in 
this chapter will be confined to spinning and weaving of 
cotton and cotton blended products.
9.1 The "Labour-Intensive" Textile Industry
Several studies suggested that the textile industry is 
relatively labour-intensive. M. Mehta (1970, Table 14) 
classified manufacturing activities in seven Asian countries 
into s i x  categories according to their ratio of fixed assets 
to employment. The six levels of labour intensity were very 
low (below US$500), low (US$500-1,000), low-medium (US$1,000- 
2,000), medium-high (US$2,000-3,000) , high (US$3,000-5,000) 
and very high (US$5,000 and above) capital requirements per
255
worker. All seven countries revealed a fairly consistent 
ranking pattern. Textile manufacturing activities were 
generally classified as having very low, low and low-medium 
capital requirements per worker.
Another study was conducted by Lary in 1968. He 
employed value added per worker as a measure of labour- 
intensity. The higher the ratio, the more capital-intensive 
the industry. In comparison to other industries in the 
United States, the textile industry was found to be 
relatively labour-intensive (Lary, 1968, Table 2, pp.24-29).
In particular, capital intensity in weaving up to 1965 was 
below total manufacturing average. In addition, there were 
fairly good correlations (over .75) between the ranking of 
industries in the United States and that of Japan and the 
United Kingdom (Table 6, p.75). However, correlations of 
this ranking between the United States and India was only .6 
for all industries. Not until seven extreme variations were 
eliminated was the correlation .78 reached. Therefore, Lary 
concluded that the textile industry was relatively labour- 
intensive in both developed and less developed countries.
While this argument is not to be disputed here, several 
points need to be mentioned in this connection. Firstly, 
within the textile industry, employment potential of 
different branches of the industry varies substantially. On 
the basis of a 77-sector input-output table of India in 
1964-65, Hazari and Krishnamurty (1970) ranked industries 
according to their total labour requirements per unit of 
final output. It is evident from Table 9.1 that although 
silk and cotton fabric manufacturing have high rankings in 
terms of the generation of employment, production of cotton 
yarns and synthetic fabrics requires much less labour per unit 
of final output. M. Mehta's study (1970) also confirmed this 
pattern. Silk and knitted goods were found to have the lowest 
capital requirements, followed by cotton fabrics and then 
other textile products.
Inspection of aggregate statistics at industry level may 
not reveal that certain sectors of an industry are capital-
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intensive if the industry covers a wide range of activities 
such as the textile industry. For instance, the use of two 
or four digit industrial classifications in Lary's study 
meant that spinning and weaving activities were aggregated. 
The fact that spinning activity is relatively capital- 
intensive may have been hidden by the average figure.
Secondly, recent technological progress in textile 
manufacturing has been more marked in spinning than in 
weaving. Therefore, by selecting weaving as an illustration, 
it is not surprising that Lary reached the conclusion that 
the textile industry was labour-intensive. Important 
innovations that would potentially convert spinning from a 
batch-run operation to a semi-continuous process had not 
taken place at the time of his writing. This point will be 
more fully elaborated in the next section.
Thirdly, when each textile manufacturing activity is 
considered separately, e.g., cotton spinning, weaving of man­
made fabrics, certain activities of the industry turn out to 
be among those industries which have the lowest employment 
potential. According to Table 9.1, production of cotton yarn 
ranked sixty-second among seventy-seven industries in terms 
of employment potential.^
The implication of these three points is that failure 
to distinguish between different branches of textile 
manufacturing may lead to incorrect policy formulation. For 
instance, if employment generation is the policy objective, 
cotton weaving rather than spinning is the suitable activity.
It is difficult to compare Mehta with Hazari and 
Krishnamurty1s studies. Mehta did not distinguish between 
cotton spinning and weaving. As a result, the cotton textile 
manufacturing in his study ranked nineteenth among seventy- 
nine manufacturing industries in terms of fixed assets per 
worker. Moreover, measurements used in the two studies are 
not readily comparable. The number of workers per unit of 
final product may not be perfectly correlated with fixed 
assets per worker. The inclusion of indirect labour in the 
Hazari and Krishnamurty study, which is not possible in the 
Mehta study, may have contributed to this result. The use of 
the values of fixed assets may also have affected Mehta's 
study.
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Table 9.1
Ranking of Textile Manufacturing Activities 
on the Basis of Employment Potential*
Products Ranking
Number of workers 
per unit of final 
product
Raw silk 10 790
Silk fabrics 15 498
Cotton fabrics 35 127
Jute textiles 40 138
Cotton 53 82
Cotton yarn 62 47
Artificial fabrics 63 47
*Based on 1964-65, 77-sector input-output table of India
Source: Hazari and Krishnamurty (1970, p.184, Appendix 2)
9.2 Technological Progress in the Textile Industry
The relative labour-intensity in the textile industry
is partly the result of the fact that the spinning and
weaving processes are characterised by separate batch
operations with connecting manual material handling between
2each step (Fig. 9.1). In a conventional mill, nearly half 
of the production workers are involved in material handling.
The rapid rise in wages in the developed countries 
necessitates innovations that will reduce labour intensity, 
as well as increase output. Research and development centres 
around three areas: increase in machine speed, automation of
material handling and elimination of steps or combinations of 
several steps in the production process proper - all of which 
culminate in high volume production and a considerable 
reduction in labour requirements, resulting in greatly 
improved labour productivity.
For those unfamiliar with textile technology, Appendix C 
gives a simple introduction to the spinning and weaving 
processes.
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Fig. 9.1
Cotton Yarn Manufacturing Sequence - 
Actual and Potential
1954 1974 1980
Opening Opening Opening (auto-feed)
Picking (Picking) -
Carding Carding Carding (chute-feed)
Drawing - 2 
processes
Drawing Drawing (?)
Roving Roving Roving (?)
Slubbing
Intermediate
Fine
Jack
Spinning Spinning Spinning
Total = 9 steps Total = 6 steps Total = 3 to 5 steps
Source: Tewksbury (1974, Figs. 1, 2, 3)
The operating speeds of 1950 models of spinning machinery 
are compared with those of 1966 models in Table 9.2. The 
volume produced per machine increased 20 per cent for lap 
forming, 300-400 per cent for carding and at least 300 per 
cent for combing. The revolutions per minute of the roving 
process increased by approximately 50 per cent. Since in all 
cases the number of operative workers per machine remained 
constant or decreased, these new innovations were strongly 
biased towards labour-saving techniques.
Automation occurs both in the process proper and in 
material handling. In a modern mill, manual feeding and 
blending of cotton can be automated. The introduction of 
automatic winding equipment which was designed to inspect 
yarn imperfections and produce a larger output, can also 
substantially reduce labour requirements.
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Table 9.2
Operating Speeds of Spinning Machines
Technical operations 1950 1966
Lap forminga (kg/hour) 150-180 180-220
Carding (kg/hour) 4-8 15-32
Drawing (m/min) 28-36 250-450
Combing (kg/hour) 6-8 25-55b
Roving (rev/min) 500-850 1200-1800
Spinning (rev/min) 8000-12000 12000-18000
Does not take place in the new types of automated 
processing systems.
Latest models of combers of Saco-Lowell, United States.
Source: Klopotowski (1970, p.7, Table 1)
Since the fifties, various steps in the production 
processes have been merged (Fig. 9.1). Several subsidiary 
steps in the roving process have been eliminated. The 
sliver, after passing through the drawing frames can skip the 
intermediate and the stubbing frames.
Towards the end of the sixties an important innovation 
in cotton spinning, called open-end spinning, was developed 
and was commercialised in the early seventies. It presents 
an alternative to the prevailing ring spinning concept. The 
new system permits the elimination of the roving and winding 
processes.
Technological progress in weaving is also impressive 
but it is not yet possible to merge steps in the production 
process. Warping machines, which operated at 500 metres per 
minute in 1950, could operate at 750-900 metres per minute 
in 1965, and currently exceed 1000 metres per minute. Sizing 
can now be automatically controlled. A number of weft 
replenishing devices with varying levels of sophistication
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can be added to conventional automatic looms to reduce 
workload in weft supply systems. These devices include 
manual battery filling, box loading, unifil, etc. Speed of 
looms increased from 190 picks per minute in the forties to 
220 picks per minute in the fifties. The most advanced 
weaving technology - the shuttleless loom, whereby wefts are 
driven by air, a water jet, enables a speed as high as 4403picks per minute to be reached. The wave-motion looms 
currently under development can weave 3000 metres per minute, 
three times faster than shuttleless looms.
Apart from increasing the efficiency of looms, the weft 
replenishment devices also operate to reduce the labour 
requirement. Unifil, which allows a reduction of pirns per 
loom from 300-500 to 30, implies a decrease in the cost of 
stocking, fitting, maintenance and operative workers.
Technological progress is undoubtedly accompanied by an 
increase in financial costs. The OECD study of the textile 
industry in 1964 indicated that when compared with other 
industries, the cotton textile industry had one of the 
highest rates of new capital investment per worker. 
Tewksbury's study in 1974 revealed that the new high 
production cards cost more than twice as much as rebuilt 
cards of the early model. The up-to-date ring spindle cost 
between US$80-110 while the spindle of the early model cost 
between US$30-45. Another 1974 study by Lennox-Kerr 
estimated the cost of an up-to-date ring spinning mill to be 
US$35,935 per work place as opposed to US$124,424 per work 
place for the open-end system.
It is apparent that as a result of research and 
development in the capital rich countries, the textile 
technology has tended to be capital-using and it is likely 
to continue to be so in the future. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the LDCs will have to use the same
A water or air jet loom uses a jet of water or air to 
insert weft across the warp threads.
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technology to be competitive. Technological obsolescence 
does not necessarily imply economic obsolescence. Moreover, 
factor substitution is possible to a certain degree in 
textile production. In capital rich countries, high speed 
machinery and automation minimise costs while in the LDCs, 
lower speed machinery and lower quality of raw materials can 
be compensated by high attendance of labour. Lower speed 
machines reduce breakage of low quality raw materials and 
labour-intensive attendance helps to improve the quality of 
the final product.
9.3 Other Economic Merits of Modern Technology
It is widely believed that new technology (which is 
normally capital-intensive) is necessary because it improves 
the quality of the product. This is not valid for all 
innovations in the textile industry, where it is widely 
accepted that relatively modern machinery does not always 
produce better quality products than older machines. The 
ECLA study (1966a) suggests that for the three levels of 
technology considered (1950, 1960 and 1965 technology), there 
is no practical difference in quality:
It is asserted that the quality was the same in 
practical terms because strictly speaking there are 
bound to be small differences between various 
processes, for the changes are not always in the 
same direction, that is, the fact that one technique 
is more advanced than another is not in itself a 
guarantee that the product will be better. Some 
examples may clarify this point; for example, the 
large package used for intermediate products in 
spinning with the more advanced techniques has 
reduced the number of unavoidable knots in the 
spinning process, and thus permits a more regular 
fabric, containing fewer impurities. On the other 
hand, the higher speeds of the modern machines tend 
to produce a less uniform yarn despite the control 
devices included in the machinery, with which some 
manufacturers have been more successful than others.
(p.13)
Another benefit claimed for modern technology is that it 
enables space to be saved. Modern machines are generally 
less bulky. For instance, open-end spinning machines reduce
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space requirements by as much as 40 per cent. Although 
this may not be an important cost item in the LDCs where 
prices of land and installation of factories are generally 
low in comparison with those in the more advanced countries, 
the saving of space leads to savings in air-conditioning 
which is one of the more expensive cost items.
Whatever the other benefits may be, the greatest impact 
of modern technology lies in the improvement in labour 
productivity caused by labour-saving innovations. As will 
be shown later, this trend in innovations may be of little 
benefit to the less developed countries.
9.4 Economies of Scale and Textile Technology
In some manufacturing industries, as production capacity 
is expanded, unit costs decrease. In other words, internal 
economies of scale are present.
Economies of scale arise from various sources. As 
production expands, there will be some spreading of overhead 
and administration costs, e.g., in the stocking of spare 
parts and components. Firms may also benefit from cheap bulk 
purchases of raw materials. Technically, diseconomies are 
related to indivisibilities in machinery. A larger scale 
permits a better balance between different processing stages. 
For the spinning industry, the major indivisibility causing 
idle capacity is the blow room. For weaving it is the sizing 
room.
The most comprehensive study of economies of scale in 
the textile industry was carried out by ECLA (1966b). Since 
the study is confined to a given level of technology (1960 
technology), economies of scale can be conveniently defined 
as the reduction in unit investment and production costs as 
the number of ring spindles and weaving looms is increased. 
The three products under their consideration are coarse (A),
4
From a comparison of up-to-date ring spinning and BD200 
open-end spinning.
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medium (B) and fine (C) yarns and fabrics. The suggested 
optimal sizes for spinning are 18,500 spindles for all 
products, with 830 looms for product A, 680 looms for 
product B and 396 looms for product C.
According to the ECLA study (1966b, pp.3-6), idle 
capacity is reduced substantially as the size of the firm 
increases from a capacity of 2,000 to 10,000 spindles. Then 
the reduction of idle capacity becomes less significant up to 
20,000 spindles, beyond which economies resulting from a 
reduction of idle facilities are negligible. An expansion 
beyond 20,000 spindles, however, does not entail any 
technological diseconomies. It may even bring about the 
reduction in either average fixed costs or diseconomies of 
administration, depending on the quality of management.
The extent of economies of scale depends to a certain 
degree on the fineness of yarns, e.g. a 2,000 spindle mill 
exhibits idle capacity of 8.5, 17.3 and 30.2 per cent for 
products A, B and C respectively. An increase from the 
smallest scale to the ideal plant sizes mentioned above would 
reduce unit investment by 21, 30 and 40 per cent for coarse, 
medium and fine fabrics respectively and reduce production 
costs by 19, 27 and 40 per cent respectively.
Another important source of economies of scale is the 
reduction in fixed labour costs. However, in a labour 
abundant country where labour costs normally constitute a 
relatively small proportion of production costs, the economies 
gained by spreading fixed labour charges are less significant.
In general, economies of scale are more prominent in 
spinning than in weaving especially if the weaving mill is 
non-integrated. Economies of scale are also more important 
for fine than for coarse products. However, economies of 
scale in the cotton textile industry are relatively 
insignificant in comparison to other industries. Pratten 
et al. (1971, pp. 269-77, Table 30.1) estimated that a spinning
and weaving mill of the minimum efficient scale produced less 
than two per cent of the total output of the British textile
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industry, while plants of the minimum efficient scale for 
oil refining, chemicals, synthetic fibres, soaps and 
detergents, steel and motor cars produced 10, 25, 33, 20, 33 
and 25 per cent of the U.K. output for the respective 
products.
The reasons for relatively limited economies of scale 
in spinning and weaving activities are, first, the 
production process is non-continuous, and secondly, apart 
from productive units in the blow room and sizing room the 
productive unit for each stage is quite small, e.g., cards, 
looms, spinning frames. Technological progress has not so 
far been successful in achieving a completely continuous 
system. As a result, it is possible to have a small firm 
with highly advanced technology and a large firm with modest 
technology.
Yet, if expansion in plant size occurs concurrently
with technological change, it is difficult to measure
economies of scale in practice. In the first place,
technical characteristics of the newly installed machinery
may be radically different from the existing machinery. For
example, a firm could replace machinery based on the
spindle-ring-traveller system with a smaller number of open-
end spinning machines operated on the basis of centrifugal
force. If there was a resultant reduction in unit costs, it
would be difficult to determine which part was caused by
economies of scale and which part was caused by the change 
5in technology. Secondly, in the case where technological 
progress is non-neutral in the use of factors of production, 
expanding firms face a different factor price ratio from the
This particular example implies a non-neutral technological 
change. However, changes in technical characteristics do not 
necessarily imply changes in factor intensity. This argument 
is applicable to both neutral and non-neutral technological 
progress.
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rest in the industry.^ Therefore, the reduction in unit 
costs resulting from the expansion will depend on the new 
relative factor prices. No prior estimates of the 
reduction could be made without knowledge of the relative 
prices facing the particular firms.
While private gains from economies of scale which 
occur concurrently with non-neutral technological progress 
cannot be estimated a priori, on the basis of relative 
shadow factor prices, social gains can be estimated.
However, since technological change is more likely to 
originate in the capital-rich environment, technological 
progress is likely to be non-neutral and biased against 
labour-using techniques. Thus, in contrast to economies 
of scale-cum-neutral technological progress where both 
developed and developing countries are likely to gain, the 
benefits from economies of scale that are results of non­
neutral technological change may accrue mainly to the 
developed countries.
9.5 Employment Implications of R & D in Textile Technology
R & D in textile technology has been biased strongly 
towards labour-saving innovations. In the ECLA study on 
the choice of techniques in the textile industry (1966a), 
three textile mills of varying degree of sophistication were 
hypothetically constructed on the basis of actual factor 
prices prevailing in Latin America. It was demonstrated 
that as a shift occurred from relatively simple (1950) to 
more advanced technologies (1960 & 1965), output increased 
less than proportionately to the increase in total 
investment. The figures in Table 9.3 indicate that total
This is to assume that the factor market is not perfect. 
For instance, in the case of Thailand, the period of 
corporate income tax exemptions vary with the size of the 
firms. The larger the firm, the longer the exemption. 
Another example is when firms expand, their credit 
worthiness may have improved in the eyes of some lenders 
and capital may be obtained more cheaply.
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Table 9.3
Output, Total Investment and Labour 
Requirement under Different Technologies
Level of technology
Absolute figures Index figures
1950 1960 1965 1950 1960 1965
Annual yarn output (tons)
Annual fabric output ( '000 metres)
2265.6 2643.3 2895.0 1 1.16 1.27
16833 19629 21495 1 1.16 1.27
Total investment 
[in $ ’000]
4453 5658 6508 1 1.27 1.46
Labour force 
(3 shifts)
668 446 315 1 .66 .47
Source: ECLA (1966a, Table 1, p. 9)
Table 9.4
Open-end vs Ring Spinning:
Direct Labour Requirement for Three Shifts3
Technical operations Open-end Ring-spinning
Drawing 3 3
Roving 6
Spinning 12 30
Winding 15
Total 15 54
dFor an annual production of 3,240,609 kg of Ne 16 (37 tex) yarn based 
on about 454 kg/hour on a 144 hr/wk and 50 wk/yr operation.
Source: Lennox-Kerr (1974, Table 1)
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investment on a 1965 textile mill was 1.46 times greater 
than that on a 1950 mill. The gain in output was 27 per 
cent but labour requirements had fallen by 53 per cent.
The new open-end spinning system permits the labour 
requirement to be reduced to as much as one-third of that 
of the most up-to-date ring spinning system. In Table 9.4, 
the reduction in the labour force for a given output made 
possible by the new spinning method is illustrated.
Support for these studies is also contained in a study on 
textile technology (1969) conducted by the Textile Council 
in Great Britain. This study showed that the techniques 
prevailing in 1960 and 1968 used 66 and 46 per cent 
respectively of the labour requirements of 1950 techniques 
(Annexe C, Tables 6a, b, c). Open-end spinning, moreover, 
could operate with a labour force totalling only 22 per 
cent of the 1950 requirements (Annexe C, Tables 6a, 11).
Given this labour displacement effect, the next 
question concerns the impact of technological change on 
unit costs of output. Because innovations originated in 
developed countries where wage rates were rising quickly it 
would not be surprising to find that they may not be suited 
to LDCs where capital is scarce and labour is abundant. 
Several studies have been made on the effect of modern 
technology on the cost structure of the textile industry in 
LDCs. The ECLA study (1966a) estimated the costs of 
production of the three levels of technology, viz. 1950, 
1960, 1965 models. The results are shown in Table 9.5. On 
the assumptions that the total average wage of the three 
mills was US$.587, .661, .712 per hour respectively and
that the interest rate was 12 per cent, the shift from 1950 
to 1965 technology reduced labour costs by 56 per cent, 
increased depreciation and interest costs by 14 and 12 per 
cent respectively and reduced total unit cost by 11 per 
cent.
Nevertheless, this benefit from technological progress 
can be nullified if the price of labour is sufficiently low.
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Table 9.5
Unit Costs of a Textile Product 
under Three Levels of Technology
Absolute figures Index
1950 1960 1965 1950 1960 1965
Total unit cost per 
metre ($)
.207 .191 .185 100 92 89
Unit cost items affected by technological levels
- total labour costs .054 .032 .024 100 59 44
- depreciation .014 .015 .016 100 107 114
- interest on capital .032 .035 .036 100 109 112
Total .100 .082 .076 100 82 76
Source: ECLA (1966a, Table 13, p.36)
For example, if the labour costs Of all skill levels were
one-third of the Latin American situation, the changes in 
unit costs resulting from the three levels of technology 
would be US$.064, .061, .060 respectively. If the interest
rate was higher than 12 per cent, relatively advanced 
models become even less attractive.
Another study comparing conventional spinning with 
open-end spinning was conducted by P. Mehta in 1975 on the 
basis of Indian factor prices. Unfortunately, the 
assumptions on interest rates and wages were not reported 
but it was indicated that a monthly wage for a skilled 
worker in India was about «^ 25-50 in 1974 and interest rates 
were referred to in passing as being 17-18 per cent p.a. on 
bank loans and 30 per cent on private loans (P.C. Mehta, 
1975, p.220).
P. Mehta discovered that although the operating costs 
of advanced technology were lower, given a 20 per cent 
profit margin for both types of technology, the pay-off
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period for locally produced machinery was approximately as 
attractive as the earlier model of open-end spinning but 
was much more attractive in comparison to the more recent 
development of open-end spinning. In weaving, the 
conventional local technology was far more attractive than 
the imported advanced technology.
Before leaving this section, it should be mentioned 
that there may be a potential 'trade diversion' effect of 
R & D in textile technology. When textile technology is 
first introduced to the LDCs, production is mainly confined 
to coarse yarns and fabrics, owing to relative technical 
simplicity and low skill requirements. The comparative 
advantage doctrine would suggest that LDCs specialise in the 
production of coarse yarn until absorptive capacity 
improved. Meanwhile, developed countries contract their 
production in these particular product lines. However, 
some of the recent innovations such as open-end spinning 
have markedly increased the competitiveness of developed 
countries vis-a-vis LDCs in the production of coarse yarns, 
thus reducing the scope for trade and specialisation.
9.6 Implications of Modern Technology for Skill Formation
The above analysis suggests labour replacement 
following a shift from relatively simple to sophisticated 
technology. This section investigates the impact of modern 
technology on skill requirements in the industry. It has 
been pointed out earlier that before one can make any 
judgement on the desirability of certain technologies, their 
contribution in terms of formation of skills should be 
considered, i.e., is there a trade-off between the 
generation of employment and skills in choosing between two 
different technologies?
It is widely recognised that the conventional textile 
technology is relatively simple. This is one of the 
principal explanations of the exodus of the industry to the 
less developed countries. Higher levels of skills are not
270
demanded in large quantity. Technological progress has 
further reduced the need for skilled workers on the 
production floor. Personal judgement and control have now 
become more important than physical effort and the 
operators' manual skills (Tewksbury, 1975, p.75). The 
basic function of spinning (i.e., cleaning, stretching and 
twisting of fibre) and of weaving (i.e., inserting wefts 
between warps) are mostly accomplished by machinery.
Operatives are mostly semi-skilled workers whose jobs are to 
supply and remove raw materials and intermediate products as 
well as to make sure that machines are functioning properly. In 
roving and ring spinning, workers have the task of tending 
breakages.
In the textile industry, higher levels of skills are 
required in the maintenance and service department. Modern 
plants may also require electrical engineering skills in 
the power department. The trend is that as one moves from 
relatively simple to relatively sophisticated technology, 
requirements of operatives decrease and those of service 
and maintenance labour increase. However, the increase in 
higher skill requirements is not expected to be large even 
in modern mills. Moreover, the larger the mill, the more 
economical it is to employ highly skilled personnel. An 
expansion or a re-equipment of a new department may require 
a very small number of additional skilled and highly 
skilled technicians or no additional workers may be required 
because the work can be shared among existing skilled 
workers.
Modern technology also has several impacts on the 
quality of management (Smith, 1975). The increasing 
sophistication and scale of modern technology have increased 
the level of the break even point of output and rendered 
fixed costs a higher proportion of total cost. In addition, 
the complexity of advanced technology requires exact and 
elaborate control. Technological progress is not confined 
to machinery and equipment. New processing techniques, the
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fluctuation and diversification of input supplies and the 
demand for final products present additional problems to 
modern managers. In all, well-informed managers of high 
calibre with an understanding of the business are required.
Hence, the main impact of technology on modern 
management is to present it with more complex 
situations, in which the correct judgements are 
less obvious and the penalty for error is on a 
scale that can mortally wound the business (Smith,
1975 , p.42) .
. Clearly, most countries including the LDCs wish to 
possess this type of managerial resource. The problem for 
the LDCs is the proper assignment of priorities for the 
generation of different types of skills bearing in mind that 
the creation of modern management skills has an additional 
cost of miscalculation. Since managerial expertise cannot 
be built up overnight, over-acceleration in a very short 
time span may incur more costs than benefits.
ECLA (1966a) also outlined skill composition for each 
technological level for the three hypothetical mills. The 
findings are presented in Table 9.6. It is apparent that 
moving from technology A to technology C increases 
substantially the proportion of higher skills in total 
skill requirements. Skilled supervisory requirements 
increase from 13 to 20 per cent and requirements for 
technicians and managerial staff increase from 2 to 6 per 
cent. However, in absolute terms, there is a reduction in 
higher skill requirements at all levels except for the 
technical and management level when shifting from technology 
B to C. Overall, the labour displacement effect outweighs 
the skill creation effect. Thus, for a given output, a move 
from a relatively simple to a sophisticated plant will not 
generally create more skills. It is true that a relatively 
advanced technology creates specialised skills or 
substitutes mental for manual skills. Overall, total skill 
requirements diminish.
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Table 9.6
Skill Composition for Different Levels of Technology 
(Number of persons per 1,000 metres/day)a
_______ Types of technology_____________
Absolute figures_________  ____ Index
Types of skill A (%) B (%) C (%) A B C
Unskilled 4.36 ( 37) 2.78 ( 41) 1.41 ( 32) 100 64 32
Semi-skilled 5.77 ( 48) 2.75 ( 40) 1.83 ( 42) 100 48 32
Skilledb 1.51 ( 13) 1.08 ( 16) .88 ( 20) 100 72 58
Technical and 
management .25 ( 2) .21 ( 3) .28 ( 6) 100 84 112
Total 11.89 (100) 6.82 (100) 4.40 (100) 100 57 37
Based on a 23-hour working day. 
k Including foremen and office staff.
Source: ECLA (1966a, Table 6, p.22)
If the role perceived to be appropriate for the textile 
industry is that of a basic skill infrastructure builder, 
what it should do is create a large score of skilled and 
supervisory personnel rather than produce a small cadre of 
technical elites.
The technological linkage effect of modern technology 
should also be noted. Spare parts for modern machinery 
cannot yet be produced in less developed countries. Over­
attempts to use modern technology for final products may 
make the development of the related sectors, viz. spare 
parts and the machine tool industry all the more difficult.
In conclusion, it has been suggested that there are 
certain sectors, notably yarn manufacturing, which are 
increasingly capital-intensive. More caution must be
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exercised in policy formulation. If Hazari and 
Krishnamurty's study could be a guide to other LDCs, the 
push ahead for the expansion of cotton yarn manufacturing 
might not create as many employment opportunities as might 
be expected.
In the discussion of technological progress in the 
textile industry, it has been suggested that innovations 
are strongly biased against labour-using techniques. Other 
improved characteristics, such as space saving and quality 
improvement, are not very substantial. Nor is there a 
strong relationship between economies of scale and 
technological progress. Some evidence has also been put 
forward for the view that in the countries where labour 
costs are relatively low, the benefit from technological 
change may be quite negligible. However, there is a 
possible trade-off between growth and the creation of 
highly skilled workers on the one hand and the generation 
of employment on the other. It is important that the less 
developed countries have clear-cut objectives so that their 
industrialisation policies can be properly designed to 
provide the right signals to private industries.
CHAPTER 10
Technology, Employment and Skills in 
the Thai Textile Industry
Thailand is a latecomer as far as modern textile 
manufacturing is concerned. As a consequence, it appears 
that she has the advantage of having available a wide range 
of technology to choose from. This chapter investigates the 
choice of techniques in the Thai textile industry. In 
particular, it pursues an in-depth study of the proposition 
that foreign firms tend to use relatively more capital- 
intensive technology than local firms. It is hypothesised 
that direct foreign investment encouraged by local protection 
policies does not necessarily introduce pre-determined 
technology. The choice of technology in this situation will 
be dependent on local conditions. The relatively high 
capital intensity of the foreign sector described in an 
earlier chapter is not a direct result of direct foreign 
investment per se but is a result of many interrelated 
factors.
The first sections of this chapter will explore how the 
technology used in the textile industry fits into the world 
trend. Technology levels in the Thai textile industry will 
be classified. The behaviour and motivations of firms in 
their selection of technology, and the impact of the 
government's tax concessions, will be discussed. The second 
task will be to investigate the employment and skill 
implications of the textile industry so as to outline its 
future role in the country's industrialisation process.
10.1 The Size Distribution of the Firms in the Promoted 
Sector
Before examining the choice of techniques in the Thai 
textile industry, it is useful to look at the distribution
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of the size of the firms. It will be shown later that the 
size of the firms is, to some extent, related to the choice 
of technology.
In 1974, all spinning mills in Thailand were equipped 
with more than 10,000 spindles. The size distribution of 
all spinning firms is presented in Table 10.1. Three out 
of seven firms in the smallest group had less than 18,500 
spindles. One out of these three mills was the only firm 
that produced polyester/rayon fibre (and, although included 
in the table, is excluded from this study). The second mill 
in this group was established in 1936 and belongs to the 
Ministry of Defence. The third mill had 14,000 spindles but 
it produced coarse yarns (7-20s). It has been shown earlier 
than economies of scale in the production of coarse yarns 
are negligible beyond 14,000 spindles (ECLA, 1966b). Bearing 
these points in mind, it seems likely that, in general, no 
spinning firms in Thailand suffered from technical 
dis-economies of scale.
It is interesting to note that the proportion of foreign 
mills decreased as the size of the firms (measured in terms 
of spindles) increased. Foreign firms accounted for 44 per 
cent (seven out of 16 firms) of the firms in the small-scale 
group (less than 30,000 spindles), 40 per cent of the firms 
in the medium group (30,000 to 50,000 spindles) were foreign 
controlled while only 20 per cent of the mills in the large- 
scale group (over 50,000 spindles) belonged to foreign firms.
In weaving, the picture is similar and the size 
distribution of the Thai firms was more dispersed (Table 
10.2). Foreign firms tended to cluster in the medium group 
(100-400 looms). Most of the firms in the smallest group 
catered for smaller markets. For instance, two foreign firms 
in this group manufactured blankets and towels. Two others 
produced synthetic materials. The smallest foreign weaver in 
this group produced suiting fabrics. Small local firms also 
produced mainly synthetic fabrics.
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Table 10.1
Size Distribution of All Spinning Mills 
in the Thai Textile Industry (1974)
Number of firms
Number of spindles
Foreign-
controlled
Thai-
controlled
10,000 - 20,000 4 3
20,000 - 30,000 3 6
30,000 - 40,000 1 2
40,000 - 50,000 1 1
50,000 - 60,000 1 1
60,000 - and above - 3
10 16
Sources: 1) BOI lists of promoted firms
2) The Thai Textile Manufacturing 
(1973, pp.1-2)
3) Field survey 1974-75
Association
Table 10.2
Size Distribution of Promoted Weaving 
Firms in the Thai Textile Industry (1974)
Type of firm
Foreign- Thai-
Number of looms controlled controlled
50 - 100 7 5
100 - 400 7 15
400 - 800 4 3
800 - 1200 - 2
2000 and above - 1
18 26
Sources: as for Table 10.1
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Statistics of firms outside the promoted sector are not 
available. The Thai Weaving Association suggested that about 
66 per cent (211 firms) of its members had about 50 looms or 
less. However, technical diseconomies of scale are not a 
major problem for weaving so long as these small firms can 
acquire warp beams which have been sized by suppliers. The 
concern expressed by the Japanese-controlled firms over 
intense competition from these small firms also confirmed 
that economies of scale are much less significant in weaving 
than in spinning.
It should also be mentioned that an important source of 
economies in the textile industry is related to long 
production runs. This is independent of the level of 
technology. In the case of the Thai industry where most 
firms produce only one or two blends within a narrow count 
range, economies of long production runs are fairly readily 
secured.
Information on the size of the production facilities of 
the firms throws some light on the low value added and 
profits of the three largest local firms (Chapter 8). Since 
technical economies of scale for medium-sized yarn are 
negligible beyond 20,000 spindles, these largest firms can 
expect to gain an advantage in economies only in bulk buying 
and administration. On the other hand, when firms become 
too large, they may stretch their administrative resources 
too far resulting in diseconomies of organisation. By 
contrast, foreign firms tend to cluster around technically 
optimum size. This may reflect an attempt to reach maximum 
technical efficiency with minimum administrative problems 
which could arise from operating in an alien environment.
This point has important implications for promotion policies 
and development strategies for the countries which are poorly 
endowed with human capital. In addition to the monopolistic 
potential which a large firm may have, over-expansion may 
induce an inefficient use of resources when the 
administrative personnel is over-burdened.
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10.2 Factor Intensity in the Thai Textile Industry
It was shown in Chapter 5 that on the basis of the 
weighted average of total investment per worker and non-wage 
cost ratio, foreign firms appeared to use more capital- 
intensive technology than local firms. However, there are 
well-known problems associated with the use of total 
investment statistics. Firms may differ in their holding 
of fixed and current assets. Besides, there are also 
problems of aggregation and of different vintages among fixed 
assets. Therefore, it is thought that a more accurate 
measure is needed for an investigation at firm level. It is 
attempted here to classify firms in accordance with their 
technical characteristics.
Statistics in this section were mainly obtained from 
plant visits and interviews with plant managers and engineers. 
Of the 36 firms that agreed to co-operate, not all of them 
produce comparable products. Unless otherwise stated, the 
main comparison is confined to cotton/polyester spinning and 
weaving.
Information on types of spinning technology was supplied 
by 25 mills out of 26 existing mills in Thailand. Thus, this 
survey covered more than 90 per cent of the national spinning 
capacity in 1974. The survey on weaving firms was less 
comprehensive and covered only half of the firms in the 
promoted weaving industry.
10.2.1 Classification of levels of technology. To 
investigate the levels of technology used in the Thai textile 
industry, firms were classified into four categories 
according to the level of machinery sophistication as 
reflected in speed and certain other technical 
characteristics. The four categories are: conventional,
intermediate, semi-advanced and advanced technology. Firms 
that had both spinning and weaving operations have been 
treated as two separate firms. It was observed during field­
work that technology used in spinning and weaving of the
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same firm could differ in the degree of sophistication. For 
instance, it was not uncommon to discover that a firm which 
fell into the semi-advanced category as far as spinning is 
concerned used, say, intermediate technology for weaving.
Technical characteristics of the four categories are 
given in Table 10.3. Certain processes such as drawing and 
roving are omitted for purely practical reasons. Firms 
normally possess machinery of different vintages. The older 
and the larger the firms, the more scope for combinations 
of different technologies. As pointed out by the ECLA study, 
given three levels of technology for each of the eleven 
processing stages of spinning and weaving, 3 ^  or 
approximately 177,000 combinations can be formed (ECLA, 1966a, 
p .5). The best one can do is to combine some key processes 
of similar vintage and assume that once these are determined, 
the technological variations of the in-between or minor steps 
are more or less restricted. Field-work experience suggests 
that this assumption is reasonably valid even for larger 
firms as long as spinning and weaving are considered 
separately. In fact, it will be shown later that the larger 
firms have a tendency to modernise technology at all stages 
of production as they have become established and do not 
combine machinery of radically different vintages. This 
assumption is important from an empirical viewpoint when 
wholehearted co-operation is not frequently forthcoming and 
when the interviewer must try to obtain maximum information 
on different issues within limited time.
The first classifications of this type were compiled 
by ECLA (1966a) and the British Textile Council (1969) . ^  I 
have adapted them to suit the Thai situation. Conventional 
technology here is closely related to the best accepted 
practice of the British industry in 1950. Intermediate 
technology corresponds to the best practised technology in
1 See Appendix D.
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1960 and semi-advanced technology is, in fact, the best 
practised technology in the British industry in 1968.
Advanced technology is the break spinning (open-end spinning) 
which has been commercialised since the early 1970s.
The ECLA study which was conducted slightly earlier than 
the British Textile Council's study provided a classification 
of textile technology used in the Latin American industry.
The study also worked out in extreme detail the 
characteristics of five levels of technology, viz. 1930,
1950, 1960, 1965 and that under experiment. Considering the 
technology of the same dates given by the two studies, the 
ECLA study tends to be a step more advanced than that of the 
Textile Council at each processing stage.
In terms of capital costs, semi-advanced technology in 
1973 at c.i.f. price (Bangkok) was approximately 50 per cent 
higher than intermediate technology, given the assumption 
that both technologies produced equal output. This estimate 
was obtained by interviewing three textile machinery 
suppliers during field-work. Two of these agents were 
suppliers of the most popular Japanese machinery used in 
Thailand. More than 80 per cent of the spinning machinery 
in the industry was of these two makes. The estimate is 
based on 1973 figures as the firms then handled several 
orders including complete plants in 1973 as a result of the 
textile boom.
10.2.2 Choice of technology in the Thai textile 
industry. Firms under survey are classified according to 
the level of technology used, and whether they are locally 
or foreign controlled. The results are presented in Table 
10.4. Approximately half of the spinning mills surveyed used 
semi-advanced technology. Only two local mills used 
conventional technology. One of these was a government owned 
mill which was established during the thirties, and the other 
(T31) was established in 1950. Four local firms (T2, T15, 
T32, T39), another government mill, an Indian controlled
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factory (F23), and three Japanese plants (Fl, F8, F12) used 
intermediate technology. Six local mills (Tl, T9, T14, T16, 
T23, T35) and five Japanese controlled factories (F9, F6,
F13, F14, F15) used semi-advanced technology. It should be 
noted that in this category, a local firm (T14) first 
introduced the use of automatic cone winding machines 
(autoconers) to the industry in 1968. The local firms (T21, 
T33) are classified as firms using advanced technology.
They are the two largest textile firms in Thailand.
In weaving, most of the firms used conventional or 
intermediate technology. The only firm using advanced 
weaving technology also used advanced spinning technology 
(T21). The only foreign firm (F7) in the semi-advanced 
group used semi-automatic looms with attached unifil. The 
four local firms that used conventional technology were Til, 
T31, T40 and a government mill. T40 was not a promoted 
firm. Its main produce was heavy cotton fabrics for curtain 
materials. The firm used conventional weaving looms from 
Japan and was the only firm in the sample that used some 
Korean machinery. The only foreign firm that used 
conventional technology was a Japanese take-over of a local 
mill established in the early sixties (Fl).
As has been pointed out before, firms can combine 
different vintages of capital. Table 10.4 must be examined 
subject to some qualifications. The table indicates only 
approximate levels of technology. Not all of the firms fall 
neatly into one category. However, if a firm is a 
borderline case, e.g. a firm may have approximately half of 
the machinery in the intermediate group and the other half 
in the semi-advanced group. Final judgement rests on the 
executives' attitudes towards modernisation of their 
productive equipment. Since most of the executives had a 
tendency to favour more capital-using techniques for reasons 
to be stated later, the result is that most of the borderline 
cases were placed in the category with higher technology.
Thus there might appear to be a slight overall upward bias.
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For instance, T31 is the local firm which is classified 
as using conventional technology in both spinning and 
weaving. It owned machinery of the 50s and the 60s vintages. 
One-third of its cards were ordinary while two-thirds were 
converted high speed cards. Two-thirds of the ring spinning 
frames were acquired in the 1950s while one-third were 
obtained in the 1960s. The revolutions per minute of the 
ring frames for all counts produced were higher than the 
conventional standard but the requirements for labour to 
attend this machinery were higher than the intermediate 
standard. In fact, the mill should be appropriately regarded 
as a modernised 1950 plant. However, the executives did not 
prefer capital-using techniques to labour-saving techniques. 
Therefore, it is classified as a conventional mill.
Two other examples are firms in the advanced group,
viz. T21 and T33. The majority of equipment in these
factories was semi-advanced; however, their executives were
in favour of highly advanced technology. T21 had installed
20,000 open-end rotors. This firm’s past experience also
confirmed the executives' view. In 1960, it used Japanese
weaving looms (maximum 180 ppm) and then switched to Belgian
weaving looms (maximum 200 ppm) and was using some very high
speed Swiss weaving looms (Sulzer) at the time of the 
2survey. The first warping machine which operated at 400 
metres per minute had been replaced by a more modern model 
which could operate at 1,000 metres per minute. Its machines 
of older models were sold to other small textile firms, 
mostly non-promoted enterprises.
Not a single firm in this survey used locally produced 
machinery for major processing stages. In spinning, this 
is mainly because local machinery was not available.
However, locally produced weaving looms and winding machines 
are available. Most firms are aware of the existence of 
local machinery but never considered using it for the reasons 
given in Chapter 5.
2 PPM refers to picks per minute. See glossary in Appendix C.
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The findings reveal four remarkable features. In the 
first place, the range of technologies used by these large- 
scale producers is narrow. Most of the machinery used ranged 
between 1960 and 1968 models. Moreover, the machinery used 
in most mills was of similar make. Japanese machinery was 
found to be most popular in both Japanese and non-Japanese 
controlled mills.
Secondly, figures on the average size of employment 
under each technological category suggest that the larger 
the firms, the higher the level of technology.
Thirdly, the findings show a consistent behaviour in 
that all firms used relatively modern technology at the time 
they were established. A closer examination of the data 
revealed that firms which used intermediate technology were 
mostly firms which were set up during the early and mid­
sixties. Intermediate technology was quite modern at that 
time. The firms which used conventional technology were set 
up in the 1950s when conventional technology was relatively 
modern. Only three firms in the conventional and 
intermediate group were set up in the late sixties. One of 
them was not promoted and the other was situated outside the 
25-baht minimum wage areas referred to in Chapter 3. The 
relatively high total investment per worker of the foreign 
sector is partly a result of higher concentration of foreign 
investment in the mid and late sixties.
Finally, all radically advanced innovations such as 
open-end spinning, autoconers and shuttleless looms were 
introduced in Thailand by local firms. All the three firms 
that used fork-lifts for deliveries were local enterprises.
10.3 Factors Affecting the Choice of Technology
Before discussing the factors which influenced 
entrepreneurs' choice of technology in the Thai textile 
industry, it is useful to outline the conventional approach 
and an alternative hypothesis, both of which attempt to
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explain entrepreneurs' decisions. The standard neo-classical 
approach argues that the choice of technology depends on 
relative factor prices and the range of available techniques. 
In the light of this relative factor price doctrine, Wells 
(1973, pp.319-42) investigated the behaviour of entrepreneurs 
in Indonesia and discovered that they tended to select a more 
capital-intensive technique than would be predicted by the 
conventional theory. In an attempt to explain this behaviour, 
he offered an alternative hypothesis:
... If the businessman behaves like an economic man, 
he should, according to traditional wisdom, choose 
an intermediate or labour-intensive technology when 
operating in a less-developed country with low wage 
rates and high capital costs. By choosing 
appropriately, he will minimise his costs of 
production and simultaneously raise employment ...
[but] the businessman probably does not behave solely 
as an economic man. Economics put a constraint on 
his behaviour, but he may also have a rival objective 
function, which could be described as that of an 
engineering man (pp.319-20).
Wells gave the objectives of the engineering man as (a) a 
reduction in the problems of management of labour, (b) an 
improvement in the quality of products and (c) engineering 
aesthetics.
According to Wells, a reduction in the problem of 
management of labour can be considered as an economic 
objective only if the time devoted to the labour management 
could be used to earn higher returns elsewhere. Unless the 
increase in sales resulting from n o t i c e a b l e  i m p r o v e m e n t s  
in quality was sufficient to offset the increase in
production costs resulting from the use of more capital- 
intensive techniques, an improvement in the quality of 
products could not be regarded as an economic objective.
On the basis of the above two hypotheses, this section 
investigates factors affecting the choice of technology in 
foreign and local firms in the Thai textile industry. It 
will be shown that reduction in industrial relations
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problems can indeed be considered as an economic objective. 
The interviews also suggest several other interesting 
factors which affect the choice of technology.
In the interviews with sample firms, several questions 
related to the choice of technology. They are broadly as 
follows:
1. Why did you choose the existing technology? Are you 
using the most preferred technology? If not, what 
prevents you from doing so?
2. Would you have chosen different technologies had the 
government not granted tax exemption on imported 
capital equipment?
For simplicity, spinning and weaving firms previously 
categorised in the conventional and intermediate groups will 
from now be merged and called the moderate or intermediate 
group. The firms which have been classified as semi-advanced 
and advanced firms will also be merged into one group to be 
called the modern or the advanced group. Other firms which 
do not have either spinning or weaving operations and which 
have not been classified earlier were asked to rate their 
technology whether they were using moderate or advanced 
technology by international standards. Therefore, in this 
section, all 36 textile firms which were interviewed will 
be dealt with.
The major factors which influenced the firms' choice 
of technology are listed in Table 10.5. Some firms in the 
sample gave two major factors for their replies. Therefore, 
the sum total of number of factors shown in Table 10.5 
exceeds the total number of firms in the sample. It will 
be useful to go through each reason in some detail.
10.3.1 Adaptation to local conditions. Three Japanese 
joint ventures (F8, F9, F27), all belonging to the same 
parent company, and the Indian-controlled firm (F23) in the 
moderate group cited local conditions as the main factor.
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Table 10.5
Reasons for Choosing the Existing Technology 
_______________________ _____  __  (number of firms)
Reasons
Moderate
Foreign
firms
Local
Advanced
Foreign
firms
Local Total
(a) Adaptation to local
conditions 4 9 2 2 17
(b) Industrial relations
problems - - - 2 2
(c) Limited range of
technology 1 - 9 1 11
(d) Wage expectation and
labour efficiency - - 3 1 4
(e) Quality standards - 1 1 2 4
(f) Others - 3 - - 3
Total 5 13 15 8 41
Source: Field survey and interviews 1974-75
The manager of the Department of Overseas Investment in the 
Japanese firms' local headquarters gave a long explanation 
which can be summarised as follows:
First, very modern machinery was too sophisticated for Thai 
workers to handle. Automatic machinery needed careful 
maintenance and this could hardly be achieved at an early 
stage of industrialisation. Secondly, the part and component 
industry had not been sufficiently developed; therefore, 
maintenance of sophisticated machinery was doubly difficult. 
Finally, the machinery used in Thailand had been tested and 
proven in Japan so it was the technology with which the 
engineers of the parent company were most familiar. When 
asked why second-hand machinery was not used in the Thai 
factories, the reply was, "Your government does not like it. 
We did use second hand machinery in some of our affiliated
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plants in other developing countries". The manager later 
showed great interest in the scope for using second-hand 
machinery and enquired whether the Thai government would 
accept used machinery in the future.
The Indian manager of F23 indicated that low labour 
cost was the prime factor. "Like India, Thailand has ample 
supplies of labour. Technology which is highly capital­
using is too costly". This firm had installed some Indian- 
made machinery because Japanese machinery had become 
increasingly expensive. It is important to note that this 
is the only factory located outside the 25 baht minimum 
wage areas.
The local firms in the moderate group also gave low 
labour costs as the main factor influencing their choice of 
technology. In one local firm (T31), the relatively labour- 
intensive machinery which was installed in the 1950s was 
still kept running. Its two executives (who both have 
postgraduate degrees in engineering from Britain) pointed 
out that by taking good care of old machines, their products 
were cost competitive in comparison to those of firms using 
modern technology both in Thailand and abroad. They added 
that money wages in Thailand were still low by international3standards although they had been rising rapidly. Moreover, 
to replace the labour involved in material handling which 
accounted for approximately half of the firm's work force 
would be far too costly. A Taiwanese manager of a local mill 
(T15) who suggested the existing technology to the local 
entrepreneur gave similar reasons. He also stressed the 
inability of the Thai component and parts industry to cope 
with modern technology. He further added that it was the 
firm's policy to minimise automated processes.
3 The executives of T31 revealed that they had reasonably 
good industrial relations because their factory was isolated 
from high labour-dispute factories. It was also located 
away from the high wage area (Rangsit, 30 kms to the north 
of Bangkok). Therefore, they were able to hold wage and 
fringe benefits below average.
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In light of these comments, it is perhaps somewhat 
surprising that foreign firms in the advanced group also 
claimed that the technology used in their Thai factories was 
suitable to local conditions. A typical reason was given by 
one of the foreign firms with highest efficiency:
Our firm has been well established in Japan since 
the early 20th century. We have a wide range of 
technology in Japanese factories: conventional,
moderately modern, modern and super modern. The 
last type is completely electronically controlled 
but this is not suitable to Thailand. We can only 
transfer technology which has been well tested and 
tried in Japan. Therefore, the technology used in 
the Thai factory is only moderately modern.
The two local firms (Tl and T9) in the advanced group 
installed their plant in 1972 and 1973. They considered 
their equipment to be "moderately modern" by western 
standards and "modern" by Southeast Asian standards. Both 
of them used semi-advanced technology according to the 
classification used earlier. They added that their existing 
technology would allow them to be 'reasonably competitive in 
the long run'.
Why did both the firms that use "moderate technology" 
(13 firms in Table 10.5) and the firms that use "advanced 
technology" (4 firms) claim that their technology was 
suitable to the Thai conditions? One explanation which 
emerges immediately is that they probably faced different 
sets of expected relative factor prices at different points 
of time. The average age of firms (as of December 1973) is 
five years for the modern group and nine years for the 
moderate group. Another possible explanation is the lack 
of technical expertise and information on the local 
environment. These factors will be discussed more fully in 
section 10.4.
10.3.2 Industrial relations problems. Only two firms 
(T21 and T33) in Table 10.5, both locally-controlled 
enterprises, stated that a reduction in labour disputes was
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the major influence on their choice of technology. Both of 
them were the largest firms (in terms of employment) in both 
the textile and the entire manufacturing sector.
T21 employed more than 6,000 workers in 1973. During 
the field-work period, the company experienced two work 
stoppages leading to an enormous loss in terms of output 
forgone. The executive interviewed argued that,
Since our firm has the highest capacity in the 
country, strikes are particularly damaging. We 
have also had very high overhead costs. It is 
the policy of this firm to use modern technology 
as soon as we have enough funds. The principal 
merit of modern technology is to reduce reliance 
on labour.
T33 which has been experimenting with open-end spinning 
employed over 3,800 workers in 1973. The top executive 
stated that,
High wages do not worry us as much as strikes, 
which sometimes are politically rather than 
industrially-motivated. We will do all we can to reduce labour relations problems. We have 
done this by giving our labour force better 
education on industrial relations. We have 
tried to improve our middle management staff by 
sending them to seminars to strengthen their 
understanding in labour management and 
leadership. However, the most effective way to 
reduce labour problems is to use labour-saving 
techniques.
Ironically, the mill manager of this firm, a Chinese 
migrant, did not share the same view. While the executive 
cited shortage of funds as factor prohibiting the firm from 
launching into more open-end spinning, the mill manager 
revealed that open-end spinning incurred higher unit costs.
Thailand is not ready for this machine. We will 
have only 1,000 rotors and I think we should 
stop at that.
Interestingly, it was the engineer who pursued an economic 
objective.
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10.3.3 Relatively limited range of technology. Eleven 
firms (Table 10.5), all except one of which produced 
synthetic fibre and fabrics, fell into this category. Three 
of them are foreign-controlled synthetic fibre producers.
They claimed that there was a smaller range of technology in 
the production of synthetic fabrics and even more so for 
synthetic filament yarn. The only firm that produced cotton 
products was relatively new. It started production in 1973.
10.3.4 Local wage expectations and labour efficiency. 
Four firms shown in Table 10.5 fell into this category. 
Japanese and Taiwanese controlled firms stated that the 
plants in Thailand were just like those they had in Japan 
and Taiwan. Asked whether the low wages in Thailand would 
not suggest a more labour-intensive technique, a Japanese 
manager replied,
Wages will rise with industrialisation. This has 
happened in Japan and Taiwan. Moreover, it takes 
three Thai workers to do what one Japanese worker 
can do. So Thai labour is not very cheap. For 
example, an average Japanese worker can look after 
50 looms. Thai workers on the average can manage 
about 12-18 looms of similar model. A good Thai 
worker can manage up to 24 looms but not more.
The executive of T8, the only local firm in this category, 
had some working experience in Japan. He also gave the same 
answer when he was asked why he did not use more labour- 
intensive techniques.
Factory visits in Japan gave some evidence to support 
this point. Given the same technology and the same products, 
it takes twice or three times as much labour in Thailand to 
accomplish the same task in Japan. A Japanese firm gave 
evidence that while it took 4.5 men to produce one bale of 
yarn, nine men would be required in the Thai factory.
Factory visits in both Thailand and Japan confirmed that the 
best Thai worker can supervise up to 24 looms while an 
average Japanese worker can supervise up to 50 looms.
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10.3.5 Quality standards. There are one foreign firm 
and three local firms in this category (Table 10.5). They 
all agreed that, in general, given the range of technology 
that has been available since the late fifties, more 
capital-intensive technology does not tend to produce better 
quality. The quality criterion was applicable only to 
certain types of machinery, viz. autoconers, unifils and 
automatic knitting machines. The users of autoconers are 
aware of higher costs but justified their use on quality 
grounds. A chief engineer of a local plant claimed that 
unit costs increased with the use of autoconers but this 
increase was compensated for by a noticeably better (knot- 
free) yarn.
The foreign firm that used unifil looms claimed that 
workers always inserted the wrong colour of pirns in multiple 
colour weaving. To reduce human errors, unifil was used 
while other machinery was still semi-automatic. A local 
producer of socks also claimed to encounter the same 
problem and was forced to use automatic knitting machines.
10.3.6 Other reasons. Two relatively small weaving 
firms indicated that the limited domestic demand for their 
products influenced their choice of techniques. One of them 
is the producer of heavy curtain materials and silk 
products. Modern machinery produces too large an amount of 
output for his small and specialised market. This was 
especially so because, for economic use, modern machinery 
should be operated on a three-shift basis. He also uses some 
Korean jaggard weaving machines for silk products because 
silk yarn is more easily broken than cotton in high speed 
machines produced by advanced countries. The other small 
weaving firm (T8) produced towels. At the time of the 
survey, this firm was relatively new and had only 50 looms. 
The manager said he would use manual dyeing techniques until 
his weaving capacity increased.
The third firm is a non-integrated local spinner.
Nearly half of the machinery used is second-hand. The reason
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was that when the firm planned to expand capacity in 1973, 
at the height of the textile boom, new machinery was not 
obtainable because of excess demand. The executive went to 
the United States to obtain second-hand machinery. The other 
half of the machinery was intermediate. According to him, 
the acquisition of this machinery was sheer coincidence.
The machinery was offered at a very low price by a British 
manufacturer.
Most firms were content with their choice of technology 
except for two spinners (Tl and T39) who cited "shortage of 
funds" as a major factor preventing them from obtaining more 
modern technology.
It can be concluded that, in general, there is a greater 
tendency for spinners to favour labour-saving techniques than 
weavers. Even in an integrated spinning and weaving mill, 
it was found that spinning technology was slightly ahead of 
weaving techniques used. There are several obvious reasons 
for this. Firms usually commenced with weaving operations 
and later integrated backwards to spinning. Non-integrated 
weaving mills also produced small orders, which makes the 
conventional and intermediate looms more economic. It will 
be shown later that the difference in the structure of 
markets for the products also affect the choice of 
technology.
10.3.7 Tax concessions. The answers to the question 
of whether tax exemption for promoted firms on imported 
machinery affected the choice of technology are presented 
in Table 10.6. The majority of firms claimed that they were 
not affected by the policy. However, foreign firms seemed 
to be more affected than local firms. Six out of 17 foreign 
firms (35.3 per cent) claimed to be affected by the policy 
while only three out of 17 local firms (17.6 per cent) 
claimed that they were affected by the policy.
This question throws some light on the motives for the 
choice of technology. F6, a firm in the advanced group,
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Table 10.6
The Effects of the Government Tax Concessionary Policy 
___________________________________________  (number of firms)
Not
affected Affected
Not
available Total
Foreign-controlled joint ventures 11 6 1 18
Locally-controlled 
and local firms
joint ventures
14 3 1 18
Total 25 9 2 36
Source: Field survey and interviews 1974-75
claimed that the technology it was using was suitable to 
local cost conditions. However, if the tax incentive was 
withdrawn, the executive said the firm would have to 
re-calculate the cost of production on the basis of new 
prices of machinery which would include the tax on capital 
goods. Presumably, this firm allowed for the tax concession 
in its calculations. Another interesting case is a non- 
integrated spinning mill (T39). The firm's executive said 
that "we would have used more capital-intensive technology 
had we been promoted".
A foreign firm which was affected by the government 
policy made a very interesting point. It asserted that this 
type of government policy eased financial costs but was not 
of primary importance. The local government's insistence on 
modern and new machinery had left the firm with a more narrow 
range of techniques to choose from.
10.3.8 Future expansion. When asked what type of 
technology they would prefer if their firms expanded, the 
firms which use conventional and intermediate technology 
unanimously opted for a relatively more labour-saving 
technology. Even the executives of T31 who had very 
favourable attitudes towards labour-saving technology said 
that the technology to be used in the extension of the
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existing plant undertaken at the time of the survey would 
be 'a little bit more labour saving'. The number of 
spindles per man would 29.1 as opposed to 25.1 in the 
existing mill. They mentioned further that they had thought 
of using capital-saving technology but gave up the idea 
because of the increasing frequency of labour disputes in 
the industry. This indicates that the choice of technology 
in future expansion is likely to be influenced by the 
industrial problems that have been experienced since 1973.
Only one local firm claimed that a shift to a more 
modern technology was necessary because the spare parts of 
the present model were getting harder to come by. This is 
the firm that introduced false twisting production into 
Thailand over a decade ago.
Most of the firms which use relatively advanced 
technology, on the other hand, stated that they would use 
the same technology if an expansion occurred. Even in the 
light of the labour crisis, they still considered that it 
would be a long time before Thailand should go in for highly 
sophisticated machinery such as open-end spinning or 
shuttleless weaving. There were three exceptions in this 
category. Two of these were the largest firms (T21 and T33) 
and the third (Tl) preferred to use more capital-using 
techniques to minimise labour requirements.
10.4 Factors Influencing Entrepreneurs' Decisions on Factor 
Proportions
The major impression that emerged from the interviews 
is that, subject to some qualifications, the relative factor 
price thesis can be modified to explain the choice of 
technology in the Thai textile industry. To analyse 
entrepreneurs' behaviour regarding their choice of 
technology, it is useful to separate investment decisions 
into two periods, viz. before and after 1970. Next, it is 
important to recognise that there are two different factors
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affecting entrepreneurs' decisions. The first involves 
general factors affecting the decisions in both periods.
The second concerns factors specific to each period 
considered.
The first general factor relates to the prices of 
capital or the interest rates facing these entrepreneurs 
which were very low, in fact, much lower than in the Indian 
situation discussed by P.C. Mehta (1975). According to the 
replies to the BOI 1973 questionnaire, promoted firms paid 
approximately 7-12.5 per cent interest in money terms. The 
low rates of interest were available to both joint ventures 
and wholly locally-owned enterprises. The former usually 
obtained relatively cheap supplies of capital from foreign 
partners who supplied the machinery, the latter through 
cheap suppliers' credit. For instance, one wholly locally- 
owned firm reported it had obtained suppliers' credit at 7.5 
per cent per annum interest charge. The average rates of 
interest paid by the foreign group and local group were nine 
and ten per cent respectively. It was also discovered that 
interest rates charged to local firms were lower than those 
charged to smaller firms. For instance, the largest textile 
manufacturer (T21) obtained loans from a local bank at nine 
per cent interest rates while a much smaller enterprise 
obtained loans from the same source for approximately the 
same length of time at 12.5 per cent per annum. The access 
to cheap credit partly explained why the largest enterprise 
could better afford very modern technology.
Secondly, the production function of the promoted 
textile firms could not be interpreted to include all 
techniques available in the capital goods market. The range 
of technology facing these firms was narrowed by the local 
government's insistence upon "modern technology". Chief 
engineers of a government and a private mill claimed that 
it might be profitable to use older models of machinery, say, 
the 50s or 60s models if they could be obtained cheaply from
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4second-hand markets. The fact that firms discarded the 
possibility of using second-hand machinery seemed to suggest 
that the benefits obtained from promotion might more than 
compensate for the high cost of modern capital equipment.
Thirdly, as in many other LDCs, there seems to be a 
multiple wage structure in Thailand. Wages are higher in 
the promoted rather than in the non-promoted sector. 
Chantharawithun(1972, pp.57-58) suggested that, in 1967, 
weaving firms which had fewer than 50 looms used a piece­
work system and on the average wages paid by these small- 
scale enterprises ranged between 200-400 baht. The modern
large-scale sector, on the other hand, paid 600-1,000 baht.
ra relyFringe benefits were/available in the small-scale 
enterprises. In contrast, fringe benefits in the large- 
scale sector, especially in the foreign-controlled firms 
have been generously provided. In general, they included 
bonuses, free accommodation or transport, uniforms and 
medical care. Vegetables and meat were subsidised and rice 
was free. During plant visits, it was observed that one 
Japanese-controlled fibre producer provided expensive 
recreational facilities including a swimming pool and an 
air-conditioned canteen equipped with televisions. Adult 
education was provided in two Japanese joint ventures. The 
major reasons for providing generous fringe benefits were 
to boost work morale and to reduce high labour turnover.
Even among firms in the promoted sector, fringe benefits 
differed according to the location of the plants. Local 
firms which are located in the vicinity of foreign firms in 
the Rangsit area (a relatively new industrial area) appeared 
to offer comparable fringe benefits and wages. Thus there
Another possible alternative, building new machinery based 
on older models, was considered by these engineers to be 
uneconomic unless very large orders could be secured. The 
cost of rebuilding was claimed to be high because the 
materials and labour content of the new and older models of 
machinery were not significantly different.
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is a double standard even among local firms in the promoted 
sector. On the average, the actual wages (cash plus wages 
in kind) of workers in the promoted sector may be 50 per 
cent higher than the nominal money wages.
Fourthly, if labour is to be considered in terms of 
efficiency units, the real cost of labour in developing 
countries might be higher than suggested by the prevailing 
wage. Attempts were made in the Thai mills to offer monetary 
incentives to workers in the hope that they would be more 
willing to take on higher workloads. Wages would be 
increased if the number of looms attended could be increased. 
The result was more frequent yarn breakage owing to 
inadequate attendance. The manager of a government mill also 
asserted that monetary incentives ensured higher productivity 
only temporarily because "after a few months, the 
productivity curve drops".
Nevertheless, foreign managers never accused local 
labour of being lazy. The typical opinion was,
The girls are extremely obedient and hard-working 
but their work pace is slow. They walk slowly and 
they tie knots slowly but this is not featherbedding. 
They are just slow. They also lack good 
concentration. In addition, when certain jobs 
require numerical calculations, they are even slower. 
Perhaps they have not got as good education as the 
Japanese workers. While all production workers in 
Japan had more than 10 years formal education, 
production workers in Thailand had only about 4-7 
years.
However, this issue is beyond the scope of this study and 
perhaps should be pursued by industrial psychologists.
Different factors appear to have influenced 
entrepreneurial decisions on the choice of technology before 
and after 1970. Prior to 1970, most investments by foreign 
and local firms were for first projects rather than for 
expansion. The choice of technology was thus constrained 
by entrepreneurial experience and the industry's absorptive 
capacity in the host country. For the foreign firms, the
300
most important task was to familiarise the management team 
with the new environment. In such cases, although foreign 
firms would not use the most sophisticated technology in 
recognition of the low absorptive capacity of local labour 
and a desire to minimise production problems, they would also 
be unlikely to use technology which was relatively labour- 
intensive in order to minimise interaction with the local 
work-force. For the local firms, the choice of technology 
could be explained by the fact that modern technology was 
more readily come by. It takes some industrial experience 
before one can make a sound industrial decision. The only 
local firm that uses conventional technology has been in 
operation for over two decades and has the industry's best 
educated local executives.
After 1970, two other factors became increasingly 
prominent. There were rising wage rates and industrial 
relations problems. The first is the rapidly rising wage 
trend. While it is probably correct to use current prices 
of capital in the relative factor price calculations, the 
price of labour is not the prevailing wage. It would be 
more appropriate to consider the long-run expected wage.
For instance, if the working life of the machinery is 20 
years, the actual price of labour might be some weighted 
average of the expected wages plus expected fringe benefits 
over 20 years. The choice of factor proportions from a 
private point of view would certainly be the one that 
maximises long-run rather than current profits. If 
economists use current wages in the calculations of optimal 
factor proportions, it is natural they will tend to predict 
a relatively more labour-intensive technique than the 
choice in practice.
The expected wage can be calculated in various ways.
It may, for example, be based on past experience of the 
country where the investment is made. For a less developed 
country such as Thailand where the history of 
industrialisation is relatively short, investors may have
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to base their expectations on the past experience of other 
countries. It was reported earlier that firms believed that 
wages would rise with increasing industrialisation. This 
expectation was much more commonly found among foreign firms, 
owing perhaps to their longer industrial experience. Only 
one local executive voiced the same opinion. This executive 
had two years' experience in Japan and perhaps his experience 
there had suggested the opinion to him.
Secondly, reductions in management problems concerning 
labour can legitimately be regarded as an economic objective 
because failure to achieve good industrial relations can 
inflict enormous costs, viz. income that would have been 
forthcoming in the event of normal operation, compensation 
costs for failure to deliver goods on schedule, loss of 
goodwill and therefore future contracts, and so on. This 
type of risk associated with the employment of labour adds 
extra costs to the price of labour.
Although industrial relations problems cannot be 
regarded as influencing factor proportions in the sixties, 
it is believed to have become another major cause of concern 
and a primary factor influencing the choice of technology in 
the 1970s. (Whether this continues to be the case in 
future, of course, depends partly on future political 
developments and the ability of textile entrepreneurs to 
readjust themselves to the new industrial system.)
It is arguable that the above factors are irrelevant 
and firms simply make a mistake in their choice of 
technology. If firms make a wrong choice (given the 
prevailing prices), it will be difficult for them to survive. 
The following hypothetical cost calculation may help to 
illustrate entrepreneurs' behaviour.
10.5 Hypothetical Calculation
Having considered the above qualifications, the 
following hypothetical cost calculation may suggest the
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extent to which the decision of the companies in the Thai 
textile industry can be explained by the relative factor 
price doctrine with adjustments of nominal factor prices, 
any other economic and non-economic factors, or by sheer 
mistakes.
To arrive at the cost calculation, the price of a 
complete spinning plant of the semi-advanced model of 10,000 
spindles was obtained from the machinery suppliers and 
companies proposing capacity expansion to the Board of 
Investment. These are the quote prices of 1973. The value 
of the complete plant of the intermediate model was estimated 
from the suggestion made during an interview that the semi- 
advanced model was roughly 50 per cent higher than the 
intermediate model.
The rate of output, characteristics of capital equipment 
and labour requirements were based on the investment study 
scheme supplied by a leading textile machinery producer.
Both plants are estimated to produce 290 kgs of 20s cotton 
yarn per hour. Appendix E lists other technical assumptions.
Additional assumptions are as follows: capital
equipment is assumed to operate at full capacity (3-shift) 
and the depreciation period is ten years. The tax on capital 
is 15 per cent. Labour requirements include only direct 
labour. Productivity of Thai labour is assumed to be 35 per 
cent of the best European mill at the time of first 
operation and to be 70 per cent in the fifth year of 
operation. Wage costs were based on the sample average wage 
in 1973 of the local group which was 7,708 baht. An attempt 
was also made to use the average wage of the foreign group 
but the difference in the results was negligible. Fringe 
benefits were estimated to increase the money wage by 40 per 
cent. The total wage including fringe benefits is assumed 
to rise at the rate of 10 per cent per annum.
Table 10.7 presents cost calculations based on various 
assumptions. Only the costs of primary factors, namely
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Table 10.7
Hypothetical Unit Cost of Primary Factors in 
the Thai Textile Industry
(baht per kg)
Situation I: Assumptions (i)
(ii)
capital
interest
equipment tax 
rate 20%
15%
Per unit cost 1973 1977 1982
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Capital
Labour
4.06 
.54
2.72 
. 74
4.06
.40
2.72
.54
4.06
.64
2.72 
. 86
Total 4.60 3.46 4.46 3.26 4.70 3.58
Situation II: Assumptions (i) no tax on capital equipment
(ii) interest rate 9%
Per unit cost 1973 1977 1982
Capital
(a)
2.24
(b)
1.48
(a) 
2.24
(b)
1.48
(a)
2.24
(b)
1.48
Labour .54 . 74 .40 .54 .64 . 86
Total 2.78 2.22 2.64 2.02 2.88 2.34
Situation III: Assumptions (i) capital equipment tax 15%
(ii) interest rate 9%
Per unit cost 1973 1977 1982
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Capital
Labour
2.51
.54
1.65 
. 74
2.51
.40
1.65
.54
2.51
.64
1.65 
. 86
Total 3.05 2.39 2.91 2.19 3.15 2.51
Situation IV: Assumptions (i) no tax on capital equipment
(ii) interest rate 20%
Per unit cost 1973 1977 1982
Capital
(a)
3.49
(b)
2.36
(a)
3.49
(b)
2.36
(a)
3.49
(b)
2.36
Labour .54 .74 .40 . 54 .64 . 86
Total 4.03 3.10 3.89 2.90 4.13 3.22
Notes: (a) denotes semi-advanced technology
(b) denotes intermediate technology
Sources: (1) Field survey (based on 1973 figures)
(2) Machinery and unit cost proposals to BOI by 
textile firms
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capital and direct labour, are considered. Situation I 
indicates the situation that an average sample firm would 
have faced had it not been promoted and if the interest rate 
were 20 per cent. Situation II is one which is facing an 
average promoted firm in this sample. An average firm is 
one which pays the sample average wage and average interest 
rate of nine per cent. The use of a ten per cent interest 
rate (the average for the local group) does not change the 
results and is therefore excluded. Situation III considers 
a case where exemption of import duties on capital equipment 
is lifted but firms continue to obtain loans at low interest 
rates. Situation IV is one where the interest rate is 
raised to 20 per cent but capital equipment is allowed to 
enter Thailand free of import duties.
The most striking outcome of these hypothetical cost 
estimates is that in the promoted case (Situation II) the 
unit cost is substantially lower than the non-promoted 
Situation I. It is evident that in all situations up to 
1982, promoted firms will operate at a lower unit cost than 
non-promoted firms even if they select relatively modern 
technology. Under both Situations I and II, since capital 
cost takes up more than 70 per cent of total primary factor 
cost, the effect of the low price of capital on the 
reduction of absolute unit cost is so great that promoted 
firms will remain competitive in comparison with non-promoted 
firms without having to switch to intermediate technology. 
This explains the choice of technology of T39, the only non- 
promoted spinning firm whose managers stated that they would 
have chosen modern technology had their firms been promoted. 
Comparing Situation III with IV suggests that the increase 
in interest rates to 20 per cent has greater effects on unit 
cost than the removal of tax concessions. This probably 
explains why the majority of firms (25 out of 36 sample 
firms in Table 10.6) claimed that their choice of technology 
was not affected by the tax concessionary policy.
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Having recognised the fact that promoted firms are able 
to operate comfortably with modern technology under 
prevailing capital prices, an answer is still needed as to 
why firms would not use intermediate technology to maximise 
their profits. Under all situations, firms will be better 
off employing intermediate rather than modern technology.
One answer is that firms may not be profit maximisers. Firms 
may consider an acceptable level of profits as an operational 
goal.
If firms were profit maximisers, then how would one 
explain their seeming neglect of this difference in unit 
cost? First, part of this difference in unit cost may well 
be the insurance premiums paid for the reduced probability 
of the output forgone arising from labour disputes. Secondly, 
although the depreciation period is put at ten years, which 
is the normal accounting practice of most sample firms, in 
practice machinery will be used up to 20 years or more if it 
is properly maintained. After the first ten years of 
operation, the unit cost of the intermediate technology will 
be higher. Thirdly, the market for yarn is not perfectly 
competitive since a non-promoted firm could co-exist with 
promoting firms under different cost conditions. This also 
partly explains why in the same company spinning technology 
was usually observed to be more modern than weaving 
technology. Markets for fabrics are much more competitive 
than markets for yarn. Fourthly, capital cost in Table 10.7 
is an underestimation because interest payments will decrease 
as firms start to repay their loans. To take repayments into 
account will involve arbitrary assumptions on repayment 
schedules, which will unnecessarily complicate the arguments. 
Finally, the above calculation depends on the validity of 
various assumptions. If entrepreneurs expected wages to 
rise at the rate of 20 per cent per annum, or if indirect 
labour and other cost items are considered, the difference 
in unit cost will be reduced. Could this difference in unit 
cost reflect engineering aesthetics of textile entrepreneurs
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as suggested by Wells? The impression is that pleasure in 
modern technology could be indulged in only if the firms can 
afford it. In this set of data, only two firms, the largest 
and the best credit rating firms considered the most modern 
technology the best technology to be used to compete with 
foreign enterprises. In general, engineering aesthetic 
preferences are effectively constrained by economic factors.
There is another study conducted by Howard Pack (1974) 
which could be used to apply to the Thai situation for the 
choice of technology between the 1950 and 1968 models.
Pack's study was also based on the Textile Council's study 
(1969) mentioned earlier and is therefore roughly comparable 
to the Thai situation as far as levels of technology are 
concerned. Pack estimated the relative factor prices that 
would make 1950 and 1968 models of spinning machinery 
comparable in terms of production costs. The former is 
roughly equivalent to conventional technology and the latter 
to semi-advanced technology in the Thai situation. The 
assumptions and Pack's findings are given in Table 10.8.
If the price of the 1950 model is ten per cent of the 1968 
model and the interest rate is nine per cent per annum the 
break-even wage that makes both technologies equally 
profitable is $530 per annum. If the prevailing wage 
exceeds this amount, the 1968 model will be an optimal 
choice. Should the existing wage be lower, the 1950 model 
would be superior in terms of production costs. When the 
annual wage is $300 per annum and the interest rate is nine 
per cent, then the 1950 model will be a rational choice only 
if its price is not greater than 30 per cent of the 1968 
model.
It has been suggested that interest charges to promoted 
firms ranged between 7-12.5 per cent. The sole firm reported 
to have installed second-hand machinery quoted the costs of 
this machinery to be about 50 per cent of the up-to-date
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Table 10.8
Relative Factor Prices and the Optimal Choice
Costs per pound of 20s carded cotton (1968 dollars)
Equipment
1950 1968
Power .0119 . 0145
Waste . 0343 . 0219
Capital costs
r = .09 . 0023 . 0229
r = .195 . 0035 . 0344
Operate hours per pound . 0781 . 0355
Alternative factor prices required for a 1950 spinning plant
to be optimal
Value assumed Value calculated
dL r w ok w *
.10 .09 $530
.10 .19 $978
. 09 $300 . 30
.19 $300 . 55
.50 .09 $ 87
.50 .19 $366
Notes: oL = the percentage of the 1968 new plant price which
is or can be paid for a 1950 plant.
r = interest rate per annum, 
w = wage per annum in dollars, 
w* = break-even wage at which the 1950 and the 1968 
processes yield the same average cost of 
production.
Source: Pack (1974, Tables 1 and 2)
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model. Therefore, the Thai situation is very close to 
Pack's estimate in row 5 where the critical wage is $87 per 
annum.
Since the average wage in 1973 is $385 per annum for
the local group and slightly higher for the foreign group,
this is far higher than the critical wage without including
6fringe benefits or computing long-run expected wages.
Suppose that local firms should have obtained the 1950 model 
at a price which is ten per cent of the 1968 model. The 
critical wage is now $530. If fringe benefits are equal to 
40 per cent of wages, the total wage will be $539 per annum 
which is again higher than the critical wage. Thus under 
prevailing conditions, the textile entrepreneurs seemed to 
make the right choice. They seemed to behave as shrewd and 
calculating "economic" men. Given the relative factor 
prices and the conditions that they have been facing, they 
have made the choice that would largely be predicted by the 
classic model.
It has also been shown that the difference between 
choice of technology of local and foreign firms is small and 
can be accounted for by the periods in which investments are 
made and by slightly better access to capital markets on the
Including freight and insurance costs. Information 
supplied by second-hand dealers in the United States 
suggested that blenders and feeders could be obtained at a 
price which was approximately 40-55 per cent of new machinery, 
flexible wire cards at 20-30 per cent, spinning frames at 30 
per cent and cone winding machinery at 40 per cent of the 
price of the up-to-date model. Thus, overall, the figure 
given by this local firm might be slightly overestimated or 
perhaps the firm had made a bad deal.
 ^ It should be noted that the Textile Council study assumed 
two six-hour shifts for the 1950 model. Working of four 
shifts necessitates penalty payment which renders the use of 
the 1950 model uneconomic in Britain. Since penalty rates 
are not applicable in Thailand, the actual unit costs for the 
1950 model will be substantially lower than that of Britain. 
Thus w* will be higher for the Thai situation but is unlikely 
to be higher than $385 per annum.
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part of foreign firms. When local firms secure a higher 
credit rating as they become larger they adopt even more 
modern technology than foreign firms.
Although some entrepreneurs in the sample stated that 
modern technology is the most "efficient" technology, this 
should not be taken to mean that they are "engineering men". 
Firstly, this statement is perfectly correct if efficiency 
is interpreted as increase in output per worker. Secondly, 
one must distinguish between admiration and action. So long 
as their actions can be justified by the surrounding economic 
conditions, their admiration is irrelevant to the economic 
discussion.
10.6 Comparative Performance of Local and Foreign Firms 
with Different Technologies
From an economic point of view unit cost is an ideal 
figure for a comparison of firms' performances. It is 
unfortunate that unit cost figures are the most seriously 
guarded secrets of every enterprise in Thailand.
It is not possible to obtain unit costs from accounting 
reports because most firms do not keep separate accounts for 
spinning and weaving departments when they are partially 
integrated. Even when separate accounts were available from 
four firms, they did not provide the percentage distribution 
of output of different yarn counts and different types of 
fabrics so that fixed costs could be appropriately allotted 
to each product. Firms that specialise in higher counts 
yarn invariably have higher unit costs than firms which 
produce coarse yarn. When an attempt was made to estimate 
unit costs without the knowledge of average yarn count, the 
result, as expected, was extreme variation in unit costs.
It is therefore necessary to rely on an interpretation 
of indirect data of output in 24 hours per spindle as a 
measure of performance. Technically speaking, output per 
spindle per day depends on many factors, e.g. yarn counts,
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speed of machinery, operational efficiency, and so on. 
However, since all firms could be grouped according to the 
level of technology for which machinery speed is specified 
and output per spindle according to product types was 
obtained, almost all factors can be controlled and the 
difference in output reflects frequency of yarn breaks, 
maintenance, machine tending and production management.
Next, output per spindle per 24 hours for each product type 
from each firm was compared with standard production data 
given by the Thai Textile Manufacturing Association. For 
example, the standard production used in this study for 20s 
cotton yarn operating at 92 per cent efficiency is 1.21 lb. 
per spindle per day assuming that the spindle speed is 
10125 rpm. The required statistics were available from all 
spinning firms. Table 10.9 presents the percentage 
deviation from standard production figures for each group 
of firms.
As expected, foreign firms turned out to be technically 
more efficient. The major explanation is that foreign firms, 
especially Japanese firms, usually have relatively strict 
supervision and follow-up as well as better maintenance 
systems. This statement was also supported by local 
engineers working in both local and Japanese-controlled 
mills. Corporate organisation as opposed to family 
businesses also add to the efficiency of the overall 
operation, especially when the firm is large.
It may be argued that foreign firms generally use high 
quality raw materials. This contention is not supported by 
the present study. The replies to the BOI 1973 questionnaire 
suggest that average local contents of foreign-controlled 
textile firms were 42 per cent while those of the local firms 
were 25 per cent. Since it is often argued by textile 
entrepreneurs that local raw materials were inferior to 
imported equivalents, especially Thai cotton fibre which 
contained more impurities, it cannot be said that foreign 
firms use raw material of high quality standard. In fact,
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Table 10.9
Comparative Performance of Spinning Firms in Thailand
Percentage variation from 
standard production
A B C
Thai firms 0 -4.65 5.41
Foreign firms - 12.84 15.28
Notes: A = conventional technology
B = intermediate technology 
C = semi-advanced and advanced technology 
- indicates that there is no foreign firm in the 
particular category.
Source: Field survey 1974-75
one of the Japanese partners complained that his local 
partner whose functional specialisation is to obtain raw 
material supplied the joint ventures with lower quality 
cotton fibre. Yet the firm's output per spindle per day 
was much higher than average.
More interestingly, relatively modern technology did 
not necessarily produce better results than intermediate 
technology. For example, the Thai firm in group A (T31), 
the performance of which exactly equalled the standard 
figure was much more efficient than Thai firms in group B, 
although the latter used more modern technology. Foreign 
firms in group C performed only slightly better than foreign 
firms in group B. Thus, it appears that more modern 
technology did not provide substantial competitive edge.
Many local entrepreneurs did not realise that there 
were many ways to improve productivity. Some thought that 
once machines were bought, there was not much that one can 
do to improve productivity. One of the few exceptions was 
T31 which employed conventional spinning technology. It had 
the industry's best educated and dynamic executives. The
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executives compensate for the relatively older vintage 
machinery with good management and maintenance, higher 
quality of labour and the proper assignment of work-loads.
At the time of this survey, the firm was conducting a time 
and motion study and was recruiting more labour with higher 
education. The firm is thus substituting better quality of 
labour for capital. The performance of this firm indicates 
that technically a modernised old mill is still a 
competitive alternative.
10.7 The Future Role of the Thai Textile Industry in 
Employment and Skill Generation
It was shown in section 10.3.8 that all firms in the 
interviews were opting for 1968 technology or semi-advanced 
technology for future expansion. What, then, are the long- 
run implications for employment and skill generation?
10.7.1 Employment. The Textile Council (1969) and 
ECLA (1966a) studies estimated labour requirements for each 
technological level, assuming that factors such as quality 
of labour, raw materials, management and quality of final 
products can be held constant. This enables one to obtain 
a precise indication of the employment effects of shifting 
from one technology to another. The results of the two 
studies are presented with the findings of the Thai textile 
industry in Table 10.10.
Labour requirements for each level of technology of the 
firms in the Thai textile industry were computed as follows. 
The number of operating spindles per production worker was 
obtained from each sample firm. Then the average ratio of 
the number of spindles per employee was calculated for firms 
in each technological class. Given an output of approximately 
24,000 lbs per day, the number of ring spindles needed in 
each category may be obtained by dividing 24,000 by the 
average output per spindle per day of each class. By 
multiplying the number of required ring spindles at each
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Table 10.10
Index of Labour Requirements for Production of Yarn
Technology
A B C Open-end spinning
The Textile Council^ 100 66 46 22
ECLA (a) 100 53 33
The Thai Industry 100 55 34
Sources: (a) Textile Council (1969 , Annexe C, Tables 6a,
6b, 6c, 11) and ECLA (1966a, Table L)*
(b) Field survey 1974-75
*See Appendix F for the assumptions of the ECLA and the 
Textile Council's labour requirements.
level by the average ratio of spindles per employee will 
give the labour requirements for each technology class in 
the Thai case.
In Table 10.10, the estimates for the Thai industry
7suggest a strong labour-replacement effect. Should all 
firms in the Thai textile industry shift from technologies 
A and B to C, demand for products would need to expand at 
an exorbitant rate to maintain the same growth of employment 
as in the situation where technologies A, B were used.
Given this technology trend, the textile industry can be 
expected to be the major employment generator only if it 
enters successfully in international competition with 
formidable rivals such as Korea and Taiwan. Otherwise, 
policies affecting relative factor prices especially of 
increasing capital prices, must be implemented to achieve 
employment objectives.
This strong replacement effect is partly a result of the 
unusual character of T31, the only firm in the 1950 
category. It tended to operate at a very high speed and then 
make up for the frequent breakages by increasing the number 
of attendants.
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10.7.2 Skill generation. If the labour displacement 
effect can be offset by a large positive gain in skill 
generation, it may be worthwhile subsidising the industry. 
This is the crux of the skill-cum-employment criterion. The 
main difficulty in obtaining information for this section 
is that firms have widely different definitions for skill 
levels. To overcome this problem, as far as possible, firms 
were asked to supply employment statistics according to 
positions, wages and education. Most firms provided figures 
of work-force according to positions and education. On the 
basis of these figures, the work-force of each firm is 
divided into three categories. Highly skilled workers 
include those in top management level: plant managers and
assistants, chief engineers and engineers, departmental 
heads or those with a university degree or equivalent, or 
those with salaries above 3500 baht ($175) per month.
Skilled and supervisory workers are grouped into one 
category because a great number of sample firms used skilled 
technicians as foremen. This category refers to technicians, 
middle level management staff, i.e. foremen, those with more 
than ten years of formal education or those with salaries 
between 1500-3500 baht per month. The semi-skilled and the 
unskilled group consists of mainly production floor workers, 
tnose with less than ten-year formal education and those 
with salaries below 1500 baht per month. Table 10.11 
presents the skill composition under the three technologies 
in the Thai textile industry.
From Table 10.11 it appears that there is little 
difference in the amount of skills used under different 
technologies. This is because the effects of technology on 
skill composition are more than offset by the economies of 
srale in the use of skills in larger enterprises. The 
larger the firms, the easier they can economise on the use 
of higher skills (just as they can economise on stocking of 
spare parts). When the average size of the group is over 
1,000 workers, the proportion of skilled workers diminishes.
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Table 10.11
The Use of Technical and Production Skills
in the Thai Textile Industry
Average size
Types of firms (persons)
Average 
Highly- 
skilled & 
skilled
levels of skills (%) 
Skilled Semi-
& skilled &
supervisory unskilled Total
Conventional technology
Thai 711 1.21 9.20 86.27 100
Foreign - - - - -
Intermediate technology
Thai 903 1.17 11.30 87.45 100
Foreign 1322 1.37 7.26 91.28 100
Intermediately advanced and
advanced technologies
Thai 2486 .68 6.26 93.05 100
Foreign 698 1.70 13.41 84.86 100
Source: Field survey 1974-75
In the two largest local firms that used the most advanced 
technology, skilled workers constituted an extremely small 
proportion of the total work-force. However, looking at the 
first and the last row where the size of the firms is 
comparable there is a clear indication of an increase, 
though small in magnitude, in the use of higher skills at 
higher levels of technology. In general, higher skills 
constitute a very small proportion of the total work-force.
Foreign firms appeared to use more skilled workers than 
local firms in the advanced group but the reverse was 
observed in the intermediate group. Again, the influence of 
the size of the firms makes conclusions impossible.
Skill composition also depends on the executives' 
perception of productivity concept. It was pointed out 
earlier that the executives of T31, the only firm using
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conventional spinning technology, had a policy of 
substituting skill for capital resulting in a relatively 
high level of skill used in the conventional group.
Overall, it can be concluded that there will be no 
large gain in skill generation in moving from intermediate 
to advanced technology in the Thai textile industry.
In conclusion it has been shown that foreign and local 
firms' choice of technology was an act in response to an 
array of factors: prices of capital, expected long-run wage
rates, the probability of having labour disputes, the 
structure of final markets, the permissible and accessible 
range of technology and local absorptive capacity prevailing 
at the time of investment decision. The difference in the 
choice of technology between foreign and local companies can 
also be explained in terms of these factors. It was also 
observed that when local firms can afford to, they used 
advanced technology to compete with foreign enterprises.
It was also revealed that efficiency of older vintages 
of textile machinery could be maintained if the machinery 
was properly looked after. Foreign firms appeared to be 
technically more efficient than local firms owing to a 
better productivity concept, follow-up and supervision system.
It has also been shown in earlier and the present 
chapters that moving from a relatively labour-intensive to a 
capital-intensive technology in the production of textiles 
has a stronger labour displacement effect than a skill 
generation effect, i.e. the industry fails to achieve the 
skill-cum-employment criterion. Therefore, this study 
suggests that the appropriate role for the textile industry 
is in employment generation. Given the present technology 
trend, the industry will have to enter the international 
market vigorously to achieve employment objectives - 
otherwise, local policies must be implemented so as to slow 
down a technological race within the industry.
CHAPTER 11
Conclusions and Some Policy Recommendations
The end of the "Development Decade" has brought 
increasing concern about the existing international economic 
order. Bridging the gap between rich and poor nations has 
become a central issue. Technology transfer through direct 
foreign investment has come under strong attack. The main 
charge has been expressed in an UNCTAD document with 
reference to:
... a whole series of implicit and explicit 
practices ... which work towards limiting the 
possibility of the developing countries obtaining 
access to the right technology, for the right 
product under the right terms and conditions and at 
the right time. All these adversely affect the 
development of national scientific and technological 
capabilities and perpetuate the technological 
dependence of developing countries (UNCTAD, 1975e, 
p. 3) .
The above statement is from a draft outline of an 
international code of conduct presented by the UNCTAD 
secretariat. Among various objectives of the code of 
conduct are the need for international regulation of 
technology transfer, the promotion of unpackaged transfer, 
the improvement of access to technology at fair and 
reasonable prices and so on (UNCTAD, 1975e, p.ll). However, 
government action at either national or international level 
requires understanding of the mechanism of transfer which 
is under challenge. Empirical evidence on the performance 
of packaged and unpackaged transfer could be useful for 
policy formation. This thesis has attempted to bring 
together such evidence, using modern large-scale 
manufacturing industries in Thailand as a case study.
11.1 Summary of Findings
The study began by calling attention to the fact that 
the role of modern manufacturing industry must be viewed in
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a different light. The strategy of modern large-scale 
manufacturing as an engine of growth which has been adopted 
in almost all developing countries is unlikely, regardless 
of the channels for transfer of technology, to provide 
sufficient employment opportunities (i.e. the "right" 
technology) to the rapidly growing work-force. A different 
strategy to meet employment objectives may be needed.
No matter what strategy is followed, the most useful 
role that can be expected to be played by modern 
manufacturing lies in its ability to accumulate human 
capital. The main argument is perhaps best restated by an 
outline of a development model in which each sector is 
allowed to play a different role. For a country with a 
large proportion of the work-force in agriculture one can 
visualise a development model with the agricultural sector 
responsible for generating a food surplus and absorbing an 
increasing work-force. Small-scale manufacturing industries 
act as employment generators in the urban sector absorbing 
surplus labour from agriculture. The modern large-scale 
manufacturing sector will be a link to external technical 
progress, a subcontractor of small-scale industries and a 
generator of necessary skills, of appropriate technologies 
and products for small-scale manufacturing and agriculture.
Given this model of development, the study has examined 
the possibility of transferring technology for modern large- 
scale manufacturing through various channels, in particular 
technology acquisition through direct foreign investment and 
through technology contracts. In view of the dearth of 
human capital and entrepreneurship in LDCs and of the nature 
of large-scale production, direct foreign investment seems 
to have the highest potential for geographical transfer of 
technology. The empirical questions that remain are whether 
the cost of technology through this packaged channel is 
significantly different from that through the unpackaged 
channel and whether the spill-over effects from direct 
foreign investment will be more substantial.
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As for technology acquisition through technology 
contracts, it has been suggested that the pricing of 
technology is a complicated phenomenon. Technology sellers 
can achieve a desired level of return on technology by 
adjusting implicit and explicit costs and duration of 
contracts. Although the explicit costs may have immediate 
effects on the balance of payments, these effects may be 
less damaging than those resulting from the strict 
enforcement of many restrictive conditions which could have 
adverse long-run effects on the balance of payments by 
preventing the achievement of optimum output. Some of the 
restrictive conditions could also reduce the spin-off effects 
from the transferred technology. It follows, as a corollary, 
that, if these conditions (or implicit costs) are to be 
eliminated, the buyers will have to be prepared to face 
higher explicit costs if the long-run supplies of technology 
are to be maintained. Another corollary is that, since 
technology sellers can act as discriminating monopolists, 
it is very difficult to establish a fair international price 
for each technology even though information on prices can 
be collected through the co-operation of various purchasing 
countries. International co-operation in the form of exchange 
of information would be useful and would increase the 
bargaining position of individual countries somewhat but 
there would still be price differentials among countries in 
different stages of development and of diverse 
competitiveness.
With the above analytical framework in mind, the 
experience of some manufacturing industries in Thailand has 
been treated as a case study. The empirical part began with 
the industrialisation experience of Thailand. It was pointed 
out that, in the first place, the Thai government committed 
itself to a strategy of protection of local markets to 
encourage industrialisation based on imported technology.
The bulk of government assistance has centered upon modern 
large-scale manufacturing. Secondly, to offset inadequate
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infrastructure, indirect subsidies and exemptions from 
import duties have been used extensively to assist promoted 
enterprises. Thirdly, although the government has publicly 
announced its commitment to employment objectives, most of 
the currently implemented instruments are designed for growth 
objectives with the result that employment objectives have 
often been hampered.
The first chapter on the empirical findings of this 
study deals with technology acquisition in Thailand. Shortly 
after industrialisation began, Thailand found herself with 
many modern industries established by foreign investors. 
Direct foreign investment becomes the most pervasive means 
for geographical transfer of technology. Local entrepreneurs 
were also quick to respond to new market opportunities but, 
owing to lack of technical and industrial experience, they 
often had to become joint venture partners of foreign 
investors or rely extensively on machinery suppliers.
The picture of Thai manufacturing presented in this 
chapter is a common one. Entrepreneurs were preoccupied with 
the problems of technology acquisition. Technology 
transmission and adaptations through both packaged and 
unpackaged channels have been negligible. Technical and 
marketing assistance provided by foreign investors was only 
marginally more extensive than that offered by local 
producers. Except for the agro-based industries, import 
content was high. When local inputs were obtained, they 
often came from other foreign firms which had followed their 
customers to make defensive investment in Thailand. The 
superficiality of the transfer was attributable partly to 
the immaturity of industrialisation and partly to local 
industrialisation policies. Until 1970, direct foreign 
investment in Thailand was largely a response to domestic 
protectionist policy. Direct foreign investors were not 
attracted to Thailand by abundant local raw materials or 
labour but came to Thailand to defend the markets that might
321
have been lost to other producers operating behind tariffs. 
Direct foreign investment in Thailand is thus associated 
with high income elasticity and differentiated products the 
manufacture of which was highly protected. Another 
substantial part of investment, notably from Japan, was made 
in several traditional and supposedly labour-intensive 
industries. However, the influence of local incentives could 
have distorted the input mixes from what would have prevailed 
without government intervention.
Examination of the characteristics of direct foreign 
investment projects has revealed that foreign firms, on the 
average, were relatively capital-intensive but in many 
sectors, especially the relatively sophisticated projects, 
the adjusted non-wage cost ratios of foreign and local firms 
were not very significantly different. In almost all 
industries, the adjusted non-wage cost ratio was close to 
or exceeded 90 per cent, reflecting the high level of capital 
intensity of promoted projects. Foreign firms also tended to 
pay higher wages resulting in an upward drift in the general 
wage level of industries where direct foreign investment was 
prominent.
The pressure exerted by foreign investors seemed to have 
positive but weak effects on productivity in the domestic 
sectors. The reason suggested was that the foreign investors 
themselves were not always more efficient than local 
producers so that competitive pressure in these sectors was 
weak.
The following chapter investigates purchases of know­
how through technology contracts. It was found that Thailand 
has made sizeable payments for simple technology often 
connected with trademarks and brand names. She has been 
buying technology as an end in itself, technology for 
consumption rather than technology for the sake of generating 
skills and future technology proper. Another sizeable part 
of the payments was for the purchase of industrial 
experience.
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Several other interesting findings have come out of 
this chapter. First, direct foreign investment does not 
necessarily provide free access to foreign technology.
Indeed, the explicit cost of technology tended to be higher 
in the foreign than the local sectors. Secondly, the costs 
of technology both in explicit and implicit terms are higher 
in industries characterised by differentiated products and 
in industries where competition among technology sellers is 
less intense. Thirdly, among the technology suppliers from 
developed countries, Japan appeared to be the cheapest source 
of supply. The reason is probably that she is a latecomer 
in technology markets and has to offer more lucrative terms 
and conditions than established sellers to attract 
purchasers. That Japan is the cheapest source of supply 
also partly explains her prominent position as a seller of 
technology in Thailand. It was also observed that in areas 
of implicit cost Japan did not differ significantly from 
other developed countries although she was relatively 
generous in the provision of training.
The case study of the textile industry yields four 
major findings. First, the pattern of transfer of technology 
in the industry has become more packaged owing to increasing 
levels of sophistication of textile projects, the size of 
the required capital outlay and the need to enter 
international markets. Local entrepreneurs have found joint 
venture arrangements a ready means of access to the required 
technology and capital. Secondly, although it may be safe to 
say that there has been substantial transfer of technology to 
the local work-force on the production side, the potential 
benefits that may have accrued from co-operation with foreign 
partners have been reduced by the very need of each 
enterprise to attain maximum efficiency. Joint ventures in 
textiles have found it most efficient for each partner to 
specialise in certain activities, with the Thai partners 
responsible for local distribution which was their line of 
business before forming the joint venture. Such functional
323
specialisation prevents local entrepreneurs from taking over 
the entire business. However, when the local joint venture 
partners have industrial background or education, technology 
transfer at the entrepreneurial level is much more likely. 
Thirdly, employment displacement effects in the textile 
industry were found to be stronger than skill generation 
effects. This tendency is more significant as firms grow 
larger. Larger firms were also found to be less efficient. 
These facts seem to point to a case for curbing the size of 
textile firms. The study of choice of techniques confirmed 
the hypothesis that, given the present strategy, there is 
no significant difference between foreign and local firms. 
Both were relatively capital-intensive. While foreign firms 
were found to be more capital-intensive on the average, the 
most modern plants belonged to local firms. Modern labour- 
saving innovations were also first introduced into Thailand 
by local firms. Fourthly, the superiority of foreign firms 
rests with their men and management rather than with 
machines.
An attempt to arrive at a conclusive answer as to 
whether direct foreign investment is a better or worse 
channel for transferring technology on the basis of a study 
as diversified in aspects and issues as this one would 
certainly run into the danger of over-generalisation. 
However, it may be safe to conclude that apart from 
geographical transfer the packaged and unpackaged channels 
are not significantly different in their behaviour and 
performance, although the explicit cost of the former is 
slightly higher. More benefits from direct foreign 
investment could accrue to Thailand if the government would 
take measures to increase market competition and to continue 
insisting upon participation of the local work-force.
11.2 Policy Recommendations
Policy recommendations presuppose specific development 
objectives. It will be assumed throughout this chapter that
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the government is seeking policies which will put more 
emphasis than it has in the past on employment and less on 
growth.
11.2.1 Strategies for manufacturing industries. To 
give employment more weight in economic and industrial 
policies, it may require simultaneous major changes in 
overall economic strategy. An example cited above 
illustrated how piecemeal attempts at change could worsen 
rather than improve the situation. To achieve social 
welfare objectives within the current growth-oriented 
framework, the Thai government has arbitrarily raised the 
legal minimum wage substantially while leaving the subsidised 
cost of capital in modern large-scale manufacturing unchanged. 
Inevitably, small and medium firms are severely affected 
while large-scale manufacturing firms can substitute capital 
for labour. The result is that more vulnerable members of 
the work-force in small and medium enterprises bear the brunt 
of unemployment.
In addition, a well-meant attempt is not always 
sufficient to ensure effective results. For example, the 
policy of the Board of Investment which offers longer tax 
holidays to larger firms (measured by the size of their work­
force) . If this is an attempt to promote either employment 
or economy of scale then the Board is employing an 
inappropriate instrument for change; if it is promoting both 
objectives, then it is pursuing too many objectives with one 
instrument.
Large-scale producers are usually involved in relatively 
capital-intensive projects. Although the size of their work­
force is large, their capital cost per work place is also 
very high. To give a more concrete example, suppose there 
are two firms requesting promotion. One has a work-force 
of 80 and total investment of 1 m. baht. Capital cost per 
work-force place is therefore 12,500 baht. The second has 
a work-force of 250 and total investments of 250 m. baht.
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The capital cost per worker in the second case is 1 m. baht. 
Yet, by the BOI employment criterion the relatively capital­
using project will be given preferential treatment over the 
relatively labour-intensive one because the former employs 
more workers.
If the objective is to achieve economies of scale, then 
it is liable to encourage firms to expand beyond the 
technically optimum size in many industries. In the textile 
industry, the technically optimum size of a spinning mill 
is roughly 400 workers. In relatively more capital-intensive 
industries than textiles, the optimum work-force will be 
lower than 400. It seems unnecessary to encourage expansion 
beyond an optimum size. Moreover, in a country where 
industrial experience is less than plentiful, expansion 
beyond the technically optimum size is likely to result in 
diseconomies of administration. This is especially so in a 
family business where high level decision-making and 
administration are often centrally controlled with the 
consequent strain on managerial resources. The empirical 
findings of this work confirm that textile firms with a work­
force of between 400-500 workers are the most efficient in 
terms of both labour productivity and return on investment.
In fact, the largest firms are the most inefficient.
Thus if indirect subsidies in the form of tax holidays 
are to be given to manufacturing industries, a uniform tax 
holiday for firms of any size would serve the employment 
objective more efficiently than the existing policy.
However, the best means of promoting employment, especially 
in small and medium scale manufacturing industries, would 
probably be the removal of factor price distortions.
If modern, large-scale manufacturing is to play a major 
role as a skill accumulator, the criterion for the promotion 
of this sector may have to be tied to minimum training or 
R.& D expenditures and so on. Should economies of scale be 
considered vital to these industries, an optimum size range
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measured in terms of capacity could be laid down as one 
condition. However, it is important to remember that 
technically optimum size varies from one industry to another 
and it is not advisable to lump all industries together 
to be judged by a single standard either in terms of work­
force or investment.
These strategies may have to be accompanied by several 
other major changes to create employment. For example, 
measures to improve the terms of trade for agriculture may 
need to be given a higher priority. But this in turn may 
require subsidies for the urban poor to compensate them for 
the increase in the price of rice. Tariff structures which 
favour large-scale manufacturing at the expense of other 
sectors may have to be removed. Whatever action is taken, 
it is important that each measure be viewed in the context 
of its repercussions throughout the economy.
11.2.3 National science and technology policy. More 
probably needs to be done than hitherto in Thailand to 
incorporate a national science and technology policy in the 
national economic and social development plan. Such a 
policy would specify national objectives in promoting science 
and technology, provide guidelines for co-ordinating and 
disseminating information on science and technology among 
various sectors and set up some institutional machinery 
which could be useful in evaluating private mechanisms at 
work in transferring, disseminating and generating knowledge 
in each sector, and in suitable cases recommend government 
assistance to sectors where technology transmission seemed 
not to be efficiently carried out by private enterprises.
The main concern here is more specifically with the issues 
that would present themselves to such an institution for the 
promotion of science and technology for industrial use and 
for a balanced transfer of technology.
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11.2.3.1 Technology for industrial and commercial use.^  
Chapter 6 showed that a sizeable part of royalty payments 
is related to the production of goods associated with 
trademarks and brand names, mostly in the cosmetic and food 
industries. It is arguable that, since the aim of importing 
technology is to create more skills, the production of 
commodities subject to prestigious trademarks and brand 
names which involve no substantial skill creation could be 
curbed by an imposition of high sales taxes on those 
commodities. Alternatively, trademarks and brand names not 
associated with substantial skill creation may not be 
allowed to be sold either separately or with production 
technology except for export purposes. Those which are 
allowed to be sold must be subject to ceiling royalties. 
These ceiling royalties, however, may need to take into 
account the fact that to some extent trademark and brand 
name fees represent payments for a guarantee of quality to 
consumers.
These procedures involve both study of and judgement 
about the types of skills required by each product. An 
alternative which would be administratively simpler is to 
require technology sellers to separate the sales of 
trademarks and brand names from the sales of production 
technology. Then royalties on trademarks and brand names 
would be subject to a progressive tax scale charged to the 
rate or the absolute amount of royalties, whichever is 
higher.
The handling of payments for pure production technology 
could be somewhat different. In a newly industrialising 
country such as Thailand, most of the required technology
A great deal of work on regulations for technology transfer 
has been done by UNCTAD (1975e). Some aspects of the UNCTAD 
recommendations are more drastic than the following 
discussions. My recommendations are based on a realistic 
assessment of what a single national government can do and 
are applicable only to the situations and bargaining strength 
of Thailand.
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is in standardised industries and therefore the monopolistic
power of technology sellers is much less than in product
differentiated industries. Moreover, the earlier findings
of this thesis suggest that private firms, especially
locally-owned ones, are likely to be quite efficient in
minimising explicit cost. Therefore, the government could
afford to allow market forces to determine the monetary part
of technology cost but may consider setting limits to
durations and royalties (based on the average royalties of
alternative sources of supply) to avoid excessive payments
2by local subsidiaries of foreign companies.
This kind of regulation may need to be accompanied by 
legislation to prevent restrictive practices such as 
termination of production upon the expiration of contracts, 
unilateral obligations on purchasers to furnish all 
information on improvements on products to technology 
owners, and so on.
Apart from regulating excessive payments for technology 
associated with trademarks and brand names, the central role 
of government may be to facilitate market mechanisms, to 
check misconduct and to furnish information to local 
purchasers so that their bargaining position could be 
strengthened. For example, local entrepreneurs who wish to 
establish new factories might be given information on the 
availability of existing production facilities, the cost of 
alternative sources of supply, etc. Firms, especially the 
smaller ones, might also have their attention drawn to 
national and international organisations which provide free 
technical and marketing assistance. Such a service would 
require a team of economists, engineers, scientists and 
lawyers whose tasks would be to examine existing technology 
contracts, to obtain, for each technology, information on 
prices, terms and conditions as well as sources. This
For various methods of calculating royalties, see UNCTAD 
(1975e, pp.60-69) .
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information could then be compiled and transmitted to local 
firms. Local purchasers would also benefit from government 
guidelines listing conditions which are advantageous to 
technology recipients. A checklist of what should be and 
what should not be included in know-how contracts has been 
well compiled by ESCAP (1976, Annex 20).
From time to time, enquiries into payments for 
technology should be conducted to provide a check against 
undesirable practices, such as transfer pricing, tax 
avoidance through excessive remittance of know-how fees, and 
so on.
Other efforts to encourage local research and
development could also be undertaken. This could be done
by legislation governing the sale and the use of patents in 
3Thailand. Foreign patents should be used soon after they 
have been registered. The life of a patent should be short 
where it has already expired in the original innovator's 
country. All technology contracts should specify relevant 
patents and the date of the expiration of both the patent 
and the contract.
Other government assistance could be suggested, though 
its practicability would depend in considerable degree on 
the government's own resources of finance and expertise.
If the government can recruit enough specialists with 
experience in manufacturing industries, it could provide 
further technical assistance. Alternatively, the government 
could hire experienced consultant firms to give assistance 
to local firms on request. When firms submit plant layouts 
for inspection before obtaining official certificates, 
suggestions could be made on how to improve them. Such 
assistance could, on request, be extended to the selection 
of machinery and raw materials, the possibility of
For a compilation of principal provisions in national 
laws, regulations and policy guidelines on technology 
transfer, see UNCTAD (1975d).
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substituting local for foreign inputs and so on. These 
consulting firms might also be engaged to run a small 
trouble-shooting unit and laboratory testing services, at 
least for major industries. When firms run into technical 
difficulty this trouble-shooting unit could be despatched 
to give immediate help and suggestions for further action. 
Laboratory testing services, operated by universities or 
technical colleges, could also be useful.
Instead of indirect capital subsidies, the government 
could give direct and indirect training subsidies, such as 
a double deduction from taxation of training expenses or 
short-term scholarships abroad for employees of firms which 
have no access to training facilities. Engineers and 
factory managers could be invited to participate in the 
discussion of technical curricula for higher education.
11.2.3.2 Balanced transfer of technology. The fact that 
the manufacturing sector has been assigned the major role 
in technology transfer does not necessarily imply that other 
sectors can afford to neglect the potential contribution of 
modern science and technology. In manufacturing, as has 
been seen, the private transfer of technology is relatively 
efficient. The same incentives may be absent in the 
agricultural sector, partly because of the relatively low 
purchasing power of farmers and partly because agricultural 
innovations are relatively easy to copy. The transfer of 
technology to agriculture might, therefore, require direct 
government action if the government decides to promote an 
agro-based manufacturing industry. It may be, for example, 
that there is scope in Thailand for developing cotton growing 
and that the textile industry would benefit from reliable 
supplies of cheap, high-quality, locally-produced raw cotton. 
If so, a balanced transfer of technology to, and promotion 
of the cotton industry might be one way of helping the 
textile industry.
Despite this potential link between the textile 
manufacturing and cotton growing industry, the promotion of
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the cotton growing industry has been haphazard and no match 
to that of the textile manufacturing sector. For example, 
between 1967-71, the total funds allocated to the promotion 
of cotton growing amounted to 55.07 million baht 
(Wachirasombun, 1973). This was less than the revenue 
forgone through the exemption of import duties on capital 
equipment of the largest single textile mill in Thailand.
11.2.4 Control of foreign ownership. As long as the 
government promotes a competitive environment, strengthens 
tax administration and collection, and regulates technology 
transfer by effective legislation, there seems to be no need 
for further special controls on foreign investment. There 
is probably scope for the further persuasion of foreign 
firms to promote technology transfer to the local work-force 
and joint venture arrangements. There may also be a case 
for the preferential treatment of local firms in technical 
assistance, training subsidies and so on. But it is as well 
to remember that bad local investment can do as much harm 
as bad foreign investment.
In a less developed country where its government suffers 
from the lack of efficient (and incorruptible) administrative 
manpower, direct intervention in the market is not always 
the best answer to a problem. Often, the government can 
more effectively pursue its objectives by action which 
facilitates the working of the market. However, there is 
some evidence in this thesis to suggest that in certain 
instances market forces cannot be relied upon to achieve the 
complex mix of national objectives which governments in a 
country like Thailand are nowadays expected to pursue. In 
such cases, there is a role for public sector activity, for 
guidance through the price mechanisms and for regulation of 
the private sector. The achievement of the best combination 
of policies, and the instruments with which to pursue them, 
is a matter of wisdom, political skill and luck.
APPENDIX A
Alien Business Law 
(National Executive Decree 218)
1
List A comprises rice and salt farming, trade in native 
agricultural products or real estate, accountancy, law, architecture, 
advertising, brokerage or representation, auctioneering, barbering, 
hairdressing or beauty salons and building construction.
List B comprises farming, gardening, animal husbandry, sericulture, 
forestry, fishery, the manufacture or processing of milled rice, flour, 
sugar, beverages, ice, medicine, wood products, goldware, silverware, 
nielloware, other stone-polished metalware, Buddha images, alms bowls, 
woodcarving machines, lacquerware, matches, white lime, cement etc., 
plywood, veneer, chipboard, clothing or shoes (except for export), silk 
spinning, weaving or printing silk fabrics, filaments or cocoons, cold 
storage, printing, newspapers, all retail trade (except in machinery, 
engines and tools), all trade in natural ores, sale of food and 
beverages (except to tourists), trade in objets-d'avt or antiques, 
tourist guiding, hotels (except service management), all entertainment 
businesses (clubs, bars etc.), photography, laundry, tailoring and 
internal land, water or air transport.
List C covers all other service, trading, construction and mining 
activities and some further manufactures. It comprises all construction 
and wholesale trade (except trade in real estate or agricultural 
products and building construction which are already listed in A), all 
export trade, retail trade in machinery engines or tools and the sale 
of food or beverages to tourists (thus bringing all trading activities 
within the decree's purview), the manufacture or extraction of animal- 
feed, vegetable oils, textiles, knitted products, spinning, dyeing, 
printing, glass containers, light bulbs, cups, bowls, dishes, writing 
or printing paper, rock-salt, all mining operations, and all services 
not already listed in A or B.
Extracted from Draper (1974, pp.165-66).
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaires and Interview Checklists
(a) Questionnaire for Manufacturing Firms
1. Details on products
Total number of products .........
Please supply the following information on major products. A major 
product must constitute at least 20% of the value of total 
production. If any of the major products was first produced in 
Thailand by your firm, please tick ( \ S  ) in front of the name of 
that product.
Names of major products 
& specification________
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Year of 1st Designed
production maximum
in Thailand_____output
Actual 
production 
in 1973
2. If there is any part of production technologies (e.g. spinning 
machines, sanforising, etc.) which was first introduced into 
Thailand by your firm, please supply the following information.
Names and descriptions of 
production technologies
Year of adoption 
in Thailand
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
3. Have you ever concluded the following agreements? Yes L.) No L._) 
If so, please tick in front of the appropriate titles. More than 
one answer is possible.
(a) General management contracts
(b) Production management agreements
(c) Sale and marketing management agreements
(d) Licensing agreements for trademarks and brand names
(e) Licensing agreements for production techniques
(f) Others, please specify .........
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4. What is the percentage of the value of your machinery and equipment 
which is produced in Thailand? ......... %
How did you obtain imported machinery and equipment? Please tick 
the appropriate answer or answers. Please supply the percentages
if possible.
(a) Purchased from agents in Thailand ......... %
(b) Purchased from overseas machinery producers ......... %
(c) Supplied by your parent company or major foreign investing
firm ......... %
(d) Supplied by firms under agreements (as in no. 3) ......... %
(e) Purchased second hand machinery from abroad ......... %
(f) Others, please specify ......... %
5. What is the percentage of the value of the following items which 
are purchased locally?
(a) Raw materials ......... %
(b) Intermediate or semi-processed inputs ......... %
(c) Components and parts of machinery ......... %
If a certain proportion is imported, please supply the following 
information by ticking the appropriate box for each item.
(a) Raw materials are imported from [“] foreign parent or investing
firms.
Q  firms under agreement (as in 
no. 3) .
U
□
the cheapest source of 
supplies.
others, please specify ...
(b) Intermediate products are 
imported from G foreign parent or investing firms.
n  firms under agreement (as in 
U  no. 3) .
□
D
the cheapest source of 
supplies.
others, please specify ...
(c) Components and parts are 
imported from
r~j foreign parent or investing 
^  firms.
i—j firms under agreement (as in
LI no. 3) .
□
G
the cheapest source of 
supplies.
others, please specify ...
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6 .  Have you  r e c e i v e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s s i s t a n c e  from  y o u r  l o c a l  c u s t o m e r s  
an d  s u p p l i e r s ?  P l e a s e  t i c k  ( v O  i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b o x e s .
T ypes o f  a s s i s t a n c e C u s to m e rs S u p p l i e r s
Yes No Yes No
(a) T e c h n i c a l  & know-how a s s i s t a n c e  1~~1 a a a
(b) M a r k e t in g  a s s i s t a n c e □ □ □ a
(c) F i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e □ a a CD
(d) O t h e r s ,  p l e a s e  s p e c i f y ............... CD r j □ □
Have you  e v e r  p r o v i d e d  t h e f o l l o w i n g  a s s i s t a n c e t o  y o u r l o c a l
c u s t o m e r s  an d  s u p p l i e r s ?  P l e a s e  t i c k  ( W-'D i n  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b o x e s
T ypes o f  a s s i s t a n c e C u s to m e rs S u p p l i e r s
Yes No Yes No
(a) T e c h n i c a l  & know-how a s s i s t a n c e CD a CD CD
(b) M a r k e t in g  a s s i s t a n c e □ □ CD CD
(c) F i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e □ CD CD» CD
(d) O t h e r s ,  p l e a s e  s p e c i f y  .................. a CD CD □
T o t a l  em ploym en t .......................
P l e a s e  f i l l  i n  t h e  num ber o f  s t a f f  an d  e m p lo y e e s  i n  e a c h  c a t e g o r y .
Number o f  T h a i  s t a f f  Number o f  f o r e i g n  s t a f f  
S k i l l  C a t e g o r i e s  when f i r s t  c u r r e n t l y  when f i r s t  c u r r e n t l y
(a) Top e x e c u t i v e s  
& m a n a g e rs
e s t a b l i s h e d  em p lo y ed
( ) ( )
e s t a b l i s h e d  e m p lo y ed
(b) P r o d u c t i o n
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  e . g .  
e n g i n e e r s  & 
c h e m i s t s  (
(c) Forem en & 
s u p e r v i s o r y  s t a f f  (
(d) S k i l l e d  p r o d u c t i o n
l a b o u r  (
(e) N o n - p r o d u c t i o n
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  e . g .  
a c c o u n t a n t s  & 
e c o n o m i s t s  (
( f )  O t h e r s ,  p l e a s e  
s p e c i f y  ............. ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
(  )
(  )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
(  )
( )
( )
( )
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9. I3o you make the following training provisions for local employees? 
Please tick. More than one answer is possible.
(a) Formal training course conducted by the firm.
(b) Subsidised (in cash, time-off or kind) local training outside 
the firm.
(c) Subsidised (in cash, time-off or kind) overseas training.
(d) On-the-job training.
(e) Others, please specify .........
10. For firms with foreign equity interests
Names of major Percentage of
foreign investors____________Country of origin_______equity shares
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
11. 1971 1972 1973
Total sales (accrued value) in '000 baht 
Total export sales (accrued value) in '000 baht
Your co-operation may be needed again, please indicate the 
appropriate person for future contact. Thank you.
Name ....................... Position ..............
(b) Questionnaire for Spinning and Weaving Mills 
Section I - Employment and Skill Composition
1.1 Total employment .........
1.1.1 production employees .........
1.1.2 non-production employees .........
1.2 Number of shifts per day .........
Number of hours per shift .........
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1.3 Skill compositions
Positions No. of employees Fo reign_____Thai
Average Q^ualification wages ____________
1.3.1 Production & management 
-managers
-supervisory staff & 
foremen
-spinning operators 
-weaving operators 
-others .........
1.3.2 Repairs & maintenance 
-engineers 
-technicians 
-others
1.3.3 Laboratory & research 
staff
-chemists & scientists 
-other laboratory staff
1.3.4 Transport & delivery 
department
1.3.5 Electrical department
1.4 Research budget as percentage of total production costs .....
1.5 Training budget .............................................
1.6 Average percentage of machine breakdown-time due to breakdowns
1.7 Capital/labour ratio: please estimate the current value of the
following items.
1.7.1 Plants and buildings (on the basis of remaining economic life
1.7.2 Machinery (on the basis of remaining economic life ....
1.7.3 Other equipment (on the basis of remaining economic life
1.7.4 Land (current value) .................
Section II - Yarn and Fabrics
2.1 Spinning
2.1.1 number of spindles at the end of 2516
2.1.2 machinery and output
Output Models and types
Types of yarn per spindle Revolutions per minute of machine 
_________________per day__________________________________________
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2.1.3 Raw materials (1973 figures in lbs)
-quantity of local cotton consumed .........
-quantity of foreign cotton consumed .........
2.1.4 The average number of ring spindles attended to by one
operative (cotton 20s) .........
2.2 Weaving
2.2.1 Number of looms at the end of the year (2516) .......
2.2.2 Types of machinery
Models and types of looms P.P.M. Number of looms
2.2.3 The average number of looms attended to by one operative
(c) Questions for Interviews
1. Please give an account of the history of your firm, e.g. when and 
why did you enter this industry? What have been major changes in 
internal structure since establishment? How do you rate our 
present transfer mechanisms? Do you wish to contract more licensing 
or know-how or management agreements with foreign firms or invite 
foreign firms to join your company?
2. If you have concluded a licensing or know-how agreement, what are 
the conditions and duration of the contract?
3. Do you consider demand or supply factors (e.g. shortage of production 
and technical skills, labour relations, etc.) as the important 
obstacles to your operation?
4. Do you feel that competition is most intense with subsidiaries of 
international corporations, foreign-controlled joint ventures, Thai- 
controlled joint ventures, wholly locally-owned firms or imports?
Why?
5. Where, for how long and what sort of training do you provide for your 
employees of the following positions?
-managers and assistants 
-engineers and other professionals 
-technicians
-supervisory staff and foremen 
-semi-skilled labour 
-others .........
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6. In recruiting local staff do you benefit from trained labour from 
other firms? Do these employees constitute a high proportion of 
total staff? From what sort of firms (subsidiaries, joint ventures, 
Thai firms) are the better quality staff recruited?
7. What is the size of foreign staff during the first years of 
operation? Has the size been changed (compare with total staff)? 
Why?
8. Are you using the most preferred technology? If not, how does the 
preferred technology differ from the technology now employed (e.g. 
scale, factor intensity, etc.)? What prevents you from using the 
most preferred technology? Why did you choose the existing 
technology? Would you have chosen a different technology had you 
not been promoted? Will you choose a different technology from the 
existing one if the company expands?
9. Do you think that the most efficient firm is the firm that uses the 
most modern technology?
10. Have you made any changes or adaptations in your production 
technology since establishment? What made you initiate the changes 
and how do you go about making such changes? What is the proportion 
of production costs saved as a result of adaptation or initiation?
11. Have you ever used locally produced machinery and other supplies?
Why or why not?
12. How do you distribute your products locally and internationally?
What is the percentage of equity interests your firm has in supplier 
and customer firms?
13. For joint ventures only. How did you get into contact with the 
present partner? What is the most important contribution of your 
partner? What sort of problems have you encountered with your 
partners?
(d) Questionnaire for Machinery Suppliers 
Question 1
Table 1 provides very broad technical characteristics of the main 
processing stages of three levels of textile technology. It is designed 
to roughly depict four methods of production of increasing modernisation. 
If you still produce machinery and equipment which is a close 
approximation of any of the three methods, please check ( v/ ) in the 
appropriate box or boxes. If you no longer produce any one of the 
following types (e.g. technology), please indicate the minimum number 
of units (e.g. number of cards, spindles, etc.) which would render the 
production of such machinery economic in front of the appropriate box.
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T a b le 1
T e c h n i c a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f T h re e  L e v e l s  o f T e c h n o lo g y
A B C
Blow room M anual f e e d i n g  
a n d  b l e n d i n g
M anual f e e d i n g  
an d  b l e n d i n g
M anual f e e d i n g  
an d  b l e n d i n g
Lap r o l l  up to  
20 k g s
P n e u m a t ic  
d e l i v e r y .  Lap 
r o l l  up t o  28 
k g s
P n e u m a t ic  
d e l i v e r y .  Lap 
r o l l  up t o  40 
k g s
C a rd s F l e x i b l e  w i r e  
o u t p u t  8 k g s / h r
R i g id  w i r e  
o u t p u t  12 k g s /  
h r
R i g id  w i r e  
o u t p u t  30 k g s /  
h r
R o v in g  f r a m e s 800 RPM 950 RPM 1 ,0 0 0  RPM
R in g  f r a m e s Up t o  1 0 ,5 0 0  
RPM (20s)
1 0 , 5 0 0 - 1 2 ,0 0 0
RPM
O v er  1 2 ,0 0 0  RPM
Cone w in d in g  
m a c h in e s
N o n - a u to m a t ic N o n - a u t o m a t i c A u to m a t ic
Q u e s t i o n  2
As f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  p l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  t h e  r u l i n g  p r i c e  i n  1973 ( c . i . f .  
B angkok) o f  two c o m p le t e  s p i n n i n g  p l a n t s  u s i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  B an d  C. A 
c o m p le t e  s p i n n i n g  p l a n t  f o r  e a c h  l e v e l  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  i n c l u d e s  m a c h in e ry  
a n d  e q u ip m e n t  e . g . :  b lo w -ro o m  m a c h i n e r y ,  c a r d s ,  d r a w in g  an d  s i m p le x
f l y  f r a m e s ,  r i n g  s p i n n i n g  f r a m e s ,  w in d i n g  m a c h i n e s ,  s u b s t a t i o n ,  a i r -  
c o n d i t i o n i n g  m a c h i n e r y ,  a u x i l i a r y  a n d  t e s t i n g  e q u i p m e n t ,  a c c e s s o r i e s  an d  
s p a r e  p a r t s  w h ich  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  2 4 ,0 0 0  l b s / 2 4  h r s  
o f  p u r e  c o t t o n  y a r n  (Ne 20s) .
The ex a m p le  o f  c o m p le t e  s p i n n i n g  p r o c e s s  f o r  P /C  32s h a s  b e e n  
e n c l o s e d .
S p i n n i n g  p l a n t
T e c h n o lo g y  B 
T e c h n o lo g y  C
N o te :  I f  t h e  1973 p r i c e  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,  p l e a s e  g i v e  t h e  v a l u e s  o f
t h e  c l o s e s t  d a t e .  P l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  a l s o  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  c h a r g e s  
i f  t h e y  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  m a c h in e r y  p r i c e s .
1973 ( c . i . f .  Bangkok) 
(V a lu e  o f  a l l  m a c h in e ry )
Question 3
Input Output Requirements
Spinning: To produce 24,000 lbs per day of 20s cotton (English
count) operating three eight-hour shifts
Labour requirements
Total (persons)
Technology No. of machine
classification Ring spindles skilled tenders unskilled
A
B
C
Comment:
Thank you 
M. Santikarn
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APPENDIX C
S p i n n i n g ,  W eav ing  P r o c e s s e s  a n d  T e x t i l e  G l o s s a r y
(a) S p i n n i n g . S p i n n i n g  i s  a  p r o c e s s  o f  a  c o n v e r s i o n  o f  f i b r e  i n t o  
y a r n .  F i b r e  i s  r e p e a t e d l y  d ra w n ,  p a r a l l e l i s e d  a n d  t w i s t e d  t o  g i v e  
s u f f i c i e n t  s t r e n g t h  f o r  f u r t h e r  h a n d l i n g .  The f i r s t  p r o c e s s ,  c a l l e d  
o p e n in g  an d  m i x in g ,  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  a  b lo w  room w h e re  c o t t o n  b a l e s  a r e  
o p e n e d  a n d  c o m p r e s s e d .  C o t to n  i s  t h e n  b e a t e n  i n t o  f l u f f y  t u f t s .  A t 
t h e  same t i m e ,  i m p u r i t i e s  an d  d u s t  a r e  rem o v ed .  A num ber o f  f i b r e s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  q u a l i t y  o r  n a t u r e  ca n  b e  b l e n d e d  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t o  a c h i e v e  a  
d e s i r a b l e  q u a l i t y  a n d  s t r e n g t h  f o r  f i n a l  p r o d u c t s .  The m a c h in e ry  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  c a l l e d  o p e n e r s  an d  s c u t c h e r s .  A t t h e  end  
o f  t h i s  s t a g e ,  f i b r e s  a r e  c o m p re s s e d  i n t o  t h i c k  s h e e t s  o r  l a y e r s ,  c a l l e d  
l a p s .
N e x t ,  l a p  r o l l s  a r e  d e l i v e r e d  t o  c a r d s  w h ich  r e l e a s e  t h e  r e m a i n in g  
i m p u r i t i e s ,  b r e a k  up t h e  h a r d  t u f t s  o r  e n t a n g l e m e n t s ,  r e g u l a r i s e  an d  
a t t e n u a t e  f i b r e .  The o u t p u t  o f  c a r d s  i s  a  r o p e - l i k e  s l i v e r .  T h ese  
c a r d e d  s l i v e r s  a r e  f e d  i n t o  d r a w in g  f r a m e s  w h ich  m ix  t h e  f i b r e s  more 
t h o r o u g h l y  a n d  p a r a l l e l i s e  them  o n c e  m o re .
F o r  f i n e  c o t t o n  y a r n ,  t h e  s l i v e r s  m u s t  p a s s  t h r o u g h  an  e x t r a  p r o c e s s  
c a l l e d  c o m b in g .  The com bing  m a c h in e s  comb, p a r a l l e l i s e  an d  a t  t h e  same 
t im e  rem ove s h o r t  f i b r e .  A combed s l i v e r  c o n s i s t s  o f  l o n g  p a r a l l e l  
f i b r e  o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  same l e n g t h .  Then t h e  c a r d e d  o r  combed 
s l i v e r s  go t h r o u g h  a n o t h e r  d r a w in g  p r o c e s s .  The s l i v e r s  a r e  a g a i n  
co m b in ed ,  m ix ed  a n d  a t t e n u a t e d ,  a  p r o c e s s  commonly know a s  d r a f t i n g .
In  t h e  n e x t  s t e p ,  t h e  s l i v e r s  a r e  f e d  i n t o  s l u b b i n g  f r a m e s  w here  t h e y  
a r e  d r a f t e d  a n d  t w i s t e d ,  an d  wound o n t o  a  b o b b i n .  Then t h e y  go t h r o u g h  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  f r a m e s  a n d  r o v i n g  f r a m e s  w h ich  s e r v e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  same 
o b j e c t i v e s  a s  t h e  s l u b b i n g  f r a m e s .  The s l i v e r s  em erge  f ro m  t h e s e  
p r o c e s s e s  i n  a  f i r m  s t r i n g  c a l l e d  r o v i n g s .  The r o v i n g s  a r e  e n t i r e l y  
p u r i f i e d  a n d  t h o r o u g h l y  b l e n d e d  a s s e m b la g e  o f  f i b r e  r e a d y  f o r  s p i n n i n g .
I n  a  r i n g  s p i n n i n g  s y s te m  w h ich  i s  t h e  m o s t  common s p i n n i n g  p r o c e s s ,  
t h e  r o v i n g s  p a s s  t h r o u g h  d r a f t i n g  r o l l e r s  and  a  w i r e  l o o p  ( t r a v e l l e r )  
w h ich  moves up a n d  down a  r o t a t i n g  s p i n d l e .  The s p e e d  o f  r e v o l u t i o n s
343
of spindles varies with the count of yarn. The rovings are thus 
tensioned and twisted into yarn and wound around the spindles. The yarn 
is then rewound on a cone for distribution.
(b) Weaving. The main objective of weaving is to insert wefts (width- 
wise thread) across the warps (length-wise thread). There are several 
stages in the preparation for weaving. The warping machines place warp 
yarns side by side on a beam (big roller). These warps are then dipped 
or passed through sizing materials or liquid to be given more strength 
so that they will not break while being woven. The pirn winding 
machines wind weft yarn into a pirn to be inserted into a shuttle.
Then, the shuttle carries the weft yarn across the warps in a loom. The 
fabrics produced by the looms are called grey cloth.
(c) Glossary^
Automatic Zoom - A loom on which the supply of weft yarn is 
replenished automatically whilst the loom is running.
Battery loom - An automatic loom having one or more shuttles holding 
bobbins of weft yarn called pirns, these being automatically placed in 
the shuttles from a battery containing a supply of pirns.
Break spinning (OE spinning) - A system of spinning which represents 
a revolutionary departure from the conventional ring spinning system.
In the method of break spinning at present available, a stream of 
separated fibres is drawn into and spun from a rotating 'pot'. Amongst 
the major advantages of break spinning is the facility of winding yarn 
direct on to a large package; in the only machines currently available 
this is 2-6 lb. (as against 2-6 oz. in ring spinning). Production rates 
are at present twice those in ring spinning and there is a likelihood of 
further increases. Break spinning is often referred to as 'open end 
spinning'.
Construction - Details of the make-up of a fabric in terms of ends 
per inch, picks per inch and warp and weft yarn count (e.g. 122 x 
64, 36s/32s).
1 Extracted from the Textile Council (Appendix XXXII, pp.198-200).
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Count -  The 'thickness' of a yarn expressed in terms of number of 
lengths of 840 yards per 1 lb. This relationship of length per unit of 
weight applies to the 'English Cotton Count' system - the one referred 
to throughout this study.
Ends - The warp threads in a woven fabric.
Finishing -  The carrying out of those operations following weaving, 
e.g. bleaching, dyeing and printing, that impart a new appearance or 
property to a fabric. Yarn dyeing is also considered a type of 
finishing operation.
Picks -  The weft threads in a woven fabric.
Pirn -  A weft supply package or bobbin carried inside the shuttle, 
being a wood, paper or plastic tube on which the weft yarn is wound.
The term is also used to describe the tube itself.
Shuttle -  A yarn package holder used for the insertion of the weft 
in the weaving process.
Sulzen loom -  A loom which dispenses with the traditional large 
shuttle containing a weft bobbin or pirn, and has instead numerous small 
projectiles or shuttles which draw weft thread across the loom, the 
thread being secured to the projectile by a gripping device forming part 
of the projectile. It is made in broad widths only (84" to 153") and 
is used in the production of wide cloths and multi-width weaving of 
narrow cloths, i.e. two or more narrow cloths woven side by side in the 
same loom. A feature of this loom is its high speed relative to width,, 
which gives it a cloth area production rate with which only the air and 
water jet looms can compare.
Unifil -  A pirn winding mechanism which is attached to a battery 
type automatic loom for the purpose of reducing the labour content of 
the weft supply system. The mechanism also has certain quality 
advantages.
Water-jet loom -  A loom without shuttles which uses a jet of water 
to insert the weft thread into the cloth and is able to run much faster 
than conventional shuttle looms. The type and width of fabrics it can 
weave is at present limited relative to other looms, its main use being 
in the weaving of continuous filament hydrophobic yarns, e.g. nylon and 
Terylene.
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(b) Technological Characteristics of Three Levels of Technology (The 
Textile Council, 1969, Annexe C, Tables a, b, c)
1950 Technology
Process Speed Efficiency 
per cent
Actual 
production 
lb./hour
Blowroom . 75 342
Cardroom
Cards 26" doffer 86 12.2
Drawframes
12 rpm
150 ft. per min. 75 27.1
Slubbers 650 rpm 65 2.158
Inters 750 rpm 80 0.768
Ringroom 8,500 rpm 92 0.04 3
1960 Technology_____________
Actual
Process Speed Efficiency 
per cent
production 
lb./hour
Blowroom _ 67 335
Cardroom
Cards - 90 12.5
Drawframes 550 ft. per min. 75 82
Speedframes 950 rpm 75 1.12
Ringroom 10,000 rpm 92 0.0507
10,000 rpm 94 0.0282
1968 Technology
Actual
Process Speed Efficiency production
per cent lb./hour
Blowroom
Cardroom
67 335
Cards - 90 54.2
Drawframes 1,450 ft. per min. 75 216.5
Speedframes 1,000 rpm 72 1.12
Ringroom 13,000 rpm 92 0.0658
13,000 rpm 94 0.0366
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APPENDIX E
1
Technical Assumptions for Section 10.5 
General Assumptions
(1) Raw material: 100% cotton; staple length 17/16"
(2) Final product: unbleached yarn 20s (English count)
(3) Depreciation: 10 years
(4) Personnel in reserve: 10 per cent
(5) Output: 290 kg. per hour
Technical Assumptions for Semi-advanced Technology
Ring spinning frame (10,000 spindles): RPM 13,000; efficiency 92%
Speed frame: RPM 1,200; efficiency 82%
Drawing frame: RPM 250; efficiency 73.5%
High production card: output 27 kg/hr, efficiency 97%
Direct Labour Requirements
Intermediate Semi-advanced
Skilled workers 1.38 1.38
Unskilled workers 1.00 1.00
Machine tenders 22.50 16.10
1 Information supplied by Rieter International.
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APPENDIX F
Assumptions on Labour Requirements
(a) Labour Requirements of Three Hypothetical Spinning Mills 
(ECLA, 1966a, Table L, p.65)
Occupation A(1950)
B
(1960)
C
(1965)
I. Spinning 250 133 82
A. Opening through roving 69 43 28
Opener tender 3 3 -
Picker tender 3 3 3
Card tender 6 3 -
Card helper 9 6 -
Drawing tender 15 6 9
Roving tender 9 6 6
Roving helper 6 3 -
Oiler 3 2 1
Sweeper 5 3 2
Maintenance foreman 6 4 3
Production foreman 4 4 4
B. Spinning and winding 181 90 54
Spinners 36 24 15
Doffer 18 12 9
Creel loader 6 3 3
Roll picker 6 - -
Steel roll cleaner 5 3 3
Yarn hauler 3 3 3
Traveller changer 2 1 1
Winder 96 36 12
Sweeper 3 3 3
Maintenance foreman 3 2 2
Production foreman 3 3 3
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(b) Labour Requirements for Three Levels of Technology (The Textile 
Council, 1969, Annexe C, Tables a, b, c)
1950 Technology
Operatives required per shift
Process Direct operatives Supervision and ancillary
Blowroom 2 attendants , 2 feeders, 1 baleman, 1/2 (1 wasteman
1 head cotton-room man and 1 baleman on days)
Cardroom
Cards 6 strippers 
3 tenters
and grinders /
Drawframes 6 tenters 1 can carrier
Slubbers 6 tenters 2 can and bobbin carriers
Inters
Cardroom general
12 tenters 1 bobbin carrier 
1 carder, 1 undercarder, 
1 floor sweeper, 1/2 (1 
cleaner on days)
Ringroom
Count 20s 30 spinners, 10 doffers 1 overlooker, 2 jobbers,
2 tube sorters, 1 sorter, 
1 sett carrier, 1 floor 
sweeper, 1/2 (1 oiler,
6 cleaners and 2 roller 
coverers on days)
___________________________ 1960 Technology_________________________________
____________ Operatives required per shift___________
Process_________________Direct operatives_______ Supervision and ancillary
Blowroom 2 attendants, 2 feeders, 1 baleman, 1/2 (1 wasteman
1 head cotton-room man and 1 baleman on days)
Cardroom
Cards 6 attendants
Drawframes 3 tenters
Speedframes 6 tenters
Cardroom general
2 can and bobbin carriers 
1 carder, 1 undercarder,
1 floor sweeper
Ringroom 
Count 20s 16 spinners, 10 doffers 1 overlooker, 2 jobbers,
2 tube sorters, 1 sorter,
1 sett carrier, 1 floor 
sweeper, 1/2 (1 oiler,
2 roller coverers and 6 
cleaners on days)
(Cont'd)
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Labour Requirements for Three Levels of Technology (Cont'd)
1968 Technology
Process
Operatives required per shift 
Direct operatives Supervision and ancillary
Blowroom 1 attendant 2 balemen/feeders, 1/2
(1 wasteman on days)
Cardroom
Cards
Drawframes 
Speedframes 
Cardroom general
1 attendant
2 tenters 
6 tenters
1 carder, 2 undercarders, 
1 labourer
Ringroom 
Count 20s 9 spinners, 10 doffers 1 overlooker, 1 jobber,
2 tube sorters, 1 sorter,
1 sett carrier, 1/2 
(1 oiler, 1 roller 
coverer, 6 cleaners)
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